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PREFACE 
The present study "Ths United nations and the Arab Israeli 
Confrontation" was submitted to the Department of Polit ical Science, 
Aligarh Muslim University for the award of Ph.D. degree. 
During my research many people showed keen interest and helped 
me in many ways. I owe them a l l a debt. 
Professor Syed Anwar ul Haq Haqqi was my supervisor who has 
always inspired and encouraged me in my work. Without his imfailing 
kindness and expert guidance, I would not have been able to complete 
this research work. His knowledge of the subject and his comments 
and suggestions were always inspiring and gave me not only enlighten-
ment but also .confidence. I wi l l always remain indebted to him for 
his contribution to my work. 
I was fortunate to have worked in the magnificent joint 
library of the School of International Studies, Jawatiarlal Mehru 
University and the Indian Council of World Affairs located in Sapru 
House, Kew Delhi. I owe i ts Assistant Librarian, Mr S. Ansari 
special thanks for his kind and helpful attitude during my stay. 
I want to register my gratitude to a l l of my friends who have 
helped me in my work. 
KIBHI 
October 12, I970 
Aligarh 
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m UMTED MATXOKS AKD THE AiUB-lSriAELI 
COKFftOHCATXOK 
imoDucrioK 
This study proposes to examine the factors and elements 
which were responsible for the Arab Israeli conf l ict with the aid 
o f authentic records and to ejqpialn and examine the position o f 
the two contending parties, i . e , Israel and the Arabs in the United 
Nations, particularly with reference to the attempts o f the world 
body to solve the Palestine problem, which threatens peace and 
stability of the Middle East. 
The response of people towards various problems should 
result from a study of the genesis and an understanding of the 
true nature o f tfc^se problems. I t should follow moral principles 
and support legal issues with a deep consideration for justice, 
truth and peace. 
Even though i t is almost impossible to be objective yet 
this work essentially aims to ascertain the facts dispassionately 
regarding the rival claims of the Arabs and the Israelis concerning 
the Palestine question. It is assumed that the solution of this 
problem would satisfy a l l the peace-loving people, who confirm 
their faith in solving world problems through peaceful means in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter. Such an endeavour 
would further strengthen their belief in the principle of peaceful 
coexistence among nations and their degire to achieve dignity and 
prosperity for the human family. 
The motivating forces behind the Arab Israeli antagonism 
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Which Caused the viest Asian cr is is would best be understood i f 
the historical backgi-ound is Ijept in mind. 
The distant past is related with both the recent past 
and the present. Since time juDMnemorial the two communities -
the Arabs and the Israelis - regard Palestine as their homeland. 
The Zionists ca l l i t Israel , but to the Arabs i t i s Palestine. 
The Arabs have no quarrel with the Jews, as members of a 
religious faith, or as members of a particular race. As for r e l i -
gion, the Arabs consider Jews to be members of the Monotheistic 
Community of the "People o f tfae Book", and as such they are 
accorded reverence. Both religions have many patriarchs and pro-
phets in common. As for race, both Arabs and Jews are Semitic in 
origin. 
But when the Zionists intended to create and then succeeded 
in establishing a state of their own in Palestine by driving out 
about one million Arabs who had been living peacefully in their 
own homes and their .own land, that they had inherited from their 
forefathers, the Arab-Israeli conflict started. I t i s a confl ict 
between two nationalist forces, i . e . Arab nationalism and Zionism, 
i t is essentially a pol i t i cal and ideological confl ict caused by 
the damage done by the kiionist movement to the indigenous popu-
lation of Palestine, also to the Jews and to Judaism. Professor 
Toynbte was subscribing to this point of view, when he spolie at 
ths Annual meeting of the iimerican Council for Judaism held at 
Philadelphia in May 1961. The world renowned historian warned* (1) 
1 . (Quoted in Menuhin, Moshe, The Decadence of Juda^ s^n^  ^ 
Our TimB . Beirut, 1969, p, 486, 
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"The watchword of antl-Semitisia is "Back to Medieval apartheid", 
the watchword of iiioniam i s "Back to the Medieval ghetto". 
Cofflmenting on the establisbment of Isxaei and Its possible reper-
cussions on Judaism, toa said: "All the far-flung ghettos in the 
world are to be gathered into one patch of s o i l in Palestine to 
create a single consolidated ghetto there", 
A new organisation, Jewish Alternatives to Zionism Inc. , 
(JAii), has recently been formed by several prominent American Jews, 
which is opposing iiionists who, in the opinion of i t s members, 
are degenerating Judaism. The main purpose of this organization 
is to conduct an educational progr/amme regal ing the real issues 
Involved in Arab Israeli confl ict and thereby promote the cause 
of peace in the Middle East by rejecting the nationality claims 
propounded by the Zionist Israelis "Jewish People" group. Elmer 
Berger, a distinguished Rabbi (high priest) and one of the most 
eminent Jewish leaders in the United States, acting executive 
of JA^, who has been crusading in Europe, against the 21ionist 
attempts to degenerate Judaism into a fanatic and expansionist 
ideology, sayst (2) "Our goal is to destroy this dangerous idea 
that the Jewish religion should be linked up with Israel and 
consequently with Z.ionism. Judaism is a rel igion, while Zionism 
is a pol i t ical idea, initiated by Herzl to solve a certain 
problem under specific circuuistances". 
There is a vast difference between a Jew and a Zionist. 
2, He was interviewed in Europe by the correspondent of the 
Egyptian weekly magazine Al-Musawar. Translated into 
English in Al-Arab^ vol . 7, No. 8, August 1968, New Delhi. 
A Jew i s one who believes in Judaism, which Arabs regard as a 
noble religion, whereas -siionism seeks to provide Jews with a 
pol i t ical and national oriefitation extrinsic to their nomal 
sense of belonging which seeks to demolish the organic nation-
the 
hood of/Arabs• Israel was supposed to "constitute a British 
imperialist beachhead to the north o f the Suez Canal" says 
Taylor, (3) I t professes and preaches the doctrine of a superior 
race and pol it ical st^jremacy of the chosen few, which i s against 
the principles of love and egalitarianistn preached by the Prophets, 
As observed by the British M.P, Ian Gilmourj (4) "The Zionist 
di f f iculty was that the country which they aspired to appropriate 
Was already occupied by another people. Hence the setting up of 
a iiionist state entailed two ttiingsj the mpving in of Jews and 
the aioving out of Arabs. The second was not an after thought, 
s t i l l Jess a fortunate coincidence. It was long Intended and 
ruthlessly carried o u t , . , , " Gilmour adds? "Apartheid was the 
ideal. Land bought by the Jewish National Fund became legally, 
racially "Jewish" j and had always to remain so, while Arab tenants 
and labourers were evicted in large number,,,," 
He had already given an analysis of the problem (5) in an 
3 , Taylor, Alan H., Prelude to Israel^ New York, 1959. p. 23, 
4 , The Times (London), June 25, 1969, 
5, About the benefit of creating the slogan o f anti-Semitism 
and assimilation, see utterances by Zionist leaders: a-
Kabbi Mordechai Kershblum of Wew York (speaking before the 
Zionist General Council held in January 1966), Jerusaleiq 
Post, 14 January 1966. p. Sj b«Dr Nahum Goldman, President 
of the World Zionist Organization, quoted by M^nuhln, 
Moshe. The Decadence of Judaism In Our Time (Kew York, 
Exposition press, 1965), pp. 400-401, 
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article tx> the Spectator Magazine (June 24, 1960), wherein he salds 
"Since the basis of Zionism is that Jewish assiniilation In other 
countries is in the long run Impossible ana that anti-Semitism and 
persecution are bound to break out sooner or later, Zionism has 
almost a vested Interest in racial discrimination. The Israelis 
BK)unt 'rescue operations* to save allegedly tlireatened Jews in 
other countries, , , , " He addedj "In the Arab countries, Jewish 
d i f f i cu l t ies and inuaigration to Israel were the result not of anti-
Semitism but of Zionist activit ies and the existence of the State, 
of Israel, 2*ionlsni aggravated the disease that i t professed to 
cure," 
The quarrel of the Arabs, therefore, i s only with Zionism, 
which rests squarely on intolerance, bigotry and obscurantism, (6) 
Ersklne H, Childers, the noted author wi-otej (7) "The 
very basis of the post-war Palestine struggle was an appeal to the 
world*s humanitarianism over a situation deliberately designed to 
carnalize that humans instinct into one premise: Jewish statehood 
in Palestine," "None of us who remember the emotional atmosphere 
of the time can dismiss the role this 2»ionist campaign played in 
a l l that followed. The evidence of the campaign, though suppressed 
by Zionists and conveniently forgotten by Western liberals who 
6, For a classic account of ttie rise of the nationalist 
movement in ttoe Arab World and the vindication of the 
sacular character of Arab nationalism, see George Antc-
nius. The Arab Awakeninei The Story o f the Arab Katj.onal 
Movement (Philadelphia^ 1939) and Zeine K. Zeine, The 
Struggle J^ or Arab Independence (Beirut, 1960), 
7, The Specti^tor Magazine^ July 22, i960. 
knew about It, Is overwhelming. It Is detailed in White House 
conversation which was publicly acknowledged, for example, by 
Sulzberger of the Hgw York Times, who asked in 1946, »In God's 
name why should the fate of a l l these unhappy people bo subordi-
nated to the single cry of statehood," 
The Arab-Israeli confrontation is now, in essence, the re-
volt and resistance by the children of Palestine f o r the libera-
tion of their homeland, to vindicate their past and nationhood, 
and secondarily an Arab-Israeli conflict* "In fact" , says an 
Israeli lecturer, London University Professor Machower, "The 
conf l ict was always primarily concerned with the Arabs of Pales-
tine stripped o f f their national rights and driven from their 
lands". (8) The Palestine-Arabs straggle to lead both Arabs and 
Jews in Palestine to usher in another era of peace, cooperation, 
goodwill and prosperity for a l l the inhabitants of the unhappy 
land* The Jewish commanity had previously lived in the different 
Arab countries in harmony and had flourished throughout the cen-
turies of Medieval ilrab rale, Moshe Menuhin says (9) j "In 
Moslem countries {soraetiaes in Egypt, sometimes in Baghdad and 
most of all in the caliphate of Corodoba), Jews were accorded 
decent treatment, In the history of the Jev^ s such periods stand 
out as "golden ages"." 
Ceraetz, the author of a ten-volume classic history of the 
Jews, has "pointed out most omphatically, that the legal and 
8* Le Monde« January 9, 1969. 
9. Menuhin, Moshe, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time. 
Beirut, 1969. p. 20Z 
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actual position of the Jews during the Middle Ages was much 
better in the Muslim - Arab countries than in Christian Europej 
and the »Golcien Age' of Judaism in Muslim Spain has become a 
phrase whidi has found i t s way even into the most popular accounts 
of Jewish history." (10) 
There has been, in f a c t , no anti-Jewish feeling among the 
Arabs. They had fu l l sympathy for the Jews and condemned Nazi 
Germany and its policy of persecution. 
The Arabs received the Jews with open arms and extended to 
them hearty welcome by granting them places of refuge in their 
lands. Herzl had talsn note of "the friendly attitude of the popu-
lation" (11) of Palestine. Then at that time the Arabs could not 
comprehend the iiionist design of establishii::g a Jewish state by 
expelling the indigenous people of Palejstine, The Zionists had 
a definite plan of installing a Jewish state. Moshe Menuhin, a 
prominent American Jew observedt (12) "Dr Herzl badly wanted to 
secuie Palestine as a homeland for the Jewish people. But he made 
up his mind, in spite of the stublom and "benighted" Bussian-
Polish Jews, that in case he could not possibly secure Palestine 
for them, they would simply have to accept, at least temporarily, 
10. Quoted in Goitein, S. D, (Chairman, School of Oriental 
Studies, Hebrew University) Jews and Arabs. Shocken Books, 
mv York, 1956. p. 7 . 
11. "Der Baseler Kongress" in Gesammelte Schrifton, Berlin, 
1920, p. 164. (Quoted in Habinowiez. Oskar, Fifty Years 
of ^ImismT London, itobert Anscombe & Co., 1950. p. 31. 
12. Menuhin, Moshe, oa.. cjj^., p, 43. 
Q 
eome sort of Jewish botaelanci, be It in Syria, Sinai, El-Arish 
Cyprus, Tripoli , Portuguese Mozambique, the Belgian Congo, Uganda -
in any one of these territories for which he was always "nego-
tiating" . 
However, to the Palestiris Arabs, the rehabilitation of the 
Jews in their country appears as a gross betrayal and denial of 
their b i r t h - r i ^ t . When they were being driven away from their 
hearths sund homes, how could they accept or can accept expulsion, 
expropriation and tidal waves of Zionist expansionism? 
a, K, Ifehru (India) former SecretaryrGeneral, Ministry of 
External Affairs , also said; (13) "Is i t surprising that the Arabs 
have reacted strongly to their displacement by a foreign community 
which is largely of European origin? Would any other country have 
reacted differently i f i t had been exposed to a similar experience?" 
Up to the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Jews in Palestine, 
"who were one twelfth of the population and owned of the total 
area of Palestine", (14) had always lived quietly and at peace and 
harmony in Palestine and the wider Arab World. 
It is establidied by the o f f i c i a l statist ics of the man-
datory Government of Palestine, which were submitted to the United 
Nations in 1947 that Jewish property in Palestine was a meagre 5 . 6 ^ 
13. R. K. Kehru, Al Arab, Kew Delhi, vol , 6, No. 6 , July 1967, 
p. 3. 
14, Appendix VI to the Keport of Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Palestine Question, tJocument A/AC 14/32 
of jNovembor 11, 1947, p. 270. Also Government of Palestine, 
A Survey of Palestine 1945-1946^ p. 144, Ib id . , Table 7c, 
p. 149, Ib id , , p. 143. See Appendix 1. 
out of the total ai"ea of the country. (See Appendix I ) Tha 
fact that the Jews were never discriminated against by the Arabs 
i s well borne out by Dr Elajsr Berger, who quoted in his book 
Who Know petter Must Say So^ a letter written to him by a well -
Imovai Jew, Klias Cohen, wterein he said (15) that "Arabs and Jews 
have always enjoyed in this country complete freedom, freedom of 
religion, freedom of speech, freedom of trade and freedom of 
commerce as a matter of fact , Jews here have never fe l t 
anti-Semitism or discrimination". 
2he pol i t ical challenge to Palestine did not coo© from tlie 
Jewish community within i t , but from the Zionist Movement which 
was nourished and fostered from without, always wii;h motives of 
expansion and aggrandizement at the cost of Arabs. The expan-
sionist design of pol i t ical Z.ionist movement was ful ly supported 
by British Imperialism which was in an alliance with the Zionist 
Movement for its own vested interest. 
Sir Winston Churchill is reported to have saidt (16) "A 
State under the protection of the British Crown, which might comprise 
three or four million Jews, an event" w i l l have occurred which would 
especially be in harmony with the truest interests of the British 
Empire," As a matter of fact the British War Cabinet had received 
15. O.K. Doc^ umentf A/SPC/PV.399^ November S, 1963. 
16. First statement made by Ahmad Shukairy (Chairman of the 
Executive Committee to Palestine Liberation Organisation) 
before the Special Committee of the Genaral Assembly at 
i ts 399th meeting held on 6 November 1963, at 10.30 a.m. 
U.^i. Doc. A/SPC/PY. 399. 
a note from no less important a 2.1onist than Wetzman (17) sayings 
'•In submitting our resolution we have entrusted our national and 
Zionist destiny to the foreign Office and the Imperial War Cabinet, 
in the Hope that the problem would be considered in the light 
of imperial Interests and the principles for which the Entente 
stands." 
Palestine, due to i ts strategic position, was of v i ta l 
Importance to the future of British imperialism, which aimed at 
the consolidation of i t s presence in India, Bgypt and other parts 
of Asia and Africa* The strategic importance of the Middle East 
was well descriljed by Secretary Acheson of America when he said; (18) 
"Middle East is , a region of great Importance to us because of 
i ts people, i t s resources, strategic position, and v i ta l communi-
cation arteries". Anthony lautting also observed that Palestine 
was, to Britain, (19) "a base from which to exercise a dominant 
Influence in and around the Arab world", The transplantation of 
alien people on to the so i l of Palestine would, i t was thought, 
serve as the watch-dog of imperial interests in the areaj besides 
the inclusicai of Palestine within its sphere of influence. The 
Zionist enclave would help to control the nascent Arab struggle for 
freedom. 
17. Weiman, Chaim, Trial and Jbrrop. London, East and West 
Library, 1950. p. 258. 
18. Secretary Acheson, December 30, 1951, Address before the 
Jewish war veterans at New York. Bullatl^^ January 7 , 
1962. p. 4. 
19. Hutting, A. , The Tragedy of Palestine from the Balfour 
Declaration to Tgdav. London, 1967. p. 9. 
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"But before one i s driven to accept the fact of Israel," 
says one of tba few elder statesmen of India, Jaya Prakash 
Karayan (20): " le t i t be stated clearly that the transplantation 
of a foreign people on to a so i l to which they had no right, and 
at the cost of dispossessing the Indigenous population was an act 
of high international immorality. That this operation helped to 
establish a bridge-head of Western imperialism In a sensitive and 
strategic area that had risen to throw of f the tackles of the 
self-same imperialism, fui'ther compounds that immorality". 
Israel in portraying Itself as. synonymous to Judaism and 
inclusive' of all- the Jews bases its claim to Palsstine on the 
following premise SI 
It is claimed that the Bible promised Abraham that Palestine 
would belong to his seed, namely, to the Jews, They argue, there-
fore , that the setting up of a Jewish state in Pa3i9Stine is a 
fulfilment of God's promise and the attainment of the "Divine 
Kight" of Jews to Palestine, 
A number of distinguished scholars and authorities in r e l i -
gion have carefully studied the Bible and analyzed its contents 
and their Incurs have enabled the laymen to understand the deeper 
meanings of the Bible and to make their goodwill count towards the 
20. Jaya Prakash Narayan, "The Arab Israel Tangle", Palestinet 
A Symposium , The United India Press, First Edition, 
July 1969. p. 6. 
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tratb and "Infuse good blood salutarily into a sickening s itu-
ation." (21) 
They agi«e on the following t (22) 
a) The Biblical prophecy applies to the Arabs, who claim 
descent throu^ Ishmaal, as well as the Jews, who claim descent 
through Israel. 
b) ^hen Abraham made a conVenant with God thK>ugh circum-
cis ion, (Genesis XVII, 8) and was promised a l l the land of Canaan 
to be his for ever-lasting possession, Isaac the ancestor o f liie 
was 
Jews/not born at that tiioB} it was Ishmael the ancestor of the 
21, Hev. L, Humphrey Walz, the Promised Land. Amman, 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1968. p. 6, 
22, See Dr Alfred Guillaume, Professor of Old Testament Studies 
at the University of London, Israel According to Holy 
Scripti^res (Cedar Hapid, Ingram Press), pp. 11-15. 
Dr Williaia H, Stinespring. Professor of Ifew Testament 
and Semitics at Uuke University, Worth Carolina and a 
Minister in the Presbyterian Church, ljsM*> PP* 6-9. 
Dr Ovid a* Sellers, former Professor of OW Testament 
and Dean of McCormick Theological Seminary and Minister 
in the United Presbyterian Church, Ibid, t pp. 29-31. 
Dr Frank Stagg, Professor of Ifew Testament at the 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in New Orleans, 
p. 28. 
The Kight Keverend Jonathan G. Sherman, Suffragan 
Bishop of the episcopal Diocese of Long Island, Itew York, 
iifeid.» pp. 36 , 45. 
Dr Elmer Berger, a distinguished Jewish Rabbi, Ibid.y 
pp, 19-26. 
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Arabs who was clrcuaiclsed. Thus Palestine was "pix)mised" by God, 
i f at all» to the Arabs, 
c) Many non-Jews are descendants of Abraham, and a s ize-
able proportion of Jews are not descendants of Abraham. 
d) The divine promises to the patriarchs have been annul-
led by the apostasy of the Jews. 
©) Prophecies once fu l f i l l ed need not and-cannot be f u l -
f i l l ed again l i tera l ly , especially in modern times, since the 
prophecy of the "^^turn" was fu l f i l l ed when the Jews returned to 
Judea after their captivity, re-erected the walls of Jerusalem and 
rebuilt the Temp is . And thei^ is no "Second iNeturn" mentioned in 
the Holy Scripture s. 
f ) Trying to make, an ancient text f i t l i teral ly to the 
geographical, historical and pol i t i ca l conditions of today, some 
three thousand years later, is to deny the processes of change 
which God has so obviously decreed for human history* 
Distinguished scholars have also similWly refuted or re-
jected the theory of "historical rights" (23) on the ground that 
Palestine has been an Arab land. 
23. Sees Berger, Morroe, The Arab World Todgv^ ffew York, 1962. 
Fisher, B . , The, A Physical, Social 
Ivegional Geography. London, 1950j H. K. Kehru in his art i -
cle "India's Policy Fully Justified", Al-Arab, New Delhi, 
«)uly, 1967, vol. 6, Ko. 5. 
Khouri, Fred J. (Villanova University), The Arab-Israeli 
Dllemn^aj Syracuse University Press, pp. 1-2; Also A.S.d. 
Chari, Klfttorioal Baokgronnd of tha Meat ^Ri^n nrlaiSj 
(footnote contd. on next page) 
/14 
2. persecution 
Do Nazi and European atrocities confer on Jews the right to 
have a separate state of their own in a territory which does not 
belong to them? Can European or world conscience be salved by the 
forcible dispossession of the iirabs and rehabilitation o f the Jews 
at the expense of the Arabs? 
Th® Ceyl^ Observer expressed sympathy for the Jews and 
condemned Ifezi atrocities but cr it ic ised the Jewish infi ltration 
in Palestine. Ihe Os'ylonese newspaper commented that i f the Jews 
were discriminated against "that doss not ir^ an that the Jews who 
made the new State of Israel have a right to deny the Arabs their 
homes and malsB them a new persecuted inferior peopla. This aspect 
of the problem has been forgotten in the cr is is which frequently 
torment the Middle £ast." (24) 
Moshe Menuhin says: (85) " I t would be an offence against the 
principles of elementary ';5ustice i f these innocent victims of the 
(previous footnote contd.) 
published by The Indian Preparatory Committee, International 
Conference in support of the Arab peopl3s, Kew Delhi, Nov. 11 
to 14, 1967, p. 2, 
Shapiro, Harry L, , Chairman of the Department of Anthro-
pology at the American Museum of Natural History States that 
the Jews are not a clan, a tribe or in a strict sense a na-
tion, See Shapiro, Harry L. £he...'i^ ewiish pepp;!^;, A .fiiggyftphjlqal 
History, UME.SCO, 1960» pp. 74-75. 
Also gee American Council for Judaism, Issues Magazine , 
Ifew York, Winter 1965-66, pp. 21-23. 
24. Cey3,on Observer,, "Forgotten Fact", September 11, 19^ >8. 
25. Palestines A Symposium, Ojj., c^t, , p, 28» 
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corifllct denied the right to return to their homes while 
Jewish immigrants flow Into Palestine." 
3" The Balfour Declaration 
The most serious claim to Palestine by Zionists Is baeea 
on this Declaration, (26) 
On November 2, 1917 the British Government published a 
statement of policy (later known as the ^Balfour Declaration') In 
the form of a letter from Mr Arthur James Balfour, then Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Rothschild, a leader of the 
Zionist Movement. The letter readsi 
Foreign Office 
November 2nd, 1917 
Dear Lord Hothschild, 
I have much pleasure In conveying to you on behalf 
of His Majesty's Government the following declaration of sympathy 
with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and 
approved by the cabineti 
*Hi»'Majesty's Government view with favour the establish-
ment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish peo^ile, and 
will ise their best endeavours to faol l l tato the achievement of 
this i t being clearly understood that nothing shall be 
done may prejudice the c iv i l and religious rights of exist-
ing coafiBinai^ iea in Palestine, or the rights and pol l -
tiatJL f^ tSitui^ ^ epjoyfed by Jfws in any other country. • 
t should be gratefuX if you would bring this declaration to 
th^. icno^rledge of the ISlonist federation, 
Yours sincerely, 
sdi iBTHcm jmis BWOIR 
^jy^lestln^ 1049-46/. p,. 1. " 
I f i 
According to the Arabs (as well as a number of world famous 
Jurists, authors and politicians), the Balfour Declaration was 
i l legal and immoral as i t was made without the consent or know-
ledge of the Inhabitants of Palestine, It was contrary to the 
principles of national self-determination and democracy and was 
inconsistent with the pledges given to the Arabs before and after 
the date i t was mad©, (27) 
Anthony Nutting who" was a minister in the Eden Cabinet was 
both frank and forthright when he observedi (28) 
"Today, after the lapse of five bitter decadcs 
the national home for the Jewish people has become the 
national state of Israel and the c i v i l rights of the 
Arabs of Palestine l i e trampled under the iieel of an 
Israeli army of occupation. How has this seemingly 
great humanitarian gesture, the Balfour Declaration, 
turned so sour and l e f t such a t ra i l of bitterness and 
agony in its wake? 
. . . . Ihe national home, the Arabs were assured 
would not be allowed to become a national state and 
the c i v i l and religious rights of the non-Jewish commu-
nities - which Was quaint, if not rather sinister, 
description of a 92 per cent Arab majority - would be 
safeguarded.., 
27, Explanations and assurances given at various times from 
the British Government see: Je f f r ies , Palestinet The 
ResULs:, ^be Bassett Letter of 8 February 1918, pp .216-17. 
Antonius, The Arab Awakening^ The Hogarth Message of 
January 1918, p. 268. 
tomsay Macdonald 1 9 ^ , published by the Daily Star 
(Beirut), June 29, 19®. 
yfae Times (London), April 17, 1964 - U m W ^ritajj>»s 
Palestine ProaiafeSy and ensuing correspondence. 
For further studies see: Palestine noval Commission heport 
July 1937, Cfli^ , 5479,p. 23, Ib id , , July 1937, C^^. 5479, p.17. 
28. "Israel created to pay Europe's debt to the Jews", 
The TimesT June 25, lOefe. 
1? 
others also wrote about this Declaration: 
"The Balfour Declaration must, therelore, not be regarded 
as a promise given from sentimental motives | it was a practical 
measure taken In the interests of a common cause at a moment 
when that cause could afford to neglect no factor of material or 
moral assistance", (29) 
By sporxsoring the programme of Zionist colonisation,. Britain 
Intended to further reciprocal interests, especially when Sultan 
Abdul-aamid of Ottoman Empire refused Herzl's o f fer : (3o) " I f 
EiS Majesty the Sultan gave us Palestine we could undertakB to put 
the finances of Turkey in order. For Europe, we should form part 
of i t s bulwark against Asia; we should be _the advance guard of 
civilisations against barbarism. As a neutral State, we should 
keep In constant touch with a l l Europe, which would have to guarantee 
our existence,** 
The S u i t e ' s answer was unequivocally firm and definite. (31) 
"The Turkish Empire does not belong to lae but to the Turkish people. 
I cannot give away any part of i t . Let the, Jews spare their 
millions. When my E'mpire is divided up they can have Palestine for 
nothing. But i t wi l l only be our dead body which is cut upj I 
shall never agree to vivisection". 
The Zionist leaders followed a policy of shifting the emphasis 
of their alms from a *home* for persecuted Jews to a full-f ledged 
29. Wise, Stephen, and Di Haas, Jacob, The Great Betrayal. 
NftV York, Brenttaos, 1930. p. 288. 
30. Herul, L'Btah Ji^tt^ Paris, 1926. p. 96. 
31. Quoted by Kodinson in Ti» Palestine uuestlont Seminar of 
Arab Jurists on Palestine. Beirut, 1967. p. 40. 
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pol i t i ca l state. 
During the British Mandate, the aims and ends of Zionism were 
furthered gradually and piecemeal, despite unrelenting opposition 
by the Arabs. Arab appeals, protests, arguments aad demonstrations 
failed to make the British Government respect their pledges to 
protect Arab rights and stop the ever-increasing flow of Jewish 
immigrants. The British Government went back on i t s words given 
to tl33 Arabs. The White Paper of June 1922 gave an assurance 
that the creation of a Jewish state was »impracticable' and Britain 
"have no such aim in view". The White Paper of 1922 further pro-
mised not to allow" the disappearance or the subordination of the 
Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine". 
The White Paper of 1939 promised to establish "within a 
period of ten years, an iridependent PaJBStinian state in which no 
more than one third of the population would be Jews". The White 
Paper further stipulated that *no further immigration was to be 
allowed unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce In 
i t " . Great Britain flouted a l l these promises with impunity and 
included an alliance with iSionism encouraging in i ts design of 
creation a Jewish State in Palestine. 
Britain Was trying to stand on two stools and following a 
policy of duplicity. Hamsay Macdonald attacked the British policy 
of making both the Arabs and the Jews happy. Eeferring to promises 
made by Britain to the Arabs and the Jews, he warned (32) the British 
Government in 1922: "The story is one of crude duplicity, and we 
32. The Daily Star (Beirut), June 29, 1969. 
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Cannot expect to oscape tbe rcsprobatlon which is bound to follow 
as a seqttGl". 
" I t i s not the Arabs who wi l l cbooso to colonlB© Pal^stlxi©, 
it is ttS|« (33) said Golda Meir. 
"Ih® Basle Programme'' wxoto Davis Xriestsch (34) to Theodore 
Hcrsl "fflust cor.tain tbe wjrda *Oreat Palestine' or •Palestin© and 
i t s neiehbouring lerids* - otherwise i t ' s nonsons®. You do not c^t 
the t^n aUlion ^ews into a land of 25,000 to." 
From the very beginning thus their aim Was the ^ionisatton 
and de-Arabisation of Palestine, 
f o enl ist general et^port and wide sympathy tbo iiionlsts 
iuit iel ly deaandted a *l-.atlonel Some* and denied in public any 
intention of establishing a po l i t i ca l state. In 1948, however, 
they openly admitted in a Zionist conference t^ld at Blltaoi^ 
hotel , Itew torkf Isnowa as 'biltmore Piogram* in which, as General 
Patrick J, Hurley, personal representative of Paresident Boosovelt, 
reported to the prej^ident; (35) 
"The Zionist Organisation in Palestine has indicated its 
cosmltioent to «n enlarged program fort 
1 . a sovereign Jewish State which could ensbrace Pales-
tine snd probably eventually irans^oManj 
33. Cf. Mary Syrkin, Gqlda Pax'is» C.allioard, 1966, p.63, 
^uottd from tbe Palestjfie wu^stion: iit-mlnac o f Arab Jurists, 
Beiiut, 1968» p. 44. 
34. iiabinowci*,, Oskar K., A Jewish Cynnis Pro.lect. Bew York, 
Heral Press, 1962* p» 17. 
33« Onited States, i'-oreien x^elationa of the OSi ^ear Ln^t and 
Africa (Washington. D.C., 1964), vol , IV, pp, 776-77. 
2. an eventual transfer of the Arab population from 
Palestine to Iraqj 
3 , Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East In 
the f ie lds of economic development and control." 
"Some people tend to think and react as If it were a r e l i -
gious confl ict between the Muslims and the Jews and/or a racial one 
between tte Jews and the Arabs"? says Professor S. A, Haqqi In his 
detactPd and analytical article "India, Israel and the West Asian 
Crlals". (36) He continues; " i t i s neither the one, nor the other." 
" I t i s , on the other hand, a politico-economic struggle between the 
Arabs who have lived there for centuries and want to live there in 
peace and with dignity, and the aggressive militant liionlsts, who 
want to colc»iise Palestine with Jews drawn from a l l over the world, 
particularly with Western Jewry, to dominate aiid exploit West Asia. 
The great apostle of peace i^d Justice Mahatma Gandhi said: (37) 
"1 have a l l my sympathies with Jews. But sympathy does not blind 
me to the requirements of Justice. The cry for the national home 
for Jews does not make much appeal to me. Palestine belongs to 
the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English 
or France to the French. It is wrong to impose the Jews on the 
Arabs.., , nothing can be said against tfc® Arab resistance in the face 
of overwhelming odds." 
"Palestine was an Arab country and Arab interests must pre-
vail there said Jawaharlal N«hru. (38) 
36. Mainstream (Kew Delhi), July 29, 1967. 
37. Itovember 26, 1938. 
38. The Hindu (MadrasDecember 17, 1938. 
:A?ter the AllX^^ victory, the Jowish Immigration Increased 
l^pidly through wave.^  Immigrants which made for a phenomenal 
increase of the Jewits^ j population in Palestine, Whereas the Jewish 
population had numhej^ ^ 194 eio and of a total population of 
(40) 
1,035,821, in 1931, to 654,000 out of 1,764,000 in 1944, i t lat%^ 
on dumped to 650,000 ^^^g of 2,065,000. 
Jews built up lYieXr military strength through para-military 
organisations, the Ha^ j^j^ ^ the Irgtm, and the Stern Gang, to use 
violence and terroris^^ y^^ y^ killed many Ar^hs as well as English 
personnel in Palestin^^ y^^ ^ facts were clear - terrorism and 
expansionism, pure an,^  simple. Rven Sir Wiiston Churchill, then 
Prime Minister had to ^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ no\xse of Commons on November 17, 
1944| (43) 
" I f our dreams f^y Zionism are to end in the smoke 
of assassins' pistols and our labours for i t s future are 
^ Sw set of gangsters worthy of m z l Germany, 
jany like Hiyselj^ f v^ -^ e to reconsider the position we 
H consistently and so long in the past, i i Tjnere IS -co ^^ g^ ^ l^ p^^  ^ pePcefal and successful 
SSJ^saj these wicked activities must cease 
b a £ 5 ^^^ '^^ Jisible for them must be destroyed, root and 
39, a'ovemment of ^i@§tifie« A of Palestine 194S»46, Tabl« 7c, p. 
40, Ib id , , p^ 143, 
41, Givep in the S.iyp^x't of the - ^ Bdeuaent ii/364, vol. I , 
Ch. If, P« 64;'Quoted frois faiefiUne ^ti fbcus, by Sami 
Hadawi, 3rd edi^ ^ jjarcfe 19S9, i t i t o , t . 
^ y 
(|0V»jment of ^i^jt iHs, SapBlsmmf^ m^T Mamerandaa to MSGOP. f* 
43. Government of A, m m f ^ . ®.f pM^BUm, f*rt I , 
P;» 68% 
iBut the ^IdMlst lobby was too strong both in and 
Bfltaln, and the establishment of a pro-West enclave in Palestine 
t©o allarlng for Western interests for anything positive to come out 
of such a scathing appraisal of Zionist activities in the Holy Land, 
Besides the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. emerged after the war as two 
Super Powers while Britain was weakened and exhausted and was in no 
position to carry on the White Man's Burden. 
The British Foreign Secretary announced in the House of 
Commons on February 18, 1947, that His Majesty's Government had 
found (44) that "the Mandate has proved to bo unworkable in prac-
t ice , that the obligations undertaken to the two communities had 
been shown to be IrreconciXablG,'* 
The reason given was that Jews and Arabs "were unable to 
agree on the solution desired by i t . " Britain admitted i t s inability 
to solve the problem and to administer Palestine indefinitely. The 
Hnited Kingdom requested the U.t?. Kecretail-General (45) "to place 
the ©f Palestine on the Agenda of the General Assembly at 
i t s nexl "rigiilar session.« 
4S. mi. . 
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Chapter I 
PAI£STXKE IK mE UiaTED NATIONS 
Britain, after the First World viar, was compelled by con-
siderations of strategy and power po l i t i cs , to support Arab nation-
alism to dismember Ottoman Empire - an ally of the central powers. 
The Middle East was of immense significance for British 
Imperial interest since i t servea as an "overland route" to India. 
Britain*s imperial interests in the area, which included control 
over the Suez Canal and toseping the area immuned from Big Power 
rivalry, were now better served by supporting the Arab's revolt 
against Turkey. Britain could not maintain her sole and eacclusive 
authority over the area and had to share i t with other powers, esp-
ecially France. 
Anglo-French rivalry over Middle East was a serious threat 
to British hegemony and Britain wanted to ensure her supremacy over 
the Sue a Canal by controlling the Sinai Peninsula and Palestine. 
The Cold War between Britain and France was intensified in 1916, 
Palestine was internationalized. British imperialism was now being 
challenged more than ever and the British statesmen in their last 
bid to save i t , concluded an alliance with Zionist colonialism. The 
Zionists had secured British support for a ZioUist dominated Pales-
tine, The Zionists had a coveted eye on Palestine and were planning 
to carve out a homeland for the Jews. They preferred Britain over 
France for the realization of their long cherished dream. Dr Chaim 
Weizmanrt gave reason for such a preference when he wrotet (1) 
1. Weizmann, ChaUn, Trla^ n^d Error, Kew York, 1949. p. 190. 
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"As colonizers and coljonlal administrators 
the British were superior to the French. It was the 
Jews who gave substance and reality to the idea of a 
British protectorate - which afterwards took tte ' 
form of a mandate over PaBstine," 
The reciprocal interests of Britain and Zionism have been clearly 
described by an Arab scholar: (2) 
"On the one hand, Britain, by utilizing Zionist 
influence in the United States and in France, would 
avert international rule in Palestine, on the pretext 
that a British sponsored program of Zionist colonization 
required British rule 3n Palestine. On the otter hand, 
by playing a catalytic role in bringing about the desig-
nation of Britain as the ruling power in Palestine, 
2J.onism would at last be able to embark upon the long 
awaited program of large scale colonization in the 
covetod territory under the suaspices and protection of 
a Great Power". 
This alliance between British Imperialism and Zionist 
colonialism found i t s expression in the Balfour Declaration of 
* 
1917 proclaiming its support for the establishment of a "Jewish 
National Hon©" 3n Palestine. At Peace Conference the Zionists re-
commended British mandatory rule in-Palestine, 
Britain, during her thirty years' rule, sucked the "b2x>od of 
Palestinian Arabs and rendered them impotent to face organized and 
planned assault of Zionist terrorists. Britain encouraged Jewish 
Immigration into Palestine because she was committed to help the 
Jews in carving out a "Jewish National Hone". The price for British 
support to the idea of National Home was Jewish support to the 
Allied cause. Lloyd George has admitted* (3) 
2. f^®^ A. , ZlpnlSt Co,]on1,n11.sm In Palsatlne. 
Beirut, 1965. p. 13, 
3 ' Palestine itoval Commiasiot^  London, 1937. p. 23. 
cv 
"The Zionist leaders gave us definite promiee that 
i f tne Allies committed themselves to giving fac i l i t i es 
for the establishment of national home for the Jews in 
Palestine, they would do tiwir.beat to rally Jewish senti-
ment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. 
They kept their word", 
It was Britain* s turn to i»ep her word which she did at the cost 
of Arab lives and properties. Britain encouraged Jewish immigration 
into Palestine. In 1882, the Jewish population in Palestine was 
24,000 only. Between 3S04 and 1914, another 40,000 Jews came and (4) 
settled down. By 1918, the Jews in Palestine were 66,671 in number. 
From 1919 to 1923 the average of the Jews coming to Palestine 
Was 9,000 per year. 
Between 1924 and 1931, 84,000 Jews came from Poland, 
Between 1931 and 1939, 265,000 immigrants came from Central i^urope. 
The British Government tried to restrict Immigration but i l l ega l 
immigration was encouraged, by powerful Jewish agencies like Haganah 
and other para military organissations. 
(5) 
On 16 May 1948, the number of Jews in Palestine was 649,633. 
The Arab people of Palestine were not only deprived of the 
pol i t i cal control of their own country but also o f their country as 
well. The Jewish immigration posed a grave danger to local Moslem 
and Christian population of Palestine. The Palestinian Arabs were 
forced to leave their homes under terror and threat to their l ives 
by the .Zionists. Britain failed to f u l f i l i^r responsibility as a 
4 , The Central Bureau of Statist ics , Statistical Abstract 
of Israel 196^-59. Jerusalem, 1969. p. 7. 
6. Ibid. 
mandatory power to protect the l i f e and property of peoples of 
Palestine. Britain had her own interest in the establishment of a 
Jewish State, According to Nuttings (6) 
"World War II had exhausted" Britain's resources 
and she was no longer able to sustain such a base for 
herself. So, she and her western al l ies had introduced 
this alien European State of Israel to do for her and 
for them what she could no longer do f or herself, to 
take over the garrison role which Britain could no longer 
sustain and to act as beach head for Britain and western 
designs upoxi the Arab world." 
The Anglo-21onist alliance cracked under Zionist pressure during 
the World War I I . Whenever Zionists accelerated and intensified 
Jewish immigration into Palestine, Britain resisted because i t was 
a threat to her presence in Palestine. The Second World War struck 
the last nail in Anglo-Zionist alliance co f f in . 
After the Second World War, Britain was rendered very weak 
militarily and economically and her withdrawal from India diminished 
her interest in the Zionist cause. The emergence of sovereign Arab. 
States and their opposition to polit ical Zionism forced Britain to 
exercise a certain amount of restraint in her support for Jewish 
National Home in Palestine. 
The emergence of the United States of America was the most 
important post-world war phenomenon. Political Zioninm found in the 
USA a new but very powerful ally. The United States of America 
wanted to support Zionism because she had her own vested interest in 
i t , Israel could have been the safest bet to counter Arab radicalism 
which might threaten American o i l interests in the Middle East, The 
6, Nutting, Anthony, i^iS Times (London), June 26, 1969. 
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United States of America was supporting Jewish state to contain 
expanding Soviet communism in West Asia. Winston Churchill showed 
his concern In his famous "Iron Curtain" speech delivered at Fulton 
in March 1946. He told his audience that the Soviet Union had 
succeeded in establishing "In a greater number of countries far 
from the Busslan frontiers and throughout the world communist f i f th 
column". He was well aware of Britain's inability to fight Russian 
Coramuniau, so he wanted the USA to take up the job. He made an 
appeal to the USAi C7) 
"The United States at this time is at the pinnacle 
of world power. I f you loolc around you, you must fee l 
not onl^ the sense of duty done but also you must feel 
anxiety lest you fa l l below the level of achievement. 
Opportunity is here now, clear and shining for both our 
countries".. 
Secretary Dulles expressed the same feelings when he. told the 
American Seriates (8) " I t would be abhorimt and dangerous i f 
that area (the Middle East) were ruled by International Communisms 
yet that i s the present danger". 
The Soviet Union was conducting its battle of carving out 
areas of Jjifluence in the Middle East with utmost strategy and caution. 
It ciiose to sijypport Jewish claim of a state not because i t loved the 
Zionist cause. Its reason to support the Zionist cause was related 
to Kussla's ef forts not to allow 2iionist activity within i ts bor-
ders. The Zionist leaders were generally •progressives' or l e f t i s t s , 
and the Kremlin could very well expect the new state to be the ad-
vance ground of socialism in an underdeveloped and backward area. 
7. Broad, Lewis, Winatoi^  Year of 
London, 1964. pp. 477-79. 
8. Saltan, Srank, AtflBrjca ^lopism and the Aralyg. Washington, 
p. 9. 
The Soviet loaders could also perhaps believe that the installation 
of an alien state on Arab so i l would disturb the sjbatjis sm. and 
create trouble end turmoil in the area. I he jsussian design was to 
fish in troubled waters and gain a footing in a strategically imp-
ortant area, l^ he Russian support for the Zionist cause was also 
aioied at" strengthening the hands of Communist Party in Palestine, 
Palestine became a hot bed of big power intrigues and 
Zionist terrorist act ivit ies , Qreat Britain had always supported 
and cooperated with Jewish para-military organizations. The Arab 
population of Palestine became the victims of Zionist terror, Britain 
as a mandatory power failed to f u l f i l i t s obligations under the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, It became victim of i t s own mis-
deeds, She monster i t created was threatening i ts own existence in 
Palestine and its best e f forts to bring normalcy in the area and find 
a solution agreeable to both parties did not bear any fruit , Britain's 
mandatory government realized i t s impotency and on February 18, 
1947 ttm British Foreign Secretary announce a in the House of Commons 
that Els Majesty's Government had intentions of giving up mandate 
because i t "has proved to be unworkable Jjq practice, that the obl i -
gations undertaten to the two communities had been shown to be irre-
concilable", C9) 
Britain, then, coined with the idea of bringing the issue 
of Palestine before the United Nations, On April 2, 1947 Alexander 
Cadogan, the Head of the UK delegation In the United Nations, wrote 
9 . Palestine: Supplementary Memorandum to UMSCQP^  p. 27 
2f) 
a letter to the Secretary-General of the world body requesting him 
to convene a special session of the General Assembly on Palestine. 
He wrote that a "special session of the General Assembly" should be 
summoned "for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special 
committee" (10) to consider the question of Palestine. 
The special session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations was called on April 28, 1947 at Flushing Meadows in fJew 
J 
York. The f i rs t important point before the General Assembly was 
that of agenda. 
The United Kingdom wanted to restrict the agenda to the 
items submitted earlier by her. The Arab states wanted to broaden 
i t and on April 21 and 22, 1947 five Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia) communicated to the Secretary General the re-
quest that the following items be placed on the Agenda of the 
Special Session o f the General Assembly: "The termination of the Man-^  
date over Palestine and the declaration of i ts independence", (11) 
At the 70tfa meeting heM on May 1, 1947 the General Assembly approved 
the inclusion in the agenda of items submitted by the Government of. 
the United Kingdom, The additional item proposed by f ive Arab 
states was denied the inclusion in the agenda of the special session. 
Th« agenda accepted and approved by the General Assembly was that 
submitted by the United Kingdom and it was one of "constituting and 
instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration 
of the question of Palestine at the second regular session". Though 
10. UN Document A/a64y Add. 1, Supplement Wo. 11, Annex 11, p, 1. 
11. Ib id . , Annex 11, pp. 1«2. Dqcp. A/287, A/2S8, A/289, ii/290 
and A/291. 
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the additional item proposed by five member Arab states was 
rejected yet i t was included for discussion by the General Assembly 
under Rule 18 of the' procedui'e of the Assembly, 
The Arab states were not satisfied v/ith the manner in 
which Britain had referred the issue of Palestine to the United 
Nations. "The Arabs f ee l " , as observed by Eadawi, "that both the 
British action and that of the United Nations were not in confor-
mity with the provisions on self-determination prescribed ;Ui the 
United Nations Charter". (12) 
The Arab states had understood the game of Imperial powers 
backed up by the United J»tates and the Soviet Union. The issue of 
Palestine was being discussed by the United Nations at a time when 
the WesteiTi bloc had a majority among f i f ty - l ive members of the 
world body. The strength of the western bloc had been proved many 
a time in the United Imtions, Every resolution sponsored by the 
United States and her al l ies was passed. The United States of America 
was under enormous pressure from the Zionist lobby. The Zionists 
wanted the Government of the USA to support large scale immigra-
tion of displaced Jews from Europe to Palestine, Senator Eobert F, 
Wagner, Democrat of New York and Senator James E. Murray,Democrat 
of Montana urged President Truman to use his country's influence 
to gain "unlimited immigration for Jews into Palestine and hearing 
for the Jewish Agency for Palestine in the United Nations General 
Assembly, They also sent a telegram to Warren Austin, US representa-
tive to the United Nations urging him' to take up both the issues in 
12. Hadawi, Sami. Bitter Harvest . Palestine 1914-67. 
New York, 19CT, p. 77. 
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the world body. (13) The United States of America had lent the 
3lorilsts in their expansionist designs against the Arabs not only 
polit ical and diplomatic support but she had given them financial 
support as well . The United fcitates contribution to Zionist na-
tional fund in 1939-44 was £1,537,000, in Jewish year 1944-46 it 
rose to £3,989,000 and in 1945-46 it rose further to £5,768,000.(14) 
On April 23, 1947 Lord Hall told the House of Lords that 
the Afl^rican contribution to the Zionist national fund for i l legal 
Zionist purpose was about £7,000,000. (16) The United States for -
mally opposed line proposal aimed at granting a hearing to the 
»iewlsh Agency for Palestine yet gave it her blessings and on May 5, 
1947 the Zionists scored a tactical victory when the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution that the First Committee should grant a hearing 
to the Jewish Agency. The resolution,was moved by Poland and Cijecho-
slovakia. It said "that the f i r s t committee grant a hearing to the 
Jewish Agency for Palestine on the question before the committee", (16) 
The resolution was adopted with 44 votes in favour, 7 against and 
3 abstaining while Costa i^ica was absent,(17) 
I3i mw„ yprfe. May 4 , 1947, p. 43, 
14. Jewish National Finance Bulletin of the i:-conomic Research 
Institute of the Jewish Agency, 2nd issue 1947, pp. 66-68. 
15. House of Lords, |>arliamentary Debates^ 6th vol. 147, 
co l . 114. 
16. United Nations Of lice liecor^^ of i-irst Spl, Sess. 1947, 
vol . I l l , p. 6. 
17. Those states which voted against the resolution included 
Iran and Siam Cnow called Thailand) 
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The Arab member states reacted very sharply against pre-
ferential treatment granted to the Jewish Agency. . ' Faris El 
Khoari of Siyria was betraying the Arab's feeling of resentment 
when he said that tae did not know whether the United Nations was 
a proper agency to solve the Palestine question. (18) Many members 
of the United Nations wanted the Arab Higher Commitlee to appear 
before tte Political and Security Committee and present Arabs case 
on Palestine. India prepared a draft and submitted the following 
resolutions 
"The First Committee (the Polit ical and Security 
Committee} resolves that i t be proposed to President 
of the General Assembly that a plenary meeting be called 
at once to consider the following resolution that the 
i i rst Committee grant a hearing to the Arab Higher Commi-
ttee on the question before tl» Couuaittee"« (19) 
The resolution had the support of-the Soviet Union but 
Alexander Codogan of Great Britain redrafted i t . According to re-
drafted resolution "the General Assembly affirms that the deci-
sion of the First Committee (the po l i t i ca l and Security Committee) 
to grant a he.-^ ring to the Arab Higher Com n^itte© gives a correct 
interpretation of the Assembly's intentions". (20) The resolution 
was introduced by Dr Oswald Aranha, the President of the General 
Assembly and i t secured 39 votes in favour, one against while eleven 
members abstained. 
The resolution of the Polit ical and Security Committee grant-
ing a hearing to the Arab Higher Committee accorded unequal treat-
18. ^w YfffH Tlaps, May 6, 1947, p. lO. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid, 
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ment to the Arab Higher Committee, Mahmaud Hasan Pasha, Egyptian 
Ambassador to Washington, threatened to boycott future meetings of 
the Uir as a protest against the resolution passed" by the General 
iissembly Dr Charles Malik of Lebanon insisted before the f inal 
vote was taken that the General Assembly had discriminated against 
the Arab Higher Committee and urged that the General Assembly be 
called back into session to vote a resolution "whereby the Arabs 
of Palestine will be given their Just due", (21) Faced with the 
threat of an Arab boycott of its proceedings regarding the Palestine 
question, the United Mtions General Assembly held an emergency 
session on May 7 , 1947 and gave recognition to the Arab Higher Com-
mittee granting i t equal status with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 
On May 9 , 1947 the Jewish Agency's spokesman Dr Silver pre-
sented his case before the Committee, He emphasized and elaborated 
the terms "Jewish people" and "the Jewish national home" which 
were according to him, "the key terms and basic concepts of the 
Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate". "To proceed without rela-
tion to them would be to detour into a po l i t i ca l wilderness as far 
as Palestine is concerned," He asked the world body to allow Jewish 
immigration to Palestine because "A generation ago, the interna-
tional community of the world decreed that the Jewish people should 
be given the right, long denied, and the opportunity to reconstitute 
their national home in Palestine, The national home is in the mak-
ing, i t has not yet been fully established," (22) Dr Silver was asked 
21, Ib id . , May 7, 1947. 
22, For fu l l text of the speech see Kew York Tjfne^ gj May 9 , 1947, 
P» 4» 
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many questions. The most important question of them a l l was asked 
by Asaf Al i , the Indian Dolegate. He askedj (23) "The Nazi 
Government in Europe has been completely suppressed and Nazi 
termany is now under the control of the Security Council or , at 
any rate, the United Kations. If that is so , is there any reason 
why these refugees cannot be resettled in their natural German home?" 
Ihe representative of the Jewish Agency could not confidently answer 
this Kjuestion. On May 12, 1947 Mr ^.ertok tried to reply i t and 
said "you cannot settle in a graveyard, nor can you build a 
dwelling out of heaps of rubble". He said that the Jews were per-
fectly assimilable in PalBStine only. He betrayed Jewish stubborn-
ness when he said; "Ko orm has offered an alternative to Palestine. 
But even i f there were an alternative, they refused to be treated 
as mere chattels". He insisted that the issue of displaced Jews 
from Ituurope was a part of Palestine question and "to treat the 
issue of Palestine in isolation from the immigration issue would 
make as much sense as to study the beating of a heart in disregard 
of blood circulation". (24) 
The case of Palestinians was very ably presented by henry 
Cattan of Arab Higher Committee, He emphasized the independence of 
Palestine which the Arabs were not claiming on the basis of assur-
ances, "they are entitled to such independence as being their natural 
and Inalienable right". According to him the "Balfour Declaration 
23, Kew York Tlms^ May 9, 1947, p. 4. 
24. Ib id . , May 13, 1947. 
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was made without tbe consent, not to say the knowledge, of the 
people most directly affected". It was "contrary to the princi-
ples of national self-determination and democracy, as also to the 
principles enunciated in the Charter of the United Wations". 
He told the United Mtions that: (26) 
" It is high time that Palestine's right to inde-
pendence be recognised and that this tormented country 
en^oy the bisseings of a democratic government. It is 
high tiine also that a policy which has been impairing 
the ethnological and po l i t i ca l structure of the country 
be brought to an end by the highest body in the world," 
The United I><ations Polit ical and Security Committee, after 
tearing the Jewish and Arab agencies got bo.2ged down over procedural 
matters; the most serious confl ict arose over the question of terms 
of reference oi the proposed Inquiry Committee on Palestine, Th© 
positions of the Jews and the Argjss were irreconcilable, The Jews 
wanted that the question of displaced Jews from Europe should be 
linked up with the question of PaJlestine's independence. Moshe 
Shertok told the Committeej "The crux of the matter is the problem 
of Jewish immigration to Palestine". He-suggested that the terms of 
Inference should allow the committee of inquiry to keep in mind not 
only the independence question but also "various other itjsues contec-
ted with the problem of Palestine", (26) The Arabs* point of view 
was expressed by I-aris K1 Khoury of Syria when he argued that there 
was no connection between displaced persons and the Palestine pro-
blem and that the United tiations had already created the International 
iiefugee Organization to look after the refugees, Mahmud Hasan Pasha 
26, For fu l l text o f Cattan's speech see Hew inrk Times^ May 10, 
1947, p, 5, 
26, mv Xork Times J May 10, 1947, 
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Of ligypt said that the Arabs would not agree tying In the European 
problem with the Palestine cotitroversy. "We cannot", he said, "allow 
an invasion of Palestine by an alien racial group". (27) The' 
sub-comfaittee was unable to agree on the scope of the proposed 
United Imtions Inquiry Committee on Palestine. The crux of the 
dis agree a»nt in the sub-committee was whether the suggested commi-
ttee of inquiry shall consider independence for the holy land, where 
iiie Ai'si? w&s dcui^Jj^ that of the Jev/s, Tt& sulf^coimittee 
in i t s report, made public on May 11, 1947 presented four alter-
native proposals on the general question, each concluded In slightly 
di i f ©rent lang ua ge: 
A) "The Special Committee shall bear in mind the principle 
that independence for the population of Palestine should be the 
purpose of any plan for the future of that country". 
B) "The Special Committee shall be guided by the principle 
that independence for the people of Palestine shall be the purpose 
of any plan for the future of that country" . 
C) "The Special Committee shall bear in mind the principle 
that independence for the population of Palestine shall be the. 
ultimate purpose of any plan tor the futui-e of that country". 
D) "The Special Committee shall be guided by the principle 
that the indt pendence of Palestine should be the purpose of any 
plan for the future of that country", (28) 
The role of the Big Powers regarding the issue of scope of 
the Inquiry Committee was pro^zionist. The USSK had mostly supported 
iiionist proposals in the procedural battles and also supported the 
27. Ibid. 
28. Ibid . , May 12, 1947. 
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Zionist case regarding the question of European Jews, On the ques-
tion of Independence the attitude of the Soviet "Union vras far from 
be irjg unambiguous, She took the Arab side on the issue of indepen-
dence but it Was a mere eye-wash because the wording of her amend-
ment regarding the scop© of Inquiry Cormaittee was almost Identical 
to that of the Jewish Agency's proposals• It said that the 
Inquiry Committee would be directed to study not only conditions in 
Palestine but also "various other issues connected with the problem 
of Palestine". It also provided that the Inquiry Committee submits 
to the General Assembly ,a proposal "on the question of establishing 
without delay the independent state of Palestine", (29) The gs 
deputy representative Harschel Tf. Johnson told the Political and 
Security Commit ^ ee of the General Assembly that inclusion of inde-
pendence in the terns of reference for the suggested inquiry commi-
ttee would tend to "prejudge" the case and would do "a moral 
injustice" to Zionist opinion. (30) 
The second point of serious fr ict ion was regarding the compo-
sition of the inquiry committee. The USA wanted big powers to 
be excludeu from the Inquiry Committee whil© the USSR wanted ttie 
Big Five to become members of i t . The. US representative recommended 
a neutral committee consisting of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Iran, 
Peru, Uruguay, Sweden and the Eetherlands, The US representative 
explained his Government's stand: "One fear is that opposing views 
and debate among th» permanent members (the Big Five) i f they were 
on the Special Committee - over details, woula cause delay by the 
29| New York Times. May 13, 1947. 
30. Ibid , , May 11, 1947. 
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intrusion of other interests which axe perfectly obvious here". 
The attitude of Great Britain was similar to that of the USA but 
her reasons were di f ferent , Alexander Cadogan of the United 
Kingdom explained the reasonsi "My Government are in rather a pecu-
l iar position. They would find themselves, i f they-were members 
of that committee, at times in. the witness stand, and then after 
that, a moment or two later , wouM resume their seat .with the 
Jury" . (31) 
The Soviet Union thou|ht that the inclusion of Five Big 
Powers was necugsary because the United IJations would have a 
better chanco of reaching agreement i f the Big Five participated 
in a l l stages of the work, "from the fact finding of the United 
i^ations Inquiry Committee to the rendering of a judgement by the 
United Nations General As^mbly" . (32). 
There were three main proposals regarding the composition 
of the inquiry committee. The USA recommended a neutral commi-
ttee while Argentina had recommended a committee composing of 
the Five Big Powers, an Arab state, three American states other 
than the United States, a pacific state, an African state and an 
Asiatic state. The third proposal was that of Poland's which in-
cluded the Big Five, one Arab state preferably Syria, two Latin 
American states, one African and or Asifi^tic state, one western 
European state and one Eastern European state preferably Czecho-
slovakia. A careful analysis of these proposals w i l l prove one 
31. Jfew York Times, May 11, 1947, 
32. Ibid. 
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point that the USA and the USSK were conducting their own battles 
even on the question of the composition of Inquiry Committee. The 
USSR favoured tte Polish proposal for i t provided better represent-
atioi to the Communist bloc. At its 57th meeting on May 13, 1947, 
the General Assembly's Pol i t ical and Security Committee adopted 
an Australian resolution creating United Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine, The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 11, 
with 29 abstentions. The recommendation of tte First Committee 
Was approved by the General Assembly on May 15, 1947 by a final 
vote of 45 to 7 with 1 abstention and 2 ab^nt. 
The resoluticai of May 16, 1947 laid down the following pro-
vis ions i 
1. "A Special Committee be created for the above 
mentioned purpose consisting of the representatives of 
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovaicia, Guatemala, India, Jran, 
Hetherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia;" 
2, "Tlie Special Committee shall have the widest 
powers to ascertain and record facts and to investi-
gate a l l questions and issues relevant to the problem 
of Palestine"} 
3, "The Special Committee shall determine i t s own 
procedure" j 
4. "The Special Committee shall conduct investi-
gaticais in Palestine and wherever i t may deem useful, 
receive and examine written or oral testimony, which-
ever i t may consider appropriate in each case, from 
mandatory power, from representatives of the population 
of Palestine. ilrom Governments and from such organisa-
tions and individuals as it may deem necessary" j 
5, "The Special Committee shall give most care-
ful consideration to the religious interests in Palestine 
of Islam, Judaism and Christianity"} 
6. "The Special Committee shall prepare a report 
f ^ ^ ^ ^ General Assembly and shall submit such pro-
h'S 
posals as It may consider appropriate for the solution of 
the problem of Palestine;" 
7 . "The Special Committee's report shall be communi-
cated to the Secretary-General not later than September 1, 
1947, in order that i t may be circulated to the Members 
of the United Nations in time for consideration by the 
second regular session of the General Assembly" • 
The General Assembly 
8. "isBquests the Secretary-General to enter into suit-
able arrangements with the proper authorities of any State 
in whose territory the Special Committee may wish to sit or 
to travel, to provide the'necessary f a c i l i t i e s , and to 
assign appropriate staff to the Special Committee 
The resolution also 
9 . "Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse 
travel and subsistence expenses of a representatives and an 
alternate representative from each Government represented on 
the Specifed Committee on such basis and in such form as he 
may determine most appropxiate in the circumstances". (33) 
The Palestinian Arab strongly ob;|ected to. the'forming of the 
Inquiry Committee on the Palestine question. The Arab states voted 
against the resolution and their chief reason for such an attitude 
wore the terms of reference of the inquiry committee. Dr Charles 
Malik of Lebanon showed "the deepest concern" that was f e l t over 
the fact that the committee had broadened the inquiry to provide 
for the "socalled consideration of the problem of Palestine" instead 
of i t s future Government, To him, the Committee's draft was 
"highly unsatisfactory and unacceptable", (34) 
The General Assembly adopted another resolution on May 15, 
1947. The resolution for Truce as i t is called was proposed by 
Norway. The chief motivating reason behind Norway's resolution was 
33. Off ic ial Records of i-irst Special Session of General Assembly, 
April 28 to May 16, 1947, vol . I , pp. 167-77. 
34. New York Times^ May 14, 1947, p. 4. 
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the fear that the two contending parties might resort to threat 
of use of force. Ihe resolution was adopted unanimously with Arab 
States abstaining. It read: (35) 
The General Aseembly^calls upon a l l Governments 
and people and particularly upon the inhabitants of 
Palestine, to refrain, pending action by tte General 
Assembly on the report of the Special Committee on 
Palestine, from the threat or use of force or any otter 
action which might create an,atmosphere prejudicial to 
an early settlement of the question of Palestine". , 
The oatcome of the f i r s t special session of the United B&tlons 
Organization had been disappointini; as far as the Arabs were con-
cerned. The Zionists had many strong supporters among forty-f ive 
members of the United liatlons. The Zionists scored a victory in 
the United IJatior.s. Their stand was supported and endorsed in the 
General Assembly. The Big Pox -^ers, including the Soviet Union, 
were supporting the liionist l ine. The terms of referm ce and the 
composition of UKSCOP, was almost a total victory 'for Zionists. 
Tfc© United Nations Special Committee would not consider the issue 
of independence for Pales tine j it would v i s i t refugee camps in 
i.urope as well» The Arab States, in spite of their tactical defeat 
in the United ^ations, did not loss their confidence in world organ-
ization. Some of the Arab representatives expressed satisfaction 
with the outcome of the General Assembly's special session, iiehman 
A. Pasha, Secretary General of Arab League remarked about the 
special session: "On the whole we feel we are departing from the 
special session in a better position than when we arrived". Accord-
ing to Syria's rtpresentative Farifl El Khouryi (36) "This is Just 
the end ol the beginning. What is past i s nothing". 
36. UN s o s m m k A / ^ , p . 7. 
36. |fevr YprK ^ifflPa, May 16, 1947. 
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The Arabs were In an accommodating mood but not at the cost 
of self-respect and freedom. They were willing to solve the pro-
Diem of Palestine with an open heart and open mind bat the Zionists 
in league with their supporters were stubborn. They wanted un-
controlled Oewish settlement in Palestine at the cost of the local 
Arab population. The United I<ations Committee on Palestine was 
boycotted by the Arab Hlg!:wr Committee when it visited Palestine on 
June 14, 15,1947. 
The Arab Higher Committee was requested by the chairman 
of the committee to co-operate with i t in conducting investigations. 
I t was impossible because had the Arabs given cooperation to the 
committee, i t rfould haw meant total negation of ttaelr earlier a t t i -
tude» The Arab Higher Comtaltt;©© wanted to disassociate i tse l f with 
the investigations of UK3C0P because of the following reasons as 
laid down in a telei^ram sent to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations« 
1 - The a^gal basis for the Mandate has disappeared since the 
dissolution of the League of Nations, Thus the Mandatory Power is 
a 3s. facto authority in Palestine. Independence is the real issue 
and i t is of vital importance to apply the principles of the Charter 
of the United Illations and to declare Palestine as independent. The 
United Uatlons refused to include the termination of mandate in the 
agenda. 
2 - Tta0 Jewish refugee problem could not be linked with Palestine 
question since Palestine could not by I tse l f solve the ^cwish problem. 
The World Organization failed to detach the Jewish world refugee 
question from the Palestine problem. 
3 - The transgression of the wishes and interests of the great 
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ma;}orlty of the people of Palestine in the name of religious 
intere sts« 
The Arab higher Committee then pointed 6ut that the Palestine 
Arabs* natural rights to their country were ^If-evident and could 
not continue to be subject to investigation but deserved to be reco-(37) 
gnized on the basis of the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
Throughout the period of the commit tee *s inquiry, the Zionists carried 
out terrorist activitiss with the sole motive of discrediting and 
sabotaging Bidtish power in Palestine. After the Committee's tour 
of Haifa on June 19 a dynamite laden truck had exploded, (38) and 
the Committee had to pass a resolution condemning, though mildly, 
the activities of ^iionists. The resolution said: (39) 
"The members of the committee, taking note of the 
public reports of acts of violence canmitted in Palestine 
- since their arrival in the country, record their sense 
that such acts constitute a flagrant disregard of the -
appeal made in the resolution of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations o f May 15, 1947". 
The reign of terror ent.ered a new phase when on August 10, 
1947 members of an armed band disguising In Arab dress killed 4 
Jews and wounded many Jews and Arabs in a cafe in Tel-Aviv. (40) 
It was a well calculattd plan of the <ilonists to rouse world pub-
l i c opinion against the Arabs. The Arab Higher Committee Secretary 
denied the charge of the Arabs being involved in killing the Jews. 
37, U.f«. Doc A/361, Add, 1, vol. I I , Annexes, Annex 5, p. S. 
38. Kew York Times, June 20, 1947, pp. 9 1, 5. 
39, UKSCOP xteport, 1947, vol . 11, p. 14, he solution A/AC. 13/28, 
dated June 29, 1947. 
40. Uew York Times, August 11, 1947. 
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SometlflKiS later the terrorists in their own writings had confessed 
that they used to wear Arab dresses and soiaetliiies British service 
di«ss. (41) On August 15, the Haganah icillfid 11 Arabs in a raid 
on what the Zionists called the headquarters of the Arab attackers. 
The Zionists had adopted the strategy of attacking Arabs in order 
to st ir up the Arabs against the Jews. They knew that militant 
Arab reaction had to be met by British forces as a result of which 
pressure on Haganah would be relieved. On July 29, 1947 the special 
committee went to Geneva in order to start drafting i ts report. The 
committee decided by a vote of 6 to 4 with one abstention to set 
up a sub-committee to visit the Centres of Jewish refugees and dis-
placed persons in Germany and Austria. 
During the vis it to refugee centres the sub-commit tee inter-
viewed at least 100 Jewish inmates of the Centre who were, pre-
sumably, selected by the Jewish Agency. The committee reached the 
conclusion that the majority of Jewish refugees in the Centres wanted 
to go to Palestine, At one particular centre a poster was found 
which had the inscription "Palestine - a Jewish State for the Jewish 
people". The poster had a pictorial design ^showing Jews from 
Eastern Europe on the march towards Palestine shown as much larger 
area than the present geographical l imits". The report further 
said J "In the schools in the various centres children arft being 
taught Hebrew and given an intimate historical and geographical know-
ledge of Palestine". Many organizations like the "Central Committee 
of the Liberated Jews, the Jewish Agency, the American Joint Distri-
41. AtJMi!^ , Memoirs o f an Assasslr,, p , 88. 
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bution Committee and many other Jewish voluntary organizations" 
were found in existence which gave "every opportunity for general 
indoctrination o f the idea of settlement in Palestine i f such were 
desired". (42) An objective but careful analysis o f the committee's 
report would not leave anybody In doubt that the Zionists had a 
definite and organized plan to drive Palestinian Arabs out and re-
place them with Idae Jewish immigrants from Europe and other parts 
of the world. 
, The Special Committee completed i t s report on August 31, 
1947 and submitted i t to the General Assembly which embodied twelve 
general recommendations, out of them eleven wejo approved unanimously 
> 
and the twelfth (with two members, i . e . , Uruguay and Guatemala dis^-
senting, and one recording no opinion) provided that "in the 
appraisal of the Palestine question, i t be accepted as incontro-
vertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a 
solution of the Jewish problem in general." (43) The eleven re-
coimnendations which were approved unanimously provided for the 
terminaticwi of the Mandate, independence for Palestine after a tran-
sitional period during which administration of the country would be 
the responsibility of the United l^ations and for the preservation 
o f the'Holy Places. The General Assembly was to undertake imme-
diately the initiation and execution of an international arrange-
ment'whereby the problam of the distressed European Jews, of whom 
approximately 260,000 w«re in assembly centres, should be dealt 
42. UUSOOP iieport 1947. vol. 11, pp. 15-16. 
43, UN l^c A/36^i heport of U^COP, Supplement Ko. 11, vol , 1, 
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With as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their 
plight and of the Palestine problem. Minority rights were to be 
protected, peaceful relations were to be a pre-requisite to inde-
pendence, provision was to be'made for economic unity, and the abo-
l i t ion of the capitulations, and lastly, an appeal was to be made 
to both parties.to end acts of violence. 
The Committee then presented two alternatives: 
1, A Plan of Partition with Economic Union supported by 
seven members-of the Committeet Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, 
J^ et her lands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay. This plan came to be iaiown 
as the 'Majority Plan', which recommended partition of Palestine into 
Arab and Jewish States after a transitional two-year period of 
trusteeship under the United Nations with economic union and an 
International city of Jerusalem and its environs under the United 
Jfetions jurisdiction. The transitional period was recommended to 
begin on September 1, 1947, and the United Kingdom was to be appointed 
as the Trustee for the purposes of interim administration. The Arab 
State was to comprise 4,476 square mil^s or 42.88 per cent of the 
total} the Jewish State 6,893 square miles or 66.47 per cent; and 
the Jerusalem International Zone 68 square miles or 0.66 per cent. 
As regards population, the Jewish State was to contain 498,000 Jews 
and 407,000 Arabs, The Arab State was to contain 725,000 Arabs and 
10,000 Jews, The Jerusalem International '^one was to contain 105,000 
Arabs and 100,000 Jews. In addition there were to be 90,000 Bedounis, 
cultivators and stock owners, within the Jewish State, (44) 
44, he port to the General Assembly by the United Wations Special 
Committee on Palestine. London, 1947. p. 83, 
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Ihe Jews, according to the Report submitted by the Mandatory 
power to the United Nations, were holding 1,491,699 dunoms oat of 
a total of 26,323,023 dunoms In Palestine. (45) The Jewish landowner-
ship within the frontiers of the Jewish State was legs than 10 per 
cent while in tim whole of Palestine it was less than 6 per cent. (46) 
2, There was a Federal State Plan supported by three members: 
India, Iran and Yugoslavia. It came to be known as the 'Minority 
Plan' which provided, inter ^i ia , that an independent federal state 
of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital be established after a 
transitional period not exceeding three years. The federal state 
would comprise a federal government and governments of the Arab and 
Jewish state respectively. The federal government would exercise 
f u l l powers over such matters as national defence, foreign relations, 
immigration, currency, inter-state waterways, transport and communi-
cations. The Arab and Jewish States would en^oy fu l l powers over 
local self-government in its various aspects. There was to be a 
single Palestinian nationality and citizenship, with guaranteed equal 
rights for a l l minorities and fundamental human rights and freedoms, 
as well as free access to the Holy Places. (47) 
The Second Annual Session of the General Assembly on September 
23, 1947 set up an Ad Hoc Committee to consider "Question of Pales-
tine} Report of the United Hations Special Committee on Palestine", 
as proposed by U.K., and "Termination of Mandate over Palestine and 
46. Appendix VI to the Keport of the Sub-Committee 2 to the Ad 
Hoc Committee on Palestine (Question, Document A/AC. 14/32 
of November 11, 1947, p. 270. 
46. See Appendix 1. 
47. For f u l l text of the Beport see UK Doc. A/364, iieport of 
Ui^ SCOP, Ito. 11, vol . 1. 
recognition of i t s independence as one State" , (48) as proposed by 
Saudi Arabia and Iraq* 
On September 25, 1947, the Ad Hoc Committee at i ts f i r s t 
meeting Segan its deliberations and decided to invite the Repre-
sentative of Palestine Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency 
to present their views on this question. 
On September 29, 1947, Palestine Arab Higher Committeo's 
spokesman Rajai e l fiusseini, stated that it was the sacred duty of 
e Palestine Arabs to defend tiieir country against a l l aggress ion. 
They were firmly opposed to dissection and partition of Palestine or 
to give special and preferential rights to the minority. There, was 
no legal or moral basis for Jewish claims on Palestine. The 
raison d«etre of the United Kations was, he said, to assist s e l f -
defence against aggression. 
The rights and patrimony of the Arabs of Palestine had been 
the subject of no fewer than eighteen investigations withii^ 25 years 
and a l l to no purpose. The Commissions of inquiry had either re-
duced the national and legal rights of the Palestine Arabs or had 
blossed them over. The few recommendations, he said, favourable to 
the Arabs had been ignored by the Mandatory Power. For these and 
« 
for other reasons already communicated to the United Nations i t was 
surprising that tlis Arab Higher Committee should have abstained from 
co-operating with the investigation, of the UKSCOP and refused to 
appear befoi® i t . He accused the Mandatory Power of having over-
stepped the provisions of Article 6 of the Mandate by permitting 
48. UN Doc. A 3/64, Add. 1 , SuppJiSment i,o. 11, Annex 11, pp.1-2. 
Pocg, A/^87, A/gQQ and A/291. 
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Jewish immigration into Palestine threatening the soc ia l , pol i t ical 
and economic rights of the Palestine Arabs. The representative of the 
Arab Higter Committee had refrained from making any direct comments 
upon the OKSCOP report because the Arab Higher Committee considered 
its recommendations inconsistent with the United Nations Charter- and 
the covenant of the League of Nations* (49) 
The most important reason which made the report totally un-
acceptable to the Arabs was that i t did not consider the validity 
of the Balfour Declaration, It did not consider the meaning of the 
term "Jewish National Home", nor i t took any account of the validity 
and scope of the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine thereto. 
The report of the Special Committee completely ignored the promises 
made to the Arabs and it lent credence to the Jewish claims on Palestine, 
The Arabs were not prepared to accept any proposal based on 
the Balfour Declaration, The Balfour Declaration had been rejected 
by the Arabs on various grounds, that i t was made without their con-
sent and even knowledge', i t was contrary to the principles of se l f -
determination and democracy and furthermore i t was morally untenable 
for i t was inconsistent with the pledges made to the Arabs. Although 
the question of the legality, validity and ethics of the Balfour 
Declaration was raised in tiie General Assembly but the special commi-
ttee neither inquii-ed into i t nor expressed any opinion on i t . In 
the general debate of the Ad Hoc Committee's f i f t h meeting on October 4 , 
1947, Camillis Cheuaoun of Lebanon waitied the Committee that the ma-
jority plan, far from supplying a solution would create a new source 
of friction between the two peoples. According to him "the Arabs 
49, Ad Hoc CommitteeT Third Meeting, September 29, 1947. 
had occupied and possessed Palestine for at least thirteen centuries. 
The argument ccnoBining the historical association of the Jews 
with Palestine, was devoid of foundation". (60) 
Jamali of Iraq declared that the partition scheme was 
totally unacceptable and the key to the probleai lay in the formula 
"Palestine for the Palestinians arid the Palestinians alone." He 
also referred to the use of American money in Palestine where 
"Zionists were relying on dollar diplomacy and extra-territorial 
rights." He declared that "economic development of another peoples' 
country did not entitle a foreigner to pol i t ical rights there, in 
tb© modern world technical and economic superiority should not lead 
to pol i t ical domination." (51) El Khoury of Syria also made a refer-
ence to American economic help to the Zionists in their design on 
Palestine when he saids "the choice of Palestine to satisfy Zionist 
aspirations was not based on hufflsnitarian sympathy but on the inten-
tion of the Zionists in the United States to laimch an economic 
invasion of the whole Eastern world and to achieve that end by creat-
ing a bridgehead ii Palestine, to be the headquarters of their act i -
v it ies , " (52) Zeinuddin of Syria told the committee that "the United 
States had declared itsel f ready to pay for a volunteer force" , "Such 
a force" , he claimed, "although established under the United Nations, 
would be composed of mercenaries in the Zionist cause paid with 
American money. I t would be called a force for the maintenance of 
order, but i t would be used to destroy the very foundations of order 
50, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question.Summary iiecords 
of Meetings, September 25 to Movember 25, 1947, pp. 2-19. 
51, Ib id , , pp. 29-30, 
52, Ib id , , pp. 67-68, 
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in Holy Land." (53) The Partition resolution was r e a c t e d by 
the Arabs becauise it was in violation of the Atlantic Charter*s 
spirit where xioosevelt and Churchill expressed that "thoy desire to 
see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely ex-
pressed Wishes of the people .concerned." (64) The Partition Plan 
envisaged territorial changes which PaJjestinian Arabs were opposed 
to but western powers were pressing i t hard upon unwilling majority 
of the Arabs, A few honest and objective jews were also opposed 
to the partition plan but they were in a hopeless minority. One 
of such objective and conscientious Jews was Moshe Menuhin who 
l e f t Palestine because he was completely "disenchanted with po l i -
t i c a l Zionism" which according to him "implied wars of injustice 
and degeneration of Judaism". To him the "partition plan was merely 
a foothold for the f u l l realization of Eretz Israel"* (55) 
The Jewish Agency's representatives supported the Partition 
Plan with reservations. 
Habi. iibba Hillal Silver addressing the Ad Hoc Committee 
at the fourth meeting on October 2, 1947, praised the Special 
Committse for i ts conscientious labours and good faith, "He support-
ed tfcn o f the eleven recommendations unanimously adopted by UKSCOP. 
The exception was number VI dealing with Jewish Displaced persons. 
He called the committee's attention to the 'intense urge" of the 
overwhelming majority of Jewish displaced persons to proceed to 
63. Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, pp. 79-81. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Menuhin, Moshe, The Decadence of ^^ d^aisn) ir^  our Time 
Beirut, 1969. pp. 114-16. 
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Palestine. 
He told the committee that the Minority plan vas unaccept-
able to the Jewish Agency for i t made provision only for semi-
autonomous centres or provinces. Palestine would, i f the plan was 
accepted, become an Arab State with two Jewish enclaves. The 
Majority Plan was also not really satisfactory to the Jewish people, 
he said. He wanted that "the whole of Palestine, including Trans-
Jordan" as implied In the Balfour Declaration, "should become a 
Jewish State", Silver termed the "proposal for an economic 
union as promising and statesmanlike". According to him "a Jewish 
state must have in i te own hands those instruments of finaiaclng and 
economic control necessary to carry out large scale Jewish immigra-
tion and the related ©commic development", (66) 
Shertok of Jewish Agency for Palestine told the committee 
on October 17, 1947 that "had the Government of the United Kingdom 
carried out i ts obligations under the mandate, the whole area of 
Palestine might have become, in the not too far distant future, 
through large scale immigration and settlement, an independent 
Jewish state with a Jewish majority, (67) The last spokesman of 
Jewish Agency though he no longer held any o f f i c e , to address the 
Ad Hoc Committee was Dr Weizmann, "His appearance," according to 
some writers, "was without precedence and United Nations* cbcuments 
gave no i'eason why i t was allowed". (58) Weizmann appealed to the 
56. Ibid. 
67. ii«po*'t Ad Hoc Committee on the PaliBStine question, 
pp. 109-16, 
68. John ^bert and Hadawi Sami, The Palestine Diarv 1945-1948, 
vo l . Two, Beirut, 1970. 
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United Nations that "the taa;Jority plan of the special committee 
should be endorsed and appealed to the bar of the world's cons-
cience". (69) On October 22, 1947, after long deliberations, the 
Ad Hoc Committee appointed two sub-committees to report on the 
findings of imSCOP Sub-Committee I comprised of Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Poland, South Africa, United States, Uruguay, USSB and 
Venezuela. Sub-Committee I was supposed to study cai-efully the 
possibility of reducing Arab minority to smallest fraction that 
would l?e included in the J^ewish state. Acooi-ding to U.S. repre-
sentative " i t should also consider ways of making the territories 
of the proposed Jewish and Arab states, to which were now allotted 
roughly 60 per cent and 40 per cent respectively of the land area 
of Palestine, oioro nearly equal." (60) 
Sub-Committee 2 comprised of Afghanistan, Columbia, E,gypt, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, It was en-
trusted with the task of drafting a detailed plan for the termi-
nation of the Mandate over Palestine and i ts establishment as an 
independent unitary state. The Sub-Committee 2 f e l t that the compo-
sition of both sub-comfflitte€,s did not do fu l l justice to neutral 
countries. The chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee was approaciasd in 
that connection but he could not see his way to accepting that re-
commendation. The representative of Columbia who was the chairman 
of Sub-Commit tee 2 resigned and was succeeded by Sir Mohammad 
Zafarullah Khan of Pakistan. 
69. Keport Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, pp. 125-26, 
60. John Bobert, gpi, c i t . , p. 229. 
The composition of the sub-committees and the uncompromising 
attitude of the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee had made the Arabs 
believe that the Great Powers agreed upon the Partition Plan. The 
Great Powers wanted to present the Partition Plan before the 
General Assembly as a accon^pli. 
The Sub-Committee 2 proceeded with i ts work and decided to 
concentrate on three items, i . e . legal problem^, refugee problem 
and constitutionai proposals. Working Groups were established to 
look into each problem and they^  were as followss 
A) Legal Problems t Pakistan, Syria and Saudi 
Arabia 
B) Refugee Problems j Afghanistan, Columbia and Lebanon 
C) Constitutional t Egypt, Iraq and Yemen. 
Proposals 
After considering the reports of the three Working Groups, 
the Sub-Committee presented i ts recommendations to the Ad Hoc 
Committee in the form of three draft resolutions. According to 
the f i r s t , the General Assembly, before recommending a solution of 
the Palestine problem, would request the International Court of 
Justice for an advisory opinion on certain legal questions conrected 
with or arising from that problem, including questions concerning 
the competence of the United Kations to recommend or enforce any 
solution contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people of 
Pates t ine. The second resolution recommended an international 
settlement of the problem of the Jewish refugees and displaced per-
sons and stated principles and proposed machinery for the cooperation 
of Member States in such a settlement. The third resolution pro-
vided for the creation of a provisional government of the people of 
Pale stine* 
o <J 
On Hovember 13, 1947 the Ad Hoc Committee met to consider 
the reports of i t s two sub-committees. Sir Alexander Gadogan 
admitted the United Nations' failure to forge conciliation between 
"the two peoples aost directly connected with the future of Palestine". 
He further stated; " I f a scheme of partition were approved and a 
United Nations Commission set up, the Palestine Government would 
hand over i ts authority to that commission". (61) 
According to Ninvic of Xugoslavia the minority plan was 
"the only just democratic and realistic solution of the problem", (62) 
The American representative Mr Johnson spoke in a threaten-
ing mamer saying "the matter could wait no longer. The hour of 
decision had struck. If there were hesitation, the situation would 
be worse in a year's tiir©. If actions were decided upon, the United 
Nations would be equal to the task." (63) 
Sir Mohammad -dafarullah Khan of Pakistan said that "since 
the United Kingdom was relinquishing the Mandate, Palestine, in 
accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 
had th© right to become independent. The people of PaJfistine should 
become free ^ d determine their own future". (64) 
The most devastating attack on tiie Great Powers was launched 
by Mr Husseini o f Arab Higher Committee. He said that "the two 
great champsions of freedom, the USSB and the United States, had 
Joined hands to simport the monstrous perversion of the principle 
61. Ad Hoc Committee on Pal0Stir» Question, 1947, p, 153, 
62. Ib id . , p, 178. 
63. Ib id , , p. 181. 
64. Ib id . , pp. 188, 191-93. 
of self-determination in Palestine. They had disagreed on every-
thing constructive in the United Nations and had agi'eed on only 
one thing - the partition of Palestine". He appealed to the United 
Sations to "participate in establishing a democratic state as pro-
posed by the Arabs, nothing would come out of i t but prosperity 
and peace for a l l " . (65) 
The recommendations of the Sub •Committee were put to voting 
on ifovember 24, 1947. First to be put to the vote were the three 
draft resolutions submitted by Sub-Committee 2s The f i rst part 
providing for the reference to the International Court of Justice, 
Was rejected by a vote of 25 to 18 with a l l abstentions. The 
/ 
second part, dealing v;ith the question of the competence of the 
United Nations was rejected by a bare vote of 21 to 20 with 13 
abstentions. (66) 
The General Assembly met on November 26, 1947 to consider 
the report of the Ad Eoc Committee, On November 29, 1947, Chamoun 
of Ifibanon submitted on behalf of the Arab States, the general 
principles which ought to serve as a basis foi- a compromise. The 
six principles were namely: 
1) A federal independent state shall be set up in 
Palestine not later than August 1, 1948# 
2) The Government of Palestine shall be federal comprising 
the federal government and central governments of 
Jewish and Arab cantons. 
3) Very few Arabs or Jewish minorities should be le f t 
in each canton, 
4) The establishment of the Constituent Assembly elected 
on the principle of direct universal suffrage. 
66, Ibid. 
66, Of f i c ia l records of Second Session of the General Assembly, 
vol. I I , Annex 33, p, 1633* 
5) The Constituent Assetably shall be guided by the 
constitution of the United States 6f America in i t s 
task of defining powers of various government organs. 
6) The constitution shall piotect Holy Places and safe-
guard the rights of a l l religious establishments. (67) 
The representative of Iran asfed for an adjournment until January 15, 
1948 enabling the Ad Hoc Committee to give serious considerations 
to Chamoun's proposal. Jhe USA and the USSR opposed i t . The report 
was taken up and a(fe>pt€d by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions. 
The Partition Resolution divided Palestine into six principal 
parts, three of which (about 56 per cent of the total area) were 
reserved for a "»}ewish State" and the other three with tte enclave . 
of Jaffa for an Arab State ( I t Was 43 per cent of total ai^a). 
About 0.65 per cent area which included Jerusalem and environs was 
declared an "international zone'' administered by the United Nations. 
According to Resolution iro. 181 of i.ovember 29, 1947 ( 68) 
'*The General Assemblys 
"%ving met in special i.ession at the request of the man-
datory power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to pre-
pare for the consideration of the question of the future Government 
of Palestine at the second regular sessionj 
"Having constituted a Special Committee and instruct i t to 
investigate al l questions and issues relevant to the problem of 
Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, 
and 
"Having received and examined the report of the Special Commi-
67. UN Yearbook 1Q47-48, p. 246. 
68. UN Document A/S19; Of f ic ia l i^cords of General'Assembly, 
Second Session, September 16 to November 29, 1947, pp. 131-51. 
See Appendix I I . » » ft-
ttee (Docuaient A/364) Inciudiiig a number of unanimous recommenda-
tions and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the 
majority of tifse Special Committee, 
"Considers that ttie present situation in Palestine is one 
which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly rela-^ 
tions among nations; 
!rak©s note of the declaration by the mandatory power that 
it plans to complete its evacuation of Pates tine by August l , 1948. 
"Bscommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory power 
for Palestine and to a l l other Members of tl^ United liations the 
adoption and impleiaentation, with i^gard to the future Government 
of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out 
below; 
««tie quests thatt 
" (a) fh© Security Council take the necessary measures as 
provided for in the pl«ua for its implementation| 
• "(b) The Security Council consider, i f circumstances during 
the transitional period require such consideration, whether the 
situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. I f , i t 
decides that such a threat exists and in order to maintain inter-
national peace and security, the Security Council should supple-
ment the authorisation of the General Assembly by taking measures 
under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Ka-
tions Commission, (69) as provided in this resolution, to exercise 
69. At i ts hundred and twenty eighth plenary meeting on 
ffovember 29, 1947, the General Assembly, in accordance with 
the terms of the above resolution, elected the following 
members of the United Nations Commission on Palestlnes 
Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the Philippines« 
» J 
in Palestine the functions which are assigned to i t by this reso-
lution, 
" ( c ; Tbs Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, 
breach ot the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 
39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement en-
visaged by this resolutions 
"(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsi-
b i l i t i es envisaged for i t in this plan; 
"Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps 
as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect^ 
"Appeals to a l l Governments end a l l peoples to refrain from 
talcing any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of 
these recouunendationaI and 
"Authorises the Secretary General to reimburse travel and 
subsistence expenses of the members of the CommiSi^ ion referred to 
in Part I , Section B,' Paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such 
form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and 
to provide the Commission with the necessary staff assist in carry-
ing out the functions assigned to the-'Commission by. the General 
Assembly. The Kesolution also provided the following safeguards 
for both Arabs and Jews in their areas* 
" (a ; Establishing in each State a legislative body elected 
by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis o f propor-
tional representat^ion, and an e^rocutive body responsible to the 
legislature} 
" (b) Settling a l l international disputes in which the Stat® 
may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international 
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered; 
" ( c ) Accepting the obligation of the Htate to refrain in i t s 
r A 
international relations fjrata ttae threat or use of force against 
the terr i tor ia l integrity or po l i t i ca l independence of any State, 
or in any other manner incorisistent with the purpose of tb« United 
i><ations} 
" (d) Guaranteeing to a l l persons equal and non-discriminatory 
rigljts in c i v i l , po l i t i ca l , economic and religious matters and the 
enjoymbnt of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free-
dom of rel igion, language, speech and publication, education, 
assembly and association". 
The Resolution also took note of the Holy Places and con-
tained the following provisioios for their preservation! 
"1 . Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious 
buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired, 
"2. The liberty of access, v i s i t , and transit shall be 
guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to a l l residents 
and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem^ 
Similarly, freedom-'of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity 
with existing rigErsT^'FJ^?' ' ' '^^^^ public otder 
and decorum* 
"3 . Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be 
preserved, iWo act shall be permitted which may in any way impair 
their sacred character." 
iveligion and minority rights were granted and safeguarded in 
the following manners 
" 1 . Freedom of conscience and the free exercise o f a l l forms 
o f worship, subjject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, 
shall be ensured to a l l . 
"2 , no dlscrlminatlor. of any kind sbaXl De made between the 
Inhabitants on the g3:ound of race, rel igion, language, or sex. 
"3 , The family law and personal status of the various minorities 
and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected. 
"4 . Mo 1© strict ion shall he iraposed on the free use by any 
citlash of the State of any language in private intercourse, in 
commerce, in rel igion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, 
or at public meetings»" 
. About citizenship end financial obligations the Besolution 
provided that "Palestinian citizens residing in PaJ^stine outside the 
City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Pales-
tinian citizenship, reside in Palsstine outside the City of Jerusalem 
shall,i;|>on the recognition of the independence, become cltizcns of 
the State in which they are resident and en^oy fu l l c i v i l and po l i -
t ical rights." The Partition Resolution was adopted by the General 
Assembly by a thin margin of vote. The motriaers had crit ic ized the 
plan, even those who had voted for i t had their own reservations. 
The Representative of Philippines while commenting on parti -
tion plan saidi (70) "My delegation takes pait in this f inal stage 
in the consideration of the Palestine problem with profound misgivings}" 
The Swedish delegate admitted 71} that the Plan "has i t s 
weak'side and dangerous omissions". 
The delegate of Canada saidi (72) "We support the Plan with 
heavy hearts and many misgivings". 
The delegate of Kew i^ealand also talked (73) of "grave in-
70. UN Resolution 181 (11), November 29, 1947, pp.1313-14. 
71. Ib id . , p. 1312. 
72. Ib id . , p. 1319. 
73. Ib id . , p. 1357. 
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adequacies of the present proposals". 
The Foreign Minister of Belgium also offered comments on the 
Partition proposal and saids (74) "we are not certain i t is completely 
just5 we doubt whether i t is practical} and we are afraid that it 
involves great risks." 
The representative of Cuba, Dihigo opposed the Partition 
Be solution and defended his country*s opposition by making the 
following observation: (75) 
"fhe partition of Palestine Is neither legal nor 
^ust...the Balfour I^claration, in our opinion is not 
legally valid because in i t the British Government was 
offering something which did not belong to i t and which 
it had no right to give." 
"The partition contravens the terms of the Mandate, 
Article 6 of which provides that the rights and position 
of the non-Jewish population of Palestine shall not be 
prejudiced when the indigenous population i s to be de-
prived of more than half of i t s territory and hundreds 
of thousands of Arabs are to be placed under a Jewish 
Government, and forced to become a subject people in a land 
where they were once the rulers." 
The Ethiopian representative commenteds (76) 
" I t i s my duty to state that the i^thiopian dele-
gation finds i tse l f unable to subscribe to the principle 
or partition involved. We cannot agree that a solution 
to the problem of that geographical, historical and eco-
nomic unity known as Pialestine should be sougjit through 
a partition drawn along religions or other l ines" . 
On October 11, 1947, Mrs Pandit, the Indian representative 
to the United Nations saids (77) "Palestine was a predominantly 
74. Ib id . , p. 1365. 
75. General A,ssemb;f.y Plenary Meetinn RecordSy November 28, 
1947, p. 1382. 
76. Ib id . , p. 1406. 
77. AdEoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Summary Records 
of Meetings, September 25 to November 25, 1947, p. 62. 
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Arab country and In any solution that predominance should not be 
altered to the disadvantage of the Arabs. There should also be 
recognized the existence in Palestine of a vigorous, active and 
pol it ical conscious Jewish community which, within the framework 
of the state, should be entitled not only to citizenship rights but 
also to a l i f e of its own. It was clear, therefore, that a solu-
tion could be reached only on the basis of an Arab State in which 
the Jews in the areas where they were in a majority, would en^oy 
wide powers of autonomy". 
Many writers hdve written about pressure the USA brought 
to bear upon member states In order to win their consent for the 
Partition solution. Alfred Lilinthal calls the scheme of Parti-
tion *unhoay« and discusses pressure used in the United Nations, 
The final vote was to be recorded on November 26 but It was delayed 
by 48 hours because "the Zionists had ascertained that they lacked 
positive assurance of the necessary two-thirds", (78) Many members 
* 
like Philippines, Haiti, e t c . were opposed to Partition. The repre-
sentative of Philippines, Komulo observed that "we cannot believe" 
that Partition Besolution, "would sanction a solution to the pro-
blem of Palestine that would turn us back on the road to the danger-
ous principles of racial exclusiveness and to the archaic document 
of theocratic governments... The problc^ m of the displaced European 
Jews Is susceptible of a solution other than through the establish-
ment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine", (79) The 
United States of America exerted her pressure on these members and 
78. Lilinthal, A . , What Price Israel. Chicago, 1963. p. 60, 
79, Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, 11, 1314-15. 
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the result was that Philippines, Haiti, Paruguay and Luxumburg 
cast their aftirmative vote on the Partition iiesolution. Liberia 
was also pressuriaecl to vote in favour of the Partition Resolution, (80) 
"I'be Firestone Tire and uubber Company made use of its concessions 
on Liberia and had tr^smitted a measage to their representative 
directing him to bring pressure on Liberian Government to vote in 
favour of partition". 
iiichard Stevens has observed C81) that had Partition Resolution 
"been put to the vote" on November 26, " i t would have failed to secure 
the two-thirds majority necessary", The fact o f American pressure 
is well established when Stevens talks of Haiti and how she changed 
her position, "The vote of Haiti was reportedly secured through 
Adolph Berle, who used the promise of American economic assistance". 
"fk>bert Nathan gave vai'ious Latin American delegates to understand 
that their vote for partition would greatly increase the chances of 
a Pan-Aioerican road project. Kathan went so far as to use the name 
of the State Department and even of the President in making these 
promises". (82) 
David Horowitz made a solf-coofesslon about pressurising the 
i»3mbers of the General Assembly when he wrote s (83) 
"The fighting, spirit rose in us again. We met at the 
Agency o f f i c es and consulted on ways and means to turn the 
wheel of events once more. The struggle began again. The 
telephones rang madly. Cablegrams sped to a l l parts of the 
Lilinthal, A. , 2JB.- £!£•» P* 65, 
Stevens, Hichard, American Zionism and US Foreign Policy. 
New York, 1962. p. 175. 
Ib id . , p. 179, 
80. 
81, 
82. 
83, Horowitz, David, State in the Makii^. New York, 1953. p. 300, 
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world. People were dragged from their bed at midnight 
and sent on peculiar errands. And, wonder of i t a l l , not 
an influential ^ew, Zionist or non-zionist, refused to 
give us his assistance at any time. Everyone pulled his 
weight, l i t t l e or great, in the despairing e f for t to 
balance the scales in our favour". 
Eermit Roosevelt also discusses American pressure in securing 
votes for the Partition Hesolution. According to him the Zionist 
"rallying a group o f influential Americans and selecting their 
targets with care, they exerted a l l possible influence - personal 
suasion, floods of telegrams and le t ters , and political^ and economic 
pressure" . (84) on unwilling members of the General Assembly to 
secure their support in favour of the Partition fiBSolution. 
The i^ionists and their supporters celebrated Palestine Beso-
lution adopted by the General Assembly. The American pressure on 
various members of the General Asseasbly to secure their support for 
partition resolution has become a fact o f history. 
The Arabs f e l t humiliated and reacted very sharply. The 
Arab delegates in the United Kations, after the adoption of Parti-
tion Hesolution, made i t clear that they and their countries were 
not bound by the decision of the General Assembly regarding the 
Partition of Palestine for such a decision was contrai'y to the 
spirit of the United /nations» Charter. The Arabs protested against 
the partition of Palestine. "An Arab crowd set on f i r e two petrol 
lorries of the American Arabian Oil Company in Amman," A three day 
"protest strike throughout Trans-Jordan began" on December l , 1947 in 
solidarity with the Palestine Arabs." (85) 
(84) lioosevelt, Kermit, "The Partition of Palestine" Middle East 
Jouyq,al, vol , 2 , No, 1 (January, 1948), p. 14, 
<85) The Hindu (Madras), December 3, 1947. 
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Ivokrashy Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister told tlie 
Chambei' Deputies on December 1, 1947 that the "decision (of par-
t i t ion) tal®n by an unauthorized organisation is valueless" and 
he emphasiaed his country's "refusal to recognize i t " . (86) 
The Arab higher Comtaittee ordered a countrywide three days' 
strike and in i t s resolution rejected outright the decision of the 
United Nations to partition Palestine, The committee also directed 
a complete boycott of a l l Jews and resolved "to adopt necessary pre-
liminary measures for implementing a non-cooper at ion policy in-
preparation' for declaring a state of emergency in Palestine", (87) 
On the second day of general strike Arab demesastrators in »3erusalem 
burnt and looted some newish properties and the Zionists also 
began attacking buildings on the pretext that they were being used 
bi' the Arabs as centres of anti-Jewish act ivit ies . 
The Haganah blew up a flour mill in the village of Beit Safafa 
a soda vmter factory at iUjmema Quarter and also the Supreme Moslem 
Council headquarters near the American colony. They also burnt 
down an Arab cinema. (88) 
Jaffa and Tel Aviv were in the trip of fierce fighting and 
Haganah played an active role. The Haganah also requested the 
United States of America to i^nd arms to the Jews in Palestine to 
f ight against the Arabs. (89) The Zionist agents were spread a l l 
over the tilobe and were busy collecting money and arms. The Ameri-
can Jews had raised several million dollars and helped the Zionists 
: iiiitf 2 December 1947, p. 6 . 
I ? : John,Albert & Hadawi, Sami, op.. P« 276. 
89^ Ifew York Times^ December 4 , 1947, p. U 8, 
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In acquiring necessary heavy machinery. In J'rance the members o f 
Haganah bought six pieces of art i l lery . The f i r s t arms purchase 
with the comaiunist countries was completed by the end of January 
1948 "after protracted discussions between Moshe Shertok and Andrei 
Gromyko in Hew York had been concluded in January 1948 and after 
the KuKSians had given their approval. Finally Czechoslovakia 
agreed to se l l arms to the Zionists on February 24, 1948. (90) The 
military strength of the Jews in Palestine by December 1947 was 
assessed by one writer in the following manners (91) 
"At the beginning of December 1947, the 3,000 
permanently mobilised special command groups of the 
liagna and the Palmack, were brought up to a strength 
of five battalions, about 5,000 including 1,200 
women. The Haganah also commenced to mobilise its 
largest battalions - the Hich , or Field Army, as well 
as units of HIM**second~line troops used for the static 
defense of settlements and towns". 
The Zionists were planning and preparing well in advance and i t 
became evident with bloodsheu and violence initiated by Zionist 
underground terrorist groups immediately after the adoption of the 
Partition Resolution. The scheme of well planned massacre of Arab 
population by the Jewish terrorist groups became a known fact when 
a Jewish o f f i c i a l told a British o f f i cer of the Jordan Ar^ Legion 
that Arab majority would rjat be allowed to create intei^nal troubles 
because "that wi l l be fixed, A few calculated massacres w i l l soon 
get rid of them". (92) 
90. John,iiobert & Hadawi, Sami, oil. c^t . , p. 277. 
91. Ib id . , p. 278. 
92. ^i^S^f Sagot (S i c ) , A Soldier with the Arabs. New York, 19o7. p. 81. 
* aish is abbreviation lor Hebrew tieyl Sadeh. 
** HIM is abbreviation for Hebrew Heyl Matzav, 
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$he method of calcul£(fced massacres of Arab population was 
logically consistent with Ben Gurion's thesis that "Force of arms, 
not formal resolutions, w i l l determine the issue". (93) The most 
shockingly inhuman incident was the massacre of Deir Yasin on April 9 , 
1948 in Which the entire village population consisting of 250 men, 
women and chiMren was wiped out. The "evi l deeds" of Deir Yasin 
have been described by Toynbee as "comparable to crimes committed 
against the Jews by the Wazis and it "precipitated a f l ight of Arab 
population, in large numbers, from districts within the range of 
the Jewish armed forces and the subsequent deliberate expulsion of 
the Arab population from distr icts conquered by the Jewish armed 
forces" . (94) 
The Arab villages like Qaza^a, Salameh, Sara's, Qastal, 
Biyar and towns of Jaffa and Acre together with many other villages 
were attacked and occupied by the Jewish terrorist groups. By 
the end of March, the situation in Palestine had further deteriorated. 
The Zionist lobby was very active in the United Nations. They were 
making hectic e f for ts to thwart any likely attempt in the Security 
Council to undo the partition of Palestine. The Zionists were pre-
paring for any eventuality and by accelerating pace and direction 
of theii attack on Palestinian Arabs they wanted to control and 
occupy as large en area as possible befoie the meeting of the United 
Nations in order to present the vrorld body with a fait accompli. 
The Jews in their expansionist drive attaclced and occupied many 
93. Ben-Gurioii, David, Rebirth and Destiny of New York, 
1954. p. 232. 
94. Toynbee, A. , A Study of His toy v. vol . VIU, p. 290. 
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Arab ai«as. A fu l l chronology o f events has been presented by a 
few wrlttrs. On May IS, 1948, the date for the termination of 
British Mandate, many c i t i e s , allotted to the Arabs under the Par-
tit ion Plar., were occupied. On April 19, 1948 Tiberias was occupied, 
Haifa was occupied on April 22, Jaffa was occupied on April 28 and 
the Arab quarters in the New City of Jerusalem on April 30, Boisan 
(95) 
was occupied on May 10 and Acre on May 14. Kabbl Abba Silver 
wanted that the Jowish Agency should proclaim that i t had ended its 
existence and handed over a l l i t s prerogati.es to the provisional 
"Hebrew" Government of Palestine, He was hopeful that "confronted 
by a f a i t accomplij the United i-ations wi l l give the government at 
least the saaae measure of recognition i t was given to the Jewish 
Agency". (96) Tba United States of America in particular and other 
members of the United Nations in ipneral showed great concern 
over rapidly worsening situation in Palestine and asked for 
the sesBion of the Security Council which met on March 30, 1948. 
At the 27Sth meeting of the Security Council, the United States 
representative introduced two resolutions. The f i r s t resolution 
adopted unanimously noted "with grave concern the increasing vio-
lence a-d disorder in Palestine". The resolution called for a truce. 
The second resolution requested the Secretary General of the United 
JNations "to convolce a special session of the General Assembly to (97) 
conslcer further the question of the future government of Palestine". 
96. For fu l l details see: Middle East Joiiry^^ l^. vo l . 2, 
(Washington, D.C., 1948), pp. 216-21 and 329-32. 
96. John, Robert & Hadawi, Sami, gj,. c i t . , p. 351. 
97. i^ BQytf Qf, Sewl%y A/620, pp. 81-82. 
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The resolution was adopted by nine votes in favour, with two abs-
tentions (Ukranian SSt^  and the Soviet Onion) • IJhs BSSH representa-
tive opposed the US second Resolution because i t was to wreck the 
decision of tb© partition of Palestine. Be said that "the United 
States had not only refused to support" the decision of Partition 
"but had raised the question of rescinding i t , and, for that purpose, 
had submitted entirely new proposals", (98) The American policy of 
trusteebhip for Palestine generated a wave of resentment at hoae# 
About 250,000 workers/threatened to quit work "to demand that the 
United Nations carry out i t s original decision for the partitix>n of 
Palestine". (99) The Secretary General of the United f/ations, acting 
under the provisions o f rales 7 and 9 of the rules o f procedure of 
the G«83eral Asseaibly, called the second special session of the 
General Assembly on April 16, 1948 "to consider further the question 
of the iuture governmont of Palestine"* 
The General Assembly had referred the matter to the First 
Committee for consideration and report. Austin of tbe United 
States of Ajoerica opened the debate on April 19, 1948. He told the 
Committee that acts of violance and threats by the Arabs and the 
Jew* had made i t "d i f f i cu l t for the United Nations to find a peace-
fu l solution to the Palestine prohiem" He suggested trusteeship 
but "stressed that the temporary trusteeship should not tm considered 
as a substitute for the plan of partition with economic union". (100) 
98. Ibid. 
99• m U m ^ f A p n i i 4 , 1948. 
lou. Of f ic ia l Hecoxds of Secoi4 Special Session of the General 
Assembly, vol . I I , Main Committee, April 16-May 14, 1948, 
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According to Mabbi H. Silver of the Jewish Agency for Palestine 
Security Council faltered, retreated and capitulated when 
confronted by defiance" by the Aretos. He warned the United ^»ations 
not to take up any new proposal because the Jews "having won state-
hood after centuries of struggle, they would not surrender their 
freedom, nor suspend their activities on behalf of a Jewish state" . ( l o l ) 
The Jewish terrorist groups did not suspend ttieir act iv i t ies , they 
intensified and increased their pressure on Arab population forcing 
them to flee from their homes. The massacre of the Arabs of Pales-
tine was not a spontaneous act. It was rather a "coldly calculated 
plan executed by the Ir^un but with the ictiowledge of the Haganah 
and the Jewish Agency", (102) 
On May 14, 1948, the General Assembly adopted the following 
resolution by thirty-one vote in favour to seven against with six 
abstentions: 
"I he General Assembly 
"Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine 
strongly affirms i t s support of the e f for ts of the Security Council 
to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon a l l Governments, 
organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a 
truce J 
"1. Empowers a United Nations Mediator in Palestine, to 
be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed 
of representatives of Chirm, Francc, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Kepubiics, the United Kingdota and the United 
States of America, to exercise the following functions: 
101. Ibid. , pp. 44-47. 
102. Jewish Ifewfljettor (Hew iork), October 3, 1960. 
2 
" (a) To use his good o f f i ces with the local and 
coffiraunity authorities in PaJisstine tos 
" ( i ) Arrange for the operation of common ser-
vices necessary to the safety and wellbeing of the 
population of Palestine 5 
" ( i i ; Assure the protection of the Holy Places, 
religious buildings and sites in Palestine-, 
" ( i i i ) promote a peaceful ad^ustaent o f the 
future situation of Palestine. . . . 
The resolxition also directed "the United Nations Mediator to con-
form in his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and 
with such iniitructions as tne General Assen4?ly or the Security 
Council may i ssue ; " . . . 
It also "relieves the Palestine Commission tTwi the further 
exercise of responsitoiiitieb under resolution 181 (11) of November 29, 
1947". (103) 
The ilionists were active both in the United Ivations and 
outside. The terrorist groups liiee Irgun, Stern, the Haganah and 
the Paloach were conducting their reign of terror with no less 
effectiveness even during the session of the United r.ations. It 
was always their strategy to come to the United Wations with a 
fa i t accomiaia,. ^he z^ionists were in fu l l ccsitrol of the situation 
in Palestine and, during the period from Kovember 29, 1947 to May 15, 
1948 they took matters into their own hands and attaclced and occu-
pied major c i t ics and towns In Palestine before the termination of 
the British mandatory rule of Palestine on May IS, 1948- Ben-Gurion 
was honest enough to have accepted the Jewish forceful infiltration 
in the following wordsi (104) 
3-03. Un Doc. A/SeSy 1948, pp. 5-6, 8-9. 
104. Ben-Gurion, op. 9 PP» 296, 530-1. 
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"AS April began, our war of ^dependence swung de-
cisively from defence to attack. Operation »Kacli-Shon'' 
. . . v/as launched with the capture of Arab Hulda and of 
Deir MuheiBin and culminated in the storming of Qastel". 
Further 
"Until the British l e f t , the Hagamh captured many 
Arab positions ar.d liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jaffa 
and Safad . . . so, on the day of destiny, that part of 
Palestine where the Haganab could operate was almost 
clear of Arabs", 
Ti^ 2lionist forces equipped with modern weapons had not only occu-
pied parts of the territory awarded to the "Jewish'* state but had 
also invaded and occupied those parts like Jaffa and Acre which were 
assigned to the 'Arab' state and parts of International zone of 
Jerusalem. The withdrawal of the British forces had renderea 
Paiestinian Arabs defendless and at tha niorcy of the Jewish terror-
i s t s . The Arab States did not intervene in Pities tine so long the 
British Government was responsible for the maintenance of peace and 
security in Palestine. The Arabs had exhibited remax'kable control 
over tiiGir emotions by refraining from intervening in Palestine to 
save their brothers' lives and properties. They had always res-
pected the United imtions and its resolutions while the Zionists 
had violated the principle enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Wations. They bad always complied with the United Nations resolu-
tions provided thty were not in contravention of the principles of the 
Charter. The Arab States were accommodating and willing to carry 
out the decisions of the world body but not at the cost of s e l f -
i-espect and terr i tor ial integrity wiiicn every state i s supposed to 
maintain. The Zionists had crucified the United l^ Jations and the 
piinciplfis i t stood for by thoir unilateral proclamation of the 
Jewish State on May 15, 1048. The establishment of Israel on May 16, 
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1948 was a flagrant violation of th© United Kations resolution. The 
status of Palestine, after the termination of the Mandate, was to 
be determined by the majority of i ts population and not by the 
minority. 2he provisions of the Partition w e t o become ef fect ive 
two months after the withdrawal of British forces, i ,e . not before 
July 15, 1948. fhe United Nations' Mediator was supposed to take 
over the administration of Palestine from the British authorities. 
"'Xhe G^stabliehaient of Israel on May 15, 3948 was therefore invalid 
l^iT idle al ly , and non-binding." (105) 
According to one writer "the nev? 'state of Israel* vras the 
px'Oduct of bruto force, created in violation of the prlnclplcc of 
the United Kations Charter, the Universal Iteclaratlcn of Human 
i\lghts, and the vei-y resolution under which the Israelis now claim 
sovereignty" , (106) 
(ki May 16, 1948, the armies of the Arab States entered into 
Palestine, They had not gone to Palestine to liquidate Israel , their 
purpose was to protect the lives and properties of their Arab brothers 
living in Palestine, They wanted to contain 2,ionist expansionism 
which w&s threatening the terr itor ial integrity of nelghbouririg Arab 
States. The Arab armies were in Palestijae not in dcfiance of the 
United Nations resolutions but to "prevent the forcible nullification 
of parts of that A^esolution by a State which had been summoned into 
being by that self-same Resolution." (107) The purpose of the Arab 
105. Sayegh, A. Fayez, The Arab Israeli Conflict. Kew York, 1964. 
p. 26. 
106. Hadawi, Sami, Blttor Harvests* Palestine 1914-47. New York, 
1967. p. 99. 
107. Sayegh, A. F . , c^t , , p. 26. 
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Governments in'dispatching their forces was clearly communicated 
to the United Nations Secretary General in a cable sent by the 
Secretary General of the I^ eague of Arab States. He Informed him 
that "The recent disturbances in Palestine farther constitute a 
serious and direct threat to peace and security within the terr i -
tories of the Arab states themselves. For these reasons, and 
considering that the security of Palestine is-a sacred trust for 
them, and out of anxiousness to check the farther deterioration of 
the prevailing conditions and to prevent the spread of disorder and 
lawlessness into the neighbouring Arab lands, and in order to f i l l 
the vacuum created by the termination of the Mandate arid the failure 
to replace it by any legally constituted authority, the Arab Govern-
ments find themselves compelled to intei^veno for the sole purpose 
of i-estoring peace and security and of establishing law and order in 
Palestine". (108) Glubb" Pasha of the Arab Legion confirmed it when 
he wrote (109) about the intervention by Trans-Jordanj "In 1948, 
Trans-Jordan became involved in hosti l i t ies with Israel. She did 
not want to do this. She intended only to occupy that part of 
Palestine awarded to the Arabs, but the Jews were already in the 
Arab area when the Arab Legions arrive a". 
The situation in Palestine became very explosive and capable 
of engulfing the entire Middle East area. The United Nations moved 
swiftly and on May 22, 1948 the Security Council adopted a resolution 
calling upon " a l l Governments and authorities, without pre;3udice to 
108. Palestine Higher Committee, "Why the Arab States entered 
Palestine" (Mew York), pp. 9-11. 
109. Glubb, John Bagot (S i r ) , £ i t , , p. 302. 
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the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned, to 
abstain from any hostiije military action in Palestine, and to that 
end to issue a ceasefire order to their military and para-military 
forces". Clio) 
The Security Council Resolution of May 22, failed to 
bring peace to Palestine. On Ms^  29, the Security Council adopted 
another resolution: 
"Desiring to bring about a cessation of hosti l it ies 
in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and 
position of either Arabs or J^ ews, 
"Calls upon a l l governments and authorities concerned 
to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a 
period of four weeks" . 
The resolution also called on the parties "to undertalse that they 
wil l not introduce fighting personnel" into the area "during the 
ceasefire", (111) 
Israel accepted the truce with reservations. She violated 
every provision of the cease-fire orders and used i t as a pretext 
to streniithen her military power for anotiier strike, Israel accept-
ed the truce to g^in time and it was evident from Ben Gurion's 
statement of June 10, 1948t (112) 
"Our bounds ai'e set wider, our forces multiply 
we are administering public services, and daily new 
multitude arrive, , . Al l that we have taken we shall 
hold. During the ceasefire, we shall organize adminis-
tration with fierce energy, strengthen our footing in 
towns and country, speed up colonization and Aliyah 
(immiLfation), and look to the army". 
The hostilities resumed after four weeks when the ceasefire 
was over. On July 7, 1948, the Security Council addressed (113) "an 
110. UN Doc. S/773f iiesolution 49 (1948) of May 22, 1948, 
U l . UK Doc. S/8Q1, i^solution 50 (1948), May 29, 1948, 
112, Ben Gurion, Qjt, p. 247. 
113, UK Doc. S/875f May 7 , 1948, 
82 
urgent appeal to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce 
for sucli period as may be decided upon in consultation with the 
Mediator". On July 16, 1948, the Security Council ordered for an 
indefinite ceasefire, declaring that: (114) 
"Subject to further decision by the Security Council 
or tl]© General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, 
in accordance with the present resolution and with that 
of May 29, 1948, until a peaceful ad^ustmep-t of the future 
situation of Palestine is reached". 
Israel remained adeuaant and kept violating the resolutions and 
pursued her expansionist designs against the Arab world. On August 19, 
1948, a new resolution was adopted which introduced new provisions 
in addition to those embodied in the resolution o f May 29, 1948. 
According to new resolution "each party is responsible for the ac-
tions of both regular and irregular forces operating under .its 
authority or in territory under i t s control". It also stipulated (115) 
that "no party is permitted to violate the trace on the ground that 
i t is undertaking reprisals or relations against the other party5 no 
party is entitled to gain military or pol i t i cal advantage through 
violation of the truce". 
Israel was not observing any moral scruples and was gaining 
military strength and advantages to expand its frontiers at the cost 
of Arab world. According to one i^ionist journalist, ^on Kimchei (116) 
"When the truce ended, a coherent Jewish army with a tiny hut e f f e c -
tive air force and a small and daring navy was ready to give battle." 
The Mediator appointed by the General Assembly submitted his report 
114. XSh Doc. S/902^ May 15, 1948, pp. 22-23. 
• Security Council Off ic ial Kecord^ (SCOE), Number 107, 
August 19, 1948, p. 60. 
116. Kimche, Jon, The Seven Pillars ^ London, 1950. pp. 249-50, 
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on September 16, 1948, He had recommended in his report few revi -
sion in the Partiticai Plan, "according to which the i^geb would 
becoms pai't of the Arab state in exchange for Galilee" • (117) 
Count Folk Bernadotte was assassinated on September 17, 1948, one 
day after he had. submitted his report to the UK. 
The assassination was engineered by Israel and the United 
Nations asiked the provisional government of Israel to submit a 
report to tt^ Security Coancil about the tragedy* Israel failed to 
submit any report and the Security Council in i t s resolution .of 
October 19, 1948 noted (118) "with concern that the Provisional 
Government of Israel has to date submitted no report to the Security 
Council or to the •Acting Mediator regarding the progres;^ of the 
investigation into the assassination". 
The truce proved too ineffective to disengage warring par-
t ies , The United Nations was very anxious to bring peace to Palestine, 
On Isovember l o , 1948 the Security Council adopted a resolution which 
provided more plausible and effective measures to restore peace in 
Palestine, The iiesolution gave a new line o f action which f e l l 
within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, The i^solution de-
clared that "the situation in Palestine constitutes a thi"eat to 
the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter, The 
Security Council "decides that, in order to eliminate the threat 
to the peace in Palestine and to faci l i tate the transition from 
the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall 
be established in a l l sectors of Palestine; 
117, Sayegh, A, F, , gjs., c l t . . p, 30, 
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"Calls upon the parties directly Involved in the 
conf l ict in Palestine . . . to seek agreement forthwith, 
by negotiations conducted either directly or through 
the Acting Mediator on Palestine , with a vlsw to the 
imHiediate establishment of the armistice, including: 
(a) . "The delineation of permanent armistice de-
marcation lines beyond the armed forces of the 
respective parties shall i:ot move5 
(b) such withdrawal and reduction of their armed f o r -
ces as will ensure the maintenance of the armistice 
during the transition to permanent peace in Pales-
tine" . (119) 
Befoie proceeding further i t may not be out of place to say a few 
words about the »competence» of the United Jiations, The question, 
of the competence of the United nations was raised during the dis-
cussion pn the Partition ISesolution. Entezam of Iran wanted to 
know whether " i t l ies within the competence of the General Assembly 
to recommend either of the two solutions proposed by the majority 
or by the minority of the United Nations Special Committee on Pales-
tine} or whether i t lies within the rights of any member state or 
group of member states to implement atiy of the- proposed solutions 
without the consent of the' people of Palestine, (120) The Syrian 
representative El Khouri proposed "the establishment of a further 
Sub-Committee to be composed of Jurists to advise on the competence 
of the General Assembly to take and enforce a decision". (121) 
The United Jiations as an international organization had every right 
to consider Palestine (question but i ts competence to propose any 
solution and enforce any decision i t fancied was not beyond doubt. 
OK Doc. S/1080 (1948), pp. 29-30. 
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Palestine qu0stion was brought before the United Kations 
by the United Kingdom. The main reason given for such a step was 
that the two contending parties i«€, Arabs and Jews were unable to 
agre© on the solution. The United Kingdoa, after having failed to 
bring about a cotapiomise between the Arabs and the Jews, requested 
for the inclusion of Palestine question on the agenda of the General 
Assembly's Special Sessim. Article lo of the United fetims Charter 
had given the General Assensbly the power to "discuss any question 
or any matter within the scope of the present Chai'ter'^  and make 
recommendations regarding i t . 
The General As^mbly created a special committee on Palestine 
consisting of eleven nations and its Job was to "ascertain" and 
record facts, and to investigate a l l questions and issues relevant 
to the problem of Palestine". 
The UKSCOP drew up »Partition Plan' and the General Assembly 
set up an Ad lioc ConMiitlee to consider the proposal. Two sub-
committees came into eadstence to accomplish the job of studying 
UJiSCOP proposals. Tb^  siiOs-comaiittee 1 supported Majority Plan o f 
Partitioning Palestine with economic union. The sub-coranaittee 2 
submitted three proposals and one of which suggested that the General 
Assembly should ask the International Ck>urt of Justices 
(a) "Whether the United %tions Is competent to reoommend 
either of the two plans and recoaimendatIons of the ma-
jority or minority o f the United nations Special Commi-
ttee on Palestine, or any other solution involving 
partition of the territory of Palestine or a permanent 
trusteeship over any or part of Palestine, without 
the consent of the majority of the people of Palestinej 
(b) Whether the United Nations or any of i t s member states, 
is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement 
of any proposal concerning the Constitution and future 
Government of Palestine, in particular any plan of 
partition which is contrary to the wishes or adopted 
without the consent of the inhabitants o f Palestine". (122) 
122. quoted in Sohn, Louis, Cases on United Law. London, 1956. 
p. 472, 
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She resolution requesting the General Assembly to seek the 
advice of the International Court of Justice was rejected. 
The Partition Resolution of the United Nations did not expresjs 
free opinion of its member states. The United States of America 
had use a enormous financial and diplomatic pressure on members of 
the United Hations to win their support for creating a Jewish state 
in Palestine, Weizmann had accepted the fact of American pressure 
being used on various member states in order to get their support 
for the Partition Plan, He also accepted that the Partition Be so-
lution was passed because of President Trumanintervention and 
pressure, he Monde^  the French newspaper also refers (123) to 
"the weight of twenty bil l ion dollars of credits which the United 
States granted to certain countries at that time". 
The Partition Hesolution adopted by the General Assembly 
vas ultra vires for i t violated the principles laid down In the 
Mandate and the United Nations Charter. The people of Palestine were, 
under the Partition Plan, deprived not only of pol i t ical control 
over their territory but also of their state i t se l f . The Covenant 
of the League of Nations ted recognized the independent existence 
of the people of Palestine. The Mandatory power was responsible for 
looking after the Interest of the people of Palestine and was ex-
pected to help them towards the goal of complete independence. The 
United Nations Partition Plan had violated another mandate provi-
sion whereby i t was provided that at the termination of the mandate 
the territory of Palestine would be placed under the control of 
the "Government of Palestine". The United Nations was competent to 
123. Le Monde,, November 2-3, 1947. 
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deal with the question o f Palestine only to the extent i t consti-
tuted threat to peace and security. Apart from situation Involving 
a threat to peace, the United Nations had no power under the Charter 
to impair the integrity of Palestine against the wishes of the 
majority of Palestinians. 
The question of the United iiations competence is linked up 
with the question whether the United Nations was a continuation of 
the Ijeague of Imtions as regards the mandate over Palfestir®. 
Many reputed jurists of International Law hold the view that 
there exists no legal continuity between the Mandate system of the 
League and tmsteeship system of the United i^ations. According to 
Hans Kelson (124) "Ihe United Nations did not succeed to the rights 
of the League of Jiations as regards the former Mandated Territories", 
Kelson's point of view cannot be acceptod because the Charter of the 
United ifations under Article 80(1) very caearly stipulated that 
mandates which create rights and obligations for states s^d peoples 
would remain in force until they were replaced by an alternate 
system. The International Court o f Justice upheld article 80 when 
i t affirmed! (125) 
"From al l aspects, the raison d'etre of obligations 
resulting from mandates and their f i r s t objective remains. 
As the fulfilment of these obligations did not depend on 
the existence of the League of Wations they could not 
become obsolete simply because this organ of supervision 
had ceased to ex is t , nor could the right of the population 
to see the territory a<^inistered according to three rules 
be coixiitional on the existence of the League", 
A, McWair, an authority on intemational legal order saidj (126) "The 
124, Kelson, Hans, The Law of the United nations. London, 1951, 
pp, 696-97, 
125, International Court of Justice, July 2 , 1950, on South West 
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dissolution of the League of l^ations has not put an ensa to Mandates", 
The competence of the United Nations regarding Palestine Is well 
established and substantiated by well reputed jurists and verdicts 
Of International Court of Justice. Ttre United Nations Charter under 
Articles 10 and 14 had empowered the General Assembly to step in 
wherever peace and security were threatened but the United Nations-
cannot go beyond a limit and such limits are well set by the provi-
sions of the Charter. Article 1, Para 2 sets some limits on the 
competence o f the United Nations. I t sanctions the right of s e l f -
^ determination to the peoples and Palestinians were not and should not 
have been exceptions. Article l Para 2 asks the United Nations to 
work "in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law" and to respect "the principles of equal rights and self-determi-
nation of the peoples". The United Rations cannot act as a super 
state empowered to impose i t s w i l l and decisions on unwilling peoples. 
According to Brownlie: (127) 
" I t is doubtful If the United Nations has a capacity 
to convey t i t l s inter alia because the organization cannot 
assume the role of terr itor ial sovereign... Thus the re-
solution of 1947 containing a partition plan for Palestine 
was probably ultra vires (outside the competence of the 
United Nations) and, I f i t was not, was not binding on 
member states in any case", 
.The General Assembly violated Articles 10 and 14 because there was • 
a distinction between recommending some proposals as a solution and 
adopting a plan which was against the wislues of the majority of the 
people. The Partition Plan was a decision which was not mere re-
commendation but also implied some amount of coercion because it was 
127. Brownlie, I , Pji-j^c^pjg of Ptt'p.llg Iptieryifttlofiftl Ibm, 
Oxford, 1966. pp. 161-62. 
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provided in the plan that any e f fort to alter by force the sett le -
ment embodied in the Partition Besolution woald mean breach of the 
peace or act of aggression» 
The General Assembly woald haw been acting within i ts area 
of jurisdiction had i t made recommendations to the United Kingdom, 
It - violated the provisions of the United Sations Charter by creat-
ing a Cofflraittte to administer Palestine on behalf of the United 
Nations. 
Kelson is of the view that (128) "the decision of the United 
iiations to administer a territory for the purpose of establishirjg 
two states therein cannot be within the codipetence of the United 
nations". 
1!he General Assembly has no competence to impleraent a deci-
sion nor it is empowered to request the Security Council to take 
enforcefcent measures by virtue of Article 14, In fact the Council 
i s not competent to impleiaent the recommendations mad© by the General 
Assembly. 
The General Assembly was expected to have ordered for a 
plebiscite In Palestine to secure the consent of the peoples of that 
country. The Assembly did not do i t , instead it partitioned Palestine 
into Jew and Arab States without bothering about the right of se l f -
determination of the peoples of Palestine, 
The Charter of the United Nations does not confer any power 
on the General Assembly to uproot people from their areas and deny 
people the right of self-determination and the right to exercise 
power within a pol i t i cal entity. The United IJations failed to act 
128. Kelsmt I , aa* P* 197. 
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impartially and its unfortunate decision of partitioning Palestine 
into Arab and Jew State brought nothing but miseries and sorrows 
for the people of the area, 2he people of Palestine in particular 
and the people of Middle East in general are s t i l l paying the 
price with their l i f e and property for the f o l ly of the United 
Nations committed at the bid of the Zionists and their masters, 
i . e . the USA and tbs USSR, 
S 6 
Chapter II 
THE ARMISTICE. AND THE UNEASY PEACE 
The situation in Palestine, after the withdrawal o f British 
administration, had further deteriorated. The Zionists were now 
free to conduct their terrorist activities against local Arab popu-
lation of Palestine. Israel , a Jewish State, was proclaimed on 
May 15, 1948. The Zionists had stepped up their systematic and 
well planned attacks on Arab l i f e and property. The armed forces 
of Arab States had gone to Palestine to save the world from another 
war. Their aim was to prevent the local conflagration from prol i -
ferating to neighbouring areas. While Arab Israeli forces were 
engaged in fighting, the United Nations stepped in and the Security 
Council adopted a resolution on May 22, 1948 calling upon a l l parties 
to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine and ordered 
ceasefire. Israel did not observe the truce and stubbornly stuck 
to i t s policy of eaqpansion in Arab Land at tte cost of indigenous 
people. The truce was flagrantly violated and Arab territory was 
annexed by Israel. The United Nations was kept informed of Israeli 
violations of the truce but the world organization proved to be too 
ir^ffective to prevent Israel from adopting reckless and expansionist 
attitude. The Arab States were s t i l l hopeful of the United Nations 
delivering good and justice to them» 
On October 23, 1948, the Egyptian representative addressed a 
letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations informing him 
about Israel 's violations of the truce and recording deep concern 
o f his Governmei.t at the deteriorating situation. The representative 
wrote: "the Zionist forces in Palestine are constantly violating the 
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truce and defying the ceasefire orders given by the Council". The 
representative told the United Nations Secretary General of the 
dangers inherent in Israeli violatlans^^of the Council's directives. 
He stated (1) that the violations were not ordinary to be overlooked, 
they were "being done to such an extent as to endanger the safety 
of our troops and to render it imminently inevitable for them to take 
the necessary counter-measures, unless the Security Council acts in 
proper time". The Security Council met to consider the situation 
in Palestine but i t failed to act as an instrument of restoring peace. 
The Security Council was trapped in a marathon debate on technicali-
t ies and procedural questions. The time was slipping o f f and Israel 
conscious of the United -Nations ineffectiveness, refused to see 
reason and kept its policy of expansionism in f u l l gear. Israel 's 
invasion of the Efegeb came as a shock and it posed a serious threat 
to the territorial integrity of the Middle Eastern states. The 
JMegeb invasion was deliberate, meticulously planned, ruthlessly and 
unscrupulously executed. The Acting Mediator condemned Israel for 
"serious breach of the truce". In his report submitted to the Security 
Council he wrote: "A serious breach of the truce is involved in 
the Negeb outbreak as defined in the resolutions of the Security 
Council on May 29, July 15 and August 19. The resolution of July 15 
ordered an indefinite ceasefire, while the resolution of August 19 
specifically precludes acts of reprisals and retaliation". 
The 2iionists' attack on the Negeb was preplanned and un-
provoked. It was launched in ord^r to gain administrative and po l i -
t i ca l control over the territory of which assassinated Mediator, 
1. Security Council Off ic ial Records (SCOR), 373rd Meeting 
Document Ho.S/1052, October 26, 1948, p. 2, 
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Count Bernadotte, had deprived them and which they wanted to 
conquer to present the United Nations with a |'a|.t accompli. The 
Zionist attack was well-planned and the Acting Mediator in his report 
said: {2) 
" I t would seem clear that the military action 
of the last few days on a large scale which could 
only be undertaken after considerable preparation 
and could scarcely be explained as simple retaliatory 
action for an attack on a convoy". 
The Acting Mediator also referred to "widespread attack on the 
Egyptian positions by Israeli Land and air forces in the Nsgeb and 
heavy shelling and ariel bombing of Gaza." The Security Council 
heard the ieport but could not take any action because the Big Powers 
supported and appeased Israel. They ignored its violations of the 
United I^ations resolutions. The situation in the Middle East further 
deteriorated and the Acting Mediator submitted another Report on 
October 28 to the Security Council. 
He presented a grim but real picture o f the Middle Eastern 
situation and told (3) the Security Councili 
"In my view, a c r i t i ca l stage has now been reached 
where bolder and broader action is required. Such 
action as an indispensable condition to an eventual 
peaceful settlement of the po l i t i ca l issues might well 
take the form of a clear and forceful declaration by 
the Security Council that the parties be required to 
negotiate either directly or through the Truce super-
vision organization a settlement of a l l outstanding 
problems of the truce in a l l sectors of Palestine, 
with a view to achieving a permanent condition of 
peace in place of the existing truce". 
The Acting Mediator then proposed before the Council that an armistice 
was the only way out to bring peace to the trouble land. He saidj (4) 
2. Acting Mediator's Report^ S/1055 , 373rd Mtg., October 26, 1948. 
3. Ibid. 
4 . ^ctin|^Me|iatgr^s heport to Security CounGll^ 374th Mtg., 
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"Such negotiations would necessaiMly aim at a foiwal 
peace, or at the minimum, an armistice which would 
involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization 
of armed forces or their wide separation by the crea-
tion of broad demilitarissed zones under the United 
Nations supervision" • 
Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom supported the Acting Mediator, 
aaXph Bunch in his plea that the Security Council should take bolder 
and broader actions. Cadbgan in his speech said: (6) 
"The best hope, pending a pol i t i ca l settlement of the 
whole question is to arrive at a more comprehensive and 
stable state of armistice, or even peace, rather than 
seek to prolong and enforce the truce", 
The United Kingdom and China prepared and presented a draft 
resolution before the Security Council on October 28, 1948. The 
draft resolution (S/1069) embodied the suggestions made by the Acting 
Mediator. 
The draft resolution asked (6) both the parties to "withdraw 
military forces to the positions they occupied on October 14", 
The Soviet Union opposed (7) the draft resolution on the 
ground that "the Acting Mediator has not exhausted a l l possible ways 
and means under the previous resolution". According to Malik, the 
USSii representative, the Acting Mediator should be given a fair 
chance "to use a l l possible means for the settlement of the questions 
that have arisen between the two parties". 
Abba Eban of Israel also objected to the draft resolution. 
6. SCOR. Wo. 122, Qjtober 28, 1948, p. 9. 
6. Ibid. 
7 . Ibid, 
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According to him, " I t corresponds less and less to the realities 
of the situation in the Negeb and-to the prospects of a peaceful 
settlement. It i s likely to provoke a grave and unnecessary cr is is 
in.a matter clearly susceptible of peaceful negotiations". (8) 
The United Kingdom and China tried their utmost and started 
lobbying to get the resolution passed but with no success. Many 
amendments were offered and finally the United Kingdom withdrew i t s 
draft resolution. On November 16, 1948, Canada, Belgium, France 
tr io presented a new draft resolution (S/1079) which embodied the 
suggestions of the Acting Mediator and provisions of UK-China draft 
resolution. The draft resolution presented by Canada, Belgium and 
France stipulated: (9) 
"The Security Council, 
"Reaffirming its previous resolutions concerning the 
establishment eaid implementation of the truce in Palestine, and 
recalling particularly its resolution of July 16 1948 which deter-
mined that the situation jUi Palestine constitutes a threat to the 
peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter5 
"Taking a note that the General Assembly is continuing 
its consideration of the future Government of Palestine in 
wsponse to the request of the Security Council of April l , 1948 
"5tfithout prejudice to the actions o f the Acting Mediator 
regarding the implementation of the resolution of the Security 
Council o f liovember 4 , 1948, 
"Decides that, in order to eliminate the threat to the 
peace in Palestine and to faci l itate the transition from the present 
truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be est -
ablished in a l l sectors of Palestine; 
"Calls upon the Parties directly involved in the conf l ict 
in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 
of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations con-
8. Ib id . , No. 123, October 29, 1948, pp. 8-9. 
9. Ib id . , No. 126, November 16, 1948, p. 64. 
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ducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, 
with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice Includingj 
" (a) The deliniation of permanent armistice demarca-
tion lines beyond which the armed forces of the 
respective parties shall not move j 
" (b) Such withdrawal and reducticai of their armed forces 
as wi l l ensure the maintenance of the armistice 
during the transition to permanent peace in Pales-
tine" • 
Alexander Cadogan in his comments saidt (10) "By adopting the Cana-
dian, Belgian French draft resolution the Security Council w i l l thus 
be consolidating the ground already gained and...making a further 
definite step forward". 
Eban of Israel was not very happy with the draft resolution 
because he believed i t (11) "to be Incompatible in principle and 
e f fec t with the purpose of a peace settlement and with the conditions 
of an unpre;)udiced negotiations". The Arab States were a b i t 
skeptical about the Security Council*s resolution being implemented. 
They had not lost a l l hopes in the effectivenss of the United Na-
tions but they were certainly in a self-searching mood for putting 
a l l their eggs in one basket, iawsii Bey of %ypt was betraying 
Arab's dwindling hope in the United Nations when he said: (12) "We 
have", previous decisions of the Council, "unimplemented and seek 
yet another decision", Elkhouri of Syria was more outspoken and 
straightforward when be added: (13) 
10• Ib id . , p. 15. 
11. Ib id . , p. 3, 
12. Ib id . , p. 21. 
13. SCQH, Ho. 126, ifevember IS, 1948, p. 6. 
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"I f the Security Council f a i l s to execute the truce, 
as i t decided to do in previous resolution, with what 
right and with what possibility can i t take a step forward 
and decide on an armistice", -i 
Tba Camdiani Belgian, Fronch iiesolution was adopted by the Security 
Council on November 16, 1948. 
To implement the Security Council^s resolution of November 16, 
1948, bilateral negotiations between Israel and Arab States were 
held at Khodes# The negotiations were conducted by Ralph Bunch, the 
Acting Mediator. Four Armistice Agreements were concluded and signed 
at Rhodes in 1949» Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement was signed on 
February 24, 1949, with Lebanon i t came on March 23, 1949. Jordan 
Israel Armistice Agreement cams on April 3, 1949 and the last country 
to have signed armistice with Israel was Syria. The Security Council 
iiesolution of DIovember 16, 1948 was written large on a l l armistice 
agreements. The preamble attached with every agreement clearly est -
ablished (14) that the parties were "responding to the Security 
Council resolution o f November 16, 1948... calling upon them to fac i -
litate the transition from the present truce to permanent poace in 
Palestine, to negotiate en armistice". 
Ths conclusion of armistice agreements between Arab States « 
and Israel did not mean that there was no state of "belligerency" 
between two warring parties. According to the Interpretation of 
Israel , Armistice meant end of war and it paved the way for perma-
nent peac» on the basis of accomplished fact . The Arab States thought 
of armistice agreements as Instruments of temporary and uneasy peace. 
The armistice agreements, according to the Arab States, did not mean 
termination of "state of war". The interpretation given by the Arab 
14. Preamble to Egyptian Israeli Armistice Agreement, February 24, 
1949. For further details see ArabrIsraeli.Armistice Agreements . 
Beirut, 1967. " 
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States was in conformity with the principles of liiternationaX law. 
According to Oppenheim (15) "Armistices or trucos, in the 
wider sense of the term, are a l l agreements between belligerent forces 
for a temporary cessation of host i l i t ies , They ^re i a qo wise ^ fee 
£a2JM .^ etaaQ I^firy bepattse, tJas, oX ^ yeffains. 
l i ^ laelli^eyefit^p SMSSelve^, ^ ij^e fegljigereftts ^ BSJlfesaU, 
m ^ poiiQts beyond ^ mey.e, cessation qX host i l i t ies" . 
The Security Council resolution of November 16, 1948 also 
stipulated that the armistice was a "provisional measure under Article 
40 of the Charter" of the United Nations pending consideration by 
the General Assembly of the question of "the future government of 
Palestine". 
The chief purpose of amistice agireements was to disengage 
warring parties and create as large an area as possible between the 
two fighting forces. The establishment of four demilitarized zones 
along the armistice demilitarizod zone in the area of El-Au^a and i t s 
vicinity. Article VIIX, para 1 readt "The area comprising the 
village of El Au^a and vicinity shall be demilitarized, and both 
Egyptian and Israeli allied forces shall be totally excluded there-
from". Article X para 1 said» "The execution of the provisions of 
this Agreement shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission 
composed of seven members, of whom each party to this Agreement shall 
designate three, and whose chairman shall be the United Nations Chief 
of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior o f f i c e r 
15. Oppenheim, L. , International Law . A Treatise, vo l . I I , 
London, 1935» p. 433. 
from tbs observer personnel of that organization designated by him 
following- consultation with both parties to this Agreement". Under 
tt» same Article para 2 it was provided (16) that "the Mixed Armistice 
Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Bl-Auja", 
A demilitarized zona was also created along the Syrian border. 
The Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement on July 20, 1949 provided 
for the demilitarized zone would be created, Article V, para 1 stateds 
" I t is emphasized that the following arrangements 
for the Armistice Demarcation Line between the Israeli 
and Syrian armed force® and for the i>emilitarized zone 
are not to be interpreted aa having any relation what-
ever to ultimate territorial arrangement affecting the 
two parties to this Agreement". 
The Demilitarized lione was defined in such a manner that the possi-
bi l i ty of fr ict ion was reduced. Para 2 of Article V statedt 
"In pursuance of the spirit o f the Security 
Council resolution of 16 November 1948, the Armistice 
Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized zone have been 
defined with a view towards separating the armed forces 
o f the two parties in such a manner as to minimize the 
possibility of fr ict ion and incident, while providing for 
the gradual restoration of normal civi l ian l i f e in the 
area of the Demilitarized iione, without prejudice to the-
ultimate settlement" . 
Under the same ArticOe para 5(a) it was stipulated! (17) 
"Where the Armistice Demarcation Line does not 
correspoiKi to the international boundary between Syria 
and Palestine, the area between the Armistice Demarca-
tion Line and the boundary, pending f inal terr i tor ia l 
settlement between the parties shall be established as 
a Demilitarized zone from which ttM armed forces of both 
parties shall be totally excluded, and in which no act i -
vities by military or para-^ilitary forces shall 'be 
permitted. This provision applies to the Ein Gev and 
Dardara sectors which' share form part of the Demilitarized 
zone". 
16. Israel^gypt Amlstice Agreement. February 24, 1949. 
17. Israeli-Syrian Get^eral Armistice Agreement^ July 20, 1949. 
Of f i c ia l Hecorda of the Secujrjty Council^ 4th Year, Special 
Supplement ivo. 2. 
Tb® Syrian forces were present in areas declared as the Demili-
tarized zone and after signing the Armistice Agreement, the Syrian 
army withdrew from the areas in pursuance with the Agreement, 
The Mount Scopus Demilitarized zone was created in Jordan 
Sector and comprised of the Hebrew University and i^adassa Hospital 
compound along with Augusta Victoria building» On July 7 , 1948, 
Jordan signed an agree sent with Israel and agreed to treat the area 
as demilitarized and i t was to be placed under thi protection of 
the United I^ations, Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement had a map 
which showed the Demilitarized aone on the side of Jordan where 
Israel had no jurisdiction. 
Another Demilitarized zone was Jabal-«1 Mukabbir area. It 
comprised the 034 Governnient House, the Arab College, a Jewish 
Agricultural Sdiool. Apart from the %mi l i t arize d zone there was 
no man*s land between the Arab and Israeli part of Jerusalem, The 
Latrun area was also a Ko Man's Land. 
The most important principles enshrined in a l l Armistice Agree-
ments were (1) No party should try to make use of truce as instru-
ment of galriing military or pol i t ical advantage. Article IV, para 1 
of the Egyptian Israeli Armistice Agreement stated: (18) "The 
principle that no military o* pol i t ical advantage should be gainsd 
under the truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized." 
Article I I , para 1 of the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agree-
ment reaffirmed the same principle. 
18. For texts of a l l Four Armistice Agreementr, see Arab-Israeli 
Armistice Agreement (February-July, 1949), The Institute for 
Palestine Studies, Lebanon, 1967. p, 40. 
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Jordan-Israeli and Syria-Jsraell Armistice Agreements con-
tained the same provisions too. Another significant point to keep in 
mind and underlined by a l l Armistice Agreement was that its pur-
pose was not to draw a boundary line between Israel and Arab states. 
Its basic purpose was purely military rather than pol i t i ca l , Ti:^  
armistice demarcation line was to delineate the line beyond which 
the armed forces of their respective parties would not move. The 
armistice line was delineated without prejudice to rights, claims 
and i»sitlons of either party to tte' armistice as regards the u l t i -
mate settlement of Palestine question* 
yiTttce. ^ftpegta^ JrPIA 
The Armistice Agreements were intended to disengage both 
warring parties and keep a v ig i l on their military activities against 
each other, The Security Council created Mixed Armistice Commissions 
for truce supervision. The Acting Mediator who was incharge of a l l 
UN peace keeping activities in Palestine was relieved of his res-
ponsibil it ies, On August 18, 1949 General McNaughton of Canada and 
Chauvel of France submitted a revised draft resolution before the 
Security Council, According to the Be solution (19) 
"The Security Council 
"Having noted with satisfaction the several Armistice 
Agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties 
involved in the confl ict in Palestine in pursuance of its resolu-
tion of 16 November 1948j 
"Decides that a l l functions assigned to the United Nations 
Mediator on Palestine having been discharged, the Acting Mediator 
is relieved of any further responsibility under Security Council 
reeolutione" • 
19, SCOg, 436th Meeting, No, 37, August 8, 1949, pp. 2-3, 
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The xtesoiution further 
"Notes that the Armistice Agreements provide that the 
execution of these agreements shall be supervised by Mixed Armis-
tice Commissions whose chairman in each case shall be the United 
Watiais Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a 
senior o f f i cer from the obserwr personnel of that organization 
designated by him following consultation with the parties to the 
Agreements", 
The Resolution was adopted on August 11, 1949 by 9 votes to 
now with two abstentions namely Ukranian Soviet Socialist Bepublic, 
Union of Soviet Socialist fiepublics. A l l members of the Security 
Council were unanimous in asking that the Armistice Agreement should 
meticulously be observed, but some of them at the same time demanded 
a sizeable reduction in truce supervision personnel. Eban of Isrs^l 
was one of . those who insisted that Truce Supervision Organization 
should be dissolved and al l personnel, with the exception of 
certain specified personnel, should be withdrawn. Eban said» (20) 
" I believe that the Security Council would meet the 
situation i f it did cal l for the withdrawal of a l l 
observer personnel except those specified as being re-
quired by the text of the Armistice agreement themselves". 
Mahmoud Fawzi Bey of Egypt was in agreement with Eban of Israel 
when he too demanded for the withdrawal of UN observers. He said: (21) 
"The principle of withdrawing al l supervision is a very sound one 
indeed. I unhesitatingly subscribe to i t as a principle. No one 
wants outside supervision i f i t can be helped". . ' , Rafik Asha of 
Syria supported the views of i-gypt and said (22)"My delegation i s in 
favour - in complete favour of the withdi?awal of a l l personnel, pro-
viaed that the terms of the Armistice Agreements are ful ly complied with". 
20. Ib id . , p. 11. 
21. Ib id . , p. 10. 
22. Ib id . , p. 12. 
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The Armistice Agreements had provided f o r the supervision of 
the ceasefire and Mixed Armistice Commission were created under the 
chairmanship o f the Chief of Staff , The Powers and functions of 
the Mixed Armistice Commissions were clearly defined in a l l the 
General Armistice Agreements. 
Article X, para 1 of the Egyptian Israeli Armistice Agree-
ment stated that "the execution of the provisions of this Agreement 
shall be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commissibn composed of 
seven members of whom each party to this Agreement shall designate 
them". Para 4 of the same Article provided: "Decisions of the 
Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be based 
on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, de-
cisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members of the 
Commission present and voting". Para 4 also provided for the est -
ablishment of a Special Committee which would consider appeal. The 
Special Committee was to be composed of the United iKatlons Chief 
of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and one member each 
of the Egyptian and Israeli Delegations to the Armistice Conference 
at Bhodes. 
The Mixed Armistice Commission would formulate i ts own rules 
of procedure and would be empowered to employ Observers In such 
numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of Its 
functions. As to the Interpretation of the meaning of a parti-
cular provision of the Armistice Agreement, the Commission's inter-
pretation was to prevail subject to the right of appeal as provided 
In paragraph 4. 
The Observers and other personnel of the Mixed Armistice 
Commission were ftree to v is i t any area. They would be accorded 
S9 
suchfieedom of movement and access In the areais covered by this 
Agreetnent as the Commission may determine to be necessary* 
Jordan-Israel General Armistice Agreement of April 3 , 1949 
created a Special committee for the purpose of "formulating agreed 
plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of this Agree-
ment and to e f fect improvement in i t s application," 
The Special Coamittee was to formulate agreed plans regard-
ing "free movement of t ra f f i c on vital roads, including the Betlehem 
and Latrun Jerusalem roadsj resumption of cultural and humanitarian 
institutions on Mount Scopus", e t c . 
Para 3 of Article VII stated (23) "The Special Committee shall 
have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to 
i t . Agreed plans and arrangements formulated by it may provide for 
the exercise of supervisory functions by the Mixed Armistice Commi-
ssion." 
The Security Council was acting under Articles 39 and 40 in 
order to bring peace to the troubled land of Palestine, Its 
ordeirs of ceasefire, truce and armistice were directed to restoring 
normal peaceful conditions in Palestine and pave the way for mutual 
negotiations between two parties at loggershead. 
All pious hopes were shattered and Israel refused to listen 
to a l l voices of reason. The Security Council resolutions were flouted 
with impunity and Israel followed the policy of expediency and did 
not care to renounce her expansionist postures. 
The Security Council Hesolution of i^vember 16, 1948 was an 
improvement on i t s previous resolutions. I t had provided for an 
23. Ibid* 
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effective Truc^ Supervision Organization but Israel was bent on 
wrecking a l l e f forts of the United Kations to maintain peace. She 
concluded General Armistice Agreements with foiir Arab States, i . e . 
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. 
Israel under the Armistice Agreements was bound to respect 
the "injunction of the Security Council against resort to military 
force in the settlement of the Palestine question". (24) She was 
also bound by the principle that "no military or po l i t i ca l advantage 
should be gained under the truce ordered by the Security Council." (25) 
Israel flouted both the obligations i t voluntarily assumed 
under the Armistice Agreements, She invaded Arab territories and 
annexed them. Her policy of expanding frontiers was in violations 
of tte United Nations Charter and its resolutions. The Security Council 
in its Kesolution Wo, 61 dated November 4, 1948 asked Israel to 
withdraw her armed forces from those areas which i t occupied after 
October 14, 1948. 
The Security Council He solution of November 16, 1948 and 
subsequent General Armistice Agreements of 1949 established perma-
nent truce lines and demilitariKed zones, Israel , as a party to the 
resolutions and Armistice Agreements, was supposed to carry out her 
obligations and refrain from the use of force. She chose the path 
of delinquency and flagrantly violated the Armistice Agreements, 
The demilitariaed zones, which were created to keep the armed forces 
at a distance, were forcefully occupied by Israel, El-Au^a, a demi-
litarized zone near iigyptian border end the Headquarter of the Mixed 
24 , 25 See Article 1, Para 1 and Article IV, para 1 of Egypt 
Israel General Armistice Agreement, February 24, 1949. 
106 
Armistice Cominlssion, was overrun by IsraBli artaed forces and occu-
pied. Many times Israel was found as having committed aggression 
and was subsequently asked to vacate the occupied area but Israel 
had always refused to oblige the United Nations. I t showed scant 
respect for the Mixed Armistice Commission or Special Committee. On 
March 20, 1950 Israel committed a serious violation by occupying 
Blr Qattar area. The Mixed Armistice Commission aslgsd Israel to 
vacate the areaj the Special Conmittee confimed the decision of 
the Coffiffiission and asked Israel to iBave Blr Qattar, but Israel re -
mained adamant and i ts armed forces cont^.ued to occupy the area* <26) 
The matter was referred to the Security Council and on 
Hovember 17, 1950 a resolution was passed asking Israel to withdraw 
i ts forces from the zone. 
The most serious violation of the Armistice Agreement was 
committed in September I960 when Israel i armed forces occupied El -
Au^a demilitariaed zone. On September 2 , 1950 Israel i military per-
sonnel rounded up about 4,000 Bedouins l iving in the Kegeb and around 
the demilitarlaed zone of El-Auja. The Arab Bedouins were driven out 
of the territory occupied Israel . According to the reports the Israel is 
burnt tents,crops and other possessions of Bedouins. 
Israel had violated the sanctity of the demilitariased zone 
of El-Au;ja. I t established a military camp under the guise of a 
"kibbutz". They expelled Bedouins from the area to station their 
armed forces at a point which was strategically wry important. On 
September 9, 1960 the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt 
26. UK Document A/1873^ p. 55. 
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wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations. 
He charged (27) "the Israeli authorities" of undertaking a "large 
scale military operation, using troops, automatic weapons and ar-
inoured vehicles, in order to drive out of the El-Au^a area of 
Palestine a l l the Bedouins settled in that demilitarized zone and 
its surrounding areas. After being driven as far as the Egyptian 
frontier by the Israeli forces, which were guided by an Israeli re-
connaissance aeroplane, those Bedouins were compelled on September 2 
to cross frontier between Lgypt and Palestine to seek refuge in the 
E-gyptian territory of Sinai", the letter pointed out that it was 
not the f i r s t case of expulsion of local Arabs, many more had occu-
rred: "Between June 26, 1949 and September 4 , 1950, more than a 
thousand Arabs men, wotoen and children living in the areas of Haifa, 
Acre, Galilee, Jerusalem, Ramie and El-Majdal, and in other districts 
under Jewidi control, were forcibly removed from their homes and 
constrained to take refuge in the narrow Gaza Hafah sector under 
Egyptian occupation in southern Palestine". The United Nations was 
requested to intervene "in the events reported above and, while 
there is yet time, stop the expulsion of the remnants of the Arab 
population in Palestinian territory now under Jewish control". 
On September 18, 1950 General Riley,Chief of Staff after 
making a thorough investigation ascertained the fact and confirmed 
Israeli violation of the Armistice Agreement. In his Report submitted 
to the Security Council General Riley confirmed (28) that "Israeli 
military rounded up some 4,000 Bedouins and after driving the Bedouins 
27. SCfig, 611th Meeting, 16th October 1960, No. 53, pp.3-5, 
28. UN Document 6/1797^ September 18, 1950. 
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across the border the Israel is burnt tents, crops and possessions, 
and that thirteen Bedouins were .killed by Israelis during those 
operations". The question o f the Arabs expulsion and Israel ' s 
occupation of Bir Qattar and El-Auja was brought before the Security 
Council by Egypt, Mahmud Fawzi B6y of Egypt told the Security 
Council on October 16, 1950 that Israel i violations were (29) "not 
a slight mistake here and there in the application of the Egyptian-
Israel i General Armistice Agreement} nor i s i t an unintentional 
trespassing on the rights of a fev/ Palestinian Arabs", "What we 
are facing now", told the Egyptian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s much bigger 
and much more serious than a l l that. We are facing a continuation 
and. an intensification of premediated, systematic and ruthless 
aggression by world po l i t i ca l Zionism against the rights of the 
lawful Arab inhabitants of Palestine. . . " 
Fawzi referred to I s rae l ' s policy of "relentless chasing 
out of the Arabs and their possessions to the motley hordes of in-
vaders from abroad". He told the Council that the Israelis compelled 
Arabs to sign a document before being driven out. He quoted from the 
report of the Chief of Staff dated September 18, 1950 where he 
observed that the Arabs expelled were "required to sign a statement 
agreeing to go to Gaza, never return to Israel , and abandoning a l l 
property rights" . (30) 
Israel was declared in i l l e g a l occupation of Bir Qattar and 
other areas of the demilitarized zone along the Egyptian border. 
29. §QMt 511th Meeting, I^o, 53, October 16, 1950, p, 6, 
30. I b i d , , p. 7. 
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The Armistice Commission came to the conclusion that occupation of 
Bir t^ &ttar was a violation'of Article XV para 1 and 2 , of the 
Egyptian Israeli General Armistice Agreement. Israel f i led an appeal 
» 
with the Special Committee which upheld the decision of the Mixed 
Armistice Commission. Israel did not comply with the verdict of the 
Commission confirmed by the Special Committee and refused to evacuate 
areas she occupied. The matter then was brought before the Security 
Council. On October 16, 1960 Eban of Israel denied a l l charges 
levelled against i t by Egypt. He said: " I categorically state 
that Israeli forces have not violated either Egyptian territory or 
the demilitarized zone of El Au^a". He further denied the charge 
of ex^l l ing the Bedouins from Sl-Au5a. He declared that the bedouins 
expelled were not-the residents of Israel , they were Infiltrators who 
had crossed into Israeli territory without permission. He admitted 
that "the number of Azazmeh tribesmen sent back after i l legally 
crossing the frontier and committing violence is approximately 200 
families, and not 4",000 persons as alleged". He also declared with 
stubbornness "the immigration policies of my government are not the 
business or the concern of Egypt or i ts representative". "The 
immigration policy was the chief pride and achievement of Israel in 
the world" (31) and i t was Israel 's internal matter. 
Mahmud Fawzi did not allow Eban score a point and refuted 
him and his statement presented before the Security Council. On 
October 20, I960 Fawzi called Eban's bluff and refuted Israel 's 
claim that the Bedouins expelled were inf i l trators . He told the 
Council that such a theory i f accepted "would mean that Israel 
31. Ib id . , pp. 13-22. 
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could deprive a l l the remainder of the lawful Arah population of 
Palestine of their identity papers, and throw them out across tho 
frontier Into iDgypt or into any other surrounding country". He 
further informed the Council that "wg have ample proof of the 
t 
forced expulsion of Arabs from Palestine", He quoted the report 
o f ttie Acting Chairman of the Egyptian Israeli Mixed Armistice 
Commission of September 6, 1950. The Acting Chairman confirmeds (32) 
"Up to September 3, the number of expelled Bedouins totalled 4,071 
people (1,791 are in Sabha and 2,281 are in Ain-^uadeisa and in 
Gabil-el Daghra, east of Ain-el-Qiderrat)". The chairman also con-
firmed that those Bedouins were living "in Beersheba area, where, 
during the Mandate, they had received their rations from the British," 
The Security Council also heard Jordan's complaint against 
Israeli violations of international frontier, Baikal of Jordan 
informed the Security Council on October 2o, 1960 about Israeli 
aggression and occupation of Jordanian territca?y. He told (33) the 
Council that "tbe Israelis committed a flagrant act o f aggression 
upon Jordan when they occupied a part of Jordanian territory on 
August 28, 1950". "This aggression", declared Baikal, "gives mater-
ia l form to the permanent fear of the Arab States that the Isfaelie 
have embarked upon a policy of expansion at their expense". The 
Council at that juncture got involved in a debate of procedural 
importance. The issue was whether the Council was competent to 
hear and entertain complaint from both the parties over and above 
the Mixed Armistice Commissions which were directly responsible 
32, SCORy 514th Meeting, Wo, 56, October 20, 1950, pp. 8, 10. 
33. Ib id . , p. 6. 
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for looking Into such complaintGeneral ailey and Kalph Bunch 
appeared before the Security Council to record their views over the 
issue. The United States representative expressed (34) his Govemment*s 
opinion in the Security Council regarding the jurisdiction of the 
Mixed Armistice Commission, '*Jt is the opinion of ay Government 
that a l l but one of the complaints should be handled in the Mixed 
Armistice Commissions* We do not believe that the remedies avail-
able to the parties have been exhausted* This i s not to Imply that 
this Council should slight the^e complaints, but In the toterests 
Of ensuring the continued effective operation o f the Mixed Armistice 
Commissiona and the various other special negotiating bodies, the 
Cooncil should not intervene until i t has been clearly established 
that complaints exist which cani.ot be handled by the establisbsd 
machinery'* • Austin o f America presented before the Security Coimcil 
a draft i-esolution (S/1899) jointly sponsored by France, 0K and 
(35) 
The Kesolution stated that the Security Council "takes note of the 
statement o f the Government of Israel that Israel armed forces wil l 
evacuate Bir Qattar", It implied m order to Israel to evacuate 
Bir <iattar area forcibly occupied by i t in violation of the Armistice 
Agreement, Israel did not yield and remained adamant, Eban of 
Israel while commsnting on the draft resolution stateds (36) 
"There is absolutely no question of the evacuation 
of Bir Qattar, The question related to the removal 
of a certain military force at Bir Qattar, in accord-
ance with the Mixed Armistice Conwiission*s decision of 
20 March 1950. The Armistice decision related to that 
military circumstances". 
SSfiiif 522 Meeting, to, 64, I^vember 13, I960, p# 14, 
35, Ib id . , p. 16, 
^Ofif SE4th Meeting, Ko, 66, November 19, I960, p . 14, 
107 
The Resolution asking Israel to withdraw from Bir Qattar was 
adopted on l^ ovember 17, 1950, by a vote of 9 in favour with 2 abs-
tentions. (37) 
Israel ignoied a l l the Security Council resolutions and chose 
to continue acting like an unbridled horse. Tho forceTal occupation 
of El-Au^a by Israel was a part of i ts scheme to bring Jewish immi-
grants to settle thera down in Arab land. The occupation of El-
Auja was of immense significance* from the military point o f view. 
General^Burns has pointed out K1 Aula's importances (38) " I t lay 
across the second principal route f o r the invasion of Palestine 
from i-gypt (or vice versa). It was from this general area that 
the decisive attack by the Israeli forces on the Egyptian forces 
had been launched in December 1948, and that another was to erupt 
again in October-iPfowmber 1956", According to Burns El Aula's 
occupation by either party was enough to have disturbed the military 
balance in its favour, " I f , indeed, the zone had remained", wrote 
Bums, "demilitarized - that is to say, i f i t could not have been 
traversed or occupied by the armed forces of either side - i t would 
have been almost impossible for either to have carried out an of fen-
, sive successfully, the balance of forces as they were". 
The Israelis did not want to withdraw from i-l Au^ la and on 
September 28, 1953 they established in the area settlement called 
Ketsiot, The Israeli cojutention was that the settlement was for 
the purposes of farming and agriculture and they claimed that the 
demilitarized zone was part of Israeli territory. The Egyptian con-
37. Ib id . , Two abstentions were i^ gypt and USSH. 
38, Bums, E, L. M., Between Arab and Israel. London, 1962, 
p. 92. 
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tent ion was that the settlement was a military organization and not 
an agricultural centre. It was proved on October 6, 1954 when 
one captured Israeli 'Kibbutz' member toM the United Nations Mili-
tary observer that 'he was a private in a certain company of a 
certain battalion of the .Israel Army. He also said a l l the inhabi-
tants of the Kibbutz were soldiers in their unit, and consisted 
of one Captain, four KCOs, sixty-five men soldiers, and f i f teen 
woiaen soldiers. They had the usual armament of an infantry company, 
r i f l e s , sub-machin® guns, light machim-guns, mortars, and anti~ 
tank weapons" . Burns further test i f ied (39) "The Israeli carried 
identification papers proving he was a member of the Army, and his 
story sounded truthful". 
The Mixed Armistice Commission in i t s meeting on October 2, 
1953 was seized of the matter and decided that (40) "the existence of 
an Israeli Police in the new Kibbutz established in the demilitarized 
zone i s a violation of Article IV, paragraph I , and Article VIII 
of the General Armistice Agreement". 
Geceral Bennlke told the Security Council on Kovember 9, 
1953 that Israel regarded (41) "the demilitarized zone being an 
integral part of Israel" and "any Israeli activity in the demilitarized 
zone is an internal Israeli affair and of no concern of anybody". 
Israel Isept up i t s pressure on and penetration into Arab territory. 
On February 28, 1955 "two platoons of Israeli paratroopers crossed 
the Armistice Demarcation Line east of Gaza, advanced more than 
39. Burns, c j^ , , p, 93, 
40. ON Document 
41. 0N Document S/PV. 635. p. 36. 
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three kilometers into the Egyptian controlled strip, and attacked 
a military camp near the railway station", killed fourteen Egyptian 
soldiers and wounded sixteen soldiers. "Another group of Israeli 
soldiers entered ttie strip six kilometres south of Gaza and laid 
an ambush on the main road fro® Rafah" . (42) Egypt brought the 
matter to the Security Council on March 4 , 1965. The Security 
Council meeting of March 9 , 1965 was important from the point of 
view that a l l members of the Council showed deep concern at the 
deteriorating conditions in the Middle East and held Israel res-
ponsible for such a condition. 
Wadsworth of the USA told the Council that (43) "the incident 
which has occurred in the Gaza district is indefensible from any 
standpoint". He. warned Israel against latter 's policy of retal ia-
tion and made it clear that his country would not stand by Israel 
i f she pursued her policy of reprisal because he stated: "We oppose 
any policy of reprisal and retaliation". 
Hoppenot of France recorded his country's disapproval of 
Israelis policy of expansion and reprisals and expressed "anxiety 
on the events that took place at Gaza on the night of February 28, 
1956". He told the Council that (44) "we cannot remain indifferent 
to the fact that about sixty soldiers and civi l ians, most of them 
Egyptians, died during the attack by Israel forces". He congratulated 
the i^gyptian Government and nation "on the calmness and self-control 
42. Burns, fiji. c i t .^ p. 17. 
43. SCOH, 692 Meeting, March 4, 1955, p. 3. 
44. Ibid. 
that they have preserved in the face of these lamentable events". 
Sobolov of the USSR accused Israel of being 'responsible* 
for the "Gaza incident". He said that (45) "these acts by the 
Israel armed forces are a serious violation of the United Nations 
Charter and are increasing tension in the area". 
On March 17, 1955 Egypt's complaint of "violent and premedi-
tated aggression comoiitted on February 28, 1955 by Israel armed forces 
against Egyptian arn»d forces inside Egyptian controlled territory 
(46) 
near Gaza, causing many casualties, including 39 dead and 32 wounded" 
was submitted to the Security Council. 
Eban of Israel tried to justify the Gaza incident in terms 
of self-defence. He told the Councils (47) "the armed clash on 
i'ebruary 28, 1955" was the result of "a series of long standing 
antagonism and immediate provocations exploded into a conf l i c t " . 
He tried to t e l l the Council that Israeli aggression in Gaza was aimed 
at wiping out "the centre ftom which the violence is organized and 
directed". Gaza was the "Egyptian Military headquarters" from where 
military activities were being conducted against Israel and her 
people". 
Hoppenot of France rejected Eban's explanation and stated (48) 
"The Security Council cannot allow Israel to seek satisfaction for 
i t s grievances against Egypt, even i f legitimate, t^hrough a policy 
of reprisals and revenge. I f the Gaza incident, coining on top of the 
45. SCOE, 693 Mtg., March 17, 1955, p. 5 . 
46. Ib id . , pp. 5-6. 
47. SCOji, 694 Mtg., March 23, 1955, pp. 2-3. 
48. SCOiv, 695 Meeting, March 29, 1955, p . 6. 
1 
Qlbya incident, were tbe expression of such a policy, Israel would 
have to be prepared to bear alone the consequences of the censure 
of that pol icy" . 
France, United Kingdom and the United States jointly spon-
sored a draft lesolution (S/3378) in the Security Council* The 
resolution declared Israel as having violated the Armistice Agree-
ment and the Security Council resolutions. Peerson Dixon of the 
United Kingdom told the Security Council that (49) " i t was established 
in the Mixed Armistice Commission that units of the Israel army had 
crossed the demarcation l ine, attacked an outpost in the Gaza strip 
manned by the Egyptian army. "This was a delibe.rate and planned 
military operation". 
Lodge of USA charged Israel of being guilty of violating its 
United Nations Charter obligations, "The United States believes", 
he said, (60) "that, whatever the provocation might have been, there 
was no justif ication for the Israeli military action at Gaza. 
Israel 's retaliatory actions are inconsistent with i ts Charter 
obligations", the draft resolution was unanimously adopted by 
the Security Council on March 30, 1955. The resolution condemned 
Israel for violating the Armistice Agreements and the resolutions 
of tiae Security Council particularly the ceasefire resolution of 
July 15, 1948. The «»equrity Council Resolution also called upon 
Israel to take effective measures to prevent the recurrence of such 
military actions. 
Israel disregard the Security Council resolution and on 
49. Ibid . , p. 3. 
50. Ib id . , p. 10. 
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September 21, 1965 the Chief of Staff reported to the Security 
Council that Israel was not willing to abide by the resolutions o f 
the Security Council and the Israeli army had occupied the demili-
tarized zone, (51) 
The Israelis launched a full-fledged attack on El Au^a 
again on l^ iovember 2, 1955 when "Israel i soldiers confined the UN 
military observers to their rooms in the United Nations building 
at K1 Auja and then moved in force against the Egyptiaia position. 
Fifty Egyptians were killed and over forty were taken prisoners in 
the attack." (52) 
On September 5 , 1956, the Chief of Staff lodged a complaint 
with the Security Councils (53) "the Israeli army continue to occupy 
the ii-l-Au^a zone and because of her aiiiitary occupation of the demili-
tarized zoiB, Israel refuses access to El Auja to the Lgyptian members 
of the Mixed Armistice Commission". Such refusal was a flagrant 
violation of Article X para 2 of the General Armistice Agreement bet-
ween i^gypt and Israel under which ii-l Auja was declared not only the 
demilitarized zone but also the Headquarters of the Mixed Armistice 
Commission, 
Israel did not stop there, i t continiB d expanding despite 
severe warning from the United Nations. The situation in the Middle 
East In 1956 was very explosive and fJasser's 26 July's announcement of 
nationalizing the Suez Canal proved a catalyst. England ai»3 France 
suffered the severest blow by Nasser's announcement. France, Britain 
51.- UK Doc. S/3596^ Annex VIII. 
52. Hutchison, H. E . , Violent Truce. New York, 1956. p. 114. 
53. UW Doc. S/36S9j Annex, Section I I , paras 1, 9 and 10. 
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and other European countries were de^ndent on Middie Eastern 
o i l and now Egypt was in a position to cut o f f supply of o i l to 
those countries. Ihey were planning measures to face the challenge 
thrown in their face by Nasser. By September the situation had 
further deteriorated and General Burns wrote a memorandum to Sep-
tember 14, to the Secretary General acquainting him with his own 
assessment of the situation. Burns wrote to Dag Hammarsk;Joldj (54) 
"I think that i f hosti l i t ies between the disputants in the Suez canal 
question should break out, Israel might try to settle some accounts 
with the Egyptians* She might provoke a situation where she could 
attack - with self-Justif ication, at any rate - the Egyptian forces 
remaining in the Ll-Arish. El Queseima - Hafah area". General 
Bums continued with his assessment and toM the Secretary General: 
"It appears highly probable to me that tl::® Egyptians 
have withdrawn two of the throe Divisions they had in this 
area, using the troops withdrawn for defence against 
possible attempt to occupy key points on the Suez Canal. 
I'he Israelis , therefore, might find this a good oppor-
tunity to deal with the remainder of the El Arish concen-
tration thus securing hostages to force a peace sett le -
ment" . 
The Israelis found i t a good opi^ortunity to settle i ts accounts 
with iigypt. ihe Sinai Peninsula was overrun by the Israeli armed 
forces on October 29, 1966. The Egyptian positions in this region 
were attacked by f u l l military strength of Israel. The invasion of 
Sinai was an invasion of i!.gypt and it was the most flagrant violation 
of the Armistice Agreement and of the principles of territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of a state upheld by the United I<ations 
Charter. 
It was an undeclared war of aggression against t.gypt which 
54. Burns, QSl* sUm P. 
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flouted a l l c ivi l ized norms and established principles o f inter-
national law. On October 29, 1956, the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice 
Agreeioent was unilateral/ abrogated. 
Ben Gurion was comiaenting on the question of the Armistice 
Agreement between Egypt and Israel when he stateds (55)"The Armistice 
with Egypt i s dead, as are the armistice lines, and no wizards or 
magicians can resurrect these l ines" . 
Lieutenant-Colone 1 Kursella asked for the withdrawal of the 
UK personnel of the MJjxed Armistice Commission from ^aza on the 
ground that the Armistice no longer existed. General Burns was in i -
t ia l ly agreeable to ths proposal but when he reported th© matter "to the 
Secretary General he took very strong stand against any withdrawal, 
pointing out that since the duties of UKTSO under General Armistice 
Agi-eement were not suspended by the "present state of affairs" , the 
personnel of Ul'^ TSO were required to remain at their posts", (66) 
The Israeli military o f f i cers wero accordingly informed that the 
United JJations personnel belonging to the United i^ations Truce Super-
vision Organization would stay in Gaza. 
The Security Council met on October 30,1956 to examine the 
grave situation arisen as a result of Israeli aggression on Egypt, 
The Egyptian representative Loutfi Informed the Council about the 
invasion of Hgypt by Israel in collaboration with Franc© and Great 
Britain. He called "upon the Security Council, which is responsi-
ble for the maintenance of international peace and security, to 
face i t s responsibilitiBs toward maintaining peace and security in 
56, Ifew l^ ork Times, November 8, 1956, 
56, Bums, ci ,t , , p. 184, 
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Middle iJ-ast". 
The draft resolution calling upon aH the parties concerned 
immediately to cease-fire Wi.s vetoed by France and United Kingdom, 
two permanent members of the Security Council, ^ 
Brile;j of Yugoslavia commented on the draft resolution (57): 
"A draft resolution, the purpose of which was to stop the fighting 
in the Sinai Peninsula and to avoid a major conflagration, has been 
vetoed by two permanent members of the Security Council, This veto 
is a blow to the resolution of peace in the Middle Bast, It is a 
blow to the United JNations" • The Yugoslav representative suggested 
the "possibility of calling an emergency session of the General 
Assembly under the terms of General Assembly resolution {377/V) en-
t it led "Uniting For Peace", since "the Security Council, through 
the use of the veto, has been rendered powerless", (58) 
The f i r s t emergency sessicn of the General Assembly was 
held from November 1 to November 10, At the f i r s t meeting the 
representative of the United States of America presented before the 
General Assembly a draft resolution (A/3266) according to which the 
General Assembly would? (59) 
1. Urge "as a matter of priority that a l l parties now 
involved in hosti l it ies in the area agree to an imme-
diate ceasefire"} 
8, Urge the parties to "promptly withdraw al l forces 
behind the Armistice line" and observe "scrupulously 
the provisions of the Armistice Agreements"; 
3, All members should refrain from "introducing military 
goods in the area of host i l i t les j 
57. SCOh, 750th Mtg., October 30, 1956, p. 6, 
58. Ib id , , pp. 13-14. 
59. UN Year Book 1956. solution 997 ( i - s - l ) , Kovember 1, 1956, 
p. 28. 
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4. "Upon the cease-fire being e f f ec t ive , steps shouM 
be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore, secure 
freedom of navigation" ^ 
6. Kequest the Secretary General "to observe and promptly 
report on compliance with the resolution to the Security 
Council and lo the General Assembly, for such further 
action as they might deem appropriate in accordance 
with the Charter", 
Ihe representatives of various nations shoved great concern about 
the situation developing in the Middle Bast as a result of Israeli 
invasion of Egypt, 
Eifal of Jordan asked the members of the General Assembly: (60) 
"Will the international community leave the victim 
at ttie mercy of aggression? Will the elements of virtue 
of righteousness throughout the world retreat in the face 
of violence and destruction?" 
He made a sincere appeal to All the members of the General Assembly 
"to hasten to Join in a collective e f for t to stop this invasion of 
£.gypt". 
Sobolov of the OSSri described the Middle Eastern situation 
as "extreraely serious". He told the General Assembly that "on 
89 October 1955 Israel, In violation of the General Armistice Agree-
ment, of decisions of the Security Council and of the United nations 
Charter, began aggressive military operations against Egypt". Israel ' s 
aggression was planned with the purpose of creating a pretext for 
the seizure of the Suez canal by British and French armed forces." 
The i.iusslan delegate urged the General Assembly "to condemn the armed 
attack by the United Kingdom, i"ranee and Israel against Egypt as an 
act of aggression IncompatlblB with the purposes and principles o f 
the United iJatlons" . (61) 
60. OAOri, f i r s t Emergency Special Session, 562nd Meeting, 
November 1, 1956, p, 14. 
61, Ib id . , pp. 17-18. 
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Eban o f Israel was exhibiting his usual eloquence and making 
e f forts to sidetrack the fact of Israel aggression against Egypt 
by coating it with much abused theory of self-defence. He stated: (62) 
Monday, 29 October 1956, the Israel defence forces took 
security laeasures in the Sinai Peninsula in the exercise 
of Israel 's inherent right of self-defence. The object 
of these operations is to eliminate the bases from which 
armed Egyptian units,..invade Israel ' s territory for pur-
poses of murder, sabotage and the creation of permanent in-
security to peaceful l i f e " . 
Lall of India condeinned the "triple invasion" on Egypt. He 
termed the invasion on £'gypt as "brutal facts of war". He told 
the Assembly that Egypt's "sovereignty is being violently curtailed 
and territory is being occupied by the armed might of a neighbour 
and of two powerful countries. There has been released over Kgypt 
a manifestation of the law of the jungle. Thus on the territory of 
Egypt, is mockery being made of the Charter of the United Nations, and 
there the organs of the United Nations ai'e being affronted by aggres-
sion and invasion". The Indian representative was of the opinion 
that "the horroi which is upon us can be arrested, and a major 
catastrophe averted, i f immediate and ef fect ive action is taken by 
this emergency special sessions of the General Assembly." (63) 
Palamas of Greece charged that (64) "Israel , the United Kingdom 
and France have invaded iigyptian territory. They have resorted to 
force , to war", "Aggression", according to Palama, "in Itself is an 
international crime, Nothing can justify a breach of peace, as 
defined by the Charter, Even the best reasons lose their validity 
i f such a breach i s committed"• He extended to Egypt and i ts people 
62, Ib id . , p, 28, 
63, Ibid . , pp. 30-31. 
64, Ib id . , p. 37. 
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his coxmtry'e "deepest sympathy born of a close and age-old friend-
ship, in this hour, when Egypt Is defending i tsel f against aggression.« 
Ullrich of Czechoslovakia stated that tripartite aggression 
against B-gypt was motivated by "self ish goals above the basic 
principles of the Charter" and it "cal ls for a resolute denunciation 
by a l l other Member countries. "The Czechoslovak people emphati-
cally condemn these acta of aggression directed against Egypt". (66) 
The draft resolution was adopted by a vote o f 64 to 5 with 
G abstentions. 
On Ifovember 3, 1966, Loutfi of Egypt informed the General 
Assembly that the "Egyptian Government agreed to implement the reso-
lution adopted by tin© Assembly on the condition that the armed forces 
attacking Egypt desist from doing so". The Egyptian Government sent 
a communication A/3270 to the General Assembly stating that in spite 
of the Assembly resolution of November 2, 1956 "Anglo-French air 
attack continispd and even increased in intensity and frequency. 
Furthermore, i t i s also reported that Anglo-French armed forces are 
taking part in the fight against Egyptian troops on Egyptian terr i -
tory in the Sinai Peiiinsula". (66) The Secretary General of the 
United i^ations confirmed the allegations made by the Government of 
%ypt. In pursuance of para 5 of the General Assembly resolution of 
November 2, 1956, the Secretary General reported to the Assembly on 
November 3: "the Gaza strip and the iied Sea islands of Tiran end 
Slnafir had been occupied by Israeli military forces, and their air 
( operations over Egyptian territory had continued without interruptions." 
65. Ibid. , p. 42. 
66. GAORf 663rd Meeting, Ifovember 3, 1956, p. 45. 
67. tfH, year g^Q]lt; Ig^Q. liesolutlon 997 (ii- 1), p. 28. 
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On Wovetriber 3, two draft resolutions were presented before 
the Assembly, India along with 18 Afro»Asian countries piloted 2 
draft resolutions. Lall of India, before presenting the resolution, 
expressed "gravest disappointment" over the fact that the "resolution 
introduced by the leauing western power, has not been complied with 
by the western powers concerned". That was a matter of the "gravest 
concern because the result of non-compliance has led to a steady 
worsening situation." (68} India joined hands with other 18 Afro-
Asian nations and brought a draft resolution before the Assembly, 
The draft resolution noted "with regret that not a l l the parties con-
cerned have yet agreed to comply with the provisions of i ts resolution 
of November 2 , 1966, reaffirming the said resolution It "calls upon 
the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of the said 
resolution". The xesolution requested "the Seci^tary General with 
the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization to obtain compliance of the 
withdrawal of a l l forces behind the armistice l ines", (69) The 19-
power draft resolution (A/3275) was adopted by a vote of 59 to 6 
with 12 abstentions. 
The second draft resolution was presented by Canada. Pearson 
of Canada was explaining the purpose of his country's draft resolution 
(A/3276) when he stated that i t had the "purpose of facil itating and 
making effective compliance with the resolution which we havB already 
passed ou the part of those whose compliance is absolutely essential 
68, GkOtif 563rd Meeting, November 3, 1956, p. 53, 
69. Ib id . , p* 54, 
It has also the purpose of providing for international supervision 
of that compliance through the United DJations". (70) 
The Canadian draft resolution stated: (71) 
"The General Assembly, 
"Bearing in mind the uJ'gent necessity of facilitating comp-
liance with the resolution of 2 i.ovember 1956, "Requests, as a 
matter of priority, the Secretary General to submit to i t within 
forty-eight hours, a plan for the setting up, with the consent of 
the naticais concerned of an emergency international United Nations 
force to secure and supervise the cessation of hosti l i t ies in accord-
ance with the terms of the aforementioned resolution"." 
The resolution was adopted by a vote of 67 to none with 19 
abstentions* 
On November 4, 1956 the Secretary General told the General 
A s s e m b l y that he had received a i^ply only from Egypt which said i t 
accepted the cease-fire resolution of Kovember 2, 1956. He also 
submitted his f i rst report on the Plan for an emergency internetional 
United Nations force. He pleaded that the General Assembly should 
decide to establish (72) "an emergency International force to secure 
and supervise the cessation of hos t i l i t i es " . The delegations of 
« 
Canada, Columbia and Norway presented a draft resolution which created 
the United Xxations Emergency Force, The resolution 1000 (ES-1) was 
as followsi (73) 
"The General Assembly 
"^aving requested the Secretary General in i ts resolution of 
4 Jfevember 1966 to submit to it "a plan for an emergency International 
United I«ations Force, for the purposes stated, 
"Mothing with satisfaction the f i r s t report of the Secre-
tary General on the plan, and having in mind particularly paragraph 4 
o f that report. 
70. Ib id . , p. 55. 
71. Ibid. 
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73. Ibid. , p. 36, 
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"1 . establishes a United Nations Command for an emer-
gency International force to secure and supervise the cessation of 
hos t i l i t i e s . . . " 
"2 . appoints, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff 
of the United Nations llruce Supervision Organization, Ma^or Qeneral 
L. 14, Burns, as Chief o f the Command'!.,. 
The resolution was adopted on Kovember 5, 1956 by a vote, of 
57 to none with 19 abstentions. 
Israel , the United Kingdom and Frence did not comply with 
the Assembly's resolutions. On November 5, 1956 the USSR Foreign 
Minister requested for an Immediate meeting of the Security Council 
to discuss non-compliance by the UK, Prance and Israel with the 
ceasefire orders of the General Assembly of 2 November resolution. 
Before the Council met, the Governments of France and Britain had 
informed the Secretary General that they welcomsd the establishment 
of an international force to prevent the continuance of host i l i t ies 
between t-gypt and Israel. The Secretary General in his report to 
the Security Council told (74) "The Go\©rnment of Egypt has accepted 
the resolution of the General Assembly of November 5 and may thus be 
considered as having accepted the establishment of an International 
force under the terms fixed by the United Nations. The Gowrnment 
of Kgypt has further accepted yesterday the request of the Secre-
tary Ger»ral for a cease- f ire . . . " 
He al^o Informed the Council of Israelis acceptance: "Today 
I , received from the Government of Israel , a statement to the 
e f fect that in the light of i^gypt's declaration of willingness to 
cease-f ire, Israel wishes to confirm i t s readiness to agree to a 
cease-fire" . 
74. §£0R» 755th Meeting, Novenober 5, 1956, p. 2. 
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The Soviet Union was very c r i t i c a l of Israel , France and 
Britain's invasion of Kgypt, The non-compliance by these powers 
with the resolutions of the General Assembly was very. Oisturbihg. 
The Soviet Union wanted the Security Council to act under Article 42 
of the Charter, Under the draft resolution prepared and presented 
by Sobolov o f the Soviet Onion " a l l states members of the United 
Nations, especially the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist ti©p\ibllcs st^ould give military and other assistance 
to Egypt, which has been the victim of aggression, by sending naval 
and air f orces , military units". (75) 
The Council rejected ttas item of agenda proposed by the USSH 
by a vote 4 to 3 with 4 abstentions. 
The situation in the Middle East was not showing any sign of 
improvement because Israel was not prepared to witWraw its forces 
behind the armistice lines as demanded by the General Assembly reso-
lutions. 
Tb& General Assembly in i t s resolution of flovember ? , 1966 
sponsored by seven countries, Brazil , Canada, India, Pakistan, 
Ceylon, Columbia and Norway established (76) "an advisory committee 
composed of one representative" from each of the sponsoring members 
"to undertake che development of those aspects of the planning for 
the force and i t s operations not already dealt with by the General 
Assembly", 
Another resolution submitted by 19 powers (A/3309) 
"cal ls once again upon Israel immediately to withdraw a l l i ts 
forcts behind the armistice lines established by the General Armis-
tice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of February 24, 1949". (77) 
75. Ib id . , p. 7. 
76, 77 The UK Yearbook 195^^ p. 36. 
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The Israelis did not pa^ any beed to the resolutions of the United 
iNations and persisted in i ts expansionist designs. The establish-
ment of the United i^ations Emergency Force was accomplished and i t 
v^ as stationed along the line around the Gaza strips and at Sharm El 
Sheikh after March 6, 1957, when the Israeli armed forces had withdrawn, 
Israel, no doubt, withdrew bat at what cost? On i ts retreat 
from Egyptian territory of Sinai Peninsula i t demolished everything 
and i-endered a l l roads non-negotiable, General Burns, Chief of the 
United IJations Emergency Force has given a vory vivid account of 
Israeli acts of destruction. He wrotes (78) "As the Israelis with-
drew across the Sinai they began a systematic destruction of the 
surfaced roads, the railway, the telephone lines". According to 
the General ^out 70 kilometers of roads" had been "thoroughly de-
molished" by Israel . 
Israel did not grant the United Nations Emergency Force the 
freedom of movement on i ts side of the armistice demarcation l ine , 
Egypt allowed the United Nations Force to be statiomd on its t err i -
tory and i t had ttas freedom of movement. The United Nations Emergency 
Force was also stationed at Sharm El-Sheikh and it did not prevent 
Israeli ships and merchandise from passing through the Straits of 
Tiran. Israel developed the Eilat port on Arab owned land and hence 
succeeded in laying pipelines linking the Red Sea with the Mediterran-
ean. After opening of the Gulf of Aqaba in 195? to Israel ships, 
Eilat became very important as an o i l port. One of the objectives of 
Israel in invading Egypt in 1956 was to get the Strait of Tiran opened 
for Israeli ships, Israel i , in her claim over the Strait of Tiran was. 
78. Burns, f^t* c i t . , p, 243. 
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supported by the Maritime Law of 1958. Article 16 of the Maritime 
Law stipulated: (79) "There shall be no suspension of the innocent 
passage of foreign ships through straits that are used for inter-
national navigation between one part of the high sea and another 
part of the high seas or terr itor ial sea'of & foreign state" . 
Israel interpreted the clause as having conferx«d on i t the right of 
using the Strait of Tiran. The western powers had always supported 
and upheld the claim of Israel regarding the Strait of Tiran. The 
Arab countries especiidly ii-gypt, had always taken the stand that 
the Strait had been Arab terr i tor ial waters and there was no inter-
national agreement binding Egypt to share i t with any other country. 
The Israelis were excluded from the Gulf of Aqaba. Under the Arm-
ist ice Agreemisnt of Febiuary 24, 1949 Israel was not allowed to make 
use of the Gulf of Aqaba. The provisions of Annex 11(b) to the 
General Armistice Agreement drew the Line of demarcatioh "from point 
402 down to tte southern most t ip of Palestine and Trans-Jordan 
Palestine frontiers" . (80) Under the provision Israel was completely 
excluded from access to the Gulf of Aqaba. 
The Israel armed forces violated this provision also and 
launched an attack on the southern Megeb which brought them to the 
Gulf. Israel occupied Umm Kashrash situated within the vicinity of 
the Gulf and local Arab population of the area were forcibly driven 
away and their property appropriated. 
The Israel i policy was one of ej^ansion. The Armistice Agree-
ments exercised no restraining influence on its expansionist designs. 
On the Syrian border also violations were flagrant. Article V of the 
79. Quoted in Hadawi, Sami, Bitter Harvest^ p. 147, 
80. UN Doc. A/1264/Kev. p. 11, 
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Israeli Syrian Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949 provided for a 
demilitarized zone para 1 of the said article "emphasized that the 
following arrangements for the Armistice Demarcation Line between 
the Israeli and Syrian armed forces and for the Demilitarized zone 
are not to be integrated as havi^ any relation whatsoever to ultimate 
territorial arrangements affecting the two parties to this Agree-
ment"* "The Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized zone" 
according to para 2 of Article V, "have been defined with a view 
toward separating the armed forces of the two parties in such manner 
as to minimize the possibility of faction and Incident". (81) 
Israel, was i ts usual stubborn and unscrupulous self when she 
violated Article V.of the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Agreement, The 
demilitarized ZOUB along the Syrian border was raided by the Israeli 
armed forces and the Arab population of the aa^ oa was thrown out. 
The matter was" referred to the Mixed Armistice Commission but Israel^ 
refused to attend the meeting of the Commission on the ground that 
the demilitarized zone was an Israeli territory and thus was beyond 
the Jurisdiction of the Commission. 
Israel 's refusal to attend the Commission's meeting was a 
flagrant violation of the provision of the General Armistice Agreement 
of 1949. The matter was referred to the Security Council which met 
on April 17, 1951. Far is i-l-Khouri of Syria told the Councilt 
"Ii.arly in February 1951, and in violation of the 
Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement of 20 July 1949, 
the Israel Government began wortt along the western bank of 
the Jordan river and on Land belonging to Arab peasants in 
SI. yhe Arnb Israeli Armistice Agretmcn^^ Basic Document 
Series Mb. 4. Beirut, 1967. p. 27. 
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th© Mansoura sector, situated within the demilitarized 
zone. I^otwithstanding the repeated warnings of the 
Chairman of the Israeli^yrian Mixed Armistice Commission, 
Israelis not only of demilitarized zone origin crossed the 
bUd ge of Benat Yakub on 13 March 1951 and began work on a 
large scale in the demilitarized zone of the Eastern Bank 
of the Jordan Kiver. On 15 March Israel reinforcements, 
armed with automatic weapons, Bren Guns and mortars were 
hurried to the Huleh demilitarized zone, with a view to 
forcing the local Arab inhabitants to cease resistance and 
to sel l their land to the Palestine Land Development Company". 
The Syrian representative further told the Council about 
the United Nations observers' encounter with a "six-man Israeli patrol 
armed with r i f l es and one l ight machine-gun in the village of Ghanama 
within the central sector of the demilitarized zone" on March 27 
1951. Another serious violation of th« Armistice Agreement committed 
by Israel was on April 4 when "two Israeli mechanized patrols attacked 
the Arab police station established unuer the supervision of the 
United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission o f the El Hamma sector 
in the demilitarized zom" • (83) Beferring to the question ol 
jurisdiction over demilitaiized zone Ii.1 iOioury stated: (83) "we 
never agreed that the demilitarized zones along the line between 
the two states were taken from Syrian occupation. Th© Syrian army 
withdi«w from this tract o f land only.in order to supply the place 
for the demilitarized zone. For this reason the Syrian Government 
has always claimed the part where the demilitarized sow now exists 
to be Syrian territory because this territory was under Syrian 
occupation up until the time the Armistice Agreement came into 
force" . 
Bban of Israel refuted the Syrian claims and insisted that 
82, SCfiii, 641st Meeting, April 17, 1951, pp. 6-8. 
83. Ib id . , p. 3. 
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Israel had sovereignty over the demilit&rlssed zone. He declared 
the Syrian claim "unfounded" and told the Council (84) "we reject the 
Syrian claim. We shall sign no peace involving the cessation of 
these areas. There can be no Israel without the Huleh and the Ein 
Gev sectors, without liie precious sources of the Jordan and the 
swamps and marshes of Lake Huleh". He threatened Syria and the 
United Nations when he said that " to defend its rights and claims 
in that area Israel wil l reveal a tenacity no less pronounced than 
that which warded of f similar grave po l i t i ca l and military threats 
to the southern area of Israel", 
Major General fdley, Chief of Staff of the United I^ations 
Truce Supervision Organization appeared before the Council on April 25 
1951, General Hiley offered his own interpretation of ArticJ^ V of 
the Israeli Syrian Armistice Agreement. "The purpose of the demili-
tarized ione", according to General Eileyi (86) "was to separate and 
to keep separated for the • duration of the armistice the armed forces 
of the two parties, in order to eliminate as fully as possible f r i c -
tion and troublesome incidents between them. This was to be, in e f fect 
a sort o f "buffer zone" pending final settlement of the dispute". 
According to General "neither party to the Armistice Agreement there-
fore enjoys rights ol sovereignty within the zone" 
General liiley in an answer to a question put by Austin of the 
United States said: (86) "The Armistice Agreement limits civi l ian 
84, SCOH, 542 Meeting, April 25, 1951, p. 25, 
86. Ib id . , p. 29. 
86. SCOR, 544 Meeting, May 2, 1961, p. 6, 
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control to the local villages plus the land attached to those vi l lages. 
But at no time do the Israelis have the authority to assume f u l l 
control over non-military act ivit ies within the zone that extends 
beyond those vi l lages , unJfiss there is an agreement between the 
Chairman, the Israelis and the refugee Arabs that live in that de-
militarized zone" , 
The Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution of May 8, 
1951, Dhe resolution was presented by the USA, Turkey, France and 
the United Kingdom and was adopted by 10 votes to 1 abstention. The 
resolution, noting with concern the fight that had broken out in the 
demilitarized zone along the Syrian Israel i borders. 
"Calls upon the parties or persons in the area concerned 
to cease f i g h t i n g . . . . " (87) 
Another draft resolution ^onsored by the United KingdCM, 
Tui'key, France anoi the United States was adopted by the Council on 
May 18, 1961 by a vote of lo to one abstention. 
The resolution asked (88) the Israel delegation to the Mixed 
Armistice Commission'^to insure that the Palestine Land Development 
Company Limited is instructed to cease a l l operations in the demili-
tarized zone until such time as an agreement is arranged through 
the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for continuing this 
project" . The resolution took strong exception to Israel 's non-
compliance with the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and her 
refusal to attend the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, 
Without mentioning the name of Israel the resolution said that i t 
87, SCOu, 646 Meeting, May 8, 1951, p. 4 , 
88. SCQK^  646 Meeting, May 16, 1961, pp, 2-6. 
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"consldera it inconsistent with the objectives and intent of the 
Armistice Agreement to refuse to participate in meetings of the 
Mixed Armistice Commission*. Jhegarding those Arabs who were 
expelled by Israel the resolution said that "Arab civilians who 
have been removed from the demilitarized 2©ne by the Government 
of Israel should be permitted to return forthwith to their homes 
and that the Miaeed Armistice Commission should supervise their 
return and rehsbilitation in a manner to be determined by the 
Commission.**." 
Israel did not show any respect for the Security Council 
resolution and persistently followed her policy of aggrandizement. 
Israel did not vacate the demilitai'ized zom nor did she allow the 
expelled Arabs to return and settle down on their own land. Repeated 
requests of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission f e l l on 
deaf ears and Israel refused to attend the meetings of the Commission. 
The stubborn attitude of Israel and i t s refusal to abide by 
the provisions o f the General Armistice Agreement was reported by 
the Chief of Staff in his reports submitted to the Security Council, 
In four separate reports the Chief of Staff charged Israel of refu-
sing to implement the Council resolution of May 18, 1951 and he also 
informed the Council through his report that Israel was not prepared 
to withdraw i ts control over the demilitarized area. I t was also 
stated in the report that Israeli police was interfering with the 
freedom of local Arab people of the area and the Chairman of the 
Mixed Armistice Commission and other observers of the United Nations 
were not allowed to move freely, (89) 
89, For tteports see the following Documents; 
1} fieport of 26 June 1951. Document S/2213. Part I I , paras 14-17 
2) Heport of 16 August 1951, \Jh Doc. S/23oO, para 9. 
3) Beport of 6 November 1951, tJN Doc. 5/2389, paras 14-16. 
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The act iv i t ies of Isi^ aeX in demilitarized zon^ increased and 
on October 27, 1963 Chief of Staff General Vagan Bennike confirmed 
"encroachment on Arab lands", he al9o charged Israel of placing d i f f i -
t3 
culties in the functioning of the Mixed Armistice Commission and took 
exceptions to "Israeli Opposition to the fulfilment by the Chairman 
and United Nations observers of their responsibility for ensuring the 
implementation of Article ¥ of the?General Armistice Agreement", (90) 
The condemnation of Israel by the Chief of Staff meant nothing 
to a country which was bent upon pursuing a deliberate policy of 
non-compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations and a 
policy of ruthless expansion. Israel was not spared and duly con-
demned by the succeeding Chief of Staff General Burns who submitted 
a report to the Security Council on January 6, 1955 where he brought 
the fact to the notice of the Council that (91) "Police from the state 
of Israel, acting under orders from police headquarters outside the 
demilitarized zone, dominated the zone"« He further told the Council 
that "The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission was unable to 
implement the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement", The 
underlying fact behind General Burn*s reference to non-implement at ion 
of the Armistice Agreement was Isi-ael^s stubbornness and refusal to 
comply with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, 
The Israel i policy of deliberate provocation and planned 
attack was once again in f u l l gear when in December 1955, a Syrian 
post on Lake Tiberias was attacked killing 56 persons. The Israeli 
attack on Syrian border was barbarous and was condemned even by the 
90. SCOKy 630th Meeting, October 27, 1953, p. 14, 
91, UN Doc S/3343, para 18, 
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United Kingdom. Pierson Dixon of the United Kingdom called it "the 
shocking attack of Israel armed forces m Syrian s o i l and against 
Syrian forces and civilians on the North Eastern hores of Lake 
Tiberias". The representative further saidi (92) "We deplore this 
attack by Israel forces on civilian.«.and commend the Government of 
Syria on the attitude of restraint which i t had shown in this matter". 
Lodge of the United States of America also expressed his country's 
vehement protest against brutal attack on Syria by Israel . He saids (93) 
"We oantiot stand aside and f a i l to condemn the action of the Govern-
ment of Israel in that incident of 11 December". He registered his 
country's protest against Israel utter disregard for the United Na-
tions resolutions. Referring to Israel , repeated violations he observedj 
"What makes these particular deliberations more serious is the fact 
that a Member of the United Nations, indeed a Member created by the 
United Nations, should now,be before this Council for the fourth 
offence of this kind in two years". 
It was the harshest criticism and outright condemnation of 
Israel and its attacks on Arab states by one of its staunchest a l l ies . 
This change in Ataerican policy was due to new developments in the 
Middle East. The United States of America's reputation in the Arab 
world at that particular Junctuxe was at its lowest ebb. The Soviet 
Union was gaining ground by supplying arms and modern weapons strengthen-
ing Arab military potential against Israel. The infi ltration of the 
Soviet Union in the Middle East was a potential danger to the American 
influence because the western bloc could not afford to put a l l Its 
92. SCOH, 710 Meeting, 12 January 1966, pp. 4-5. 
93. Ib id . , p. 11. 
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eggs in one Israeli bas]£©t. Ttje United States knew the strategic 
importance of the Mid41e East and wanted to retrieve the lost ground, 
ItT denunciation of Israel for its brutal attack on Syrigii territory 
was a straw in the wind, 
arhe Israeli attack on Syria in the region of Lake Tiberias was 
too intense to be ignored. General Burns the Chief of Staff in his 
report submitted to the Security Council saidj (94) "The Israel action 
on the night of 11 to 12 De^ ceiaber was a deliberate violation of the 
Provisions of the General Armistice Agreement, including those to the 
demilitarized zone which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered 
Syria". 
The Security • Coimcil was gravely conceited with Israeli attack 
on Syria and a long debate followed wherein every member condemned 
Israel for i t s flagrant and repeated violations, A draft resolution* 
sponsored by france, the USA and the United Kingdom was placod before 
the,Council. Shukairy of Syria was not ful ly satisfied with the draft 
resolution. He appreciated (95) the resolution to an extent because^ 
"such a resolution certainly, such a verdict , would be a great deterrent", 
According to Syrian representative such verdict would, f a i l because 
" Israel ' s policy was deeply embedded in aggression, Verbal measures are 
no cure. The only remedy is to apply effective measures to cut the 
ev i l out at the root". The resolution was not satisfactory because 
" I t has failed to provide for effective measures to deter Israel from 
committing further aggression". 
The draffc resolution was adopted unanimously by the Security 
94. UM Doc. S/3S16. para 29. 
95. SCOh^  715th Meeting, January 19, 1956, pp.2, 3 , 
1 ^ J . ^ c ; 
Council on January 19, 1956. The resolution declared that (96) "5his 
Israeli action was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the 
General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, Including those 
relating to the demilitarized zone,, ." The Security Council "con-
demn tt^ attack of December 11, 1955 as a flagrant violation of the 
ceasefire provisions of its rosolation/54 (1948), of the terms of the 
General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israelis 
obligations under the Charter of the United Kations." 
The Council also "expresses its grave concern at the failure 
of the Gowrnn^nt of Israel to comply with i t s obligations". 
Israel had always found i t a smooth sailing in spite of 
condemnatory resolutions of the United Hations. She was behaving 
like a spoilt child of the United Nations. Her flagrant violations 
did not cease, her policy of planned attack on.Arab Land did not 
sufier any setback and her policy of expansion and naked aggression 
was not abandoned. She attacked the demilitarized zone at El -
Tawafiq. I t refused to attend a meeting of the Mixed Armistice 
Commission called to look into the issue. General von Horn, new 
Chief of Staff wrote in his report "I was angry. And with reason. 
Ihe Israelis had broken the Armistice Agreement, broken their word, 
ignored my ruling of January 20 and were now blatantly disregarding 
the Security Council's ruling that they should attend meeting called 
by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission, (97) 
General von Horn came to Mew York to acquaint the Security 
Council with the latest situation in the Middle East especially in 
96. UK Doc. S/3538t i^esolutions and Decisions of Security 
Council, nth year 1956, pp. 1 -3 , 
97. Horn, Carl von, General, Soldiering for Peace. London, 
1966. p. 123, 
Syria sector. Before he bad made his appearance before the Security 
Council the Israeli representative Michel Comay came to meet him in his 
United Nations Office on April 3, 1962, 
According to the account given by the General in his book, 
Comay tried to pressurise him and even threatened him. Comayp iece 
o f advice to the General was "to forget a l l about that outdated - V _ " -
United Nations idea of running a patrol boat on Laks Tiberia? the 
idea was s t i l l - b o m , and ought to be abandoned^ because the take was 
essentially Israeli sovereign territory" , Comay threatened General 
Horn: " I t would be wise to listen to his advice otherwise my l i f e 
was bound to, become a great deal more uncomfortable", Gewral Horn 
"appreciated" Comay's "thinly veiled threats" and told him " i t was 
really a waste of breath to attempt to intimidate the Chief o f Staff 
of 0MSO - especially on the United fetions territory" , (98) i:he 
Security Council cast on March 28, 1962 to con3i<fer the complaint of 
Syria against Israel violation of the Armistice Agreement, Israel 
attacked Syrian territory on March 16-17, 1962, According to Chehlaoui 
of Syria (99) "Israel armed forces carried out a mortar attack on the 
Arab village o f Nuqueib, forty Israeli armoured launches opened f i re 
with automatic weapons on the Syrian military post of Ed^ Douga. The 
Israel arti l lery at Bouria launched a violent bombardment of the city 
and village of Sqoufiye, Israel military aircraft bombed tbs Syrian 
position at E-Al Fiq and iiaki and they bombed the area of El-Hemma". 
Israel was again condemned by the Security Council and a draft 
resolution S/5110 introduced by the United Kingdom and the United 
98. Ib id , , p. 86, 
SOORy 999th Meeting, March 28, 1962, p, 3. 
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States was adopted on April 9 , 1962 by a vote of 10 with one absten-
tion. According to the resolution the Security Council (100) "reaffirms 
the Security Council resolution of January 19, 1956 which condemned 
Israel military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, 
whether or not undertaten by way of retaliation; "Determines that the 
Israel attack of March 16-17, 1962 constitutes a flagrant violation 
of that resolution and cal ls upon Israel scrupulously to refrain from 
such action in the future", 
Israel committed violations against the provisions of the 
Israeli Hashemite Jordan Kingdom Armistice Agreement of April 3, 1949. 
Jordan had already signed with Israel an agreement on July 7, 
1948 whereby i t vms provided that UN check posts would be established 
by the Commander and Arab and Jewish Policy would be placed on 
duty under the UK Commander, The Gent-i-'al Armistice Agreement did not 
dispute any provision of the Agreement of 1948. A map showing the 
deBiilitari2s?d zone on the side of Jordan was attocked with the 
General Armistice Agreement. The Mount Scopus was a demilitarized zone 
and i t included places like the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hos-
pital e tc . This demilitarized zone was placed under the direct con-
tro l of the Chief of Staff of the UMTSO, Israel never accepted such 
a situation because it would have meant a setback in her eacpansionist 
design, Israel regarded this area as "an enclave of Israel" where 
the United Kations or any other body did not have any control. 
Article VIII para 1 of the Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement 
created "a special committee, composed of two representatives of ' 
each party for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrange-
100. Ibid . , April 6, 1962, p. 12. 
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ments designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to e f fect 
improvements in its application"• 
The functions of Special Committee were also clearly defined 
in para 2. Tte Special Committee was supposed to include matters like (101 
"free movement of traf f i c on vital roads Including the 
Betlehem and Latrun Jerusalem roads, resumption of the 
normal functioning of the cultural and humfiOiitarian inst i -
tutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto etc , " 
Israel never respected her Agreement with Jordan and frequently 
violated the territorial integrity of Jordan. The area of Jerusalem -
an internatiaial zone and otter areas even demilitarized zone and no 
man*s land were raided and placed under control of the Israeli armed 
forces. The existence of the United liiations Truce Supervision Organi-
zation was mesfiingless as far as Israel was concerned* 
General Bums has confii'med the hostility of Israel towards 
the Organization in following wordss (102) 
"Not long after I took over the duties of Chief of 
Staff Ui'^ TSO, I learnt that the Israeli Defence Forces 
and the Government loolced in the United Kations Truce 
Supervision Organization with a jealous eye, sometimes 
with imperfectly concealed host i l i ty" . 
General Burn further wrote about Israeli leaders attitude towards the 
United Nat ion St 
"The Israelis" , wrote Burns "looked on the UM as an 
organization to be kept in the dark, and even deceived, 
as an enemy may be deceived. The result was that one f e l t 
th3 hostility against the UMSO always latent, and that 
cooperation from the Israelis only came when it suited 
their propaganda purposes", 
E. li. Hutchison who had acted as the chairman of Jordan-Israel Mixed 
Armistice Commission wrote about Israel hostile attitude towards th* 
101. The Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements, February-July 1949. 
Basic Documents Series Ho, 3 , Beirut, 1967. p. 21. 
102. Bums, op. c i t . , pp. 54, 66, 
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United nations. He wrote in an open letter* (103) 
"Be assured that the vast majority of these observers 
from seven different countries fee l as I do and openly 
condetan Israel as an uncooperative, militarily aggres-
sive country s t i l l working towards expansion". 
On January 6, 1952, the Israeli armed forces raided across the de-
marcation line near Bethleham at Beit Jalla. Hutchison found Israel 
guilty of having raided Beit «ialla and wrote that (104) "Israel was 
) 
condemned for a serious breach of the (General Armistice Agreement 
for the Beit aalla attack". According to Hutchison Beit Jalla 
attack "lost i t s singular importance among the numerous incidents 
that were occurring far too frequently. Life was cheap along the 
border. Many Arabs were killed inside Israel while trying to re -
trieve items from their former hones or harvests from the lands they 
once had possessed". 
On *lane 4 , 1952 Israel committed another violation of the 
Armistice Agreement when famous "Barrel incidtent" took place. The 
Israel is , in violation of the Armistice Agreement moved soldiers 
into uQ man's land. The barrels, which Israel took to Israeli terr i -
tory bypassing the United Nations check post, were seized by the 
United Nations Truce Supervision observers since they smelled some 
foul play in i t . The Israelis became desperate to retrieve those 
barrels from the United Nations custody lest they ran the risk of 
being exposed. "At 12oo hours on the day scheduled", writes Hutchi-
son, (105)"the door of MAC o f f i ce burst open and three Israeli o f f i cers , 
103. Hutchison, ii. H., Justice and Time. Open Letter published by 
World Truth Jerusalem, Jordan, p. 6. 
104. Hutchison, Violent Truce. Jfew York, 1956. p. 16. 
105. Ib id . , pp. 25, 27. 
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with pistols drawn and escorted by two enlisted men who were hold-
ing Thompson Sub-machine guns at the ready marched into the loom" 
and took over the o f f i ce of the MixBd Armistice Commission. The 
Israelis posted their C3wn guards claiming that the building was ou 
their side. They took the keys of the room barrel was locked in and 
the door was locked each evening by them, "Wo amount of pressure 
changed this routine until the barrel was moved from the building". 
On September 17, 1962 es-Sanls incident occurred where It 
was reported that Jordan was being subjected to harassia^nt and 
terror from Israeli side. Israel had expelJbad ten families of es-Sanls 
tr ibe. The United Nations observers confirmed Jordan's complaint when 
they found (106) "over loo families, nearly 1,000 members of this-tribe, 
camped temporarily ^u,st inside Jordan". 
On October I4, 15, 1953, the village of Qlbya became the target 
of Israeli aggression In which about 53 per^sns were killed and 15 
had been wounded. Hutchison had described It as "wanton destruc-
tion" and the case was taken to the United Nations Security Council 
where Israel was condemned. The Security Council wanted to condemn 
Israel in harshest language but "Z,tonlst pressure at the Security 
Council level Watered down the wording of the resolution". (107) 
Israel was indulging in wanton acts of destruction and mass 
killing because it had nothing to fear. The United States of America 
had i ts own compulsions and Israel was ful ly aware of i t and knew 
that the United States would never go beyond polite limits of condemn 
106. Hutchison, aa. c l t . 31. 
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its acts of violations. The (^ ibya Incident had shown the world 
that Israel was bent upon expelling local Arab people from their 
homes in order to accommodate the Jewish immigrants. There was not 
one mibya. According to Hutchison (108) "there were many small 
Qibyas but they were never publicized." 
The Security Council Resolution of November 24, 1953 had 
condemned Israel and stated that the Security Council (109) finds that 
retaliation action at Qibya taken by the armed forces of Israel on 
October 14, IS, 1953 and a l l such actions corstitute a violation of 
the cease-fite provisions of the Security Council resolution 54(1948) 
and are inconsistent with the parties obligations under the General 
Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan and the Charter of the 
United Nations". The Security Council also "expresses the strongest 
censure of that action, which Can only prejudice the chances of that 
peaceful settlenient which both parties, in accordance with the 
Charter, are bound to seek, and cal ls upon Israel to talse effective 
measures to prevent al l such actions in the future". 
This Security Council resolution was nothing but a mere addi-
tion, to the already piling heaps of documents condemning Israeli ac-
tion of violence. What was the use of such resolutions when the 
United Jiations could not prevent the recurrence of such devastations 
and loss of human l i f e ? Israel was doing what i t planned to do, 
even the United Hat iotas resolutions could not bridle i t s recklessness. 
The resolutions were mere "paper tigers" and had no deterrent value 
to prevent Israel from committing violations of its obligations. 
108. Ibid. 
109.. m Pqo, S/913$/H5v, 2} S/IMf/S/hey, X, pp.4-5. 
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Israel kept i t s policy of retaliation and reprisal in f u l l gear. 
Israel made El Ffeteh a scapegoat and tried to t e l l the United 
Katioixs that Israeli attack on Aral) land was to destroy the strong* -
hold of i-l Fateh guerrillas. In a letter to the President of the 
Security Council Israel Government l isted a total of forty-three 
attacks across the frontier against c iv i l ian targets in the Israeli 
(110) 
border areas. Of this thirty-three have been from Jordan territory. 
The Israeli theory of B1 Fateh*s attack was a lamo excuse to 
conceal i t s expansionist designs ar.d to laplicate Jordan in the matter. 
It was heing done in order to f^r|.cate a pretext to justify Israel i 
unprovoked agression against Jordan, lil Fateh was an organization 
which had nothing to do with Jordan or with my Arab Government, i t 
was composed of people,expelled by Israel from demilitarissed mne 
rendering them homeless. These homeless people organized themselves 
in 1958 and started a long struggle to liberate their own hoae, i . e . 
Palestine. Israel tried to pat blame on Syria also for El-Fateh 
act iv i t ies . In a letter dated May 16, 1966 Israel told the tJKs (111) 
"Syria i s the source, training ground, principal supplier and main 
supporter of a vicious terrorist organization, variously known as 
Bl-Fateh. . . " . It was a pretext for the coining attack on Syria on 
iJuly-l4, 1966 when Israel i ^et bombers attacked Syrian areas, hit 
mechanized and engineering equipment destroyed bull dozers with 
napalm bombs wounded nine civil ians ahd ki l led one woman". (112) 
The Security Council and the Mixed Armistice Commission con-
demned Israel many a time. On November 25, 1966 the Security Council 
110. UH Doc. S/7277 of May 3, 1966. 
111. m Doc. S/7296t May 16, 1966. 
112. UK Doc. S/7419t July SI, 1966. 
adopted a resolution condemning Israeli attack on Sammu. On November 
13, 1966 Sammu was attacked by Isrfc^l armed forces, Jordan lodged 
a complaint against Israel 's , brutal attack on the village of Samtnu in 
the southern Hebron area. The Security Council heard the representa-
tives of both the countries and adopted a resolution on November 25, 
1966, The Security Council resolution observed? (113) "This incident 
constituted a lar£;e-scale and carefully planned milita^^y action on 
the territory of Jordan of the armed forces of IsraeT', The resolution 
further reaffirmed "the previous resolutions of the Security Council 
condemning past incidents of reprisal in breach of the General Armistice 
Agreement between Israel and Jordan and of the United Nations Charter". 
The resolution "censures Israel for the large scale military action 
in violation of the United liations Charter and of the General Arais-
t lce Agreement between Israel and Jordan", It also emphasized "that 
actions of military reprisal oannot be tolerated and that i f they 
are repeated, the Security Council Willi have to consider further and 
more effective steps as envisaged In the'Charter-to ensure against 
the repetition of such ac ts . . . " 
The Israelis ignored a l l Security Council directives and 
the United Nations took no action to compel stubborn Israel to 
comply with them. The United Nations failed in its fundamental duty 
of restoring and maintaining peace in the Middle East. The basic 
reason for the failure of the United Nations was the attitude of the 
permanent members of the world bociy. The United States of America, 
Great Britain, France, even the Soviet Union in the formative period, 
had fully supported Israel, They expressed their concern and sympathy 
113. UN Doc. s/759g and Corr. 1 and Add, 1. 
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for Arab refugees but refused to take ef fect ive measures to compel 
Israel to abide by the decisions of tjtie United Nations, Had the 
United Nations shown some courage and taken positive measures, 1967 
war would have easily been avoided. The June war of 1967 was a r e f -
lection on the effectiveness of the United Nations and exposed its 
impotency in implementing i ts own decisions. The General Armistice 
Agreements were flouted .with impunity by Israel and she was, many a 
time, condemned for her flagrant violations. The Chief of Staff and 
Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commissions had charged Israel of 
committing breach against the Armistice Agreement and condemned her 
for suph acts. E. H. Hutchison wrote recently that (114) the "cal l 
for peace" given by Israeli leaders becomes 'ridiculous and mean-
ingless" when one looked into "the United Nations mounting record 
of Israeli military action against the bordering Arab countries", . 
According to Hutchison Isi'ael had always refused cooperation and 
boycotted the commission established by the United Nations. He 
cited the example of Ifegev to establish his contention; "Israeli 
forces moved into and took over the Negev after the ceasefire and 
against direct UN orders, Israel refuses UN military observers 
freedom of movement along the borders, a right guaranteed by the 
General Armistice Agreement. "Israel refuses to allow the UN to 
place patrol boats os. L&k& Tiberias and yet the UN had, according 
to the G.A.A. jurisdiction over the demilitarized zones.. ." Writing 
about Mount Scopus, the highest point on the Jordan side of Jerusalem, 
Hutchison wrotes "since 1948 Israel has claiioBd sovereignty over the 
area and refused to allow the UN Commander to carry out an inspection." 
114, Open Letter by Hutchison, sr. sH., , pp. 2-6, 
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Writing about Israeli violations he asks the world not to forget 
"that Israel 's record of military aggression is staggering and should 
be listed in detail and widely exposed." 
As late as October 1966, the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned 
Israel for i ts violations of no man's land's inviolabil ity. 
Israel was aslsed to refrain from repeatirxg its acts of vio-
lence but Israel did not pay any heed to the request and its semi-
o f f i c i a l paper of Israel announced that Israel would challenge the 
decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission and declared that (115) "the 
vote talsBn by the Mixed Armistice Commission is considered an error". 
On May 3 , 1967 Israel disregarded once again the directives 
of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice 
Commission "condemned the Israeli authorities for crossing the armis-
tice demarcation line into no-man's land . . . and for ploughing areas 
situated in Jordan and in no man's land, in violation of the General 
Armistice Agreement". (116) 
The President of the Security Council was not exaggerating 
when at one of i ts meetings in April 1968 he saidi (117) "Israel 
continued to ignore council and Assembly decisions, continued its 
aggression and violation of Intern<itioj;ial lawj and showed the world 
^ and the United Nations by its action particularly the intention to 
hold a military parade in Jerusalem, that i t was not thinking of leav-
ing the Arab part of Jerusaljsm". The President, while condemning 
l is* October 7, 1966. 
116. Document S/7890. 
117. UK Monthly Chronicle. United Nations Organisation, vol , V, 
Ko, 4 , April 1968. I - . 
Kesolution Security Council, May 1968, p. 21. 
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Israel i military act ivit ies in Jerusalem, s^idj "The acts of Israel 
in Jerusalem, we re those of an aggressor who did not care to abide 
by the United KatiotiS decisions or follow a policy of peace in the area" • 
It becomes a boring exercise i f one mentions each and every act 
o f violation by Israel , and the United Nations resolutions condemning 
i t for such acts. Since 1949, Israel has been condeianed by the organs 
of the United Kations for i ts aggression against the Arab States more 
than forty-four, times. Thirtytwo of these condeninations were adopted 
by the Security Council for "flagrant violations" of the Armistice 
Agreements with the four neighbouring states. This is in glaring con-
trast to the fact that none of the Arab States has so far been con-
denined even once for aggression or action against Israel in breach of 
the Armistice Agreements. 
I f Germany and Japan's non-compliance with-its directives was 
responsible for the League of Ifetions' fa i lure , Israel is utter d is -
regard and contempt can be counted as a factor i-espcmsible for the 
Reclining prestige of the United Kations. 
Israel had, with deliberate plans, violated a l l the United 
JSations resolutions even the one which created the 'Jewish State ' , 
Israel also violated the obligations i t unreservedly accepted when i t 
was admitted to the world community. Israel continued and s t i l l conti-
nues to be member of the ttoited Nations in spite o f i ts violations of 
the United Nations. It disregarded 22nd Ivovember 1967 resolution 
despite repeated warnings of the United Kations and s t i l l continue to 
control areas which i t captured during 1967 war, Israel is an expan-
sionist country and consistently pursuing a policy of naked aggression 
and expansion rendering numerous people homeless in their own states. 
Chapter III 
LAM) WITHOUT FBOKTIER 
The Basle Congress of 1897 was the f i r s t Zionist meeting 
which outlined a definite programme for world Zionist movement, 
Theodor Heral was the founding father of the idea of the Congress 
which bad the aim to unite the Jewish community and "create for 
the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law". The 
Basle Congress also outlined the strategy to achieve the Zionists* 
aim and i t was to be done through "the promotion on suitable lines 
of the colonization of Palestine of Jewish agricultural and indus-
t r i a l workers" . (1) Herzl's slogan was "Let the people without a 
land return to a land without a people", (2) 
The Zionist Congress had a definite and ruthless plan to 
implement. The boundaries of the Jewish Home were not confined to 
Palestine only, but stretched, according to Herzl, to far beyond 
Palestine so as to include areas and territories constituting the 
Arab land. In 1896, Theodor Herzl published a paper wherein he advo-
cated f lex ib i l i ty in the drawing of the frontiers of the Jewish 
State. In his description of frontiers Herzl saidj "The northern 
frontier is to be the mountains facing Cappadocia (Turkey); the 
southern, the Suez Canal. Our slogan shall bei "The Palestine of 
David and Solomon", C3) 
The iiionists were definitely thinking in terms of ruthless 
1, Stein, Leonard, Zionism. London, 1932, p, 62, 
2 , Menuhin, Moshe, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time. 
Beirut, 1969. p. 22, 
3, Marvin, Lowenthed, The Diaries of Tha /^^ r^ w^r^^. ifew York, 
1956. p. 124. See map no, 1 drawn by Herzl in his Complete 
eiMlS^, vol , 11, p, 711. 
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expansion in what constituted the Arab world. Palestine was a small 
chunk of territory and i t would not have been suff icient to accommo-
date ten million Jews. 0avld Trlstsch sounded a warning and as}ced 
the iilonlst leadership to accept the "Greater Paaestlne" programme. 
He wrote to Herzl in 1899: "The Basle programme must contain the 
words 'Great Palestine' or Palestine and Its neighbouring lands -
otherwise It Is nonsense. You do not get the ten million Jews into 
a land of 26,000 km". (4) The only alternative to accommodate ten 
million Jews was the policy of aggrandizement end expansion. The 
Zionists duclded in its favour and sanctioned a l l possible means to 
achieve the goal of a Jewish State, The Zionist organization was 
set up in 1907 and Its purpose was to plan and conduct the struggle 
f o r achieving a Jewish State. The Zionist organization was a symbol 
of Zionist aspirations and gave an organizational shape to the idea 
propounded at Basle in 1897. To accelerate the process of coloniza-
tion of Palestine by the Zionists many subsidiary organizations were 
established. The "Jewish Colonial Trust" in 1898, the "Colonization 
Commission" in 1898j the "Jewish IJational Fund" in 1901, the "Pales-
tine Office" in 1908, and the "Palestine Land Development Company" 
in 1908 were created f or this spec i f i c purpose, namely, to plan, 
finance and supervise the process of colonization of Palestine. 
In i t s Init ial phase, the Zionist movement fai led to cut 
much Ice and i t s progress was extremely slow. At the outbreak of 
World War I after thirty years of Jewish Immigration to Palestine, 
their strength was of the total population of the country. It 
encouraged new alignments to emerge. In 1917, Zionist colonialism 
Oskar, K, A Jewish Cvnms Project. Wew York, 
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concluded an alliance with British imperialism. Ihe si^port of a 
big li^ uropean power was the most important requirement for the 5iiOnist 
movement to succeed in i t s mission. 
After the war was over and the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, 
Britain had emerged as the most powerful country in the Middle East. 
British Imperialism required Zionist support for its own selfish ends. 
Great Britain had already reached an understanding with po l i t i ca l 
Zionism and issued a policy statement on November 2, 1917. The Balfour 
Declaration of 1917 was the "declaration of sympathy with Jewish 
Zionist aspirations". (5) 
The Balfair Declaration and promises made in i t were the result 
of the policy of expediency, i t s purpose was to enlist and ensure 
the support of the Jewish community for the Allied Powers. According 
to Churchill, the Declaration "was a practical measure taken in the 
interests of a common cause at a movement when that cause could 
afford to neglect no factor of material or moral assistance". (6) 
World War I came to an end in 1918 and the Supreme Council of 
the Peace Conference decided not to restore Palestine to Turkey and 
instead place i t ur^ der the control of a Big Power. On September 29, 
1923 Britain became o f f i c i a l l y responsible for Palestine administra-
tion. Britain*s assumption o f the mandatory role was contrary to 
the wishes of the local Arab peoples. 
The Zionists had supported Britain to become mandatory power 
in Palestine. Britain was a supporter of the Zionists who at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1919 had circulated an extensive plan des-
5. See the Introducticn, pp. 15-16. 
6. Wise, Stephen & Jacob, Hass, The Great Betrayal. Ifew York, 
1930. p. 288. 
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APPENDIX i r 
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i ' l ? 
cribing the frontiers of a Zionist states "The boundaries of Pales-
tire vere starting on the north at a point on the Mediterranean Sea 
in the vicinity of Sidbn and following the watersheds of the foot -
hi l ls of the Lebanon as far as Jisr-£l-Karaon, thence to El-Bire, 
following the dividing line between the two basins of the Wadi El-Korn 
and the Wadi El-Telm, thence in a southerly direction following the 
dividing line between the eastern and western slopes of the Hermon, 
to the vicinity west of Beit Jenn, thence eastward following the 
northern watersheds of the Hahr Maghaniye close to and west of the 
Hedjaz Bailway" • In the east the line was to tei^inate "in the Gulf 
of Aqaba'^ . In the south the boundary "would extend "from El-Arish in 
northern Sinai to Aqaba in the south". "In the west the Mediterranean 
Sea" was the boundary line» " In an appeal to the Peace Conference, the 
iiionists said "that the geographical area of Palestine should be as 
large as possible so that i t may eventually contain a large and thriv-
ing population". (7} 
Great Britain helped the Zionists in their scheme of carving 
out a Jewish State in Palestine, The Jewish immigration was en-
couraged by Britain and it gave al l possible fac i l i t i e s to Zionist 
organizations operating inside PaJ^stine. In 1918, the total strength 
of the Jewish community in Palestine was 8 per cent (83,794 Jews). 
In 1922 the number went up to 83,794 making Jewish percentage twelve. 
In 1931, i t further increased to 17 per cent making Jewish population 
174,610. Between 1944 and 1948 the trend was further accelerated. 
During this period the Jewish population was 650,000 and their per-
7. Halpern Ben, The Jewish State. Harvard University Press, 
1961. pp. 303-04. See map No. 2. 
See Appendix Ifo. 11. 
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centage in the total population of Palestine was 31 per cent, (8) 
The flood of Jewish immigration had swept o f f Palestinian 
pol i t ical stability and plunged the area of holy places into the 
dark sea of bloodshed and terrorista. The British Governmerit got 
alarmed, as the monster of i ts own creation was uprooting i t s con-
tro l over Palestine. The Zionists were striving for a Jewish State 
and were, with terror and massacre of Arab population as their 
weapons, creating a situation favourable for the realization of their 
ultimate goal . The British Administration was crippled and the situ-
ation became intolerable. In March 1920, General Bols had sent to 
London an o f f i c i a l communique wherein he wrote that the authority 
of each department of British administration is "claitned or impinged 
upon by the Zionist commission". The Zionists ¥ere "bent on commit-
ting the temporary Military Administration to a partiallst policy 
before the issue of the Mandate". The Report also pointed out that 
the iSionists aim was not merely to establish a "Kational Hon©" but 
"in reality they wi l l be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish 
iitate and a l l that i t pol it ical ly implies". (9) 
The terrorist groups, and para-military cel ls a f f i l iated 
with the 2iionist Organization, were indulging in riots against the 
Palestinian Arabs, The Zionists combined diplomacy and action in 
order to achieve their goal of the Jewish State through a long pro-
tracted struggle. In i t s f i r s t decade from 1897 to 1907 the Zionist 
Organization set up financial, administration and propaganda depart-
8, For these statistics see Government of Palestine's Survey 
1945-46, pp. 143-44 and 149. Also see UKSCOt> Document A/364y 
vo l . I , Ch, IV, p. 64, and Israe 1 Government Yearbpok 1950^ 
p. 369, 
9 . Barbour, Keville, Kisi Domlnus. London, 1946, p, 97, 
ments. At the saa© time important Zionist leaders established and 
maintained diplomatic contact with their countries to secure wide 
support for the cause of the Jews. luring these in i t ia l ten years 
much ground work was done and in 1907 the Zionist movement undertook 
a plan of action» The plan was formulated by Dr Weizmann and adopted 
at the 8th Zionist Congress, The synthetic Zionism called for a slow 
but steady infi ltration into Palestine to carve out Jewish enclaves. 
Such Jewish enclaves were intended to exert pressure on the -autho-
. r it ies of Palestine to allow and guarantee to protect Zionist coionlr 
zation. 
The year 1917 marked a new but the most significant era of 
tile Zionist Movement. The Zionists succeeded in obtaining the approval 
of the British Governinent for its plan of Jewish immigration. In 
1927 the Zionist organizations were granted substantial amount of 
control over local administration of Palestine* In 1937 tt^ British 
Government was pressurized to concede the basic demand of the Zionists 
and a British Koyal Commission recommended to set up a Jewish State. 
The Anglo-Zionist conspiracy temporarily failed because the Palesr^. -
tinian Arabs rose againiSt i t and -frustrated a l l attempts ,to impose 
such a state on them. 
The Zionists intensified their struggle and subsequently 
their acts of violence increased*, Haganah, Palmach and Irgun demons-
trated their strength and ferocity. In May 1942, the Zionists re-
considered their plan of strategy to implement i t . The "iialtimore 
Conference" was convened in New York. The leaders of the Zionist 
Movement met and deciax-ed that the gates of Palestine be opened,.., 
and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth Integrated 
In the structuxe of the new democratic world", (10) The British 
Government wa^  pi-esented in 1945 with the demand that an "immediate 
decision be announced to establish Palestine "undivided and undiminished" 
as a Jewish state". Another demand made fey the Jewish Agency was 
that i t should be "invested with the control of Jewish immigration 
into Palestine". (11) 
The iiionists did not always use the word "statehood", they 
camouflaged i t with tJae more polite term of "home". The Zionist 
demand for a "home" for persecuted Jews was nothing more than a 
shrewd tactical slogan valid for such time as they could get su f f i -
cient manpower to dislodge the population, namely, the Ard>s, who 
constituted the overwhelming majority and owned most of the land. 
From 1897 to 1942 the leaders of the Zionist Movement tried to show 
the world that they wanted a Jewish national home not a Jewish State. 
After 1942 they abandoned t^ieir strategy and openly started using the 
expression Jewish State, It was a mere strategic stunt and the ob-
jective of Zionism was to attain "statehood". Theodor Herzl confessed 
in his diaries that the sum total of the Basle Congress" in a word 
which 1 shall guard against pronouncing publicly - it would be this: 
At Basle I founded the Jewish State, If I were to say this today, I 
would be met by universal laughter. In five years, perhaps, and 
certainly in f i f t y , every one wil l see i t " , (12) 
10. HiSCO Foundation for Palestine: Palestine'. A Qt»&y of Jewish. 
Afal) .P9licj,eg. Kew York, 1947, vol. I I , p. 1086, 
See Genei-al J, Hurley's report who was President i^joseveit's 
ptrional representative in the Middle i^ast, in the Introduction, 
p. 20, 
11. ^ y a l Institute for ^ International Affairs , (ire at Britain and 
Balestine 1915. 1945. pp. 139-40. 
12. Herzl, Theodor. T^gp Bucher ^ vol . 11, p. 24; quoted in Cohen 
Israel , A Short History of Zioniarn, London, 1951. pp. 11 & 47-48. 
The policy of tiae Zionist Movement in i t s early pro-
gramme and action was to systematically change the Arab character 
end population of Palestine into a Jewish one, through dependent 
Mandated Palestine then to an independent Jewish State. Jewish itami-k 
grants could be sett lad by forcible eviction of the Arab population 
of Palestine, The Zionists adopted four Important means to achieve 
their goal of attaining statehood for the Jewish community: diplo-
matic action, colonization, expulsion and expansion. 
Diplomatic action and settlement on Palestine soi l was shrewdly 
combir©d. The o f f i c i a l pronouncements made by Great Britain were not 
sufficient to attain the target of the Jewish State, Such a state was 
possible if the Jews in large numbers were brought to be settled in 
Palestine, 
Ben Gurion wrote that such pronouncements "would remain pieces 
of paper i f we did not manage to bring Jews into Palestine and prepare 
the land for large scale settlement". (13) 
The Zionists conducted their war against both the Palestinian 
Arabs and the British government. Their aim was to establish the 
"Jewish State" , To achieve their goal the Zioriists employed the third 
means i . e . expulsion of the Arabs as an indispensable part of their 
strategy to get rid of those 497,000 Arabs who were living within 
the Jewish state, O'Ballance wrotes (14) " I t was the Jewish policy 
to encourage the Arabs to quit their homes and they ejected those who 
clung to their villages." 
The Zionists had stepped up their terrorism because they sus-
13. Gurion Ben, ^en Gurion Looks Back. London, 1965, p. 53, 
14. O'Ballance, Edgar, The Arab»Israeli War 1948. Kew York, 1967. 
p. 64. 
pected that the Security Council might undo the partition of Palestine. 
After the acceptance of the Partition Resolution of November 29, 
1947 the Zionists adopted an offensive policy. Ben Gurion wrotes (15) 
"As April (1948) began, our war of independence swung de-
cisively from defence to attack. Field troops and Palraach 
in particular were deployed.. . . and almost a l l of Kew 
Jerusalem occupied, and the guerillas were expelled from 
Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberiah, Safad while s t i l l the Mandatory 
was present. Arabs st^irted fleeing from the c i t ies almost 
as soon as disturbances began in the early days of December 
1947" . 
On May 15, 1948, Mandatory rule over Palestine was o f f i c i a l l y termi-
nated. Between November 29, 1947 and May 15, 1948, the Zionist 
attacks intensifiea on Arab towns and villages. During this six months' 
period about 400,000 Palestinian Arabs living within the "Jewish 
State" were expelled and forced to take shelter in neighbouring Arab 
States. Many c i t ies and villages which were assigned to the 'Arab 
State* under ths Partition Plan, were a l l attacked and occupied by 
Israeli forces, (16) The Zionists were executing .their plan with 
utmost ruthlessness and trying to expand the frontiers of the Jewish 
State beyond the area assigned by the Partition ftesolution. The 
Partition Kesolution of Uovember 29, 1947 had clearly demarcated areas 
of the Arab state and the Jewish state. 
The Zionists were not content with the boundaries of their 
proposed state, they annexed Arab areas and launched an all-out attack 
on Arab vil lages. To them the Partition Plan was a temporary expedient 
device which should serve their long term purpose o f establishing Great 
15, Gurion Ben, David, Rebirth and Destiny of Isx-ael. New rork, 
1954. pp, 291-92, 296, 
16, See Chapter I , pp, 68-69• 
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Israel. To quote Dr Kioier Bergers (17) "In princlpOe a l l of them 
Cth8 .Zionists) agreed to accept (partit ion) . But in practice, the 
more militant segmentB of the movement, tacitly supported by the 
o f f i c i a l idlonist str^Jture, began in 1948 to develop and implement 
plans with two designs in mind. "The f irst was to increase the 
territory of the proposed so-called "Jewish State" and the second was 
to reduce the size of the Arab population in those territories assigned 
to the so-callad "Jewish State" by the Oeneral Assembly recommendation". 
According to J^ n Gurion, (18) the Jewish State "has been established 
in only a portion of the Land of Israel" . 
The ceasefire orders of the Security Council were flagrantly 
violated by Israel, She used i t as an interlude to replenish and 
streiigthen her military potentials and i t continued attacking Arab 
villages in defiance of May 22 resolution. The Arab population was 
expelled to make rooms for the Jewish immigrants. 
Large scale looting and massacres of Arab population were 
confirmed by Count Bernadotte, UH Mediator. In his Beport in 1948 
he said that the Z.ionists weie committing "large scale looting, 
pillaging and plundering", and ttere were "instances of destruction 
of villages without apparent military necessity". (19) 
The Security Council directive ordering ceasefire was violated 
when fighting again broke out on July 9, 1948. Israel was steadily 
expanding and gaining new areas belonging to the Arab States by the 
17. Bervar, E, "The Crisis in the Middle East In Depth 
and Perspective", The Arab World (September, 1969). 
18. quoted in Childers, ii-rskine B. , The Bond to Suez. London, 
1962, p. 176. 
19. Uh Doc. A/648 - UN Mediator tteport. p. 14. 
use of sheer force. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 
Itovember 16, 1948 calling upon the parties to conclude an armistice. 
The Armistice Agreements were concluded between Israel and 
four Arab States, i . e . , ISgypt, Lebanon, Jordan and" Syria. Israel 
acquired, after the Armistice Agreements were signed, control over 
nearly 8,000 sq. miles of territory out of a total of 10,436 sq. miles. 
Under the Partition Resolution the total area allotted to the Jewish 
J 20) 
State was 56.47^ whi3jB after the Armistice Agreements i t became 77,^  
Israel 's expansion beyond the territory given to it under the Parti-
tion Resolution thus was i l legal and in .violation of the United Nations 
directives. 
On December 11, 1948, a Conciliation Commission was set up by 
the General Assembly, Its chief purpose was to take steps to assist 
the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a f inal settle-... 
ment of a l l questions outstanding between them", (21) The Commission 
met at different places like Lebanon and Lausanne, At Lausanne i t 
presented a "protocol" as the basis of its work which was signed by 
Israel and t):» Arab States on May 12, 1949. The working document on 
the basis of which the commission was supposed to have conducted i t s 
deliberations was the map o f partition and Israel had agreed to i t . 
Later on Israel went back on its words and told the Commission-that 
s.he "COaid not accept a certain proportionate distribution of terr i -
tory agreed upon in 1947 as a criterion for a terr itor ial settlement 
in the present circumstances," (22) 
20, Hadawl, Sami, Palestine in ^ocus. Beirut, 1968. p. 52, 
21, GAOR, 194 (111) of 11th December 1948. 
22, Ul» Doc. A/927 of 21 June 1949, pp, 24-29, 
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Israel'fa acceptance of the Lausanne protocql was ^ust a 
shrewd ruse, Machiavlllian in i t s duplicity. Israel had applied 
for the membership of the United Nations and she accepted the protocol 
in order to show the world body her faith in the Charter and readiness 
to carry out i ts international obligations. The Government of Israel 
confessed i t , when it statedi (23) "In away, Israel ' s attitude at 
the Lausanne talks aided i ts delegation at Lake Success to obtain the 
maJOi-ity required for admission". 
Israel showed utter disregard not only for the Lausanne Proto-
co l of 1949 but also for the Ajprnistice Agreements concluded with the 
Arab states. The Armistice Agreements had provided demilitarized zones 
in each sector and Israel violated each zone's exclusive status granted 
under ttbe Agreement. 
B.ver since 1948, Israel has always tried to push i t s terr i tor ia l 
frontiers beyond ai^as assigned to i t under tiie Partition Plan. Jeru-
salem was declared international zone but i ts sanctity was flagrantly 
violated. Chaija Weizmann was askiiig the Jews to prepare for an even-
tual occupation of the holy city when he saidt (24) 
"Do not worry because part o f Jerusalem is not now within 
the state. Fear not, my friend, the oM synagogues w i l l 
be rebuilt anew and the way to the Wailing Wall w i l l be 
opened again. Within your blood and sacri f ices you have 
renewed the Covenant of old. Jerusalem is yours by virtue 
of the blood which your sons shed defending i t " , 
Ben Gurion, the chief architect of Israel , while accepting the 
inviuation to foi'm a cabinet told his partys (25) "1 accept to form 
the Cabinet on one condition and that i s , to uti l ize a l l possible means 
23. Israel Government le&r Book 19SQ. pp. 140, 142. 
24. Dov, Joseph, TJie Faithful Cltv: The Seige of «ierusalem. 
Kew iork, 1948. p, 332. 
25. Israel Government Year JBoo^  p, 64. 
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to expand towards the South" • It vas In keeping with the promise of 
Ben Gurion to expand to the south that Israel attacked Sinai peninsula 
in 1966. 
Israel has planned i ts expanionist designs with meticulous 
details and executed it stage by stage. Israel lopt expanding gra-
dually in the demilitariasd zone during the Arihistice. The El-Au;)a 
demilitarized'2Dne was Il legally occupied by Israel in 1950, Before 
ttB occupation of El-Au^a, Israel had violated the terr i tor ia l integ-
rity of Bir Qattar-and occupied i t on March 20, 1950, The Mixed 
Armistice Commission aslKd Israel to withdraw i t s armed forces from 
Bir (jattar but Israel refused to abide by the directive. The Security 
Council resolution of November 17, 1950 asking Israel to withdraw 
from the occupied area regained a s^re piece of paper because Israel 
refused to obey the Security Council, 
The naked aggression against Bir ^attar and El-Au^a was an 
exercise in brutal aggrandizement and the expulsion of Arab Bedouins 
from their homes coiifirmed Israel 's plan of ruthless expansion, "It 
was," to quote Egyptian Repi^sentatlv©, "a continuation and Intensi-
fication of premeditated, systematic and ruthless aggression by world 
po l i t i ca l Zionism against the rights of the lawful Arab inhabitants of 
Palestine". (26) 
The Israel is , Instead of withdrawing from El-Au^'a, established 
a settlement called "ketsiob". It was actually a military establish-
ment from where Israel wanted to penetrate deeper Into'Arab lands. In 
1955 further advance was made when the Israeli armed forces attacked 
and occupied Oaza. 
I t was another step forward towards the goal of "Greater Israel", 
SCfig, 511th Meeting, ho, 53, October 16, 1950, p. 6, 
The Israeli armed forces were the main actor in bringing Israel 
nearer its goal. In 1952 Moshe Dayan said; (27) "It lies upon the 
peopBs' shoulder to pr^are for the war, but i t l i es upon the Israeli 
army to carry out the fight with the ultimate object of erecting the 
Israeli Empire". 
The occupation of Gaza was t i l l then the most important and 
serious development in the Middle i-ast since the Armistice. Israel 
tried to justify i ts actions and occupation in terms of solf-defence, 
Her contentioo was that the occupation of some Arab areas was indis-
pensable because they were being used as headquarters of anti-Israeli 
guerrilla act ivit ies . Ihe theory of reprisal and retaliation was 
vague and it was not accepted by the United Kations nor did i t receive 
support from Israel 's staunchest a l l ies like France, the USA, the 
United Kingdom, 
The US representative commenting on the Gaza raid, said (28) that 
i t was "indefensible from any standpoint", "We oppose any policy of 
reprisal and retaliation". 
Israel was not prepared to accept any resolution of the United 
Nations and vacate the areas occupied by i t . It went ahead with i t s 
plan and e f forts to establish Gi-eater Israel . After Gaza it overran 
Sinai Peninsula. 
During 1965 General Election campaign in Israel, leaders 
of various pol it ical parties were making big promises about extending 
Israeli frontiers towards south of Israel. Ben Gurion was pitched 
against Sharett for leadership. The Mapai Party led by Ben Gurion 
assumed more hawkish postures in order to capture power. 
27. February 12, 1962. 
28. SCQR, 692nd Meeting, March 4 , 1965, p. 4. 
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Ben Gurlon on July 9 , 1965, spoke in Beersheeba where he pro-
mised to "bring water and youth from the north to the ffegev" . (29) 
Ihe water, he meant, was primarily the water from the Jordan River. 
Israel in i t s cxpansiorjlst drive now wanted accsess to Eilat 
to establish its contacts with Africa and Asia. Sharett, a contestant 
f or power in Israel was reported as warning that "Israel would assure 
by force the freedom of sea approach to Eilat should our enemies f a i l 
to respond to our e f forts through international channels and peaceful 
negotiations to l i f t their blockade", (30) Israel was bent upon 
reaching Kilat and developing i t as an o i l port. Ben Gurion also 
agreed with his chief r ival to use force to open Kilat , , He told a 
correspondent that opening Eilat f o r Israel i shipping was not d i f f i -
cult because "we c ^ do i t by air , by land or by sea." (31) 
Nasser had in mind Israel i expansionism ax.d the promises given 
to the Israel i people to push Israelis frontier further south when 
he natloi.alized Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Israel mobilized i t s 
entire military strength and on October 29, 1956 it invaded the Sinai 
Peninsula, 'ihe invasion of the Sinai was invasion of Egypt. Aided 
by i:.ngland and France, Israel used its superior military strength to 
expand deeper in the Arab Land and render many Arabs homeless. The 
invasion of i-gypt had one motive - to expand in the south. A prominent 
member of the Herut Party observed* (32) "Peace with the Arab count-
ries i s impossible with the present boundaries of Israel which leave 
Israel open to attack. Israel should take the offensive immediately 
29. Burns, L. M., Between Arab and Israe l i . London, 1962, p. 82. 
30. Ib id . , p. 82. 
31. Kew York Times' April 25, 1956. 
32. New York Times, January 25, 1956. 
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and capture strategic points Its border including the Gassa 
strip ©nd thou should tate over the British bacised kingdom of Jordan." 
The Sinai cmpaim was not the result of a few day® planning. 
It was a well planned and raetticulously executed ecbecae to grab one 
of t»© mosTi strategic areas to provide Israel an access to the sea. 
tfh© reasons given for the invasion of Egypt varied^ eomo said that 
i t was a "preventive war", to sotae i t was a "retaliatory raid". It 
was iBOie than that. Burns, the Chief of 0X2fSO has quoted Colonel 
Kursell^, Israel A w Itiai^n Officer for Armistice Affaire with the 
Ministry of ForeiLn Affairs as saving that " i t was not Just a re - (33) 
taiiatory raid, ^ut thet the Isrtel forces were going to stay in binai" • 
The Security Council followed the mm ritual o f awjeting and 'jondering 
over tl3e grave situation. The resolution was vetoed and en emergency 
©ession of tiio General As^mbly was called, in vjhich a resolution was 
adopted under which QFnited dilations Force osmo into existence and was 
st:nt to ti::^  Middle East to iseep peace but with small success^ Israel 
believes in the policy of speaking soft ly but v^ithout foregoing the 
use of the big stick. 
IsrcsBl talks of peace but prepares for war. Whenever an Israeli 
leader became too enthusiastic ii. talking about peace, It has generally 
resulted In an attack on Ar&.b territory^ Israel is that way a master 
of duplicity. £l«Iarra of Jordan was referring to Israeli duplicity 
when he challeiiged iibaix's cal l f o r peace and doubted his motive. He 
said that Eban*s ca l l for peace "worries me", say this because ex-
perience iiBS shown that when tiae Isreelio speak of peacc and make loud 
noises about i t , we take i t as a uernir.c to prepare for Israeli agtres-9 , 1952 
sion. (34) Ue cited few instances like Kbui'o Speech of January 
33. Bums, L, L. M., 0£. p. 180, 
34. SCOii, Doc. S/PV. 1310, October 28, 1956. 
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emphasiaing the need of peace and only nineteen days later two Jor-
danian villages Falama and iiantls were attacked. 
On September 28, 1953, Kban again expressed his love for peace 
and his concern "to heal a wound of aggressive violence". Sixteen 
days later Qibya became a victim of the most brutal aggression by 
Israel on October 14, 1953, 
i 
Moshe Sharett also spoke in Lban*s tone on December 11, 1953 
declared that Israel was always ready for peace. Three months later 
the Jordanian village of Nahhalin was attacked on March 28, 1964, 
El-Farra cited many other instances of Israel 's vague, in-
sinceie profession of peace, which actually meant "blood, murder, terror 
and aggression", (36) 
The same story of double talk was repeated in 1967, Iievi 
Eshkol, Israel Premier told the Knessets (36) "Israel has no aggres-
sive designs') against Arab countries, Moshe Dayan also saids "We 
have no invasion aims. Our only target is to f o i l the Arab armies aim 
of invading our country. Soldiers of Israel, we have no aims of 
territorial conquest". 
It i s not only Kgypt but also Jordan and Syria who have been 
victims of frequent Israeli attacks. Israel has a l l along wanted to 
capture the entire Western Bank of the Jordan Kiver to establish 
Greater Israel, The Israelis had an armistice agreement with Jordan 
but fi-equently and flagrantly violated i t . In 1962 the Israeli armed 
forces attacked Beit Jalla and occupied the area. On September 17, 
1952 the Israeli armed forces expelled ten families of Es-Sani tribes 
35, Ibid, 
36, Tp^  May 23, 1967, 
37, ffew York TimeSf June 5, 1967, 
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end occupied their land near Jordan. The biggest attack launched by 
Israel against Jordan came on October 14, 1963. Qlbya, a village on 
ttje .iordan side became a victim of Israeli aggression. Lake Tiberias 
also became target of Israeli aggres&ion. The Israeli Government 
undertook its work along the western bank of the Jordan River on Land 
belonging to Arab peasants in the Mansoura sector. The Israfelis on 
March 13, 1951, crossed the bridge of Benat Yakub and began work 
on a large scale, in the demilitar-ized zone of the Eastern bank of 
the Jordan iiiver. The Palestine Land Development Company Limited 
was the "itionists* chief organ of colonization. I t was like East 
India Company which was the chief instrument of British expansionism 
in India in the 18th century. The Palestine Land Development Company 
Ltd., was a body Invested with powers to deprive the Arabs of their 
laiJd. The Zionists were deposing the Arabs by purchasing their land, 
or failing that, they were being frightened and molested. . The Arabs 
who remained in Palestine were also subjected to torture. Their 
homes were looted and burnt, theii- lands were grabbed and they were 
reduced to the status of second class cit izen. a11 inhuman devices 
were being used in order to grab more and more Arab territory in 
order to accommodate more and mo^ e Jews, The Palestine Land Develop-
ment Company Limited was, therefore, instructed by the Security 
Council in i t s resolution of May 18, 1961, "to cease a l l operations 
(38) 
in the demilitarized zone until such time as an agreement i s arranged". 
Israel, however, did not abide by the Security Council reso-
lutions asking it to vacate aggression and abandon i ts policy of ey-
•xpansionism. The Palestine Land Development Company Limited did not 
38. SCOH, 546th Meeting, May 16, 1961, pp. 2-5. 
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cease operating in the demilitarized aone as required by May 18, 1951, 
Security Council Resolution, Israel 's policy of "encroachment on 
Arab lands" (39) was confirmed by General Vagan Bennike the Chief of 
the Staff of UMTSO. 
The Israeli expansion in the Syrian sector reached new heights 
when in 1955, a Syrian post on Lake Tiberias was attacked and occu-
pied. Ihe Israeli attack on Syrian so i l was deplored by Great Powers 
and the Security Council. Israel was severely condemned for i t s acts 
of violence agairist innocent Arabs. Mo amount of condemnation of 
Israeli actions has, however, made the Zionists desist from their plans 
or actions. 
Kesolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly 
have been treated as meie scraps of paper by Israel, In 1962, Israel 
With a l l i t s military strength, attacked tm Arab village of Huqueib 
in Syria. Syrian positions at El-Fig and 2akl and El-Henwia were 
attacked and bombed. The United l^atlons Truce Supervision Organiza-
tion was incharL© of looking after and preserving the territorial integ-
rity of Arab land. 
Israel in making onslaughts on Arab States has shown no inhi-
bitions or respect for world opinion. It disregarded and, at times, 
/ 
defied even the Mixed Armistice Commissions directives. Many Chiefs 
of Staff of UWrso are on record in confirming that Israel remained, (40) 
throughout, indifferent and contemptuous towards the United Mtions 
Supervision Organization. Israel started as a small state comprising 
small chunk of territory. From 1948 to 1956 t i l l the time of Egypt 
39. SCOKy 630th Meeting, October 27, 1953, p. 14, 
40. For detailed account see (1) E.L.M. Buxns, Between Arabs and 
Israel i . London, 1962$ (2) Carl von Horn, Soldlering for Peace. 
London, 1966; (3) E, H. Hutchison, Violent Truce. New York, 1956. 
1C4 
Invasion, Israel's frontiers expanded. I t deliberately, with ful l 
and detailed plan, embarled on a policy of wiping out Arab population, 
and replacing ttiem with the Jewish immigrants, 
A look of Israel 's map would be enough to convince anybody 
of Isxael's ruthless and shameaBSs expansionist pol icy. 
Israeli leaders had always expressed their expansionist 
design and whenever they had any opportunity to push Israel 's fron-
t i e r forward they grabbed i t discarding a l l considerations of morality 
J 
and international obligations. One of Israe l ' s military leaders was 
provoking his people to acquire more Arab terr i tor ies . He wrotet (41) 
"Let us retaliate not by aggression of personal 
violence but by giving an additional spurt to our 
development. For every one of ouc comrades who 
f a l l s , let us build a new agricultural settlement. Far 
from evacuating our vi l lages , l e t us roclaim more 
desert and swamps and build new v i l lages" . 
The Truce and, then, the Ai'mlstice Agreements with the Arab States 
did not mean much as far as Israel and its acts of violence were 
concerned. 
Bayed Hofal has, with much e f f o r t s , collected a s tat i s t i ca l 
data about Israeli attacks on the Arab States during the Armistice 
and af ter . According to him from 1957 to 1962 at least 2500 attacks 
were made by Israel on Jordanian frontier . On the Egyptian frontier 
the number of attacks i s not that staggering, nevertheless it helped 
Israel to expand in the most strategic areas like Gaza str ip and 
toinai Peninsula, From 1949 to 1961 Israel made 1635 attacks on the 
Egyptian frontier. On the Lebanese frontier th^'number 97 while on 
the Syrian side the number of attacks during 1965 and 1962 was 16,997, 
41, Pearlman, Moshe , The Army of Israe3„. Jfew York, 1950, 
P • 31, 
The total number of attacks made by Israel on t i l l the Arab States 
was 21,240. (42) 
Israeli policy of expansion was not spontaneous, i t was a well 
planned and deliberate policy. Its swift penetration in the Sinai 
campaign o f 1956 was the result of ssiany years planning and extremely 
careful execution. Two Jnussian authors have mcceeded in digging 
deep into the secret military records of Israel and quoted from 
secret document showing that Israel had detinite plans. In one of 
the documents i t i s reportedj (43) 
Tiran and Sanafir, Sinai Peninsula Suez area 
. . . Xhe occv^ation of thess areas wi l l bring us un-
limii.e4 possibil it ies for the use of the Gulf of Aqaba 
and the port of Elath. The occupation of these terr i -
tories wi l l put at one's disposal o i l wells from 
which we can extract to thousand tons of o i l per year, 
and also trade profits resulting from the possession 
of the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal wi l l bring us from • 
10 to 20 million dollars per year. The port of Elath 
also wi l l bring us 10 million dollars per year". 
Wherever Israel had peretrated into Arab territories, militarized 
agricultural settlements had come into existence. Israel 's military 
strategy was to establish border settlements with strong military 
guard. Most of these settlements were established on lands which 
were abandoned by the Arabs. Out of 370 such settlements about 350 
were, according to Don Peretz, founded on Arab refugee property, (44) 
The fort i f ied settlements on border areas were aimed at defending 
the State of Israel. Ben Gurion wrotet (45) "Upper Galiee and the 
42. Nofal, Sayed, Israel Crime Record. Cairo, 1963, pp.37-38. 
^^ainis A The State of Israel: Its Position and 
Pol it ics . Moscow, 1958. pp. 44-45. 
44. Pe^tz , Don, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, Washington^ 
1958. p. 143. 
45. Gurion, Ben David, Israeli Y^ar Book 1959-60. p. 23. 
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expanses of the South and the Wegev are the country's weak points, 
and no military force can assure us of their continued possession 
unless we settle, them as speedily and closely as possible", 
The whola of the Sinai Peninsula ^as overrun in 1956 and 
Israel in return for its withdrawal from the Sinai insisted upon 
retaining an important strip with i t . That strip ran from El- . 
Arish to the Gulf of Aqaba and Was of immense strategic importance 
for Israel 's plan to reach the sea and operate shipping through the 
Strait of Tiran, "Eretz Israel" also included the western bank of 
the Jordan River and the Golan Heights in Syria. Israel wanted hot 
only an outlet to the sea which she got when Elath was captured, 
Israel also wanted portions of Lebanese and Syrian territories to 
include the-headvraters of the iiiver Jordan and a portion of the 
hiver Litani to ensure Israel economic progress and development. To 
get ample water supply Israel chalked out a plan to divert the water 
of the xtiver Jord^. It was the iaost important chain in the schecae 
of Israeli expansion, Israeli contention to justify its. claim.to 
divert toe water of the Kiver Jordan was that Syria and Jordan .were 
utilizing the waters of the xarmuk Hiver. Such a contention was un-
palatable. The Jordan River was of great significance for the Arab 
States bordering the Hiver since they had to depend on water re-
sources in the absence of o i l resources. Lebanon, Jordan and Syria 
a l l the main beneficiaries of Jordan Hiver water, Israel was planning 
to pump out the water from the Hiver Jordan to be utilized by the 
Jewish immigrants living in Hegeb. The "Johnston proposal" was the 
blueprint which Israel wanted to use in undertaking the project. 
Johnston came to the Middle East as an Emissary of Eisenhower. His 
assignment was to study the matter and make suggestions to both the 
parties. The Israeli policy of diverting the waters of the Kiver 
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Jordan was aimed at making the return of the Palesttoian Arabs im-
possiblfi by occupying maximum Arab territory. It had another aim of 
allowing s t i l l greater influex of the Jewish immigrants which would 
help i t in realizing the dream of Eretz Israel stretching from the 
"Kile to the Euphrates". 
The Arab states opposed any scheme of diverting the waters 
of the Hiver Jordan. They refused to cooperate with Israel in any 
irrigation development plaii as proposed by the United States of 
Anerica because their support would have meant a severe, blow to the 
rights of the Palestinian Arabs. The question of the itiver Jordan 
and i t s division between Israel and the Arab States was not to be taken 
in isolation of the Palestine problem. 
According to the Arab States the question of repatriation 
of Palestinian Arabs to their homeland and the division of the waters 
of the Mver Jordan were two sides of the same coin and hence were 
to be tackled simuitaneously. The United Nations Economic Survey 
^ 4. 
Mission had accepted this relationship between the repatriation of 
Arab refugees and agreement on international water rights. The 
mission visited the Middle East in 1949 and after a long and thorough 
study of the probl»m i t s report said that peace and cooperation were 
essential pre-requisites for any development scheme. - I t saidj (46) 
"In the absence of a peace settlement between Israel 
and adjoining countries on outstanding issues involving 
repatriation and compensation of Arab refugees and 
territorial Doundaries, i t i s unrealistic to suppose 
that agreement on the complex question of international 
waters rights could be negotiated among the parties" . 
The position taken by the Arab States was vindicated by the report 
of the United Nations J^conomic Survey. The Arab states took a serious 
46. Kizk, Kdward. The hiver JordfiT}. e^w York, 1964. p. 20, 
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View o f the Israel i designs of expansion and decided to oppose every 
scheme to divert the waters of the Hiver Jordan. The chief reason 
for their strong opposition was that Israel wanted to grab more land 
because the reservoir and pipelines were to be built on land which 
was Arab ohtw^. The main wa,ters of the itiver Jordan had i t s origin 
in Lebanon and Syria and i t was a boundary line between Palestim 
and »)ordsji. Its diversion would have meant hardship and poverty for 
the Arab cultivators in the Jordan Valley* 
Israel has always been, with single mindedness and meticulous 
details, following a policy of pushing its frontiers inside the Arab 
territory. It has been buay preparing for war which provided i t the 
opportunity to appropriate Argfc lands and expand i t s geographical 
iitttits. The toaders of Israel have always itched for ths Qt I M 
B i b a n d that opportunity came in 196? wten the Israel i air force 
was in action against the UAh^  Jordan, Syria end Iraq. The plan was 
to acwieve <secure* and »recognized' borders by occupying Sinai, the 
Golan Heights and the West Bank of Jordan including Jerusalem. The 
plan was execut^ed with great speed and fantastic precision. 
Israe l ' s expansionism was in f u l l cry in 1967 and was based 
on i t s occupation of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian terr i tor ies , 
Hoshe Dayan was disclosing the Israeli plan of expansion and annexa-
tion when he saids (47) 
"People abroad must realize that with a l l the strategic 
importance to Israel of Sinai, the Golan Heights, and tYiB 
Tiran Straits - the mountain range west of the Jordan 
l ies at the heart of Jewish h i s tory . . . I f you have the 
book of the Bible, and the people of the book, then you 
also have the land of the Bible - o f the Judges and of 
the Patriarchs in Jerusalem, Hebron, uericho and there-
abouts" • 
47. The Jerusaleiq Ppst^ August 10, 1967, p . 1. 
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The military preparedness of Israel in 1967 was far better and 
superior than 1956. '•The armoured corps in 1956" wrote Klmche, (48) 
"represented a small fraction of the total*, by 1967 this bad risen 
to a significant percentage. More than half of the defence expendi-
ture went into the air force . Armour and airpower had become the 
two decisive factors." With such military might and planned scheme 
of expansion Israel einbarlsed upon another adventure unparalleled In 
the annals of history and i t endeavoured to preserve, uphold and 
defend the new status quo, This expansion was to materialise the 
dream of "Eretz Israel" , it was the fulfila^nt of a people's ances-
toral dream. TM Jerusalem Post wrotet (49) "The land was promised 
to us by the Almighty, and a l l the prophets foretold Its return to 
us." Israel had always enjoyed the fruit of sggwssion and i t refused 
to withdraw from the areas occupied during the June War of 1967. 
Israel relUsed to withdraw its armed forces from occupied areas not 
because i t wanted •secure' borders. The main reason was i ts expan-
sionist policy and greed to acquire more and more land to absorb mass 
Jewish immigration. Eliezer Liveneh saidx (60) "Israel must make 
ready for absorbing mass immigration during the next decade, and aU 
resources must be mobilized for that goal, including re-education of 
the people towards "genuine Zionism". Moshe Talenkin and Professor 
tiaJ*©! J'isb also spoke at the f i r s t post election convention of the 
LaP*^  of Israel Movement held on ffovember 9 , 1969. These two gentlemen 
48. Klmche David, and iiawly, Dan, The Sandstorm - The Arab-
Israeli W«r of 1967. Bew lork, 1968. pp. 173-74, 
49. je^ Mgfti^ JP August l o , 1967, p. 1. 
50. Ib id . , November l o , 1969, p. 8, 
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also dwelt upon the revolutionary role of the Six Day War of 1967 in 
Jewish history and scoffed at those people who were arguing to go 
back to the pre-war position. (61) The Pa3j2Stlnian Arabs, like other 
human beiiigs, were deeply involved with land, of their birth and re-
lUsed to yield despite the pressure and ^ terror applied by Israel. 
The Arabs who refused to leave their homes were subjected to inhuman 
and cruel treatment- Their houses were burnt and their possessions 
were looted which was in keeping \fith the Zionists* lust for domina-
tion ^nd expansion. An Indlim expert of International Law observed: (52) 
"depression of Arabs has become intensified since 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Under the pretext of main-
taining law and order Israeli Military started blowing 
up the homes of suspected Arab patriots and extended 
the practice to Jerusalem on March 6, 1968 which was de-
nounced by the Mayor Teddy Kolleck. The Arabs in Gaza 
were subjected to particular humiliations, curfews, 
searches, detentions m<X f ines" . 
Israel 's policy of expansionism was deliberate and conceived 
at the time of Israel 's birth. Count Bernadotte had perceived future 
pol i t i cal development when he prophetically said: (63) 
" It could not be ignored that unrestricted immigra-
tioa to the Jewish area of Palestine might, over a 
period of years, give rise to a population pressure 
and to economic and polit ical disturbances which 
would justify present Arab fears of ultimate Jewish 
expansion in the Kear East. 
Israel was encouragitjg mass immigration of the Jews and Ben Gurion 
in 1961 declared: "Kvery religious Jew has daily violated the pre-
cepts of Judaism and the Torah of Israel by remaining in the Diaspora". 
(54) iivery Jew living outside Israel was, according to Ben Gurion, "godless". 
The Jeru^^em Post^ November 10, 1969, p. 8. 
52. Lakhanpal, L. P. , Documents and J^tes on Arab-Israeli Question. 
NiW Delhi, 1968. p. 397. 
53. UJJ Mediators' iieport. UJg Doc. S/888. 
Jewish Ifewslettey (ifew York), 9 January 1961. 
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The Jewish immigration gathered new momentum even after June war of 
1967. According to JerusaJjem Post "the security situation has not 
affected immigration and prospects for 1970 fluctuate between 55,000 
and 60,000." (55) The Israeli prt-ss advocate everyday the policy of 
unlimited Imaigration disregarding the absorptive capacity of pre-
war areas or after war occupied areas with intention and knowledge of 
dangers which it poses to neighbouring Arab states. The Jerusalem Post 
wrote I (56) 
"Tbe Government coalition negotiations committee 
November 23, made headway on a number of issues and 
resolved unanimously to increase settlement both in 
Israel and the administered areas. 
The term »homeland* was used apparently in order to 
avoid having to'name specific areas in the Golan Heights, 
the West Bank or Sinai where such new settlements are 
to be established within the next four years", 
Israel is an expansionist state and the Arabs have suffered in terms 
of material and human loss. "That the Arabs fear and suspicion" wrote 
(57) Professor Haqqi, "are not groundless have been repeatedly subs-
tantiated by the attitude of the British and U.S." GcvernioBnt towards 
Israel , and the moral and material support extended to Israel by the 
Anglo-American Jewry and the elite in western countries". 
Tbe financial aid given to Israel by American Jews has be.en 
fantastic, "Amexican Jews have poured into Israel for the last 15 
years, ^568 million bonds for Israel, ^1,035,000,000 through the UJA 
and another ^250 million in private investsnts that were often moti-
vated by conscience", (58) 
65. , l^ ovember 19, 1969, p. 1. 
56. Ib id . , November 24, 1969, pp. 1, 8. 
57. riaqqi, S.a.B., "The Arab Israeli Conflict - Its heal Nature 
and Dimensions" al'Arab (New Delhi), vol . 9 , No. 1, January '70, 
58. Time Magazine ^ May 10, 1963, 
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According to another report the American aid to Israel In 
the last sixteen years totalled 3698 million. (59) 
During the years 1948-61, the Joint Distribution Conunittee 
(60) 
expended about 0120,000,000 of i t s share of UJA funds for i ts pro-
gramme in Israel, 
Many Jewish intellectuals have openly denounced Israel policy 
of expansion. Albert Einstein was offered to becon® the President of 
Israel, The great scientist declined the o f fer and observed that "he 
had never been a i^iionlst and had never supported the creation of the 
state of Israel", (61) Einstein was concerned with the rights of 
Palestine Arabs and wanted them to be repatriated to their homes. 
Professor Morris Cohen was also opposed to the idea of a 
separate Jewish State, He did not have a blind.love for Zionism which 
tas regarded "not merely a philanthropic movement to help the homeless. 
I t claims to be a solution-of the Jewish probleiai and i ts emphasis on 
Palestine rests on a nationalist philosophy v/Llch is a direct challenge 
to a l l those who believe in libeTallsm." (62) 
Zionism was an antithesis of lioeralism and even of human 
civi l ization. The expansion of Israel and expulsion of Arab popu-
lation were the natural concomitants and logical outcome of Zionist 
doctrine. Ian Gilmour rightly observed: (63) "Stripped of i ts pseudo-
59. The Timas (London), June 3, 1964, 
60. American Jevish Yearbook IQf^j p, m , 
61. Lilenthal, Alfred, What Price IsyAe^? Chicago, 19B3. 
p. 173. 
62. Cohen, Morris, Zionism^ Triballs|w or Liberalism. ISfew York, 
1964. p. 4. 
63. The Times J June 25, 1969. 
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historical overtones, Zionism meons tbo displacement of Arabs by 
Jews and the tuiniitg of Arab land into Jewish land." 
Israel i s not a state. I t is a m.ovenient which preaches 
and practises hatred, discrimination against those people whose land 
i t had forcibly acquired. Israel as a movement does not have a 
frontier - i t cannot have a frontier. Its frontiers wi l l be deter-
mined by its military strength and by the extent of Jewish immigra-
tion, The Law of Jrtetux-n was a clear manifestation of Israel 's policy 
of expension. On July 5, 1950 the Israeli Knesset unanimously passed 
the law which statedj (64) "Every Jew has the right to immigrato to 
the country". A Jew who comes to Israel and aftur his arrival ex-
presses a desire to settle there may, while in Israel , obtain an 
immigrant cert i f i cate" . Israel 's vested interest. ig. not in peace but 
in war because its motto i s expansion in the Arab world to help Jews 
to retui'n to the "Promised Land". 
War i s a convenient instrument o f expansion and Israel has 
always used i t and wi l l always use i t to expand in every direction. 
The best example of Israeli-expansionist design was Moshe Dayan's 
statensant in one of Israel ' s weeklies. (65) 
"Our fathers had reached the frontiers which were 
reorganized in the Partition Plan. Our generation 
reached the frontiers of 1949. Kow the Six-Day gen-
eration have managed to reach Suez, Jordan and the 
Golan Heights. This is not the end. After the present 
ceasefire lines there will be new ones. They wi l l 
extend beyond the Jordan - perhaps to Lebanon and 
perhaps to central Syria as well. 
Dayan's statement is an houest confession of iiionist expansionist 
proposals submitted to the Peace Conference of 1919. Israel has 
64. , La^ueurWalter, lid. The Israel»Arab Header - A Oooumentary 
History pf the Middle E^st Conflict- Jtew York, 1969. p. 128. 
65, Quoted i>y Ian Gilmour, The Times^ June 25, 1969. 
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forced, as Day an confesses, i ts way out o f the frontiers assigned by 
the Partition Plan of the United Stations and wi l l keep grabbing more 
and more territories to materialize the religions myth of the 
"Promised Land", Israeli expansion has denied the basic human rights 
of the inhabitants of Palestine mid rendered them homeless in their 
own land. The refugee problem is an integral part of the Palestine 
question and any e f fort to solve i t later in isolation is bound to 
fisszle out. As a matter of fac t , the reccnt State of Israel, is not 
the ultimate goal of the iiionists. It is only the f i rs t stage for 
fulfledged 'ingathering of world Jewry.' Israel in its expansionist 
drive passed through many stages and at every stage it was condemned 
by the United I'Jations. The Security Council and the General Assembly 
have adopted innumerable resolutions asking Israel to abandon i t s 
policy of expansion. Mo positive result out of the United Nations 
directives has so far come out. 
Israel has always treated the United Kations resolutions with 
great contempt and has paid them scant heed. Israelis adamant behaviour 
constitutes a severe blow to the prestige' of the United Kations. 
Israel 's refusal to refrain from proclaiming fUll territorial sover-
eignty over the areas under i ts de facto occupation after each aggression 
is a negation of a l l principles of international law and civil ized l i f e . 
The United Nations is on t r ia l . The worM body should not become and 
remain a silent spectator to Israel flagrant violations of the United 
Nations Charter. 
Chapter IV 
THE PAISSTIKIAN REFUGEES 
Polit ical 2iioiiiem bases Itself on both ideology and expe-
diency, The ideological orientation of Zionism involves a parti-
eular attitixie of the Jews towards the Arabs. Apartheid was an 
ideal before the Zionists and they applied i t , in fu l l measure, 
against the Palestinian Arabs. The scheme of discrimination became 
a part of iiionist ideology because i t would help in the achieve-
ment of i t s goal of establishing the Jewish state. The racial 
content of Zionist ideology was too strong to be ignored, Theodore 
Herzl and othsr leaders of pol i t i cal Zionism advocated for naisied 
discriminatory treatrosnt for the gentiles - here the Arabs. Herzl 
confided a plan to his Diary to "spir i t the penniless population -
across the frontier by denying i t employment". (1) The Zionists, 
as early as 19051 boycotted the AreJbs and described Arab employment 
by Jews as "painful leprosy". The Arabs were treated as an inferior 
race ^ust as the Jews were treated by Hitler, The Zionists were 
following Hitler 's myth of racial superiority to i ts logical end 
and preparing schesnes to exterminate Arabs or drive them out of 
their homes. The Zionist Hitlerite aggressiveness re-enacted Kazi 
brutalities in Palestine. The most significant aspect of the crea-
tion of the 'Jewish State» was that i t was to be mstalled on the 
land which was already occupied by another people. The Jewish State 
could be formed only when indigenous people were expelled to acco-
mmodate Jewish immigrants. Such a situation was bound to give rise 
to perpetual confl ict between two groups - the alien intruder and 
the victim of such intrusion. 
1 , Quoted by Ian Gllmour, The Time^ (London), June 25, 1969, 
The conf l ict between the Jews and the Palestinians became 
a prominent feataire and even during the mandatory rule the two 
gtouLj^ s were always at loggerheads. Pol i t i ca l iiioniSm was in 
alliance with British imperialism in i t s endeavours to colonize 
Palestine» l!he Zionists wanted the local people o f Palestine to 
give willing approval to the idea of the Jewish state to be e s t -
ablished in their own country. The people of Palestine saw the 
wicieedress o f the ilionists and refused to sign their own death warrant. 
The Zionists were not prepared for the refusal which would have meant 
defeat for their plan, fhey resorted to the use of violence against 
the innocent people of Palestine as the Palestinians resisted the 
Zionists and their push into their homeland. The Zionists were well 
armed and had definite plan to achieve the goal of the •Jewish State*. 
They had the f u l l support of Britain who encouraged the Jewish Immi-
gration into Palestine» The Zionists encouraged by Britain, financed 
by the United States of America, and armed by Eastern Europe, esp-
ecial ly Czechoslovakia, Kept up their pressure of terrorism and 
bloodshed on Palestinians, The Jewish National Fund was established 
in 1901 during the Fifth iiionist Congress• I t was established to 
purchase land for the Jews, The Fund was devoted "to bring about the 
settlement of Palestine by Jews in steadily increasing number", (2) 
The Jewish Fund had acquired 758,200 metric dunams by 1944 
as compared with a holding of 16,379 metric dunams jn 1917, (3) This 
2 , Parson, Leonard, Keren London, 1921, p. 77, 
3, Gabbay, itoi^, B.,, A Political Study of l^ he Arab-Jewish 
SjgillliSl. Geneva, 1959, p, 27, 
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policy of Land purchase meant eviction of the Arabs from Palestine, 
The Mayor of Hablas told the Shaw Commission in 1930: (4) "The 
ob^c t of Zionism Ib to get hold^of PaJfist^e—and the Zionist 
policy is to dispose of the Arabs in every posplblfi way and to 
replace them with Jews" . 
The Arabs opposed the land transfer to the Jews and demanded 
the cessation of Jewish immigration. The mandatory power issued 
white papers restricting the exodus o f the Jews into Palestine but 
not with much success. The Zionists gathered at Biltmore Hotel in 
Uew York iji May 1942 and issued a ca l l to the world ^ewry to get 
back "to the L&nd of Israel"* Ben-<ittrion in the Ccnference de-
clared! (5) "Immigration was the crucial problem on which there 
could be no compromise.- Ko pol i t i ca l opposition or obstruction on 
the part of the Arabs... w i l l prevent Jews from getting back to the 
Land of Israel' ' . Tfae Biltmore, programme was adopted and ship loads 
of Jewish immigrants started pouring into Palestine, Their arrival 
ijti Palestine had meant eviction and expulsion o f the Arabs of 
Palestine, The Biltmore programme had discarded the concept of b l -
nationaHsm. According to the programme, the Jews were the only 
race to live in Palistine and the Jews Commonwealth would not have 
room for a non-Jew. Yet Weisanann gave the. Arabs of Palestine 
some assurances which were never kept. He saldi (6) " I f the Arabs 
4 . Shaw Commisalon Report, vol . 3, 47th Meeting, Colonial 
ho, 48, 1930. p. 499. 
5 . June 1942, p. 14. 
6. Weizmann, Chalm, "Palestine's itole in the Solution of the 
Jewish Problem", Foreign Affairq (January, 1942), pp. 337-
38 * 
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do not wish to remai® in a Jewish State, every fac i l i ty w i l l be 
given to ttoaiB to transfer to one of the maoy and vast Arab count-
The fac i l i t i e s promised by Weiamann provod a camouflage 
for the Zionist terrorism and massacre• Ithe Partition Plan of 
Koveraber 29, 1947 was accepted by the ^Sionists as the "ultimate 
miniaum acceptable". The Zionist para-military organizations 
carried out a f ierce psychological warfare against local Arabs» The 
Es^anali estsJQlishe^ a communicatioti network to mal^  important 
broaidcasts to strU^ terror in the hearts of Palestinians and maiss 
them leave their homes in panics In 1948 i t saidt (7) 
"We wish i t to be known to every Arab in Jeru-
salem - particularly in the Arab City - that we 
are able to reach most of their houses end that 
we shall fia3 i t an easy Job to blow up any de-
sired number of houses in any one night", 
The reign of terror continued unabated, The OSA and other 
powers viewed the situation with grave concern and wanted to find 
a peaceful solution of the problem* The USA desired no violent 
change in the status quo since i t would be a severe blow to the US 
national interest in the Middle East, The Secretary of State (8) 
told tte Arassd Cofflmittee of the Senate on March 20» 1948! 
"The grave international situation had ©mpbasized 
the compelling importance o f preventing the out-
break of open warfare in Palestine, The interest 
of the 0S in a peaceful settlement in Palestine 
arises not only out of deep humanitarian consider* 
ation but also out of v i ta l elements of our national 
pol icy" . 
The OS coined with the idea of placing Palestine under the 
Trusteeship System. The American proposal of trusteeship for 
7, Hftgflnnfa Rrgnrifliiisfr.? March 19, 1948. 
8. The Jtew York Timely March 21, 1948. 
1V 9 
Palestine gave rise to grave apprehensions ixi the minds of Zionists 
who thought i t was an attempt to undo partition and frustrate .their 
design about the Jewish State, They stepped up their activities In 
Palsstine, Haganah and other terrorist groups launched an undeclared 
war on innocent people of Palestine in an e f f or t to confront the 
United Nations with a fa i t accompli. (9) 
Ben Gurion was outlining the policy of extermination and 
expulsion of the Ar^s when he spoke to the Mapal party in 1948, He 
salds (10) 
"In the s ix , eight or ten coming months o f the 
struggle many great changes w i l l take place, very 
great in this country and not a l l of them to 
our disadvantage, and sorely a great change in the 
composition of the population in the country". 
The para military organizations were executing the plan of 
expelling the Arabs from those areas which were occupied during the 
host i l i t ies in 1948. During the truce Israel did not abandon i ts 
policy of evicting the Arabs from their homes. With the cessation 
of hosti l i t ies most of the Arab population in the Jewish occupied 
had l e f t their homes, land and property. Count Bernadotte si^med 
up the causes responsible for Arab exoduss (11) "The exodus of Pales-
tinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their 
communities by rumours concerning real or alleged act of terrorism 
or expulsion". 
The policy of terror was responsible for the exodus of the 
Arabs. They had become panicky and abandoned their homes, lands 
9. For brutal attacks and massacres, see Chapter I , pp. 69-70 
10. Ben-Gurion's Speech before the Central Committee of Mapal 
Party, February 7, 1948. 
11. UK Mediator on Palestine, Dgc.. A/648T Supp, ho, 11, p, 14, 
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and property, Meaatjfoem Belgln, the Cofluaander of Irgun wrote that 
the Arabs "were seized with limitless panic and started to flee 
for their l ives . . * , the Arabs began to f lee in terror even before 
they clashed with Jewish forces" . (12) 
Israel tried to put the blame for the Arab exodus on the 
Arab states and i t s leaders, the Isreueli leaders held the Arab 
League, leading Arab newspapers, broadcasts from Arab capitals and 
secret Arab Radio Stations, responsible for creating panic aaong 
the Arabs by presenting to them an exaggerated picture of Zionist 
brutality. Gabbay accused the Palestinian leaders of having deli* 
berately encouraged tS^ e Arab exodus. "The Arab exodus", wrote 
Gabbay, "however, wouM never have assumed such a wholesale charac-
ter during April-May 1948 had i t not been for the behaviour of the 
Arab Paifistlnia^i leaders - the Arab Higher Committee, the Municipal 
authorities, the local commanders, big landlords, wealthy merchants, 
doctors, lawyers, teachers, clergymen, e t c . and to some extent the 
Arab Governments themselves". (13) 
To say that the Arabs l e f t their homes on their own or were 
asked by their own organizations to leave their homes is a blatant 
l i e . Many ob;}ective writers have nipped this l ie in the bud and 
asserted that the Arab exodus was "deliberate and essential part of 
iiionist scheioe of expansion. Edgar wrotes <14) 
12. Beiein, Menachem, the BevQ3.t: The Story of the Irgm^. 
Kew York, 1951. p. 164. 
13. Gabbay, Kony, an* SAt., p. 93. 
14. O'Ballence, Edgar (Ma^or), TM. Arab^lsraeli War 194?^ . 
London, 1957. pp. 64 and 209. 
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" I t was the Jewish policy to enaoarage the Arabs 
to quit their homes, and they used psychological 
warfare extensively in urging them to do so* 
Later, as the war wore on, they ejected those 
Arabs who clung to their v i l l ages . . . . The Israelis 
made no excuse for i t as i t was a l l part of their 
plan for the reconquest of their 'Promised Land*, 
in which there was no room for large, hostile alien 
groups". 
A British writer confronted the Israelis and asked them to show him 
the documentary proofs of their allegation against the Arab Govern-
ments and broadcasting houses ordering the Palestinian Arabs to 
evacuate tli^ir homes, " I asked to be shoxm", he wrote, "the proofs. 
I was assured thoy existed, and was promised them. Kone had been 
offered when I l e f t , but I was assured again. I asked to have the 
material sent to me, I am s t i l l waiting". Erskine tried to check 
it with the records of BBC and found the charge was baseless and un« 
founded, "There was not a single order, or appeal, or suggestion 
about evacuation from-Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside 
or outside Paaestine, in 1948?*. (15) 
A prominent Jew Kathan Chofshi also ridiculed the Israeli 
allegation and wrote; (16) "How and in what manner we, Jews, forced 
the Arabs to have c i t ies and vil loges. .* Some of them were driven out 
by force of armsj others were made to leave by deceit , lying and 
false promises. It i s enough to cite the c i t i e s of Jaffa, Lydda, 
Kamie, Bersheba» Acre from among numberless others". 
professor Khalidi is one of those few chosen Arab scholars 
who got access to some secret records of the Zionist act ivit ies . He 
15. • Erskine, Childors B. , Tm. l^pectatorT May 12, 1961. 
16. Jewish Ijewsletter ^ February 9, 1959. 
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has published a vivid account of one of the most notorious plan 
called "Plan Dalat" which was undertalien by the Zionists to extermi-
nate the Arabs living in Palestine and expel the remnants of Arab 
population. The capture of Haifa, Jaffa, Galilee, Tiberias and 
tJerusalem and complete annihilation of Arab population living in 
these areas was part of "Plan Dalat". (17) 
The ruthless execution of plan resulted in the mass 
exodus of the Arabs, The "Partition Plan" had le f t the Jewish state 
With 496,000 Arabs to which another 397,000 Arabs added when Israel 
captured 3,496 square kilometeres of Arab land during the truce and 
armistice, The total Arab population under Jewish control was 
CIS) 
892,000 while the Jewish population was 656,000. The policy of 
expulsion and extermination was the only alternative for Israel to 
reduce the numerical superiority of the Arabs in order to avoid their 
pol it ical supremacy. The extermination and expulsion of the Arabs 
was a manifestation of Zionist ideology. The Zionists wanted to 
convert Paaestin© into a racial state exclusively for the Jews. 
Israel 's chief aim was to avoid establishing a bi-national state in 
Palestine and make i t an exclusive Jewish state; such an ideal could 
not be achieved i f the Arabs were allowed to remain in Palestine, 
The only alternative was to expel the Arabs from Palestine and en-
courage Jewish immigration. The Zionists followed this alternative 
because i t was expedient. 
17. Khalidi, Walid, "Plan Dalat" • The Zionist Master Plan 
for the Conciuest of Palestine" Middle East Forui^  (November, 
1961). 
18. Davis, John, Ky^apre ge^ c?^  . A qS; t^e 
Arab Problef^i. London, 1968. p. 57. 
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The number of the refugees In 1948, according to the estimate 
by B^rnadotte was 330,000. The Acting Mediator's report of October 
1948 put the figure as 472,000 and stated that the estimate made by 
the Arab States was much higher and ranged between 740,000 and 780,000. 
In June 1949 the Secretary General of the United Nations 
presented his report before the General Assembly and his estimate of (19) 
Arab refugees was 940,000. 
In July 1948 the Arab League brought to the notice of the 
United l^ations the refugee problem and asked the world body to view 
the problem with due urgency and undertake rel ie f measures. Count 
Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator took a special and keen interest 
in the refugee problem and requested the United Nations not to delay 
i t s measures of r e l i e f . He regarded the problem of the Arab refugees 
as inseparable from the Palestine question. He wrote in his report: (20) 
" I t i s , however, undeniable that no settlement can be ;5ust and comp-
lete i f recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee 
to return to home from which he has been dislodged". Count Bernadotte 
wanted that the refugees must be granted the right of repatriation and 
no pol it ical consideration should be allowed to stand in the way of 
i t s implementation. 
On September 16, 1948 Bernadotte asked that Israel should be 
persuaded to agree to the repatriation of the Arab refugees, (21) 
Id* Annual report of the Security Coiinc;;i June 30, 1949, 
p. 102, 
20. UN Mediator Report, poc. A/648t p. 5. 
21. UW Doc. A/648. 
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" I t would be an offence against the principle of 
elemental justice i f these innocent victims of the 
confl ict were denied the right of return to their 
homes,,. The right of innocent people, uprooted 
from their homes by the present terror and ravages 
of war to return to their homes should be affirmed 
and made e f fec t ive" . 
The General Assembly was seized with the question of refugees 
and i t Was at Bernadotte's initiative that i t met on December 11, 
1948 and adopted a resolution, Bernadotte was assassinated in 
September 1948 but the General Assembly met to consider his and Ealph 
Bunche, the Acting Mediator's reports. On December 11, 1948 the 
General Assembly adopted a resolution which stateds (22) 
"The General Assembly**., 
"11* Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their 
homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted 
to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return 
and fcr loss of or damage to property which, under principles of 
international law or in equity, should be made good by the Govern-
ments or authorities responsible. Instructs the Conciliation Com-
mission to faci l itate the repatriation, resettlement and economic 
and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of 
compensation", . ' 
The General Assembly resolution unambiguously asked for repatria-
tion and compensation. The Conciliation Commission consisting of 
Turkey, France and the United States of America came into existence 
and was entrusted with the task of facil itating the process of re -
patriation of the Arab refugees. The conciliation commission failed 
in i ts e f f or ts to secure the right of repatriation for the refugees 
because Israel defied a l l i ts directives and denied the Arabs their 
natural right to return to their own homes, Israel had also d is -
regarded its obligations assured under the Lausanne Protocol which it 
22. General Assembly Of f i c ia l Kecordp (GAOm) Resolution 
No. 194 ( 3 ) , December 11, 1948. 
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signed on May 12, 1949 and whereby Israel undertook the responsl- ^^ ^^  
b i l i ty of receiving the Arabs back to their homes. The Protocol said: 
"The United Nations Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine anxious to achieve as quickly as possible 
the objectives of the General Assembly's resolution 
of December 11," 1948 regarding refugees, the res-
pect for their rights and the preservation of their 
property, as well as territorial and other questions, 
has proposed to the Delegation of Israel and to the 
Delegations of the Arab Stales that the working docu-
ments attached thereto be taken as basis for dis-
cussion with the Commission". 
The Commission tried its utmost to make Israel agree to repatriation 
and compensation but a l l i t s pleadings f e l l on deaf ears, Israel 
remained adamant. The Conciliation Commission admitted its failure 
and in i ts Third Progress Eeport on the refugee question it observed: (24^ 
"The Arab delegations continue to hold the view 
that the f i r s t step must be acceptance by the 
Government of Israel of the principle set forth 
in resolution 194 (111) of December 11, 1948, con-
cerning the repatriation of refugees who wish to 
return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours. The commission has not succeeded in 
achieving the acceptance of this principle by the 
Government of Israel", 
Count Bernadotte also had tried before his assassination, 
to solve the refugee problem in keeping with the principles of justice 
but failed to persuade Israel to accept the refugees back in Pales-
tine because, as he observed; (26) "The Israeli Government had a 
very great opportunity in connection with the Arab refugee question. 
It had missed that opportunity. It had shown nothing but hardness 
and obduracy towards these refugees". 
23. uuoted in Cat tan, Henry, Palestine. The Arabs and Israel^ The 
Searcy far Justice. London, 1969. pp. 67-58. 
24. Third Progress Report of the UM Conciliation Commission for 
Palestine. UK Doc. A/927. 
25. Bernadotte, F. Count, To Jerusalem. London, 1951. p, 209. 
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The Israeli Government was guided by its own narrow con-
siderations. The leaders of Israel were showing stubbornness and 
stating that the refugees were not Israel prob3ism, they were the 
problem of the Arab State. According to Ben-Gurion, as shown in 
the 8th Progress Report of the Conciliation Commission, "a real 
solution o f the ma^ or part of the refugee question lay in the re -
settlement of the refugees in Arab States". (26) 
One Israeli writer made it very clear that with the expan-
sionist policy of Israel i t would be impossible to allow the refu-
gees to come back to their homes. The Jewish imimSgrant's had re-
placed them aid occupied their homes so they could not be accepted.. 
He wrote: (27) 
•*In Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Safad, Tiberias, 
Acre, and Eamleh, Ar^s owned many modern houses. 
As a result of the great on-rush of Jewish immi-
grants during the last nine months, a l l houses 
f i t for habitation have inevitably been taken 
over. There is not a house in the c it ies of 
Israel which is free to accomodate i t s pre-war 
owners, should they return. The same Is true of 
the bigger and more prosperous villages". 
Israel opposed the repatriation of the Arab refugees on racial 
grounds} it did not want to alter i ts exclusive Jewish character. 
Eban of Israel was exposing his Government's racialism and apartheid 
when he told the General Assembly: (28) 
26. OT A/1367. October 30, 1960. 
27. Horin, B. E . , "The Fate of the Arab Refugees, Palestine" 
Itew York. vol . VI, No. 1. Spring, 1949. 
28. fiMi, 12th sess., fiovember 27, 1957. (Pol it ical Committee) 
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"One cannot repatriate people in geography alone. 
To live xn a modem state is to live not only within 
i ts landscape but also within i t s tradition and cul -
ture, i ts religious hii^ltage and linguistic expres-
sion; its community values and i t s special impulses 
of patriotism and nationhood,,. In this sense re -
settlement in Israel would be not repatriation but 
alienation from Arab society and transference to the 
, only state in the area in which Arab loyalties do not 
predominate", 
Shai-ett of Israel had already rejected the proposal of repatriation 
on security grounds. He saidt (29) 
"The return of the Arabs to Israel would undoubtedly 
create an atmosphere o f mutual suspicion vrtiich would 
conduce neither to the stabil ity of the area nor to 
the coiitentment of the inhabitants. The repatriation 
of refugees was being urged as a means of seat ing 
within Israel a f i f t h coluunn which would facil itate a 
future war of reconquest, Repatriation was impracti-
cable and politically i t would be an act of criminal 
f o l l y " . 
Israel did not show any sign of accommodation and continued its 
policy of expansion and expulsion of the Arabs, During the 
Armistice Israel attaclsjsd and occupied many Arab areas and ex-
pelled Arab populaticai^ 
The Security Council adopted a resolution on Hovember 171 
1950, asking Isi'aei to allow the expelled Arabs to come back 
to their homes but it did not listen to and comply with the de-
cision, Israel 's non-compliance with the directives of the United 
Mations was due to the fact that i t had taken the Big' Powers and 
their support for granted. Had the Big Powers, especially the 
United States of America chosen to exert a l i t t l e bit of pressure 
on Israel i t would have implemented the General Assembly resolution 
29. GAOHy 6th sess, , Ad Hoc Polit ical Committee, November 30, 
1960, pp. 410-14, 
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Whenever the USA. had exerted pressure on Israel compelling it to 
comply with ttfi UN resolutions, Israel had always obliged the USA. 
In May 194® Israel received a note from the U.S. Government 
insisting that Israel should grant tangible concessions on the 
question of refugees falling which the US Government would re -
consider its attitude towards Israel* Ihe US Government's note 
"interpreted Israel 's attitude as dangerous to peace", (30) Israel 
responded and immediately made an offer to the Conciliation Commission 
to permit the return of 100,000 refugees but the Commission con-
sidered the Israeli proposal "unsatisfactory" because "Israel reserved 
tSue right to resettle the repatriated refugees in specific loca-
tions". (31) Again, in 1953, the 0S Government discontinued financial 
assistance to Israel when i t refused to obey the decision and autho-
rity of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organiaation. Israel 
had no other alternative but to yield to American pressure and 
abide by the decision of tiae UHTSO and stop its drainage work in the 
Syrian-Israeli Demilitarized zone. (32)' 
The United Kations, confronted with Israeli non-compliance 
undertook significant measures to provide re l ie f for the Arab re -
fugees, The conditiais in which the refugees were living were at 
hardship and suffering. They did not have even sufficient food to 
eat but they were eager to return to their homes. Count Bernadotte 
presented a picture of refugee l i f e at Ramallah: "Uever have I seen 
30. P«retz, Don, Israel and the Pftie^tine Argbs. Washington, 
1958. p. 42. 
31. UW Doc, A/1367y p. 14. 
32. Cattan, Henry, aa* p. 198. 
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a more ghastly sight than which met my eyes here at ftamalXah. The 
car was l i teral ly stormed by excited masses shouting with oriental 
fervoui' that they wanted food and wanted to return to their homes. 
There were plenty of fighting faces in- that sea of suffering 
humanit/*, (33) In 1949, the United Nations tie 11©f for Palestine 
Refugees (UMiPR) was organized for the time being to undertake re l ie f 
measures. On December 8 , 1949 the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution Whereby the United'Nations be l ie f and Works Agency was created J 
and in I960 i t took over rel ie f work for the Palestine refugees. The 
dual task assigned to UI3RWA was to remove distress and promote re-
habilitation. The most important thing UMWA was struck with was the 
intense desire of the refugees to return to their homes. In i t s 
f i r s t annual report (34) to the General Assembly, UJEWA took note of 
their desirej 
"The desire to go back to their homes is general 
among a l l classes5 i t is proclaimed orally at a l l 
meetings and organized demonstrations, and, in writ-
ing, in a l l letters addressed to the Agency and a l l 
complaints handed into the area o f f i cers . Many refu-
gees are ceasing to believe in a possible return, yet 
this does not prevent them from insisting on i t , 
since they feel that to agree to consider any other 
solution would be to show their weakness and to re -
linquish their fundamental right, acknowledged even 
by the General Assembly, They are, moreover, scepti-
cal of the promised payment of compensation. This 
sense of injustice, frustration and disappointment has 
made the refugees irritable and unstable". 
The Director of the Agency, Howard Kennedy to his foreword wrotei (36) 
33. Bernadotte, Count, fij^. gl i . , , p. 249, 
34. g«^ WA„ m i , p. 15. UK Doc, A/lQOfi. 
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"The war in Palestine added to an area that formerly 
supported five millicti persona the crushing burden of 
a million Arab refugees. Over 800,000 were virtually 
destitute» There is a l i t t l e margin between subsis-
tence and starvation* Since the end of 1948, needy 
refugees, who have lost both their homes and livelihood 
as a result of hosti l it ies in Palestine, have existed 
principally on re l ie f by the United Nations, supplemented 
by private contributions from a l l over the world. Today, 
after three years, the refugees s t i l l wait to know what 
is to become of them"» 
uwtiwa enjoyed close cooperation of the United iNations Specialized 
Agencies in carrying out its task of providing rel ief to the refu-
gees. The Arab countries Lebanon, o or dan, Syria and the United Arab 
Kepublic have also shown respect and generosity in assisting UNBVIA, 
These Arab States have spent more than ^100,000,000 mostly 
for education, health services, housing and road Improve me nt. "The 
people of these countries", wrote Davis, former Commissioner of 
UMViA, "have borne with courage the economic, social and other sacri-
f ices and hard^ips resulting from the presence of large numbers of 
refugees within their borders. Contrary to much western thinking, 
the Arab host government have also helped qualified young refugees 
to obtain employment, both within the host countries and elsewhere",(36) 
UWSWa did remarkably v;ell in alleviating the sufferings 
of unfortunate people who were forcibly expelled by po l i t i ca l cons-
pirators. The refugees were always keen to get back to their homes, 
their sufferings had intensified their attachment to their original 
home. The Director General of UJEWA wrotej (37) "The great mass of 
the refugees continued to believe that a grave ln;Sustlce has been 
36. Davis, John, Qja. s i t . , p, 66. 
37. uw DQC, 
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dom to them and to express a desire to return to their homeland". 
In another report the Director reaffirmed the strong desire of the 
refugees for repatriation. He informed the General Assembly: "The 
refugees in general strongly maintain their insistence on the idea 
and aspiration of returning to their homes. The refugees have also 
expressed the wish that they shouM be enabled to receive redress 
for the loss they have suffered without prejudicing their claims to 
repatriation". The Coaifliissloner General of J7Z®WA also informed the 
General Asi^mbly "of their feeling embitternment at their long exile 
and at the failure of International conmunity, year after year, to 
implement the resolutions so often reaffirmed." (38) 
In June 1951, John Blandford Jr. became the director of UMWA. 
ae submitted the famous *Blandford Plan • to the General Assembly in 
1952. According to the report of the Director, his plan was an 
alteriaative project for the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab 
countries. The Blandford proposals were phrased in such a manner 
that the "refugees interests in repatriation and compensation must 
not be prejudiced". (39) When the Blandford plan was taken up in 
the Ad Hoc Polit ical Committee, the US representative supported i t : (40) 
"The experience thus gained had made it clear that 
a l l refugees could not be resettled in the areas in 
which they were currently located and that some of 
them would have to be moved to areas of greater eco-
nomic opportunities. The plan is undoubtedly one of 
the most constructive enterprises ever sponsored by 
the United Nations". 
38. UK Doc. A/S813. 
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TjO0 representative of the tJnited Kingdom was of the opinion that 
repatriation was inimical to the interest of the refugees. He 
said J (41) 
"The OK Government did not ca l l in question the 
right of the refugees to return to their homes. 
What it did question was vhetaier i t was in the 
interests of the refugees themselves that they 
should exercise that right*. . The UK delegation 
f e l t that the bulk of the refugees would find a 
happier and more stable home, at any rate in the 
immediate future, amongst their Arab brethren". 
The Arab States saw the snags clearly and they rightly opposed 
the "Blandford Proposal" which was aimed at denying the refugees 
their right o f repatriation. The Saudi Arabian delegate said:(42) 
"It was a mistake to believe that the problem of 
the Arab refugees of Palestine could be solved by 
resettling the refugees in the neighbouring count-
r ies . That was not a practicable solution because 
i t failed to take account of the needs and feelings 
of the refugees or of the desires of their Arab and 
Muslim kinsmen... It was not a realistic solution 
because i t failed to recognize the inherent quali-
t ies of the Arabs, who armed by the justice of 
their cause, had never bowed before their aggressors". 
The ii-gyptian representative also advocated a solution which 
would not exclude repatriation. He said that the Blandford Plan 
"should not prejudice the right of the refugees to repatriation and 
compensation, ray government considered them a practical means of 
relieving the plight of the refugees pending a f inal solution",(43) 
The draft resolution was finally revised and a new provision 
was added which read "without prejudice to repatriation or compensa-
41. The Times, January 11, 1952. 
42. GAOfi, 6th sess . , Ad Hoc Pol it ical Committee, 43rd Meeting, 
43. Ib id . , 44th Mtg,, January 18, 1952, p. 245, 
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t ion" . I t was adopted by the General Assesnbly by 47 votes to none 
and 7 abstentions. (44) 
The resolution "endorsed, without prejudice to the provisions 
of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (111) of 11th December 1948 or 
to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Resolution 393<4) of 2nd December 
1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resett le-
ment, the programme recommeriied by UNRWA, which envisaged the ex-
penditure of 050 million for re l ie f and ^200 million for reintegra-
tion over and above local contributions". (45) 
The plan once adopted got support from the Arab S^^ates 
and the chief factor causing this change of attitude was the inclu-
sion of the provisiorj that i t would not prejudice the right of re -
patriation or compensation. 
The plan failed to alleviate the miserable conditions of 
the refugees and reasons for the failure were clearly spelled out 
in umWA report: (46) "The time has been short and the pace has 
been slow. Deep misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the new 
programme have had to be faced". 
The United Rations and its specialized agencies were adopting 
measure to provide the refugees better l iving, better education and 
better housing. The real problem, however, remained, namely, re -
patriation or compensation. The Government of Israel, despite the 
44, Ib id . , 6th sess., 465th Meeting, January 26, 1952, p, 406. 
45, GAOR,. hesolution ^o, 513, January 26, 1952, 
46, United Nations, G^OR, 7th sess, , gQc. A/217X, Supp. Ko. 13, 
p, 7 , 
best e f f o r t s and persuasion of the United Nations remained unconcerned 
and adamant* The Onitad Katlons passed a resolution every year 
calling for the return of the refugees or compensation to them, but 
i t always remained unheeded. 
The Director of UKRWA confirmed Israel 's non-compliance with 
the directives of the United Kations, He wrote: (47) "The Govern-
ment of Israel has taken no affirmative action in the matter of re-
patriation and compensation." Israel had flouted its obligations 
under the United Nations Charter. The Partition Resolution of November 
29, 1947 clearly stated that the rights of the non-Jewish people living 
in the Jewish State would not be violated. (48) 
Israel flagrantly violated the provisions of the partition 
Resolution of November 29, 1947# Israel adopted not only worst 
possible discriminatory attitude toward ths Arabs living inside i ts 
borders but also confiscated and appropriated Arab property. Al l the 
property movable and iaunovabie was seized by Israel in 1948. Israel 
refused to cooperate with the United Nations PaJestine Conciliation 
Commission when i t asked for relevant details about the seized Arab 
property, Israel was repeatedly asked by the Commission to provide 
information about the administration of Arab property but they kept 
i t a secret, "Much information concerning the use, amounts and dis-
tribution of abandoned Arab property and the government's policy 
toward it was secret. Even the United Nations in spite of frequent 
re^jueats, was unable to obtain adequate information about Israel 's 
disposition of Arab property", (49) 
47. UN Daa, mm* 
48. See Chapter 1, pp. 59--60** 
49. Peretz, Don, Israel and the Palestine Arabs. Washington, 
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The confiscation of immovable property of the Palestinians 
was done in a systematic manner. In 1948 the Abandoned Areas Ordinance 
was passed under which the Government of Israel was empowered to de-
clare any occupied aiea as "abandoned" and confiscate i t . Then came 
the Absentee Property Regulations 1948* Under this law the scope of 
seizure was extended and a l l property owned by the Arabs who.had le f t 
homes was placed under an Israeli custodian. In 1960 another law the 
"Absentee property Law" was enacted under which the Israeli custodian 
had tt» authority to se l l vested property to a development authority 
established by Knesset. On July 31, 1960, the Development Authority 
came into existence to buy, rent or lease property. 
The United Kations was supposed to look after the interest of 
the refugees but i t failea to secure for the Palestinian refugees 
their natural r i ^ t to go back to their homes. The Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine was established to try to bring conci l ia-
tion between Israel end the Palestinians, but its e f forts also failed 
to yield fruit because Israel was not willing to concede basic human 
rights to the original inhabitants of Palestine now living as refugees. 
In i t s Third Heport the Commission listed the non-compliance of Israel 
as an obstacle in achieving a possible solution. It had devised 
measures to protect the property and interest of Arab refugees but 
Israel refused to obey the directives of the Commission, It again 
requested the Government of Israel to abrogate the notorious Absentee 
Property Law, "The Israeli delegaticai informed the Committee that its 
Government was unable to abrogate the Absentee Act or to suspend mea-
sures of requisition of Arab property". <50) The Conciliation Commission 
50. UK Progress Keport of CCP. UK gfic. A/992^ September 22, 1949. 
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for Palestine got a new directive Jfroai the General Assembly asking 
it to carry on negotiations regarding measures for the protection 
of the rights, property and interests o f the refugees. The Con-
cil iation Commission tried afresh but again failed to success for 
itself and justice for the Palestinian refugees. The Arab States 
wanted to safeguax-d the rights of their Palestinian brothers, and 
when the United Mations and its allied bodies could not do much to 
help them, they requested for the appointment of an Independent cus-
todieai to look after the administration of Arab property. In 1961, 
a draft resolution was introduced but i t was rejected. In 1964 
again a draft resolutiori was Introduced, The representative of 
Afghanistan while introducing the re®>lution, said: (51) "Ee could 
not see any i-eason why Moslem or Christian Arabs should not continue 
their ownership o f property, , , . To refuse them that right would be 
an act of racial and religious discrimination condemned by the whole 
world," 
The representative of Israel opposed i t on the ground that 
the Arabs had rejected the Partition Plan hence could not claim any 
right guaranteed under i t . To him, such a step like appointing an 
independent custodian to look after the management of Arab property 
wouM amount to interference in Israeli internal affairs* (52) Israel 
had always tried to invoke the doctrine of "domestic jurisdiction" or 
"sovereignty" in i ts defiance of the United Mtions resolutions. The 
51. UN g ^ , A/SPC/SR. 45^. 
52, Ibid* 
Israeli delegate pleaded before the Special Polit ical Comraittees (63) 
"The United Nations cannot be asked to dictate to a sovereign state 
who should be permitted to enter its territory• That is a matter for 
the Government of that state to decide in accordance with i t s laws 
and with security, economic and demographic factors". This emphatic 
assertion on the doctrine of "domestic jurisdiction" constituted a 
violent breach of the undertaking given to the United Nations by 
Israel at the time of its admission to the UIv% Abba Ebban very 
clearly stated: (54) "The Government of Israel wil l cooperate with the 
Assembly in seeking a solution to those problems,.. I do not think 
that Article 2, paragraph 7 , of the Charter, which relates to domestic 
^jurisdiction could possibly affect" any problem, "My ox^ n feeling is 
that i t would be a mistake for any of the Governments concerned to 
take refuge, with regard to the refugee problem, in their legal right 
to exclude people from their territories" . Such assurances were 
offered to the world body not because Israel genuinely wanted to 
observe them but because it was expedient to get into the world forum. 
It flouted the General Assembly resolutions of l«ovember 29, 1947 and 
December 11, 1948 and invoked Article 2, paragraph ? , contrary to i t s 
assurances given to the UK. The Resolution of December 11, 1948 
spelled the principles of repatriation, the restitution of property 
of the refugees and compensation for loss or damage, 
Israelis refusal to grant the right of repatriation to the 
refugees is the greatest hypocrisy committed by a state in modern time. 
The Jews on the one hand claimed statehood on the basis of their right 
53, Uli Doc. A/SPC/PV, 509^ November 11, 1966, 
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to return to the land of their ancestors bat they on the other hand 
deniea the Palestinian refugees their natural right to return to 
their original homes. Enlightened *lew8 have also pleaded the refu-
gees* cause and demanded for them the right of repatriation. The 
Ihud Association of Israel said: (65) "In the end we must come out 
publicly with the truth, that we have no moral right whatever to 
oppose the return of tiie Arab refugees to tbsir land. Polit ical con-
quest cannot abolish private property." 
No amount of corjdemnation and disapproval of Israeli deeds and 
attitude could restrain i t from adopting a policy of expropriation 
and expulsion of the Arabs adding to the numbers of refugees. In the 
aftermath of the war of 1967 and subsequent occupation by Israel of 
the West Bank of Jordan, the Sinai, the Gaza and the Golan Heights 
a new cr i t i ca l refugee problem emerged, "By December 1967, an e s t i -
mated 245,000 persons had fled from the West Bank and the Gaaa Strip 
into the area of Jordan East of the river, 116,000 had le f t the 
Israeli occupied area of Syria, and some 61,000 persons, including 
11,000 from Gaza and 60,000 from the Sinai Peninsula had taken refuge 
in Egypt, Of this total , about 146,000 were UMWA supported refugees 
who had been uprooted for a second time." (56) 
During the June war of 1967 Israel personified the Nazi Ghost 
of destruction of c iv i l l i fe and property, Tte people of Jerusalem 
and other occupied areas were reminded of the old days of naked bar-
barism and wanton destruction. To give few examples of Israeli rampage 
56, Quoted in Menuhin, Moshe, qj^, c i t . p, 143, 
66, Davis John, Qji* d t p . 69, 
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one wouW cite Jerusalem. After the June 1967 war 135 houses in the 
Magharibah Quarter, the area near the Wailing Wall were completely 
dynamited and bulldozed toy the Israeli authorities. Ambassador 
Thalmann was appointed by the UK Secretary General to observe the s i tu-
ation in Jerusalem and report to him. Thalmann's observations veri-
f ied the above report and this incorporated by the Secretary General 
in his report wherein he informed the General Assembly that this 
i l legal action of Israel had rendered 660 Arabs homeless, (57) 
The National Council of the Churches of Christ of the United 
States sent a study team to Jerusalem to probe into the oases of des-
truction and brutality by Israel* In i t s report the study team saidj 
"The villages of Yalu, Beit Kuba and Emmuas were occupied by Israeli 
military forces on June 9, 1967. Within the next five weeks, a l l 
homes and other buildings were systematically destroyed except for a 
church and two Muslim shrines in Emmas which were later detaolished. 
The people of the villages, numbering over 4,000 have been scattered". 
!I|ie Israeli o f f i c i a l s stated clearly that "there is no plan to rebuild 
the three villages or to return the inhabitants to their land". (58) 
The Israeli policy of wanton destruction was a well calculated policy 
intended to be used for its own purposes. Brigadier Shlomo Gazit, 
the head of the Israeli Military Government for the occupied terr i -
tories explained his Government's policy in an interview given to Kok 
Israel. He saidt (59) "The act of blowing up houses is essentially. 
57. Report of tt^ Secretary General under General Assembly Resolu-
tion 2254 (ES-V) A/6793, S/8146, para 113 (1967). 
58. National Council of the Churches of Christ. New York. Report 
of the Deputation to the MiddJfi Kast. 1968. 
59. Itew Outlooky vol. I I , No. 6 (July-August, 1968), p. 50. 
a deterrent action, a punishment which i s supposed to deter others". 
The Israeli policy of destroying Arab property was a gross 
violation of Article 63 of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 1949 
which prohibited "any destruction by the occupying power of real 
or personal property belonging individually or collectively to pr i -
vate persons, or to the state, or to other public authorities, or to 
social or cooperative orgeaiizatione" • (60) 
Dui?ing the June war Israel followed the policy of mass evic -
tion of the Arabs and individual deportation of Arab leaders in 
Gaza, Iflest Bank of Jordan and Golan Heights. J^tween i3ime 5, 1967 
laid May 30, 1968, a total of 399,248 Arabs from the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip were evicted to the last Bank. (61) 
One Israeli newspaper also reported on June 13, 1967 that 
Israeli Ma^or General Yosef Said had said that the "Israeli forces are 
endeavouring to persuade the Arab inhabitants... or to oblige them to 
cross the Suez Canal... and that many of them are afraid to leave their 
homes". (62) 
On June 30, 1968, the total number of refugees registered 
(63) 
with the UMIWA was 1,364,298. I f 30 per cent refugees not register-
ed with UKRVJA are also added figure would amount to 1,800,000. Israel 
does not accept the children born to the refugees in re l i e f caflg)S on 
the ground that they were born outside Palestine, Since 1948, an 
average of about 30,000 chlMren have grown to maturity every year, (64) I t means that in two decades a total of over 500,000 young refugees 
60. Malllson, J.W.J., The Arab World ( MBW York), vol . XV, No. 6, 
June 1969, p. 3. 
61. Hepoxt of the Higher Ministrlal Comm ,^ttee for Refugee. Amman, 
May, 1968. p. 3. 
62. DavarT June 13, 1967. 
63. m Dqc, M m ^ p. 18. 
64. Davis John, fig. £11., p. 63. 
have reached maturity. This logic of not accepting f i rst generation 
of the refugees as Palestinians is fal lacious. If the Arabs have for -
feited a l l their rights to their original homeland because they are 
born in exiJfi outside Palestine with what logic can Zionists claim 
Palestine aS their homeland after the expiry of two thousand years. 
Tte United Ivations again moved and passed resolutions contain-
ing pious words promising better conditions for the refugees and asking 
Israel to allow tt^ refugees to go back to their homes. 
The Security Council on June 14, 1967 adopted a resolution 
which saids (65) 
"The Security Council, 
Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, 
welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military 
operations have taken place and to faci l itate the return of those 
inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of host i l i t ies" , 
Israel did not comply with this directive also and UfHWA in 
its September 1967 report to the General Assembly saidt (66) 
"After nineteen years the refugees have s t i l l had neither 
an opportunity of returning to their homes nor compensa-
tion for their property. Since tte two issues of ii-epatria-
tion and compensation are linked together as alternatives 
on the resolution, the continuing deadlock over repatria-
tion has had the result of denying the refugees any benefit 
from the property they l e f t behind in 1948, It would hardly 
seem that this can have been the intention of the Assembly 
in adopting its resolution nineteen years ago. Suggestions 
have been made from time to time for measures to enable the 
refugees to receive compensation, irrespective of whether 
they would have opportunity of returning to their homes and 
without prejudice to this or any other pol i t i ca l claims that 
may have; but these suggestions have not been pursued". 
The General Assembly also adopted a resolution on July 4, 
1967 confirming the Security Council Kesolution of June 14, 1967 and 
66, SCCR Resolution 237, June 14, 1967. 
66. Quoted in "Twice in a Lifetime" tJltoWA Publication Middle 
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calling on Israel to allow the refugees to return home. Israel 
continued to hinder the implementation of these resolutions and did 
not allow the refugees to go back to their homes. Almost 85^ of 
those wlio had fled to the East Bank applied for return in keeping 
with the General Assembly resolution* Israel did not allow a l l of 
them} a very small fraction of applicants about 15,000 were admitted 
by Israel, Israel in the meantime had intensified its pressure on 
occupied areas which resulted in a mini<-exodus exceeding the total 
number of refugees Israel had taken back« The UK Secretaiy General 
confirmed this when he said: (67) 
"Since ilum 1967, further violent incidents, especially 
in the Jordan-Israel sector, have created a new displace-
ment of refugees and other persons in .Jordan, many of 
whom, having flBd from the valleys, wi l l be facing an even 
harder winter this year than they did last year, for they 
wil l be Iti tented camps on the h i l l s , where climatic condi-
tions are severe" • 
Israel has repeatedly been asked by the Ifeited Nations to allow the 
reiligees to go back to their homes but to no avail. Israel has 
relentlessly gone ahead with its policy of unlimited Jewish immi-
gration with a view to strengthen its militai'y potential and Jewish 
character. It is believed that "the greater the population of 
Israel, the greater wil l be army# A million soldiers wil l safeguard 
the state of Israel against any Arab attack. Ko Arab country wi l l 
dare to attack Israel i f her army wi l l be a million strong". (68) The 
Israeli policy of mass Jewish immigration constitutes the gravest 
67. The Secretary's statement before the Special Pol it ical 
Committee , November 11, 1968. The United Katlons and tt^ e 
PaJBstinian BefuneeiS' York. 
68. Jewish mv&iettev^ February 23,1959. 
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threat to the Arabs and i t also means their permanent displacement» 
Israel 's policy of expansion demands permanent displacement of the 
Arabs of the occupied area, "Israel 's desire for land", wrote 
Davis, "and for minimising the Arab population on that land, i s also 
reflected in i ts policy of land seizure and occupation following the 
fighting of June 1967". (69) 
Levi Eshkol confirmed the Davis thesis when he announced 
"a comprehensive master plan" to develop East Jerusalem occupied in 
1967. The Master Plan "wil l include about 1,000 to 1,S00 housing 
units". (70) 
The refugee problem constitutes one of the most crucial and 
explosive issues in Arab-2ionlst confrontation. The people who have 
been uptooted from their original homes, were and are s t i l l livirig 
on international charity. "For twenty years", as the Secretary 
General of the United Hations has observed, (71) "the Palestine r e -
fugees - well over one million of them - have had ho homeland, no 
future and even a detectable glimmer of hope on their horizon". 
The Arab refugees seem to have been condemned by Israel to permanent 
and perpetual homelessness. Lord Caradon had a l i t t l e insight into 
the heart of the refugees when he saidj (72) "There is no more terri-
ble sentence than the sentence of leaving home and land to set out 
on an exile as harsh as i t is apparently hopeless". 
69. Davis John, Qa, c i t « , p. 70. 
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Bertrand Russeli the world renowned philosopher, issued a 
message belbre his death where he condemned Israel for its aggres-
sive postures against the Arabs, About the refugees he wrote: (73) 
"Many of the refugees are now well into the third 
decade of their precarious existence in temporary sett le-
ments, The tragedy of the people of Palestine is that 
their country was given by a foreign power to another 
people for the creation of a new state. The result was 
that many hundreds of thousands of innocent people were 
made permanently homeless. With every new conf l ic t their 
numbers have increased. How much longer is the world 
willing to endure this spectacle of wanton cruelty? It 
is abundalitly clear that the refugees have every right 
to the homeland from which they were driven, and the 
denial of this right i s at the heart of the continuing 
conf l i c t . A permanent 3ust settlement of the refugees 
in their homeland i s an essential ingredient of any 
genuine settlement in the Middle East" . 
Israel has always Ignored world public opinion and fabri-
cated excuses for her unwillingness to solve the refugee pi^ oblemcialong 
the lines suggested by the United Nations. It has tried to link up 
the solution of the refugee problem with pol i t ical settlement witti 
the Arab States. 
The Israeli stand is untenable ana cannot be accepted for 
two obvious reasons. Firstly, there exists no connection between the 
solution of tbis refugee problem and pol i t ical settlement with the 
Arab States as the former is a human problem and Israel explicit ly 
for i ts satisfactory solution under the Laussane Protocol. Secondly, 
the repatriation of the refugees Is an obligation which Israel owes 
and should owe not to the Arab States but to the Palestinian Arabs 
whom i t has deprived of their hotaes and property. To hope for peace 
in the abaecc® of redi-ess and rectification for the wrongs done to 
73. International CoRf^renge of Parliamentarians o^ the Middle 
East Crisl^T afiSMSflts, Cairo, February 2-6 , 1970, p. 17. 
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innocent people amounts to wishing for a thing without baving a 
genuine belief in it« 
The point was emphasized by General de Gaulle in his letter to 
BenGuxion on December 30, 1967 in which he accused Israel for block-
ing the way of peace in West Asia through its bellicose attitude. He 
advised him to persuade his peoplfi (74) "to see the path of reason 
and peace and to come to a settlement with their neighbours by provid-
ing a solution to the touchiest and most human® problem of West Asia -
the Palestinian refugees." 
The representative of Ceylon expressed his Government's stand 
on the refugee problem and he said that the obligation of Israel to 
allow the refugees repatriation or compensation had no moral connex-
ion with a peace settlement." (75) 
The 2ambian delegate told the world body that the repatria-
tion of the Palestinian refugees was an essential ingredient to any 
peace settlsment in the Middle East. He said (76): "No peace was 
possible in the Middle East unless the Council ensured the restora-
tion of the rights of the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine," 
Israelis e f forts at linking peace settlement with the solu-
tion of the refugee problem ai'e a part of her imperialist design. 
Whenever Israel has expanded into Arab lands and forcibly evicted 
Arab population of occupied areas, i t has emphasized the need to have 
peace with the Arab States, According to Bertrand Russell (77) "For 
74, AF£ Dispatch, January 19, 1968, 
75, gM Monthly Chronicle, January 1970, p. 96. 
76, Ib id , , vol . VI, No, 5, May 1909, p. 4 , 
77, Bertrand Russell, oji, c i t . , p, 71. 
O p /J 0 6 
over twenty yeacs Israel has expanded by force of arms. After ©very 
stage izi this expansion Israel has appealed to reason and has 
suggested negotiations. This i s the traditional role of the imperial 
power, because it wishes to consolidate with the least di f f iculty 
what i t has taken already by violence. Every jQgvj. conquest 
I M ma basis Ql y a proposed negotiation trm gtre^l^^, w y ^ toffy® 
in .justice of the previous aggression". 
The Israeli objective has always been to secure Arab recogni-
tion for Its territorial gains. Until 1956 Israel sought Arab reco-
gnition of the Armistice Agreements as i t s borders. After occupying 
Sinai and Gaza the demands were stepped up. After the Hwob war, 
Israel once again tried to obtain Arab accept^mce of a peace settle-
ment making i t a condition for the solution of the refugee problem. 
The Israeli pretence of linking the refugee problem with the 
peace settlement has now been abandoned for considerations of expediency, 
It is now openly said that the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees 
is impossible. GoMa Meir declared in the Enesseti (78) 
Anyone who speaks in favour of bringing the Arab 
refugees back must also say how he expects to 
take responsibility for i t , if he is interested 
in the State of Israel. Not everyone who talks 
in terms of bringing them back cares about how 
Israel can continue to exist with hundreds of thou-
sands of Nasser*s emissaries in our midst. It i s 
better that things are stated clearly and plaintlyj 
we shall not let this happen" • 
This new line of Israeli approach was reaffirmed by Ben-4urion who 
on October 11, 1961, rejected the proposal mooted in the United Nations 
to give the refugees a choice of repatriation or resettlement, C79) 
78. (quoted in Menuhin, Moshe, jata. c i t . , p. 198. 
79. Ibid. 
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This position was further reaffirmed in the United Rations 
by the Israeli delegate, who saidt (80) 
"Xhe solution to the problem lay not in Israel 
but in the Arab worM, . . . Although i t was natural 
for refugees to wish to return to their former 
homeland, that wish was irrational for in 1948 
Palestine had ceased to exist as a territorial 
entity on the map". 
The role of the United Nations and its two main pol it ical 
organs i . e . the General Assembly and the Security Council lacked 
effectiveiffiss i f not sincerity. 
The l i f e of the Arabs living in I s r a e l is extremely suffocating 
because they are treated as f i f th columnists. The Arab minority has 
been placed in a class 'B* category and their activities have been 
severely restricted. The Arabs ai'e discriminated against in matters 
of ^obs, education, health fac i l i t i es and they are forbidden to form 
their own pol i t i ca l parties, "The continuation of military government", 
says Don Paretz,"in many Arab areas hampers the i^ee and healthy 
growth of an indigenous Arab pol it ical movement", (81) 
In the f ield of education there i s a wide disproportion bet-
ween the Arabs and the Jews living in the Jewish state. A total of 
369,247 Jewish students attended public schools while the number of 
Arabs was only 26,830. Arab students thus constituted 6*5^ of the 
total student population, while the Arab residents of the state were 
over of i ts total population. The statistics furnished by the 
Ooverrunent of Israel to the United Nations further revealed that, of 
the total number of Jewish students, 4.6^ attended secondary schools 
8 0 . UK Doc> a/SPC/Sr 433T October 1 9 , 1965. 
8 1 . Peretz, Don, op. c i t . , pp. 2 8 8 - 8 9 . 
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While only of the Arab students had access to secondary education; 
4,500 Jewish students attended Universities while among the Arabs 
there were only 73 students who could reach the universities, (82) 
James Warbug writing about the Arabs living in Israel has 
observed: (83) 
"nothing could be more tragic than to witness the 
creation of a Jewish state in which the non-Jewish 
minwities are treated as ^cond class citizens -
in which neither a Jew's Christian wife nor their 
children can be burled in the same ceraetery as 
their father. It i s a state based In part upon 
medieaval theocratic bigotry and in part upon the 
Nazi - exploited myth of the existence of a Jewish 
race" * 
Sabri Jiryis, a Christian Palestinian Arab lawyer and technically an 
Israeli citiaen wrote a book on Arab minority which was f i rs t published 
in Hebrew in Haifa in 1966 and later translated into English in 1968. 
Detailing the l i f e of the Arabs in Israel, he sayss "Every single in i -
tiative in the f ie ld of social activity o f a l l kinds and in a l l classes 
of Arab society is closely watched by the Military Governors or the 
defence services". Discussing the conditions of the Arab youth, Sabri 
wrote: "With daily close contacts with neglect and repression frc^a 
the authorities, many young men have grown desperate and turn to drastic 
solutions, such as leaving the country", (84) 
Israel has denied the Arabs not only po l i t i ca l and social freedom 
but also religious liberty. The great majority of Islamic Waqf possess-
ions have been confiscated by the Custodian of Absentees' Property, The 
82. UK Doc> E/CK.4/Sub 8/L.Q2/qdd of August 16, 1956, 
83. Yhe Jewish newsletter^ November 30, 1969. 
84. Yiryis Sabri, The Arabs in Beirut, 1968. p. 141. 
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restrictions on religious activities of Muslims emanates from the 
liionist contempt for Islam. Dr Azreil i , Chief Editor of Maariv wrote 
in 196St <8S) "Islam is the enemy of a l l f ru i t fu l thought, a l l genuine 
initiative and a l l productive ideas. It Represents darlaiess, reaction 
and imprisonment for five hundred million human beings". 
Israelis attitude towards the Palestinian Arabs was a direct 
violation of the specific guarantees and fundamental human rights 
which the United Nations had extended to the Palestinian Arabs under 
the Partition Plan, fhe United Nations have, no doubt, uttered noble 
words and passed many resoluticms affirming and reaffirming them in 
each subsequent year. What is the value of such resolutions i f they 
cannot be implemented? Ihe sufferers, the victims o f injustice, do 
not require mere sympathy or verbal assurances, they require e f fec t ive , 
and if needed, coercive measures to help them out of the quagmiri® of 
suffering and oppression. As John Davis rightly remarked: (86) "In 
tte end, one must even be prepared to impose corrective measures on 
Israel against her w i l l " . 
The Palestinian Arabs had a l l along hoped to get justice 
through the United Hations but they realized that they were hoping too 
much from the world body controlled by Big Powers which had a vested 
interest 3n the existence of Israel. They therefore resolved to 
carry out their struggle themselves and seek the restoration of justice 
denied to them into which they find themselves for no fault of theirs. 
Shukairy, Chairman of the Executive Committee for Palestine Liberation 
told (87) the world organization, "the Palestine problem exists in the 
85. Quoted in Sabri Jiryis, pp. c i t .^ p. 144, 
86. ^avis, John, qh, c i t . , p. 107. 
87. m Doc. A/SPC/PV. 399^ November 6 , 1963, 
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United Nations and outside the United Nations and will continue to 
exist in the United Nations and outside the United Nations until the 
people of Palestine are repatriated to their homes and are repatriated 
to their homeland". 
In 1963 the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organic* 
zation was a step in the direction of institutionalising the aspira-
tion of Palestinian Arabs to return home. A spokesman of the Palestine 
Arabs told the Special Polit ical Committee: (88) "After seventeen years 
of patient waiting" the Palestinian Arabs "had lost a l l faith in the 
United Nations but the establishment of the organization had re* 
awakened their hopes and afforded them an opportunity to renew the 
struggle for their homeland". In 1963, Ahmad Shukairy again told the 
United Nations of i ts failures. He saidt (89) 
"For the last fifteen years, the United Nations 
has been reiterating its position in support 
of repatriati<»i, but not single refugee repatria-
ted. We cannot wait and s i t indefinitely* There 
is a limit to our patience, and the self-restraint 
of any nation - any nation - is not without bounds 
and not without limits. When human patience is ex-
hausted, man is boimd to succumb to the counsel of 
desperation. Palestine could be the scene of a 
liberation movement and no one should be caught 
by surprise, for Palestine is our homeland and re -
patriaticai is our right - our Inherent right". 
The Palestinian refugee problem is an Imperialist problem. It i s 
a by-product of Zionist alliance with imperiaiism. There Is quali-
tative difference between the Palestinian refugees and the refugees 
in other parts of the world. The problem of refugees in India and 
Pakistan, Korea, and other places should not and cannot be put on 
par with the Palestine tragedy and the refugee exodus. In India and 
SB. U.N» Provisional Summary Records of Special Polit ical Committee 
No, A/apC/ax 437, October 26, 1965, pp. 3 -4 . 
89. UN Doc. A/SPC/PV. 399. 
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Pakistan It was the result of the division which was mutually and 
voluntarily accepted but in Palestine i t was something imposed on 
the native people "by an alien power* The indigenous people were 
forcibly expelled from their horaeland and dispossessed of their pro-
perty, Ahmad Shukairy succeeded in drawing a dividing line between 
the Palestinian refugees and refugees in other parts of the world. 
He saids (90) 
"In Asia and Africa^ imperialism was a foi^eign domina-
tion, i t was an alien exploitation. But the peoples, the 
native peoples, remained in their homes, remained on 
their farms, remained on their land. Bo doubt a l l sorts 
of hardships acts of repression and displacement were 
inflicted upon our brethren in Asia and in Africa, but 
here the native people in Palestine were uprooted, d is -
possessed and thrown out of their country by aliens, 
strangers, 5ust like the clans who settled in Asia and in 
Africa. That is what makes the problem of the Palestine 
refugee of a uni«|u© character, more grievous than a l l 
the colonial issues that confronted the United Nations, 
because the Palestine problem has been beclouded by the 
highly organized and highly financed Zionist propaganda" 
Jhe Palestine refugee problem is an Inseparable part of the . 
Palestine (Question and i ts solution can be sought only within the 
general framework of the Palestine Question, on the basis of the 
right of the indigenous people of Palestine to self-determination. 
Peace in West Asia depends <» the solution of the refugee problem 
and would be tenable only when It i s based upon the principle of justice 
- the right of repatriation for the Palestinian refugees. 
The United Nations has an important role to play in the solu-
tion of the refugee problem. The world body has passed many resolutions 
reaffirming them every year but could not compel Israel to comply with 
them. The Secretary General of the United fJatiors saidj (91) "All 
90, Ibid, 
91. The Secretary General's Statement, op. c i t . 
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these twenty years the General Assembly has not found it possible 
to talte any significant step towards a real solution o f this great 
and tragic human problem. This fact re f lects upon us a l l and cer-
tainly upon the United Nations. I believe, however, that the tragedy 
of the Palestine refugees, who three times in twenty years have known 
at f i r s t hand the cruel blast of war, demanas that the United Nations 
should live up generously to its humanitarian duty towards them." 
Th^ activities of UIvRWA were, no doubt, helpful in providing 
re l ie f measures for the refugees but i t had not been able to bring 
the refugees any closer to a basic solution of their problem. They 
must cease to be refugees and their hon^land must be restored to 
them. The Palestine refugees are a determined and conscientious people 
who want to live and wi l l not shrink from any sacrifice to safeguard 
their legitimate rights. The Palestine refugees are a proud and 
brave people who are prepared to shoulder the grave challenges without 
foregoing their cherished values - liberation, freedom and ;)ustice. 
In 1968, The Times (London) brought out a poignant advertise-
ment which read: "Wanted, another Arthur Balfour to provide a national 
home for one and a half million Arab refugees"* (92) The Palestinian 
refugees are living in worst possible conditions but their national 
consciousness is being strengthened in ex i le , Korman Bentwich sounded 
a warning to Israel when he wrote» (93) 
"Jews learn from their own history how national conscious-
ness is strengthened in defeat and exi le . I t was in the 
f i r s t captivity, when they wept by the waters of Babylon, 
that Judaism took permanent form, and became a way of l i f e 
of a people in exi le . The Arab exi les of our time weep by 
the waters of Jordan, Israel may produce a Cyrus to bring 
back a remnant". 
92, ^ntwich, l^ orman, Israeli Two Fateful Years 1967-69- London, 
1970, p. 52, 
93, Ibid. 
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TBE JUWB 1967 WAR AND ITS BEPERCUSSIOKS 
A distinctive characteristic of Zionist strategy Is that i t 
« 
does not want to resolve the conf l i c t . It is rather directed at 
prolonging i t . The resolution of confl ict would mean abandom^nt of 
the fruits of aggression which would ultimately mean the abandonment 
of a cherished dream and a well-thought out policy, namely, the 
establishment of a State in consonance with past Israeli history and 
glory. The expansionist ambitions of Israel constitute a significant 
link in Zionist conspiracy against the Arabs to destroy their inde-
pendence and freedom by i ts planned perfidious attacks. The most 
important tactic of i^ionist diplomacy is military action. This 
diplomatic military strategy is used as an effective vehicle for terrl* 
torial expansion which is an expression of the policy of force. A 
cardinal principle of the strategy is the necessity to carry out 
"defensive" war outside Israeli territory and to never allow the 
adversaries to penetrate inside Israel 's boundaries. Thus the concept 
of defensive war is equated with preventive war and i t is closely 
related with ti;]© question of boundaries. Israel , in i t s attempt to 
thwart tta9 enemy's power of pre-emption always seeks extended borders 
through territorial expansion and the occupation of more and more 
Arab territory to e f f ec t mass eviction of the Arabs and correspond-
ingly mass immigration of the Jews. Hodgkln, the Foreign Editor of 
Tlqe Times recording his verdict on the Israeli occupation and evic-
tion of the Arabs said the act to be cruel, repressive and profoundly 
depressing. (1) Israel wanted to displace the Arabs because it 
thought that unless the Arabs were pushed to desperate conditions they 
The Times (London), October 28, 1969, 
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would not agree to have peace with Israel, Professor Jacob Talmon, 
one of Israelis foremost historians and leading intellectuals, saids (2) 
"This is a basic discrepancy in a motto which becomes a disease and 
which states that Arabs do not understand except the language of power 
and wil l even never surrender or agree to peace unless placed under 
desperate condition" • Israel has always launched a war to create 
"desperate" conditions, Jhe governfflent and people of Israel have, 
by and large, accepted the 'doctrine* that Israel 's security l i e s in 
periodic warfai-e which after every few years must reduce the Arab 
States to impotence. The doctrine of "periodic warfare" is aimed at 
delivering a severe blow to the economy and national l i fe of the 
Arabs. It is also intended to cause "the extensive damage to property 
and the expulsion of very large number of the Arabs by "applying terror, 
bloodshed, destitution and misery" (3) in order to establish a •purely 
Eret2 Israel" on Arab land, Israeli atta<ak of aune 6 , 1967 on Egypt, 
Syria, and Jordan was an important link in a chain of events which had 
started as early as 1947 when Israel came into existence. The war in 
June 1967 was a very significant event because i t further enabled 
Israel to extend its borders deeper into Arab lands. 
The war started with swift and surprise Israeli attack on 
June 6 , 1967 upon Egyptian aerodromes, Israel also invaded the West 
Bank of the Jordan River and Syria. Israel claimed that i t went into 
action in self-defence against a possible attack by Egypt, It further 
claimed that i t s sole aim in using force was to defend its territorial 
2, Open Letter to y, Ga l i l i , The Arab World (Mew York), vol . XV, 
Mo* 9 , September 1969, p. 6, 
3, Marie, Sister, i^ firggalem Dj^y published in Temoinage Chretien 
(Paris) , July 27, 1967. 
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integrity against Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran on 
May 22,1967• I'he incident of the Straits of Tlran was not a cause 
but it was merely a pretext. The theory'of self-defence has also 
been fals i f ied by Israeli leaders through their public utterances. 
General Babln in an interview published in the is. Monde saids (4) 
"I do not believe that Kasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent 
into Sinai on May 14, would not have been enough to unleash an offen-
sive against Israel". Later on Levi Eshkol also stateds (5) "The 
massing of Egyptian troops in Sinai before the outbreak of hosti l it ies 
was of a defensive nature". 
It is obvious that the causes of the 1967 June war, which were 
built up sometlraes on ttie sabotage, raids and the other upon the 
closure of the Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli ships, or the defence pact 
between Kgypt and Syria and between Jordan and Egypt, were not the 
real causes of the six day vrar. These developments were immediate 
excuse for Israeli aggression. The roots of the conf l ic t l ie in cer^ 
tain provocative acts counaitted by Israel much before Hasser announced 
the closure of Tiran for Israeli ships. The most provocative inci-
dents had occurred in Israeli^Syrian demilitarized zow which was est -
ablished unaer the Syrian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of July 20, 
1949. Israel constantly disregarded i t s obligations and committed 
many breaches of the Armistice Agreement for which it was censured 
and condemned by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and 
the Security Council. Israel turned a deaf ear to their resolutions 
and requests and erected forti f ications and placed police personnel in 
I f iJtode, February 28, 1968. 
5. Ib id . , July 3, 1969. 
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the aone in utter violation of the provisions of the Armistice 
Agreement* Ultimately Israel established complete control over the 
demilitarized zone. As Colonel Hutchison, an observer of the UWTSO 
stated: C6) "the situation on the Syrian-Israeli border was aggravated 
by Israel 's constant attempt to exert total control over the Demili-
tarissed Zones that separate the two countries in soitie sectors." 
General von Eorn, Chief of Staff of the UlttSO has also con-
firmed that Israel was guilty of violating the terms of the Armistice 
Agreement. General Von Horn observed*. (7) "The ^ews developed a habit 
of irrigating and ploughing in stretches of Arab land, for the ground 
was so fert i le that every square foot was a gold mine in grain. 
Gradually, beneath the glowering eyes of the Syrians, who held the 
high ground overlooking the zone , the area had become a network of 
Israeli canals and Irrigation channels edging up against and always 
encroaching on Arab owned property", 
Israel was appropriating Arab owned land with the objective 
to rehabilitate more and more jiewish immigrants in the Demilitari2sed 
zone. Israel boycotted a l l meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission 
and did not allow the United ^lations personj.el to conduct investi-
gations against Israel regarding the Dejailitarized zone. The United 
Nations Secretary General brought this point before the Security 
Council in his report. He statedj (8) 
6. Hutchison, E. H., Violent Truce. New York, 1956. p. 107. 
7 . Horn, Von, Soldier^la for Peace. London, 1966. p. 78. 
8. U.K. Document 8/7573^ November 2, 1966. 
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"Since June 1966, United Nations Military observers 
have been prevented by Israel from carrying out investi-
gations in the Hagrovrim and Susita areas. Access to the 
Dardera ax-ea, in the central sector of the D/zone, has 
also been refused to United Nations Military observers. 
Such restriction has prevented the investigation of 
Syrian complaints relating to Israeli forti f ications in 
the Demilitarized zone»" 
The Secretai'y General also dealt at length with the Israeli policy 
of forcibly evicting the Arabs and appropriating their land. He 
said (9) that on the Western Bank of the Demilitarized zone "Arab 
villages have been demolished. Their inhabitants evacuated. Their 
lands on the Western Bank of the riverj and the Khoury farm in the 
same area, are cultivated by Israel nationals". 
Israel, however, did not abandon its policy of using the Arab 
owned land for cultivation. On April 3 , 1967 Israel decided to cu l t i -
vate a l l areas of the Detailitarized zone, Israeli armoured tractors 
helped by regular arm forces started cultivation. It was a clear 
attempt at instigation, Syria defended i ts larid but Israeli planes 
bombarded Syrian villages. Syria lodged a complaint with the Security 
Council in which i t stated: ( l o ) 
"The Israelis continued to cultivate the disputed 
ai'eas in the Demilitarized zone for the sole purpose 
of instigating host i l i t ies . This they did by armoui*ed 
tractors protected by tanks and every armament, i l legally 
placed in the Demilitai'ized zone, in violation of the 
General Armistice Agreement. This demonstrates beyond 
any doubt a clear criminal intent to provoke a large 
scale war with Syria" . 
This incident was a rather very serious one and according to ons 
writer, it was "curtain-riser to the six day war", (11) According to 
9 . Ib id . , pp. 4-5. 
10. UK Doc. 8/7845^ April 1967, p. 5, 
11. Yost, Charles, "The Arab Israeli Warj How i t Began" Foreign 
M I M m i vol, 46, Ko. 2 (January, 1968), p . 306, 
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another observer of Middle l^ast polit ics this incident was the 
biggest since 1956 aggression. He wrote: (12) "On April 7 , th© 
biggest Arab-Israeli battle since 1956, was fought over Syria. It 
precipitated a l l the events which led to the larger war almost 
exactly two months later" . 
Israel had launched a massive raid on April 11, 1967 and 
caused a serious clash by its provocative cultivation of Arab-
owned lands. Israel was also responsible for aggravating the situ-
ation by i t s threats to invade Syria and occupy its capital Dsunascus. 
General Odd Bull, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Trice 
Supervision Organization appealed to the two Governments to exercise 
the utmost restraint, to observe the ceasefire and to use the Mixed 
Armistice Commission to resolve differences which misht arise bet-
ween them. (13) U Ihant also endorsed General Bull*s e f forts and 
supported (14) his "intention to continue, in the light of the res-
ponsibilities entrusted to UJffiSG by the Israel Syria General Armistice 
Agreement and by the relevant Security Agreement and by the relevant 
Security Council resolutions, to exert every possible e f fort to help 
maintain en atmosphere of quiet by averting incidents between the 
parties". 
Israel refused to lend ears to the voices of sanity and de-
moderation and its leaders issued and delivered extremely provocative 
statements. Charles Yost has quoted (15) many utterances of Israeli 
Chief of Staff said on May 10, 1967 that Israeli forces might "attack 
12. Draper, Theodore, Israel and World Polit^^s (New York, 1960), 
p. 47. 
13. 0W Doc. S/7877, May 8,1967. 
14. Ibid. 
16. .Yost Charles, op. c i t . 
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Damascus and change i t s Government". On May 13, Israel 's Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol said that Israel would take drastic measures 
against Syria "at the place, the time, and in the manner we choose". 
On May 12, a British United press message from Jerusalem (Israel i 
sector) carried the report (16) that "a highly placed Israeli source 
said here tonloy that i f Syria continued the campaign of sabotage 
in Israel i t would immediately provoke military action aimed at over-
throwing the Syrian regime". Thei^ was also a strong rumour that 
the USSR had warned the UAh about a probable attack on Syria by 
Israel, Ijg. Flf^aro. has quoted a Soviet statement distributed by Tass 
giving the information that the Security Sub Committee of the Knesset 
had, in i t s meeting held in early May, empowered the Israel Govern-
ment to take retaliatory action against the Syrians. (17) The Arab 
newspapers also expected Israeli aggression against Syria and other 
Arab States. The Al-Gumhurya gave a warnings (18) "Israel prepares 
aggression on a broad front in the I^orth." The Al-Huriva (19) ex-
pected an aggression by Israel in the near future and also predicted 
that the Western Powers would help Israel in launching aggression 
against the Arabs. One day before the war an Israeli newspaper 
Ha'aretz published a speech by the Minister of Labour Yigal Allon where-
in he saidt (20) "There i s not the slightest doubt about the outcome 
16. The Guardian (London), May 13, 1967. 
17. liSJlEMa, May 17, 1967. 
18. 41:^Mbamt April 21, 1967. 
19. Al-Huriva (Beirut), April 24, 1967. 
20. UN Doc. S/7a96, May 19, 1967. 
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of this war, and each of I ts stages and we are not forgetting the 
Jordanian and the Syrian fronts either." 
The Israeli threats aiid the intemperate and belliicose utter-
ances by its leaders deteriorated the situation further. The 
Secretary General of the United Nations in his report made a reference 
to these inflacomatory speeches with a sense of great concern. He 
wrote; (21) "Keports emanating from Israel have attributed to some 
hl€h o f f i c i a l s ixi that state statements so threatening as to be 
particularly inflajnraatory in the sense that tj^y could heighten emo-
tions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the l ines". 
The Secretai'y41eneral expected concern at the "steady deterioration 
along the line between Israel and Syria, particularly with regard 
to disputes over cultivation rights In the Demilitarized zone, since 
the f i r s t of the year". (22) 
The mobilisation of lerueli armed forces was a direct threat 
to Syria and i ts territorial integrity. The Israeli strategy and 
policy of provoking a large scale war appeared to be abundantly clear. 
Syria was forced to seek Egypt's assistance under the Mutual Defence 
Pact of November 1966, Egypt was under an obligation to come to 
Syria's help in case i t was threatened by any'foreign power and 
Egyptian troops started moving towards Alexandria and Ismailia. 
Nasser took such a step for two reasons. First of a l l both 
in Cairo and Damascus there existed a genuine fear of an impending 
Israeli aggression against Syria. Nasser wanted an effective deter-
rent to demonstrate Arab strength in order to prevent the situation 
2 1 . UN Doc . S/7896y May 1 9 , 1967. 
22. Ibid. 
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from escalating further. He explained his point when asked a® to 
why he chose that time for the confrontation with Israel by reqaest« 
ing the UK to withdraw the UKEF, Masser replieds (23) "When Lshkol 
threatened to occupy Syria it became our duty to come forward to 
help our Arab brothers. Thus we have to ask for the withdrawal of 
the UMiF". 
The ^ c o ^ reason for Egypt's response to Syria's request was 
severe criticistn of Nasser's policy in the Arab world. Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia were charging Nasser of playing soft with Israel. The 
Israeli attack on the Jordanian village of Samou on November 13, 1966 
which was condemned unanimously by the UN Security Council (24) and 
Israeli aggression against Syria on April 7, 1967 had gone unpunished 
and Nasser was under severe criticism for his utter inaction and 
passivity in the face of Israeli aggression. Egypt was thus placed 
in a d i f i i cu l t position* It had to face the situation and help 
Syria in case of the latter was attacked by Israel, But the Egyptian 
troops could move up to the Egyptian Israeli Armistice line only and 
so Isigypt had to ask for the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency 
Force stationed on i t s territory after the 1956 tripartite aggression. 
The UIEF was created by the proposal originally mooted by Lester 
Pearson of Canada on November 1, 1956 and the General Assembly Reso-
lution of February 2, 1957 which stated that (25) the "scrupulous 
maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the 
UNfcF on the Egyptian Israeli armistice demarcation line and the imple-
23. Si^ mmary cff World Broadcastf Part IV, II Series, May 31, 1967, 
24. UN/BES/22a (1966) November 25, 1966. 
25. A/1125 (XI)^ February 2, 1957. 
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mentation of otber measures as proposed in the Secretary General's 
report with a view to assisting in achieving situations conducive 
to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area". There was 
f i r s t a demand for partial withdrawal but the Secretary General said 
that i t could only be total* This l e f t Kasser with no choice for 
i f he had bowed down at that stage, he would have lost prestige both 
at home and abroad. The demand for total withdrawal was thus forced 
upon him by U Thant, Nasser made i t not out of choice or preference 
but unwillingly and under pressure of circumstances over which he had 
no control . 
On May 16, 1967, Egypt requested the Secretary General to 
withdraw the United Nations Emergency Force from the Demilitarized 
zone along the Egyptian Israel i border. General Fawai, the Chief of 
Staff of the United Arab Eepublic Armed Forces sent a message to 
Ma^or General Rikhye, Commander of the OKEF, to rejaove his men from 
Sinai, and to group them in the Gaza Strip to ensure their safety, 
should military action become inevitable. (26) General Eikhye imme-
diately communicated the message to the Secretary-General. On May 18, 
the Secretary General received a request for the withdrawal of the 
United Nations Emergency Force from the UAH Foreign Minister. On 
May 19, U Thant announced (87) that "the buffer fmotion which the 
UlEF had been performing was eliminated". The withdrawal of the UKEF 
was cr i t ic ized as a decision in great 'haste' and'liurry'. Some 
people thought that the Secretary General should not have readily 
26. The Arab World^ May 17, 1967, p. 2. 
27. Kxternal a f fa i rs Review (Wellington), vo l . 17, 
May, 1967. p. 4Q, 
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complied with the UAH»s recpest for the withdrawal of the UKEF. 
'Ihe United Nations was the cnly hope for keepiiig peace in the region 
and disillusionment became great when i t failed to live up to the 
aspirations set for i t . Many were incredulous to see that the 
complex and magnificent edifice of the peace keeping UfEF had proved 
so fragile'. She UIEF was likened to a ^fire brigade which vanishes 
from the scene as soon as the f i r s t ssjioke and flataes appear"* (28) 
The witt^rawal of the UKEF was a clear indication of the situation 
worsening further and i t created, among many countries, a sense of 
irritation with the United Nations and i ts Secretary General, Pre-
ventive diplomacy was conceived by Dag Hammarsk^old as an interna-
tional version of the policy of preventing further escalation of a 
c r i s i s . This preventive diplomacy was institutionalized by the crea-
tion of the UiJEF and with i ts withdrawal the chances of containing 
the confl ict vani^ed. The armed forces of Egypt and Israel were 
brought face to face and it was no longer possible for the United 
Nations to perform the functions of the shock absorber* The Secretary 
General wanted the presence of the United Nations and he tried to 
reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. His 
e f for ts did not yield any fruit because the Israeli Government refused 
to have anything to do with i t . The decision regarding the withdrawal 
of the UKfcF was highly resented by Israel, It questioned the power 
of the Secretary General to grant UAil's request for the withdrawal 
of the United Kations forces. The Secretary General confronted Israel 
with the suggestion that the United Nations forces should also be 
stationed on Israeli side of the armistice line, Israel saw in that 
28, Itew York Titnes^ June 20, 1967, p. 17, 
224 
suggestion an attempt to tamper with i t s territorial sovereignty 
and i t turred i t down as being "entirely unacceptable". (29) 
The Secretary General had acted according to the terms and 
conditions laid down at the time Egypt agreed to keeping the UlEF 
on its so i l . The Secretary-General in his report submitted to the 
Security Council explained his position and tried to Justify his 
stand. He stated: (30) 
"The was introduced into the territory of the 
UiiK on the basis of an agreement reached in Cairo 
between the Secretary General of the tJnited Bat ions 
and the President of Egypt, and i t therefore has 
seemed fully clear to me that since UAH consent was 
withdrawn i t was incumbent on the Secretary General 
to give orders for the withdrawal of the Force, In 
the face of the request for the withdrawal of the 
Force, there seemed to use to be no alternative course 
of action which could be taken by the Secretary General 
without putting in question the sovereign authority 
of the Government of the UiE within i ts own authority"* 
With the withdrawal of the UlfeF the Egyptian troops occupied 
areas including Sharm Bl-Sheikh, the most strategic area overlooking 
the Straits of Tiran. Px'esident Nasser took another logical step 
when he announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to a l l ships 
flying Israeli flag or carrying strategic material. On May 22, 1967, 
in a Speech given at the airforce headquarters in Sinai, he saidj (31) 
"We are now face to face with Israel and if they want to try their 
luck without Britain and France we await them. The Israeli flag wi l l 
not pass through the Gulf of Aqaba and our sovereignty over the ent-
rance to the Gulf is not negotiable". With the closure of the Straits 
29. l o s t , Charles, op. c i t . ^ p. 313. 
30. UK Monthly Chronicle , vol . IV, Ito. 6, June 1967, pp.6-7. 
31. Quoted in Arab World ^ Jiew York, May 23, 1967, p. 4. 
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of Tlran Nasser had restored the status aao. ^ t e existing before 
1966 aggression. 
The position of Egypt and other Arab States was very clear 
over the question of the Gulf of Aqaba. Since the position of Israel 
on the Gulf was not fixed by any permanent boundary decision, Israel 
did not have any sovereign right over the Gulf of Aqaba. The count-
ries hav.ing permanent boundaries with the Gulf, namely, Jordan, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia had agreed to close it to Israel ships and their 
action was lawful. Israel has treated the closure of the Straits of 
Tiran as a cagus b e l l i . Levi Eshkol, the Prime Minister of Israel de-
clared (32) that tte blockade was a violation of international law 
and constituted "an act of aggression against Israel" . 
On May 23, President Johnson of the USA declared (33) that US 
considered the Gulf of Aqaba "to be an international waterway and 
feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is i l legally and potentially 
disastrous to the cause of peace", The US Ambassador to UAA xiichard 
H. Kolte submitted a five point foi-mula on behalf of the United States 
of America, The ma^ or provisions of the formula weres (1) UK&F 
troops would not be asked to withdraw^ (2) the UAR would not send 
troops to Sharm El-Sheikhj (3) UAR forces would be barred from enter-
ing the Gaza Sector of the UAli-Israeli borders*, (4) the United Nations 
would administer Gaza until the cr is is was settled^ and (5) UAR and 
Israeli troops would pull back from the border areas. 
Sigypt rejected the formula and the Egyptian newspaper the 
Al-Ahram reported (34) that the formula was not acceptable because 
32. SmnmariT of Worl(^  Broadcasts^ Part IV, Second Series, May 25, 
1967. 
33. Jfew Yorl^  Times J May 24, 1967, p. 16. 
34. U s m m f May 26, 1967, 
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It would not help solve the prob3jem« The situation was deteriorat- , 
Ing rapidly and there seemed to be no siga of amicable settlement 
of the confl ict , M&sser's announcement of the cloaare of the Straits 
of Tlran was regarded as an act of war by Israel. He did not want 
warj his purpose was, as the Observer said, "to deter Israel rather 
than provolo It to a f ight" . (35) The withdrawal of the UKEF and 
closure of the Straits of Tiran had given Kasser much the coveted 
diplomatic victory and he was ready to laegotiate a .pol i t ical sett le -
ment of the Palestine Probiem, The basic problem was not Aqaba or 
Tiran or Masser himself declared (36) in the Egyptian National 
Assembly that "the question today i s not of Aqaba nor is i t the 
Tiran Straits or the United ilations Emergency Force. It is the rights 
of the people of Palestine"* The basic problem was that of the 
rights of tJie Palestinian Arabs who had been driven out of their 
homes by Israel, All other problems were ancillary. Nasser's inten-
tions were obvious, Chai'les W, Yost, US Special Envoy to Cairo, 
observed: (37) "There does not seem to have been any intention in 
Cairo to initiate a war", Nasser also told Christopher Mayhew, a 
member of the British Parliament that i f the Israelis do not attack, 
"we wil l leave them alone". (38) 
Egypt had made a public announcement and issued a declaration 
renouncing the use of force and assuring that i t did not want war. 
35. TJie Observer (London) ^ June 4 , 19©?, 
36. Al-Ahramy May 30, 1967. 
37. Sharabi Hisham, "Prelude to war - The cr is is of May-June 
1967" The Arab World ^ vol. XIV, Kos. l o - l l , 1968, p. 26, 
38. Ibid. 
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Israel did not not follow Egypt. It did not issue any public decla-
ration renouncing its intention to attack Syria* Israel, it seemed, 
was not Interested in a peaceful settlement. The real problem before 
Israel was not of territorial security because its military superiority 
made it dominate i t s neighbours, War with Arab States, however, to 
the Israeli leaders was the only way out to relieve Israel of i t s 
economic hardships and severe recession. Since 1965 when the repatria-
tions of West Germany were exhausted, Israel 's economy had deteriorated 
and the rate of growth had fallen sharply, resulting in a peculiar 
situation, namely, th« persons emigrating from Israel exceeded those 
immigrating to Israel, This process seen^d to threaten the very 
existence of pol i t ical Zionism as a philosophy. About the deteriorating 
economic conditions of Israel tbe Time Magazine wrote: (39) "Crisis was 
permeating in every sphere of Israel l i f e in 1965 Israel 's economy 
began to slow down" . 
Israeli Labour Minister Yigal Allcm also admitted it when te 
said: (40) "there were 16,000 unemployed Israel is" . "A day later 
the State Bank put the figure 35,000 to 40,000 and two days later the 
Government's own economic Planning-Authority decided that tSae figure 
was closer to 60,000 (nearly lo per cent of the national labour force) 
and growing". The number of unemployed had reached 100,000 in 1967 
and "Labour r iots had broken out in Tel Aviv on March 16, 1967", (41) 
A military campaign against the Arab world to be justified 
39, Time Magazine, June 4 , 1967. 
40, Ifewswaek. January 16, 1967. See also lijg. GuardienT August 7, 
1970. 
41, Cat tan, Henry, Sfi. c i t . , p.
in terms of " self-de fence" was the most feasible alternative to 
put Israelis house in order. Israel 's real intentions were, therefore, 
not to defuse tt^ c r i s i s . It rather wanted to escalate i t and looked 
only for an opportune moment. Before striking against the Arab 
States Israel wanted to ensure the support of the United States and 
neutralization of the United Kations. The Arab States seem to be 
convinced of the fact that Israel was acting in collusion with the 
United States, Military experts are of the view that Israel could 
not have carried out its attack on the Arab States without effective 
assistance of its western supports chiefly the United States. The 
experts also point out that the vast air operation conducted by 
Israeli air force against Egypt, Syria and Jordan could not have re-
mained undetected by the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean* (42) 
The US ship "Liberty" torpedoed by Israel was only 16 miles 
away from shore. The ship was spying and knew what was going to 
happen. The very fact that American warships equipped with the most 
modern and sophisticated electronic devices to detect air attack 
did not warn the UAR of the impending attack made one suspect the 
United States intentions. Before the June war "a joint memorandum 
had been drawn up by the Secretary of Defence and Secretary of States," 
They advised President Johnson that the United States was faced with 
two basjXJ policy choices in making good its commitments to Israel. 
They weres (1) "to permit Israel to deal with the problem alone which 
in o f f i c i a l circle is referred to as the "unleashing Israel" alter-
native-, (2) for the United States to assume respcaisibility for opening 
42. Jansen, G, H., Whose Suez? Aspects of Collusion, 1967, 
Beirut, 1968, pp, 13-15. Also see The Times. June 13, 1967 
a^ icl the p^lLy m U (London), May 30, 1967. 
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the Straits. (43) The United States of America seemed to be possess-
ing Information leading to the conclusion that Israel was preparing 
for a strike but the United States 4ld not warn Israel against such 
an attack, much less caution to the UAH against i t . The Central 
Intelligence Agency's director Hichard Helais had his own assessment 
of the whole situation in the Middle East and he was sure of Israel 's 
victory within four days if i t took the init iative. (44) General 
Isiheeaer, Chairman of the ^oint Chiefs of Staff of the tJSA expressed 
the considered assessiipnt of the situation by the Department of Defence 
when he saidj (45) "He had no information of ar^ Egyptian intention 
to attack, i f anything, i t was the Israeli army that was pressing to 
begin host i l i t ies . Israel had nothing to fear. Her army was far 
superior to that of Bgypt." 
Israel started war with the connivance of the USA who had asked 
the UAii to play cautious and not to take the init iative. The United 
States of America was a major ally of Israel and had a vested interest 
in i t s survival as a viable po l i t i ca l entity. For i t s security, Israel 
mainly depended upon the United States. Having been incessantly 
backea and supported by Western Imperialism, the "protection of Israel 's 
security" said (46) the Israeli Prime Minister, "depends on the pre-
sence of the United States Sixth Fleet in the ffediterranean". 
The strategic policy of Israel to launch a massive surprise 
attack on the Arab States became possible only with the aid and assistance 
43, Draper, Theodore, <2J2.# c j^ , , pp. 89-90. 
44. k imaa^i June 13, 1967. 
46, Kimche and Bawly, ajg., cjjb,, p, 126, 
46, She Stn,teaman (Kew D e p i ) , May 14, 1967» 
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of the United States as Israel 's survival is believed to be of 
vitally Important for strengthening and preserving American interests 
in the region. The United States wanted to use Israel to encircle 
the revolutionary movements and to tighten imperialist control over 
the Arabs to guarantee to western monopolies support in their o i l 
Interest, "The continued flow of o i l at econoinlcally reasonable 
rates to Western Europe" outlined,' (47) Alexis, Johnson, Deputy 
Under Secretary of State for pol it ical a f fa irs , " is of great Importance 
• Access to the air and sea routes to and through the Near East is 
important to us comfiierdally and mil itari ly" . According to US 
assessment, the main problem or threat in the Middle ii-ast i s not 
provided by the Arab-Israeli conf l ict , but by the progressive policies 
of the Arab States, adversely affecting Anglo-American-interest and 
promoting the cause of communism. Senator Joseph Clark appeared before 
the Congressional Sub-Committee on Peace in the Middle East and he 
isaid (48) in his testimony that the obstacle "to peace" in the region 
is tbs UAiv and its progressive orientation. He called for the 'des-
truction of the progressive regimes" in the Arab world and a greater 
commitment to Israel as toe bulwark of American interests in the region. 
President Johnson was confronted with Intensified American Jewish 
Community criticism over his Vietnam policy. He argued that the 
American Jews continually exerted pressure on US Administration to 
support Israel but were opposed to their commitments to South Vietnam, 
ae raised the issue with Abba Ebban when he visited Washington in 
February 1966, Johnson sought American Jews' support for his policy 
47. Jules, Davids (Ed.) , Documents on American Foreign Relations 
Ifew York, 1966. p. 322. 
48. Lughod, A. I . , "Israel 's Arab Policy", The Arab World^ ag., c i t . 
p. 38, 
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in Vietnam in return for military aid to Israel. Israel was conduct-
ing negotiations for the delivery of Amrican arms, missiles and 
aircraft.Israel and its sappca'ters agreed to work to muzzle Jewish 
opposition to his Vietnam policy as a prlc© for U.S. military aid 
Israel is a state created by imperialist powers and propping 
i t to contain the forces of progress in the Middle East, The United 
States of America was at the time itching to l e t the UAH down for i ts 
anti-American po l i t i cs , liabbi Elemer Berger studied the conflict at 
the level of international politics and according to him the real 
target of 19^ conf l ict was neither Aqaba nor the Straits of Tiran nor 
the .Straits of liran nor was the issue of Israeli sovereignty. The 
real aim or object rather was that "both the British and the United 
States wantea Egyptian forces out of Yemen"* (49) Issac Deutscher 
has blamed the USA for having encouraged Israel to wage war in order 
to get rid of Kasser. Had Kasser fallen "Egypt might have become an-
other Ghana or Indonesia", (60) In Issac*s opinion Israel acted not 
only with the knowledge of Western powers but was "absolutely sure 
of American and to some extent British moral, po l i t i ca l and economic 
support." (61) The United States of America was the most important 
factor behind Israeli bellicosy. 
The United Nations had a special responsibility to maintain 
peace in the Middle East. The Secretary General had not lost a l l hopes, 
he undertook his historic mission of peace to Cairo on May 23-25, 1967, 
49. Berger, Emile, habbi. Pxoblems of American Policy M^kara 
Lecture delivered at Southern Massachusett Institute of 
Technology, November 15, 1967, p. 10, 
50. Deutscher, Issac, "On the Israeli Arab War" New Left Review 
July-August 1967. pp. 30-45, 
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u Thant had discussions with Nasser, General Rikhye and General 
Bull but failed to exercise any tangible e f fec t and the situation 
further worsened. The success of his attempt depended on the Great 
-A 
Powers sharing the Secretary General*s perception of the situation 
and readiness to adopt suitable measures to prevent the outbreak of 
major hosti l i t ies between Israel and the Arab States, 
The Security Council was called into session in the absence of 
the Secretary General, Its f i r s t meeting of the yeai* was called at 
the request of Canada and Denmark on May 24, 1967, The representative 
of Denmark said: (52) 
"There has been a military build-iip along the borders 
of Israel and the United Arab Republic, and there i s 
no way of denying that the stage is set for a major 
military c lash . . . . the slightest miscalculation, the 
slightest misunderstanding of one or the other wise of 
the oppoiasnts' intentions, could lead to large-scale 
host i l i t ies , " 
The Security Council met twice on May 24 but no positive result seemed 
to be llowing out of i t . A Carmdian-Danish Draft resolution was pre-
sented before the Security Council which gave ••full support to the 
e f forts of the Secretary General" and requested the member states 
"to retrain from taking any steps which might worsen the situation". (53) 
The resolution was not put to vote because of Russian opposition. 
The Soviet Union considered that the Security Council meeting should 
not have been called. ' On May 23, the Soviet Government issued a policy 
statement on the Middle East situation which was read in the Security 
Council on May 24. The Soviet Representative Fedorenko saidi (54) "Let 
52. UH Doc. May 24, 1967,pp. 38-40. 
53. ffey iQt,}^  May 25, 1967. 
54. m Doc. S/PV./ia42^ May 24, 1967,p. 27. 
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no one have any doubts about the fact that, should anyone try to 
unleash aggression in the iwar East, he would be met not only with 
the united strength Of Arab countries but also with strong opposition 
to aggression from the Soviet Union and a l l peace-loving states," 
The United States of Atnerica also presented a Draft Resolution 
which called upon the parties to comply with the Secretary General's 
appeal for restraint and caution. (55) 
The United 4raJa Republic also presented proposals which de-
clared that "the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreetaent was s t i l l 
valid" end the United Hations machinery should be fully operative. 
It asked Israel to abide by the provisions of the Agreement. The 
Chief of Staff of UKfSO was requested to reinstitute the Mixed Armis-
tice Comraission within two weeks in El-Au;ja Demilitarized zone. (56) 
The Security Council could not take ariy decision on any draft because 
there was no agreement among the Great Powers. In the face of the 
failui'S o f the Security Council the only hope of averting a ma o^r 
coiiClagration in the Middle Bast was U Thant who was assessing the 
situation in Cairo. On May 26, 1967, the Secretary General presented 
before the Security Council his report. The Secretai'y General said; (67) 
"President Hasser and Foreign Minister Hiad assured 
me that the United Arab Eepublic would not initiate 
offensive action against Israel, Their general aim, 
as stated to me, was for a return to the conditions 
prevailing prior to 1956 and to f u l l observance by 
both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice 
Agreement between Egypt and Israel" . 
The Secretary General renewed his c a l l for reviving the Mixed Armistice 
66. U.A. Monthly Chronicle^ vol. IV, No. 6, June 1967. p. 6. 
56. Ibid. 
57. UH Ooc. a/7906, Secretary Genaral's Re^oort of May 26, 1967. i' ^ » 
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Commissions to allow the presence of the United Nations to act as a 
shock absorber. He was of the opinion that a breathing spell was 
requii-ed for a peaceful settlement of the con f l i c t . He urged: (58) 
"All the parties concerned to exercise special res-
traints j to forego belligerence and to avoid a l l other 
actions which couM increase tension, to allow the 
Coancil to deal with the underlying causes of the 
present crisis and to seek solutions. There are other 
possible courses of action which might contribute 
substantially to the reduction of tension in the area. 
the Armistice Agreements constitute an important st^p 
towards the establishment of permanent peaje in PaJastine". 
In this context, U Thant pleaded for the resurrection of the Egypt 
Israel Mixed Armistice Commission to provide a limited form of United 
Imtions presence in the area. The Secretary General admitteds' (59) 
"The problems to be faced are complex and the obstacles 
are formidable, I do not believe, however, that we can 
allow ourselves to despair." 
" I t should be kept always in mine that in spite of 
the extreme d i f f i cu l t i es of the situation, the United 
Nations has played an essential and imporiant role for 
more than eighteen years in maintaining at least some 
measure of peace in the J«eai' East, In that task It 
has encountered many setbacks, frustrations, crises, 
confl icts and even war, but the e f f o r t continues un-
abated, We are now confronted with new and threatening 
circumstances, but I s t i l l believe that with the co-
operation of a l l parties concerned the United Nations, 
and the Security Council in particular, must continue 
to seek, saad eventually to find reasonable, peaceful and 
;ju.st solutions". 
U Thant had referred to the role of Big Povrers in maintaining 
peace in the Near East. The Soviet Union and the United States 
of America were conducting their battle in the Council but they were 
extremely cautious and trying to avoid a direct confrontation. "There 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid. 
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were exchanges between Washington and Moscow", wrote LaqJ^ar, (60) 
"about the MMdle i^ast situation from May 19, each assuring the 
other of their desire to preserve peace in the area* I t does not 
seem that any constructive measure was saggestedj perhaps these 
exchanges vie re thought necessary in view of the movements of the 
Eastern Mediterranean task force of the Sixth Fleet, and the gradual 
Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean"« France v/anted the 
Big Powers to work ^ointly» George Gorse, Minister of Information 
o f France declared that (61)» "the 1950 tripartite Declaration was 
no lor^er binding. The Security Council was powerless to act without 
agreement between Anierlca, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, and 
its Was therefore the special responsibility of these four to meet 
and to t ^ e joint action to preserve peace". 
There were hectic activities within the United fetions to re -
vive preventive diplomacy propounded by former Secretary General, 
Dag HamiDBrskjold, Outside the United Nations the parties concerned 
were drifting tow&i'ds more belligerent position. On May 28, Levi 
Eshkol, the Israeli Prime Minister declared (62) that his Government 
was fully prepared for any military eventuality and also maintained 
that the USA, Britain and France were ready "to work without delay 
for a rapid l i f t ing of the blockade" and the mobilization of Israeli 
defence force was a "decisive factor in the speeding up of inter-
national pol it ical activity". The United States of America wanted to 
60. Laquair, Walter, Tfae Road to War - The Origlfi and Aftermath 
of the Arab-Israeli Cot^flict 1967>68. Pelican, London, 
1969. p. 183. 
61. Ib id , , p. 186. 
62. The Arab World^ June 10, 1967, p. 5, 
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ensure for Israel the rlg,ht of innocent passage through the Straits 
of Ttran. Washington had thrown its f u l l weight behind the British 
move to rally the maritime nations against the blockade. Ifost of 
the countries approached were reluctant to sign a Joint declaration 
which would have led to the loss of o i l concessions and other compli-
cations with the Arab States, The prevailing view in the State 
Department and the Pengaton was "that the use of military force should 
be avoided. Such a view emanated from the belief that Israel was 
militarily superior and General Wheejer, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff had predicted (63) that "the Israelis would win the i^ ar w&thin 
three or four days i f tfeey brought of f the f i r s t air strike." 
,By 29 i t was clear that Washington, In spite of earlier 
pi'onounceioynt regarding the closure of 3?iran, was not "prepared to 
tafee or support physical action to ei^force freedom of navigation". (64) 
Abba Ebban met president Johnson to pressurize him into resort-
ing to the use of force to ensure for Israel free passage through 
Aqaba. Johnson seemed to have offered Israel "an American commitment 
to maintain i t s economic v iabi l i ty" . (65) Washington, told Johnson, 
w&s willing to sustain Israel 's economy, i ts o i l requirements if 
Israel refrained from using force to break the blockade. 
According to one reliable source the substance of American 
jOffer to Israel wasi (66) "The 0nitud States can of fer you firm 
guarantees against your destruction, even indijKiing air cover for your 
63. Bewswek^ June 19, 1967. 
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c i t i es against Egyptian bombers provided that a shooting war is 
unleashed on the Arab s ide . . . I f , however, Israel makes the f i r s t 
move the United States can of fer l i t t l e but words of sympathy and 
expression of goodwill," 
Ihe State Department of the United States evolved a new compro-
mise formula asking for free passage for a l l but Israeli ships during 
an 'interim period', in the course of which a permanent solution would 
be sought, (67) 
The United States of America's stand was dictated by on© over-
riding consideration: what wouM the Soviet Union do? The USA did not 
want to risk another confrontation with the. Soviet Union as i t was 
deeply involved in Vietnam. The focus of American effcirt to solve 
« 
the Middle Eastern problem without usjing force was, therefore, in the 
United Kations. The Security Council met on May 26, 1967. 
Arthur Goldberg of the United States told (68) the Security 
Councilj 
"The attitude of the States was not partisan. The 
United States was committed to supporting pol i t i cal 
independence and territorial integrity of a l l nations 
of the area, and opposed aggression by anyone in any 
form, whether overt or clandestine. In the view of 
bis Government, the f i r s t thing the,Council must do 
- as an interim measure and without extended debate -
was to endorse the Secretary General's appeal and 
c a l l on parties concerned ^to exercise special rest -
raint, to forge belligerence". (69) 
According to Goldberg "foregoing belligerence must mean foregoing 
any blockade of Aqaba during the breathing spell as requested by the 
67. ?few XQiTH; TXffleg, May 31, 1967. 
68. Doc. S/PV. 1343, May 29, 1967. 
69. Ib id . , p. 16. 
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Secretary General". (70) 
Mohammad Awad El Kony of the OAii accused Israel of contemplat-
ing "an attack against Syria". He said: "The Israeli authorities 
claimed the right to nav^at© in the Gulf. T^hat was without founda-
tion, The Gulf had been under uninterrupted Arab control for over 
1,000 years. It had always been a national inland waterway sub;)ect 
to absolute sovereignty. I t was a mare clausum and so was not an 
international waterway. There is no shade of a doubt as to the 
continued existence of the state of war between the Israelis and both 
the Arabs of Palestine and their brethren in the Arab countries.. . 
My Government has the legitimate right, in accordance with interna-
tional law, to impose restrictions on navigation in the Straits of 
Tiran with respect to shipping to an enemy". El Kony charged (71) 
Israel of "unilateral denunciation of the Egyptian-Israeli General 
Armistice Agreement" and aslcsd that "this Council should, in its 
endeavor to deal with the present situation, recognize the continuing 
validity of the Egyptian-Israeli Gerieral Armistice Agreement and that 
the United Kations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully 
operative". He aslsed the Council to cal l on the Israeli government 
to respect and abide by i t s responsibilities under that agreement, 
Hafael of Israel saids (72) "Every interference with the free-
dom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba was an act of aggression 
against Israel , an infringement of the sovereign rights of a l l nations 
to unimpeded use of this international waterway, and a gross violation 
70, Ib id , , pp, 36-37, 
OK Monthly Chronicle ^ vol , IV, No, 6, June 1967, p. 15, 
72, Ib id , , p. 17, 
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of international iaw". George Torach of Syria saids (73) "The cr is is 
in the Mldd3i0 ^^ ast was the direct outcome of the unprovoked, massive 
attack by regular Israeli forces against the Syrian people and terr i -
tory on April 7* In i ts wider and deeper context, i t was but a mani-
festation of the PaJsstine Question. 
Mohammad El Farra of Jordan saldj (74) " Israel ' s persistent 
violations of the Armistice Agreement had caused the present tensions 
in the area» War was a tragedy. Kobody wanted war* But when the 
Council allowed injustice to continue because of power pol i t ics and 
pol i t i ca l expediency in order to secure a so-called peace, no peace 
was secured". About the Gulf of Aqaba and Israeli claim El Farra 
saids " I t must be remembered that Israeli presence on the Red Sea was 
a military presence resulting from an act of occupation in violation 
of Security Council ceasefire resolution. The Gulf of Aqaba was an 
Arab Gulf. Neither the United ^tates nor the United Kingdom was en-
t i t led to become self-appointed jurists or to pass judgement on the 
status o f Arab waters". 
Fedorenko of Soviet Union condemned Israel for i ts warlike 
preparations. He saids (75) "The real culprit in the dangerous aggra-
vation of tensions once more was Israel, which could not have acted 
as i t had without the direct and indirect assistance o f certain imper-
ia l is t powers seeking to restore colonial domination over the Arab 
lends. The Security Council must decisively condemn provocations and 
throats against the Arab States." 
Parthasarthi of India supported the Secretary General^s sugges-
tions and said: (76) "The United Arab Republic was exercising i ts 
73. Ib id . , p. 20. 
74. Ib id . , p. 23. 
76. Ib id . , p. 19. 
76. Ib id . , p, 18. 
sovereignty In asking for the withdrawal of UKEF. The Gulf of Aqaba 
was an inland sea and entry into I t lay within the terr itor ial waters 
of the United Arab Republic. Ko State or group of states shouM 
attempt to chaUbenge by force the sovereignty of the United Arab Re-
public over the Straits of Ilran'*. 
Ihe Security Council could not adopt any resolution ajad in 
the meantiffie the situation in the Middle Kast was rapidly deteriorating 
and assuming alarming proportions. The United Nations failed to 
comprehend the speed with which the situation was worsening. "In view 
of the extreme gravity and urgency of the situation", observed (77) 
Arthur Lall , " i t was not tlms that the Council lacked but unfortunately, 
a clear perspective of the dangers involved and a determination to grasp 
the f u l l nature of its own responsibility"* 
Israel had, it seemed, made up i ts mind about recourse to the 
use of force, A cabinet reshuffle was announced in Tel Aviv on June 1 
which brought Moshe Dayan, a hawk, back as Defence Minister of Israel, 
Dayan the master of deceit played soft with the press about the pros-
pects of Israeli attack. He said: (78) " i t was too late for any 
military attack and too soon for diplomatic activities and i f some 
formula could be achieved in time he would be glad and surprised", 
Dayan's appointment as Israel 's Defence Minister was the most unambigu-
ous hint of Israeli intentions, Dayan's comeback was the most sensa-
tional peace in the whole drama and now sub-terranean emotions sur-
faced in patriotic demnnstrations throughout the country. It was a 
77, ^ 1 1 . Arthur, The PJ^  and the Middle ii^ ast Crisis , li^e?. 
New York, 1968, p, 45. 
The Jerusalem Post, June 5, 1967, 
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Victory for military sector. The chief characteristic of Israeli 
po l i t i ca l system is the constant power struggle betveen the mil i -
tary sector and the c iv i l ian sector. The ascendancy of Eshkol, Ebbem, 
and others was regarded as a victory of the c iv i l ian sector. In 
May-^um the people of Israel were getting impatient with po l i t i ca l 
leaders who were talking about peace* "They had become increasingly 
annoyed with Eban, who they believed had allowed bis zeal for peace 
to impede his ^judgeoient", (79) 
The appointment of Dayan as Defence Minister was a positive 
victory of the Militants who had always distrusted Israel i p o l i t i -
cians talking softly• They wanted action which meant war with the 
Arabs and i t came on June 5 when in the early hours Israe l i airforce 
bombarded the air f ie lds of the UAE, Jordan» Syria and Iraq. The UAH 
promptly declared national emergency while Algeria, Jordan, Syria, 
Iraq, Kuwait and Sudan announced that they were at war with Israel. 
The Israel i forces advanced swiftly and by 10 June Israel was in 
possession o f the whole of Sinai, Gaza, Jordan's Mest Bank aijd the 
Golan Heigh cs of Syria. 
Israeli Prime Minister told the nation that Israel was trying 
to repulse an aggression. He told his peop3e and the people of the 
world a blatant l ie when he saidt (80) "£gypt has imposed a military 
battle on us* The army and the people wi l l stand f i rm. . . We have 
the power to f o i l the design of the attacker. Israel seeks peace. 
It defends peace, . . Our only aim is to rid our borders of every 
threat of sabotage and every danger of aggression". 
79. Kimche and Bawly, aa, p» 151. 
80. Jerusalem Israel Democratic Service (In Hebrew) 
lOOO houses June 5, 1967. 
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Kafael of Israel repeated the same l ie in the Security Council 
wten he informed (81) the world organizations "Egyptian armoured 
columns moved in an offensive thrust against Israel 's borders. At 
the same time Egyptian planes took o i f from airf ie lds in Sinai and 
strucK out towards Israel, Egyptian artil lery in the Gaza Strip 
shelljed'the Israel viHages of Keasufni", e tc . "Israel forces en-
gaged «.he Egyptians in the air and on land and fighting Is s t i l l 
going on"* Israel was trying to justify I ts aggression by telling 
the United Nations that i t had been attackea by the UAR. 
The Security Council had a letter from the representative 
of the UAH which.stated (S2) that Israel had "committed a trecherous 
premeditated aggression" against his country* The United Arab Re-
public "in repelling this aggression . . . had decided to defend i tse l f 
by a l l means in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United filations." The Secretary General in his report told (83) the 
Council that "there was a serious military action on land and in the 
air at a number of points which was spreading". He also told that 
"three Ufi&F soldiers in the Indian contingent were killed and an 
undetermined number wounded when Israeli aircraft strafed a UKSF 
convoy". Parthasaithl of India asked the Council to condemn Israel (84 
for the "Wanton irresponsible and brutal action" in which Indian 
soldiers were killisd. 
SL* Pftc S/fV,. m i , June 5 , 1967, p. 20. 
82. PU Monthly Chronic3b^ vo l . IV, No, 7 , July 1967, p. 8. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid. 
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El Kony of UAR stated (85) in the Council that "for several 
hours now the Israeli armed forces and the Israeli Air Force have 
again committed a cowardly and trecherous aggression against my 
country's "This aggression," asked El Kony, "be vigorously condemned 
by the Security Council*" 
^ On J^une 6 , 1967 the Security Council adopted a resolution 
unanimously- It said: (86) 
'*The Security Council, 
"fJothlng the oral report of the Secretary General in this 
situation, 
"Having heard the statements made in the Council, 
"Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing 
situation in the Hear East, 
"1. Galls upon the Goveztiments concerned as a f i r s t step to 
take forthwith a l l measures for an iminediate ceasefire and for a 
cessation of a l l military activit ies in the areaj 
"2, Requests the Secretary General to keep the Council 
promptly and currently informed on the situation." 
Arther Goldberg of the United States welcomed the resolution 
because, according to him, (87) "the ceasefire was the urgent f i r s t 
step to restore peace to the Hear East. Once that was done the 
Council should turn Its immediate attention to achieving a more last-
ing peace". Lord Caradon of Britain welcomed the resolution and said: (8$ 
"The Council had taisen a f i r s t essential step and only a supreme 
ef fort could enable i t to rise to its obligation to establish a 3ust 
settlement and to restore the authority of the United Nations. He 
85. UN Document S/Py/347,, June/5, 1967, pp. 22-30, 
86. Resolution Ko. 233, UN Doc. S/py/348f June 6, 1967. 
87. Ul^  Doc S/PV. 1348, p, 7 . 
88. Ib id . , pp. 18, 20. 
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trusted the Council would not f a i l to make that Bxxpeeme e f f o r t " . 
India welcomed the resolution but made it clear that i t 
would have preferred a resolution calling for (89) "a withdrawal of 
armed forces to positions held by them prior to the outbreak of 
host i l i t ies , that ie as on June 4 , 1967 along with the ceasefire'\ 
The Soviet Onion adopted the same line and i ts representative 
Fedorenko stated: (90) "The Soviet delegation decisively .condemns 
the aggression of Israel, considers It to be the bounden duty of the 
Security Council to adopt without any further delay a decision con-
cerning the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the forces of 
the aggressor beyond the Armistice Lines", 
Eban of Israel also spoke in the Security Council, He said: (9i; 
"The Government and people of Israel were disconcerted by some aspects 
of the role of the Onited Nations in the conf l i c t . Israel welcomed 
the appeal for the ceasefire as formulated in the resolution, but its 
implementation depended on the absolute and sincere acceptance and 
cooperation of the other parties". 
George lomch of Syria saidj (92) 
" I t was clear from the statement of the Secretai'y General 
and the death of the UK&F soldiers, that Israel started the 
aggression against the United Arab Republic, Al l subse-
quent events flowed from the premeditated and well prepared 
Israeli attack on the United Arab Bepublie. As for the 
resolution which the Council has ^ust adopted, his Govern-
ment opposed any gains made by Israel through a fa i t 
accompli. It was the duty of the Council to condemn Israel , 
the aggressor, and to apply the sanctions provided for in 
the Charter"'. 
89. Ib id . , p. 46. 
90. Ib id . , p. 27. 
UK Doc. S/py. 134«j June 6, 1967. 
92. Ibid. 
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The ceasefire orders were not observed by Israel and i t conti-
nued with its plan of expansion and occupation. On June 7 , the 
Secretary General reported Israeli violations of the ceasefire order 
o f June 6, He saidi <93) "Israeli forces continued bombardment of 
Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, and occupied the crest" , The Secretary 
General also "informed (94) the Council that "Jordan had accepted the 
ceasefire resolution and had stated that immeaiate orders were issued 
to the armed forces to ceasefire except in self-defence", 
Fedorenko of the USai chargedi (95) that "Israel was not 
heeding the Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire". 
He categorically condemned Israel for i t s unjustified aggression against 
the Arab States and introduced a resolution which was adopted unaili-
mously. 
The Security Council's resolution of June 7 , 1967 noted that 
Military activit ies in the I f ea r E a s t were s t i l l continuing. The 
resolution demanded "that the Governments concerned should as a f i rst . 
step cease-fire and disoontiitue a l l military activit ies at 2000 hours 
GMT on 7 June 1967" • 
Eban of Israel charged (96) that the "Arab states had not 
complied with the ceasefire resolution", "The Soviet draft resolution 
lacked balance and distributed responsibility inequitably", Tarabanov 
Tarabanov of Bulgaria gave Eban a f i t t ing reply when he saids (97) 
m Monthly .PbrQfiXgli., vo l . IV, l«o. 7 , July 1967, p. 13. 
94, Ibid. 
95, Ib id . , p. 14, 
96. Ib id . ,p . 15. 
97. UK Doc. S/PV.iafin, p, 26, 
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"The United Arab xtepublic could not stop resisting 
aggression until aggression ceased. It could not be 
c6ntended that the victims of aggression should not 
defend themselves against a foreign invader only when 
aggressor had ceasedfire and had stopped i ts military 
act ivit ies , and only then, could a ceasefire begin", 
Israel disregarded ceasefire orders and i t s atmed forces 
kept advancing• Coaimenting upon Israel 's flagrant violations of the 
Security Councll*s directives, Arthur Lall has observed:(98) "The 
strongest debating point against Israel was that, after the Council 
had adopted its f i rs t resolution on a ceasefire, Israeli forces had 
continued to advance. Indeed, they had continued to advance after 
Eban himself had reiterated solemnly in the Courts 11 his government's 
acceptaiKJe of the ceasefire", 
The Secretary General had information about Israeli violation 
of the ceasefire which he reported to the Council on ^une 9,1967. 
He said: (99) "The Chairman of ISmc had informed him that the f i r s t 
confirmed bombing by Israeli aircraft north and east of Irake Tiberias 
was at 0746 hours GMT that day and that bombing, napalming and straf-
ing had been continuous up to 1218 GMT. The Chairman had also con-
firmed bombing in the vicinity of Damascus at 1246 hours GMT", 
Tomeh of Syria also charged Israel of disregarding the cease-
f ire resolutions of June 6, 7# He saldi (100) "an hour after his 
Government had accepted the ceasefire resolution of June 6 and 7, 
Israel had unleashed vast air and land operations against i t . These 
operations were proceeding with increasing intensity, leaving no 
98. Lal l , Arthur, sa* SH.» p» 66, 
PU Monthly Ci;^ronicle^ vol . IV,No, 7 , July 1967, p. 17, 
100. Ibid, 
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doubt that their aim was a total Invasion. The rathlessness of the 
attack was Indescribable". Israel 's non-compliance with the direc-
tives of the United Hations cast enormous reflection on the interna-
tional organization which had the ;5ob to maintain peace in the world. 
The Arab States were demanding that Israel should be astesd to withdraw 
from a l l occij^led areas but Israel was non-yielding and insistingljr 
clinging to the policy of aggression. "A new pol i t i ca l real i ty" , 
said (101) Levi Eehkol, "in the Middle East has been created," 
He Was hinting at the new situation which had arisen as a result 
r of Israeli aggression and occupation of Arab areas. The Arab states 
wanted the United Nations not to allow the aggressor to en^oy the 
fruits of aggression. The Soviet Union and India held the same opin-
ion and wanted Israel to vacate the areas i t occupied during the 
June War. 
Fadorenko of the USSE was cr i t i ca l o f Israel and i t s main 
a l l ies . He demarjided;(102) "Israel must also immediately and uncon-
ditionally withdraw its troops from their (the Arab States) terr i -
t o r i e s , . , • We cannot allow the forces of aggression to remain on the 
territory seized by thsm. This situation brooks of no delay". 
Parthasarathi of India also made the same demand when he said: (103) 
"The Council should, f i r s t , reinforce i t s c a l l for a ceasefire and 
immediately order withdrawal of a l l armedl forces to positions they 
occupied before the outbreak of host i l i t i es " . 
iOl* MEl Di^atch London, June 9 , 1967. 
Ul< Doc. S/PV. 1352T June 9 , 1967. 
103. Ibid, 
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Israel continued committing serious violations of the cease-
f ire directives issued by the Security Council. That Israel did not 
have any respect for the United Nations and i t s e f forts to maintain 
peace was shown by Moshe Dayan»s remark quoted by the USSR repre-
sentative in the Security Council. Fedorenko charged Dayan of having 
stated! (104) " I certainly cannot recall that any problem was ever 
settled by diplomacy or through the United ffations". 
Such was the Israeli contempt for the United Nations and i t s 
resolution that Israeli leaders poured (105) " f i re and brimstone on 
the UW. "The United Nations'* they said, "has become the paradigm 
of perfidy, the epitome of hypocrisy". The use of force was the only 
way for Israel to satiate i ts hunger for expansion, Israel was using 
force even after the ceasefire orders. Israel was bomb tog the Arab 
States in utter disregard of the UK resolutions. Israel had occupied 
the torn of Kuneitra and was pressing forward towards Damascus. The 
Secretary General read out a report from General Bull, the Chief of 
UKCSO. (106) "Most immediate Report received from Chairman of Israeli-
Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. Damascus at 0923 hours GMT Air 
attack on Damascus going on". The attack on Damascus was confirmed 
by another message from the chairman of ISMAC. The Secretary General 
readj (107) another message "confirming attack at 7.35 GMT in area -
repeat area - of Damascus airport. A second air attack south of 
Damascus at 8.65 GMT. And a further attack at 9:19 GMT north of 
Damascus". -
104 . UI. D o c . S/PV.1357T p p . 2 2 - 2 6 . 
106. Menuhin, Moshe, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time. 
Beirut, .1969. p. 572, 
106. m Doc, sypya354^ June 10, 1967. p. 36. 
107 . Ulv Doc. S /PV. 1355, pp. 3-5, 
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Fedorenko of the Soviet Union expressed his country's indi-
gnation and commentedi (l08) "The circle is complete. The perpetra-
tion of the crime is proved.,*." He asked the Security Council to 
adopt stern measures to deal with Israeli acts of violation and also 
be prepared to act according to the Charter to foj ce Israel to comply 
with the UH resolutions* 
The Security Council failed to adopt measures o f economic 
sanctions in order to compel Israel to comply with the ceasefire 
orders. On. June 12 another resolution was unanimously adopted which 
condemned (109) "any end a l l violations of the ceasefire". It also 
requested "the Secretai-y General to continue his investigations and 
to report to the Council as soon as possible". It affirmed "that i ts 
demand for a ceasefire and discontinuance of a l l militai-y activities 
includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent 
to the ceasefire. Calls for the proiapt return to tii© ceasefire posi-
tion of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 
GMT on 10 June 1967'. 
Apart from the violations of the United Hat ions ceasefire 
orders and occupation of Arab areas, another ma^or consequence of 
June War of 1967 was the aggravation of the Palestine refugee problem. 
Israel occupied large chunk of Arab territory: the Itfest Bank of the 
Jordan, the Sinai, the Gaza, the Golan Heights arid the Straits of 
Tiran. The Arabs living In these areas were forcibly expelled. Over (110) 
400,000 Palestinians were expelled by Israel or had fled under terror 
108. Ib id . , p. 6. 
109. Security Council Of f i c ia l Records (SCOE), 1357th Meeting, 
June 12, 1967, Kesolution Mo. 236. 
110. Cattan, Henry, op. c i t . , p. 119. 
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from the new occupied territories to the East Bank, so that Jordan 
had becotae a lar^e refugee cajnp. Israel treated the Arab population 
as war hostages and subjected them to torture and great sufferings. 
The Security Council ^opted a resolution on ^une 14, 1967, calling 
upon (111) "tte Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare 
and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military opera-
tions have taisen place at.d to facil itate the return of these inhabi-
tants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of host i l i t ies" . 
Israel appeared to be yielding to international protest against 
i t s policy of expulisiai. But it was merely a gesture. It announced 
to allow the return of refugees to the occupied West B^k in August 
and approved applSssations for the return of 170,749 Arabs. By 
August 31, 1967 deadline Israel fixed for i ts implementation, only 
14,027 refugees had actually returned. (112) Israel did not listen 
to the United IJations and disregai'ded the directives of the Security 
Council and flagrantly violated the Geneva Convention of 1949 on 
human rights. Israel 's treatment of the UK was a replica of Germany's 
treatment o f the League of mtions after the rise of Kazi regime, 
[ The Soviet 0nion wanted (113) the Security Council to condemn 
Israel for " i t s aggressive activit ies and continued occupation of part 
of the territory of the United Arab Kepublic, Syria and Jordan, and 
ask Israel to withdraw a l l i t s troops from those countries". The 
Soviet Union did not succeed in the Council so it turned to the General 
Assembijr and invoked Article 11 of the UK Charter which empowered the 
111. SCOri, 1361st Meeting, June 14, 1967, Resolution No. 237. 
The Arab Wor:^, vol . IX, Kos. 5-6, May-June 1968, p. 5. 
113. a/79Sl/Hev. 2 . 
9 r I i. 
Assembly to discass any questions relating to the maintenance of 
peace and security". I'he Soviet Union asi©d for special enjergency 
session of the General Assembly through a letter addressed to the 
Secretary Gewral from Andrei Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affaira 
of the USSR, The emergency session of the Assembly was being con-
vened C1.14;) to order to consider the piospocts of "liquidating the 
consequences of Israelis aggression against the Arab States and the 
immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice lines". 
United States of America opposed the Soviet move to 
convene special emergency session of the General Assembly* Goldberg 
saidj ( l i s ) "The United States Government does not believe that a 
situation has arisen in which the Security Council fa i l s to exercise 
i t s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Accordingly, the United States is not able to concur 
in the request for the holding of an Emergency Special Session at 
this time"» 
Despite tiie U.S. obejections the emergency session was hold on 
June 17, 1967. Israel was adamant and had made i t clear that i t 
would not withdraw its armed forces from the occupied areas. On 
June 18, 1967, it-ban of Israel stated: (116) "I f the General Assembly 
were to vote by 121 to 1 in favour of Israel returning to the Arm-
istice line tomorrow, Israel would refuse to comply with that decision. 
Ihis has been made clear to the ma^ or powers".. The General Assembly 
New York Times^ June 14, 1967, p. 1, 
116. Ib id . , June 16, 1967, p. 4 . 
The .Jerusalem |>ost, June IS, 1967. 
heard Alfixi Kosygin who demanded (117) the immediate withdrawal of 
Israeli forces to th© armistice lines and for " f a l l elimination of 
the ccffiseqaences of 'the aggression". He expressed the hope that the 
General Assembly wi l l talue an effective decision ensuring.,, the 
restoration and consolidation of peace and security in i>he Middle Bast". 
Woureddin Attassi President of Syria stated: (118) "We shall 
reject any conditions or discussions based on an invasion. We ask 
you to firmly condemn aggression and to immediately liquidate its 
traces" • 
Mahmoud Fawzi, Deputy Premier of the United Arab Republic 
dealt with the US Israeli collusion in launching attack against the 
Arab Btates. He drew (119) ithe attention of the General Assembly to 
"a great number of unoelievable atrocities'% Israel committed in 
the invaded and occupied territories. These atrocities included bomb-
ardment of hospitals, killing great number of c iv i l ians , using napaljn 
bombs, destroying a l l constructions and pro;]ects, 
Mahgoub, Prime Minister of Sudan argued that even conceding 
tiie provocation caused by the masslrig of Arab troops on its frontiers 
(120) "the action taken by Israel was not legitimate self-defence within 
the meaning of Article 61 of the Charter because no armed attack on 
its territory had in fact occured". He insisted on the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from the occupied territories. 
Jordan was represented by King Hussein who described Israel as 
A/PY. ifii^fi, p. 2 . 
118. Ib id . , p. 26. 
A/PV. 1 5 ^ , p. 36. 
120. 4/PV. p. 36. 
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"the aggressor". He told the world Assembly: (121) "sympathy for 
the past sufferings of the Jews should not mean accepting aggression. 
The Arabs wanted peace with justice, not peace by submission. The 
Hour of decision had come, and unless the Assembly acted speedily 
and ef fect ively , the plight of the reftigees would be doubled. There 
must be a clear recognition by the Assembly that one member state 
of the United Imtions had deliberately violated the territory of 
three member states". He said the duty of the UN "can be nothing 
else but the swift condemnation of the aggressor and the enforcing 
of the return of Israeli troops to the lines held before the attack 
of June 5* 
Sharifv^din Pirzada, Foreign Minister of Pakistan also spoke 
about Israeli aggression agaiust the Arab countries. He said (122) 
that tte Assembly should examine a l l outstanding issues in the Middle 
isiast. I f the UK Charter is properly applied then "the only course of 
action for us is to condemn the aggression launched by Israel on 
5 June atjd to demand the withdrawal of Israel forces from Arab terr i -
tories, including the Holy Places, to positions prior to host i l i t ies , , , 
The wrong done to the Arabs must be righted". 
M. C, Chagla, Indian Foreign Minister also supported the view 
that Israel must be made withdraw from a l l occupied territories . 
According to him (123) "the foundation of a lasting peace in the re-
gion could only be based on total , immediate, unconditional withdrawal 
121. PgOf A/PY, i m , p. XI. 
122. A/Py. 1531T p. 67. 
123. U2J Monthly ChronicIfiy vol, I? , Wo. 7 , July , 1967, p. 44. 
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of Israel from the areas now under i t s occupation". He aslsed the 
Assembly to request the Security Council to talce the necessary steps 
to ef fect the withdrawal of Israeli forces. 
From among the western bloc the most outstanding speech made 
was by Britain's Foreign Minister, George Brown who laid down the stipu-
lation that there should be no territorial acquisiticais for Israel as 
a result of the war. He saMj (124) "In my view, it follows from 
the words in the Charter that war shall not lead to terr itor ial aggran* 
dizement"« 
Goldberg of the United States of America presented before the 
Assembly a draft resolution embodying Johnson's Five Principles enun-
ciated in his speech of May 23, 1967. Goldberg opposed the Soviet 
Union's draft resolution which according to him in e f fec t was (125) 
"a prescription for jtenewed host i l i t i es " . He said "there were leg i -
timate grievances on a l l sides of the confl ict and a f u l l settlement 
should deal equitably with them and with outstanding questions from 
which ever side they were raised" . 
Maurice Cauve de Murville, Foreign Minister of France saidj (126) 
"The indispensable task was a solution in substance of the existing 
problems which were, apart from navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba, 
the situation of the Palestinian refugees and the conditions of v i c i -
nity of the States concerned". "Israel had occupied territories be-
longing to the United Arab republic, Jordan and Syria and no fa i t 
accompli on the spot regarding the territorial boundaries and the situ-
124. p. XI. 
125. Chm^cj-e, vol . IV, Uo. 7, July 1967, p. 38. 
126. Ib id . , pp. 45-46. 
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ation of the citizens of the States concerned could be considered as 
permanent" • 
Kban of Israel expressed his country's stubborn attitude over 
the question of withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied terr i -
tories. He said: (127) "The suggestion that everything go back to 
where it was before ^une 6 was totally unacceptable, Israel would 
reject the coipept of returning to the situation of belligerency out 
of which the cr is is arose". 
Th© absence of a ccxisensus was the hallmark of the emergency 
session of the General Assembly* It was apparent from the very begin-
ning that the positions of the Soviet Gfnion and the United States of 
Aiiierloa were as divergent as ever and the chasm between the two appeared 
to be unbridgeable. The Soviet Union was trying to mobilize support 
behind her demand for a total and unconditional wlthdrav;al of the Israeli 
forces from occupied Arab territories . 
The United States held the view that withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces should not be a pre-requlsite to any possible po l i t i ca l sett le -
ment of the conf l i c t . According to the USA the withdrawal of Israel 
army from occupied Arab territories should form an Integral and insepa-
rable link to the establishment of a lasting pease in the Middle East. 
The US position was in Icseping with Its policy of supporting Israel 
and i ts aggression against the Arab States. The two sides, i . e . the 
Soviet Union and the USA were trying to secure endorsement for their 
respective position; On July 4 , after a marathon speech making session, 
two draft resolutions were there before the General Assembly. One reso-
lution was submitted by Yugoslavia on June 28. It called for the Immediate 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied Arab territories . It urged 
127. Ib id . , p. 36. 
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" a l l states to render every assistance to the Secretary-General" (128) 
in helping him to impleflient i t . The Yugoslav draft resolution waB a 
resolution of non-aligned states which according to Lall vas (129) 
" less drastic than that of the Soviet Union and less sweeping than that 
of the United States". 
The second draft resolution was sponsored by the Latin American 
countries and presented before the General Assembly on June 30, 1967 by 
Dr Solomon of Trinidad and Tobago. The Latin American draft resolution 
also called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces but linked such a 
withdrawal with an end to a l l forms of belligerency between Israel and 
i ts Arab neighbours. It requested (130) "the Security Council to 
continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of 
urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence 
of. the United Nations". 
The Ai'ab States opposed the Latin American draft resolution for 
in i t the withdrawal of Israeli forces was conditional to peace nego-
tiations. Habib Bourguiba Jr. of Tunisia saidt (131) "The majority of 
nations represented here, and particularly by the four Great Powers, 
none of which has ever called into question the actual existence of 
Israel as a state, whereas In our eyes i t is the very existence of 
Israel which constitutes permanent aggression." It was made clear that 
direct negotiations with Israel were ruled out. 
According to the Syrian representative the Latin American draft 
resolution (132) "comes just to deepen our wounds and humiliation. The 
128. A/Ir» 2^2,» Bftr,, 
129. Lall , Arthur, op. c i t .^ P» 173. 
130. A/L. 623, New Yprk Times^ Ju2y 6, 1967. 
131. i^/PV. 1543y p. 32. 
132. A/PV. 1549. p. 97. 
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Tfco countries of Latin America.. .^ave confirmed that whlX© their 
hearts are on our side, their swords are brandished against us". 
Eban of Israel also spoice and he opposed the non-aligned draft 
resolution which according to him, (133) "requires Israel to act as 
though there were peace, while allowing the Arab states to act as 
though there were war"^ 
Both draft resolutions f e l l because none of i t could secure the 
required two-thirds vote. The vote on the Yugoslav draft resolution 
was 63 to 46 with 20 abstentions while that on the Latin Araericari draft 
was 57 to 43 with 20 abstentions. (134) 
The General Assembly found i tse l f seriously deadlocked. The 
positions of the OSa and the USSE were irreconciliable and no agree-
ment in the United Nations was in sight, Israel was awai'e o f the Big 
Powers' antagonism and i t utiliaed the cleavage to i t s f u l l advantage, 
Israel was effectively combining its military strategy with diplomacy. 
I t was steadily pursuing i t s pol ic ies without any consideration or 
regard of approval or disapproval by the international cotcmunity. 
Intemperate and bellicose utterances had become routine. On July 14, 
1967 Ben Gurion defended the Zionist policy of colonialism. He told 
the Jewi^ community rejpresentatives from the USA: (135) "We have to 
colonize Jerusalem and i t s outskirts and colonize and industrialize 
the Kegev." 
Israeli leaders were refusing to withdraw from occupied Arab 
territories on the ground of security and survival of Israel, Moshe 
Dayan stated (136) in August: "We must not allow other countries, acting 
133. 4ZELua54Z, pp. 28-30. 
134. ^w York Times^ July 5, 1967, p. 2. 
135. Dflllv Report, July 14, 1967. 
1-36V The P^st, f^ ugust l o , 1967, 
9 ' Q ^ c 
in tbsir own interest, to force us to the situation. . . . We need to 
consider the reality of 1967 and the 1967 map. We need not only 
permanent borders but frontiers that wil l ensure tranquillity". 
Ihe Israeli leaders made theii- intentions known even to the 
United iiations as they had fully grasped the realit ies of international 
po l i t i cs and i t s mechanism* Bban had the courage of defiance when 
be told the General Assembly session in September that the suggestion 
to withdraw troops to pre-5th June positions eouM not be accepted 
by Israeli (137) '*Our road does not lead backward to an armistice 
eroded by belligerency, destroyed by sovereignty. History summons 
us forward to a new spirit and structure of relations". Eban repeated 
Israeli arrogance and stubbornness in the Security Council which met 
to consider the Middle iiast situation in Kovember. The Israeli 
spoilsman spoke in a manner reminscent of the thirties when Hitler 
hurled defiance right and l e f t and even seemed to hold civi l ization 
and humanity cheap as compared to the re^ization of Nazi aims, Eban 
stated (138): '*It i s our firm resolve never, never to return to the 
danger and vulnerability from which we have emerged. This resolve 
must prevail over ©very other consideration. To avoid a return to 
any of the conditions which prevailed on 4 June is a supreme national 
purpose worthy of any e f fort and any consequence". 
After a long spell of consultation, negotiations, differences 
were sought to be ironed out between the USA and the USSR, . King 
Hussein*s v i s i t to the USA was instrumental in taking much wind out of 
Israel 's propaganda sai ls . The USA understood the Arab position better 
than ever before and tried to win over the Arab States by showing some 
137. A/PV. 1566J September 25, 1967, 
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Signs of helping them in meetirig their demand about t he withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from Arai) territories. 
Lord Caradon, the British representative siibmitted to the 
Council a resolution which was unanimously adopted on Hovember 22, 
1967# The resolution of ifovember 22 was the most important direc-
tive of the Security Council. It emphasized (139) "the inadmissibility 
of ttm acquisition of territory by war" and further affirmed that the 
lasting peace in the Middle East included the application o f both the 
following principless 
« 
1, "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conf l i c t " } 
2, "termination of a i l claims or states of belligerency 
aiid respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty; 
territorial integrity and pol i t i ca l independence of 
every state in the area and theix right to live in 
peace within secure and recognized boundaries from 
threats or acts of force" , 
3, "affirms further the necessity? 
(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through 
international waterways in the area; 
(b) for achieving a ;5ust settlement of the refugee 
problem. • 
The resolution of November 22, 196? made the most important contribu-
tion when it requested the Secretary General "to designate a special 
139. SAies/242, DM Monthly ChrQnlG3,e^ vol , I ? , Mo, 11. December, 
1967. pp. 8-19. 
The Security Council had adopted a resolution (S/2322) 
on September 1, 1961, calling upon Egypt to terminate the 
restrictions on the passage of international commercial ship* 
ping and goods through the Suez Canal. The UAti continued its 
policy of blockade of Israeli shipping. President Kasser had 
c lar i f ies the OAu position, in a Press interview on October 8, 
1959 that the resolutions conccrning Palestine are indivisible 
entity - the right of the refugees to return to their homeland, 
their right to their properties or compensation for their pro-
perties, and their right to the Palestine territory canjrot 
be divided. . . the only starting point would be to Implement al l 
the 0li resolutions. Uh resolutions cannot be imposed on us 
alone whiifi Israel is allowed to ipiore them. A1 Ahram, October 9 , 
1969. 
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representative to proceed to the Middlfi East to establish and maintain 
contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and 
assist e f forts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in 
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution." 
fhe Secretary-General was swift and quick on November 23, he 
had designated Gunnac Jarring of Sweden as his special representative 
in accordance with para 3 of the Security Council Be solution of 
Kovember 22, 1967. liie appointment of Gunnar iiarring as the UK media-
tor to conduct negotiations with Israel and the Arab States was wel-
comed in the Arab world but Israel could not conceal its unhapplness. 
The appointment of Gunnar Jarring was a negation of the Israeli policy 
of direct negotiations with the Arab States. Israel»s interpretation 
of i^ ovember 22 Resolution was totally unacceptable to the members of 
the United Nations and subsequently questioned by them. Eban while 
commenting on the resolution said (140): 
"The policy of the Israeli Government and nation remains 
as i t was when I formulated it on 13 arid 16 Hovember, namely, 
that we respect and fully maintain the situation embodied 
in the cease-fire agreement until it i s succeeded by peace 
t reat ies . . . Those are our aims and positions. They emerge 
from five months of international discussions unchanged, 
unprejudiced and intact. I t is now understood as of a last-
ing peace establishing recognized and secure boundaries." 
Eban's interpretation had meant that i t was only with the est -
ablishment of a permanent peace and secure, recognized boundaries that 
other principles could bo implemented. Israel did not comply with 
the resolution of November 22, 1967. The Arab countries had agreed to 
implement the rtsolution and as an indication of their willingness 
Mahmud aiad, Foreign Minister of the UAU mad© the following declara-
140. S/py 1382y November 22, 1967, pp. 46-47. 
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tlon on May 11| 3.968 (141)i 
"We have already emphasized our acceptance of the 
Security Council resolution which includes the freedom 
of passage through the Suez Canal. In return to this 
Israel has to carry out i ts responsibilities and obliga-
tions which Include the withdrawal of forces frota the 
Arab territories it occt^ies, and the settlement of the 
problem of the refugees. I f Israel carries out i t s 
obligations we wi l l carry out ours also, thus making for 
a more stable peace in the Middle Kast.area", 
Israel insisted on concluding peace treaties with the Arab 
States on the basis of direct negotiations. The Arab States rejected 
Israeli-claim because the Security Council resolution of November 22, 
1967 did not mention direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab 
States. The Secretary General of the United Mations fully vindicated 
the Arab position when he declared at a Press Conference (142): 
"The most comprehensive and, in my view, the most impor-
tant resolution adopted by the Security Council regarding 
the situation in the Middle East is the one adopted on 
Moveatoer 22, 1967. I do not think there was any mention 
of direct talks in that resolution," 
But there was mention of the Secretary General*s Eepresent-
ative promoting agreement between the parties directly involved. 
Israel flagrantly violated the Security Council resolution 
of i^ ovember 22, 1967 by not withdrawing from occupied Arab terr i -
tories and by undertaking periodical raids of Arab areas. The Se-
curity Council on April 1, 1969 adopted (143) a resolution condemning 
Israel for " i ts premeditated air attacks on Jordanian villages and 
populated areas in flagrant violation of the Charter and the cease-
141. AReRce Ff.ffacf fpegse, May 11, 1968. 
142. U^ -, , vol . VI, fJo. 6, October 1969. 
143. .2Q5 (1^69) , UH Mpntt^ y^ Cl7rQn^c?,e, vol . VI, I^ o. 5, 
May 1969, p. 12. 
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f i re resolutions". 
Iare»l was not in the habit of listening to noble words of 
caution and restraint. It did not refrain from indulging in nefa-
rious activities to destroy human l i fe and property of the Arabs. 
On August 12, 1969 the representative of Lebanon addressed a letter 
to the Security Council President req^uestioning an urgent meeting to 
consider (144) "the situation endangering the peace and security of 
Lebanon" as a result of Israeli raids on civi l ian population and 
villages in southern Lebanon. 
The Security Council met and unanimoisly adopted a resolution 
on August 26, 1967 condemning the premeditated air attack by Israel 
on villages In Southern Lebanon and deploring a l l violent incidents 
in violation of ceasefire, The Council also deplored (146) the ex-
tension of the area of fighting and declared that "such actions of 
military reprisals and other grave violations of the ceasefire could 
not be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider 
further and more effective steps as envisaged in t^ he Charter to ensure 
against repetition of such acts". 
Thi6 Security Council and i ts resolutions f e l l on deaf ears 
and Isrsel continued its occupation of Arab territories, made no move 
to solve the refugee problem as envisaged under f^ ovember 22 resolu-
tion. On ttie other hand it adhered to its policy of annexation to 
strengthen i t s hold over occupied Arab areas. The State Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Tanzania told the United Lations (146)s "In spite 
of the UH resolutions of November 1967, Isr£,el has not only maintained 
144. UM Monthly Chronicle ^ vol . VI, No. 8 , August-September 1969, p.69. 
146. Ib id . , Resolution 270, August-September 1969, p. 69. 
146. Ib id . , vol , VI, No. 9 , Octobe. 1969, p. 1S7. 
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its occupation of Arab areas, bat has also acted to strengthen i t s 
hoM on them." 
The Secretary of Hate for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia was 
also of tb© opinion that Israel 's intransigence had spoiled a l l chances 
of peaceful settlements of the Mi<5i<i3js ^astern problem. He said; "Israel 
to this date has not accepted the Security Council resolution o f 1967, 
has not ceased to insist upon the annexation of occupied Arab terr i -
tories and maintain a ruthless attitude towards the Palestinian popu-
lation." 
To this day Israel has not accepted or shown willingness to 
comply with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. 
The Arab States had made i t abundantly clear that they were 
willing to maintain peace in the Middle East but direct negotiations 
could never becoaie a condition for a peaceful settlement. The Arab 
States he^ reacted direct negotiation because the party primarily 
responsible for discussing the fate of that area is the people of 
Palestine whom Israel refuses to recognise. No Arab state has a right 
to dispose o f a portion of Palestinian territory. I t i s up to the 
Palestinians to decide what they agree and what they do not agree to, 
by way of ultimate disposition of their land. 
The second most important implication of Israeli insistence on 
direct negotiation is to leave out the United l^ations. The United 
^ations has been, from the very beginning, a party in Palestine confl ict 
and any move to resolve this conf l ict without the United Nations seems 
to be unconceivable as far as the Arabs are concerned. 
The war* unleashed by Israsl on June 6, 1967 was the most 
important link in the chain of Israeli policy of aggression, i t has 
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resulted in the aggravation of tbe po l i t i ca l , human and economic issues 
that existed before the conf l ict . 
The war had cost the Arabs about 20,000 soldiers but the most 
signilicant aspect of the human situation is the refi;^ee problom. 
The Government of Jordan has estimated that about 410,248 persons were 
displaced itom the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To the number of 
Palestine refugees who were displaced from the West Bank and the QaZB 
Strip, one must add 16,000 Palestinians registered with TJIMVU as re -
fugees of the 1948 conflict and 3,000 to 4,000 Palestinian youngmen, 
also previously registered with the UHRViA, who were expelled by Israel 
from thD Gaza Strip to Egypt, (147) 
The total number of registered Palestine refugees with UI©WA 
according to the report of September 15, 1967 was (148) "to be 70 per 
cent of the total number of refugees and displaced persons". In another 
(149) 
report dated June 3o, 1968, UMiMA's figure of refugees was 1,364,298, 
The condition in which Palestine refugees have been forced to 
live is fai' more important than the number' of the r e : ^ e e s , 
Israel on several occasions had bombarded the dwellings of 
Palestine refugees. On November 2o, 1967, the refugees camp at Itaramch 
was heavily fired by Israeli artillery which caused enormous loss of 
human l i f e including children. (160) On February 15, 1968, twenty 
villages and i«fUgee camps across the Jordan Eiver became victims of 
the most cruel attack by Israel, This attack took a t o l l of more than 
147. UU Doc, A/6713T September 15, 1967, para 40, 
148. UM Doc, A/CT7, p. 66. 
149. UK poc, a/7213, p. 18. 
150. OK Doc. A/e956. 
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one hundred human lives and forced some 70,000 people to move deeper 
in the h i l l s to search security of l i f e . On March 21, 1968 a huge 
and well equipped Israeli foice attacked Karameh destroying several 
hundred houses and abducted more than one hundred and f i f t y Arab 
Commandoes, 
The Security Council adopted a resolution on March 24, 1968 
condemning Israel for i t s brutal attack (151) " in flagrant violation 
of the United Nations Charter and the ceasefire resolutions"» The 
Commissioner General of OMIWA reported to the Security Council about 
the demolition of refugees shelters in Jabaliya and Kafah in Gaza 
Strip. (162) 
The Security Council Resolution of June 14, 1967 requested 
(153} that "essential and inalienable human r i ^ t s should be respected 
even during the vissitudes of war". The resolution also asked that 
" a l l the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War, of 12 August 1949 should be complied with". It 
also called upon Israeli Government "to ensure the safety, welfare and 
security of the inhabitants of the areas where militaiy operations 
have taken place and to faci l i tate the return of those inhabitants 
who have fled the areas since the outbreak o f hos t i l i t i es " . 
Israel , however, went ahead with its policy of repression, 
destruction and terror in violation of the Security Council resolu-
tion of June 14, 1967, The occupation of Arab territories during 1967 
war put the inhabitants of Gaza, Sinai, ^eat Bank and the Golan Heights 
under Israeli administration. The situation in the occupied territories 
151. SCOR, S/K0S/248, March 24, 1968, 
152. UK Doc^ A/6723/Add 1, July 4, 1967, 
153. SCOa, ho. 23/, June 14, 1967. 
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was shocking and paled even the atrocities conunltted by Hitler. A 
team of correspondents visited the occupied areas and wrote about the 
shocking scenes they saw and heard about the torture meted out to the 
Arabs. They wrote; (154) 
"We saw 22 years oM corporal Souilen Abdel Hasoul Gadak, 
who had been in a tank near Kafat, in the Gaza Strip, He 
had lost his le f t ax-m and been hit by nine bullets. He 
had been held for 72 hours and had been hung upside down 
by his feet. When he asked for a drink they shot at him. 
A bottle of water," 
The United Nations, through many resolutions, recommended to Israel 
strict compliance with civi l ized code of behaviour and requested Israel 
to respect the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of the 
prisoners of war and the protection of c ivi l ians, in times of war, 
Israel 's answer to the United fiat ions and to its ca l ls for 
c ivi l ized behaviour in keeping with the letter and sp ir i t of interna-
tic«aal law was its policy of psychological warfare against the Arab 
inhabitants of the occupied areas. E, G, Hodgkin visited Gaza and the 
West Bank and witnessed Israeli policy of repression in action. Writ-
ing about Israeli occupation Hodgkin wrote (165): "It is not to be 
pected that such an occupation wi l l be populax-; but what surprised rae 
was the intensity with which ti» Israelis are hated everywhere by a l l 
sections of the populations, The mood is perhaps similar to that In 
occupied France at the begiiiEsing of 1942, Repression is severe, and 
acts of resistance are multiplying." The British journalist saw the 
destruction of houses (156) "7140 Arab houses have been blown up. This 
includes entii'e villages which have been destroyed, innocent or guilty, 
154. the TlH^ eSy June 19, 1967. 
155. Ib id , , October 28, 1969, 
156. Ibid. 
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tenant or visitor or owner, the explosives go in". The Arabs were 
forcibly deported from occupied territories. Most of tfc© people de-
ported (157) "were prominent In West Bank l i f e - the former Mayor of 
Jerttsalem and the present Mayox' of ^amallah: fudges, lawyers, doctors, 
teachers and so on"« The Arab inhabitants were treated as f i f th column-
ists and put behind bars without giving them a fair t r ia l or a chance 
to defend themselves. The prisoners were also treated with brutality. 
An American newspaper wrote (158): "Beatings to extract information 
from prisoners are routine". The Econoiqj.st observed (159)s "The 
allegations of brutality to prisoi^rs un^er interrogation appear to be 
substantiated by such evidence m is obtainable by a visiting foreign 
journalist. lour correspondent has spoken to three people who claim 
to have been badly beaten or tortured with e lectr ical devices, and he 
is satisfied that the f i r s t hand account or their experiences lends 
weight to evidence obtained from other soiarces". 
Th© Arab population of occupied territories was condemned 
to constant mental and physical torture by Israeli authorities. This 
policy was aimed at terrifying the people compelling them to leave. 
The well-kr.own writer Malcolm Muggerigge witnessed a horrifying scene 
in Jerusalem about which he wrote in the Observer (160)s "I was quite 
abnormally horrified to see in Jerusalem two Ar.abs, one of them a 
youth, being arrested, beaten up and then with black bags over their 
heads, driven away at top speed in a 3eep, i wanted to rush after them 
167. Ibid. 
Christian Solence Monitor^ April 8, 1968. 
159. The feiconom^sty March 21, 1970. 
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shouting Impotently, •*It«s like Berlin. You should not be doing this." 
Ibe lig. tjjonde also wrote about Israeli torture which did not 
discriminate among the Arabs even on the basis of age. "A 75 year 
old Arab fipom the Gaza Strip was sentenced to l i f e imprisonment by 
an Israeli Military Court", (161) To force them out of their houses, 
many Kazi-lilse tactics were resorted to . Their houses were blown 
up and their villages were bulldozed* Many refugees living in Jordan 
and elsewhere were those who "have left because tl^ir houses were 
blown up or knocked down. Kot only has much of (^alqilya been bul l -
dozed} about 10 other villages have suffered the same fate. In 
Jerusalem we saw the rubble of Arab houses which have been demolished 
to make a large piazza and a car park in front of the Mailing Wall." (162 
It was in violation of Article 33 of the Geneva Convention which said 
"Heprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited." 
The L*Orient wrote about the destruction of Arab property by 
Israel. "On December 8 , 1967, 100 houses, two mosques and a school 
in the Jericho were destroyed by the Israeli Army". (163) 
The United States of America warned Israel against its policy 
of destroying Arab houses, aobert Mccloskey strongly CQndemned Israel 
which implied (164) that "the Israeli Army violated an international 
agreement by dynamiting horns of suspected Arab terrorists in Jerusalem." 
The Israeli statesmen disregarded American objection and per-
161. Le Monde, February 3, 1968. 
162. Joint Statement by Ian Gilmour and Dennis Walters, 
yjie Tineg, July 27, 1967. 
163. L'Orient, December 9 , 1967. 
164. y^e Tyj^ fettpe , March 9 , 1968. 
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sisted in their act iv i t ies . They indicated that "there would be no 
change in their policy of demolishing the homes of suspected Arab 
ter r or is t s" . (165) 
In the Latrun area the villages of yalu,Emmuas, Beit Nouba and 
Beit Sir were "systeinatically and completely destroyed by the Israelis 
19 days after the ceasefire" , (166) In the Hebron area two villages 
Beit Awa and Beit Mersim were also bulldozed^ The Secretary General's 
Special Eepresentative Gusslng submitted a report to the Security 
Council where he stated that in Belt Awa and Belt Mersim more than 90 
per cent Arab houses were completely destroyed. "The Israeli troops 
demolished the houses with dynamite and bulldozers. Groves around the 
village were burnt", (167) The destruction of Arab houses was con-
demned by the tJaited Nations Commission on Human Eights on March 8, 
1968. It asked Israel "to desist forthwith from acts of destroying 
homes of the Arab c iv i l ians" . On May 7» 1968, the United Ivatlons Con-
ference on Human Bights heM at Tehran renewed the ca l l upon Israel 
to desist from destroying the Arab houses and to respect and implsment 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights m& the Geneva Conventions 
of 1949. (168) 
The Israeli administration resorted to the policy of collective 
punishment which was a contemporary version of Kazl policy of "Peace 
Keeping Operations" in occupied Europe. Article 33 of the 4th Geneva 
Convention stated: "Collective penalties are prohibited." Israel dis-
165. Ib id . , March 12, 1968. 
166. The liflpsy September 13, 1967. 
167. m QQ^ f A/W7, , pp. 17-18, September 15, 1967. 
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regarded this provision. The civilian population was treated harshly 
and their movements were terribly restricted by imposing curfews * 
Michael Adams wrote about the curfew (169): 
"When 1 l e f t Gaza this mornicg three refugee camps 
housing 100,000 Palestine refugees were under day and 
night curfew and there was sporadic shooting in the 
streets of Gaza City which served no apparent purpose 
beyond the intimidation of the civi l ian population.,, , 
lio distribution of food was allowed; not taany managed to 
get water/' 
Observer also wrote (170)s "Curfews in refugee caxaps are 
often accompanied by the rounding up of a l l maJe inhabitants between 
the ages of 16 and 60 and compelling the® to spend hours in some cases 
up to three days in open compounds." 
The hospitals also were made target of destruction by Israeli 
army. "The worst hit building in the whole of Jerusalem", wrote (171) 
The Economist^ " i s the Augusta Victoria hospital on a h i l l next to 
the Mount of Olives, . . One whole wing was destroyed and with i t re -
search work of a llffe time". The itXJS^ u verified i t by saying that (172) 
"four Israeli jets dropped Wapalm canisters on the Augusta Victoria 
(hospital) in Jerusalem." 
The Israelis also resorted to shooting at groups of people. 
The Arab demonstrations were wantonly fired at. In May 1968 "Five 
(1 
g i r l pupils of a secondary school in the Qaza Strip were shot and wounded 
The Arab educational institutions were also subjected to Israeli 
The Guardianf .January 26, 1968. 
170, The Observar^ January 28, 1968, 
171, The Economist, July 1, 1967. 
172, Life Magazine^ July 3, 1967. 
173, The Tlqies, May 27, 1968, 
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scheme of depriving them of tbeir Arab character, The occupation 
authorities confiscated a l l the books proscribed in the schools. 
By September 27, 1967, 79 of 134 Jordanian textboolcs were cut. 
One hundred of the 139 books found in t^gyptim desks and two-thirds 
of those taken from Syria were expurgated. Books of literature, geo-
graphy, le l igion, Arabic language and even of mathematics wore 
changed. (174) The Executive Board of the UlffiSCO passed a resolution 
expressing regret that the textbooks approved by the Director General 
o f 0M.SCO were not used in the schools operated by the UfiKVIA for 
Palestine refugees in the Z^ ear East. It called upon the Government of 
Israel to remove immediately any obstacle to the Import and use of 
the books, C175) 
Racial discrimination is instinctive in Israel , it i s even 
taught to children at school. An Israeli newspaper wrote (176)s '^ The 
contempt in which the white Jews in Israel hold their black brethren 
i s unequalled anywhere else in the world. This is due to the instln-
ct ive , deeply rooted chauvinism which is common among European Jews." 
Israel discriminated against the Arabs reducing them to the 
status of second class citizens. What is l e f t of human rights which 
Israel has not entirely destroyed with regard to i ts Arab cit izens. 
Aggression, violence, oppression and underhand dealings are a l l that 
the Arab inhabitants can expect from the Israeli authorities. The 
Third Committee of Social, Humanitarian and Culture approved a draft 
resolution on November 2 , 1969, concerning Israeli practices towards 
174. The ;)erusalBm Post^ August 3o, 1967. 
175. Pj^  Monthly Chronicle, vol . VI, Ho, 10, K-ovember 1969, p. 181. 
176. Maarev^ Ito. 5507, September 18, 1962, 
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the c ivi l ian population in territories occupied by Israel . The draft 
resolution (177) "callsd upon the Government of Israel to desist 
forthwith from i ts reported repressive policies and practices towards 
ttaB civi l ian population in the occupied Arab territories," 
The special working group was appointed by the United Nations 
to investifc,ate into the violations of the Geneva Convention committed 
by Israel, The group confirmed that there were violations of the 
convention which the occupying power had committed. The group reco-
mmended that Israel should cease al l i ts oppressive policies and 
comply with the Geneva Conventions on Human Rights. The group also 
recommended that the "occupying power should refrain from demolishing 
houses for reasons not provided for in the 1949 Convention and grant 
adequate compensation in a l l cases of demolition in violation of the 
Convent ion» (178) 
These and other United Lations recommendations and directives 
could not secure Israeli compliance and remain mere palliatives in 
the absence of an effective international enforcing machinery, 
ive percuss ions - Economic 
The most significant and severe impact of June 1967 war was 
registered in the economic sphere. The loss of the West Bank includ-
ing Jerusalem and the closure of the Suez Canal depriving Egypt of 
i ts enormous revenues dealt scattering blows to the economics of Jordan 
and the UAH. One of the most important motivating factors behind 
Israeli aggression against the Arab States has been, as indicated abo^e, 
to cripple Arab economy and arrest i t s forward march. The June War of 
177. UN Monthly Chronicle ^ vol . ? I , ho, 11, December 1969, p. 93. 
178. Ib id . , vo l . VII, No. 3 , March 1970, pp. 23-24. 
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1967 lasted only six days but In terms of i ts economic losses it 
proved to be more shattering and devastatirig than the loo years war 
between England and France, Jordan was the country which suffered 
the heaviest economic losses, Jordan had lost the entire West Bank; 
ana consequently one-third o f i t s national product. In terms of pro-
duction the West Bank produces over 65^ of tte olives and about 30^ 
of the cereals, (179) 
In the industrial sector there were in the West Bank over 3,700 
industrial establishments or about of the total number of indus-
tr ia l establishments in Jordan employing about 14,000 persons or 37^ 
of the total industrial employment, (180) 
Jordan*s total foreign exchange earnings in 1966 were roughly 
^200 million, Jordan*s loss in this sphere because of Israeli occu-
pation of the West Bank would be ^80 million but i t constitutes the 
main bulk of Jordan's foreign exchange other than grants and aid from 
foreign countries. The loss of the West Bank brought soiae indirect 
e f f e c ts on i t s economy. The size of Jordan's consumer market is r e -
duced with i t s consequent e f fects on creating excess capacity for the 
industries and services of the East Bank which would have to look for 
either new export opportunities or partially close down, Jordan's 
economy used to get a substantial amount of revenues from tourist 
trade. With the loss of Jerusalem,Jordan lost the greatest attraction 
of the tourists and the biggest source of revenues and foreign exchange. 
One very significant indirect consequence of the June war was 
a substantial induction in the flow of foreign investments in Jordan's 
179. Dajani, K. I . , The Israeli Aggression - Economic Aspect. 
Amman, 1967, p. 2, 
180, Ib id , , p, 3, 
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economic deveXopn^nt progratame. The lack of genuline po l i t i ca l sta-
b i l i ty has aggravated the problem in the sphere of foreign private 
investment. One more Important economic consequence of the Six-Day 
War is a radical shuffling of national economic pr ior i t ies . The 
perpetual Israeli aggression creates a situation of insecurity and i t 
subsequently spells a shi f t from development to military budget* 
As far as economic structure of the country i s concerned, 
Jordan finds i tse l f in a very bad situation. With the influx of 
PalBStin© refugees Jordan's population has swelled and the problems 
o f housing, food and clothing hiwe got aggravated, A substantial in-
crease in population couplea with a ma o^r reduction in i t s sources of 
revenues made the survival of Jordan as a viable po l i t i ca l and geo-
graphical entity extremely d i f f i c u l t , Tte Development Board of Jordan 
is engaged in preparing development projects provide ^ob opportunities 
for skilled and unskilled labour. There are various other schemes at 
haM aiming at bettering irrigation and agricultural prospects in 
Jordan. 
The UAii sui'feied enormously and the rate of i ts economic pro-
gress slowea down because of the Six Day War. As a result of Israeli 
aggression, navigation in the Suez Canal had come to a standstil l because 
the Canal is closed to t r a f f i c . This has produced grave consequences 
affecting the interest of a large number of countries apart from the 
UAn. The Canal is the most important link between the ^ast and the 
West. The goods passing through the Canal in 1966 represented 145^  of 
world trad© and i t was a matter of grave concern that the movement of 
o i l from i t s Source to consumer market was affected. 
The closure of the Suez Canal has resulted in increasing the 
shipping costs and insurance rates because th© Cape route is longer. 
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The distance between the Arab Gulf ports and the United States has 
thus increased by 40%. The UAK has lost an annual revenue In foreign 
exchange of more than £loo million representing about ^ of Its gross 
national income. Thousands of workers engaged in the Canal and others 
who depended for their income on the Canal were rendered unemployed, 
'ihere are other countries which have suffered because of the closure 
of th5 Suez'Canal. Among these are the Arab countries, India, the 
People's republic of China, Pakistan, Western Kurope aM other countries, 
India suffered a great loss as a result of the closure of the 
Suez Canal. According to <«ie estimate the increase in cost of freight 
from Europe and the 0SA was about-40^. However, India has been able 
to compensate some of i t s losses by increasing Its exports of steel 
and engineering commodities to the Middle East and the Far East, 
Australia and Hew Zealand. 
The People's ^tepublic of China too suffered sorne losses and 
delay in importing phosphates from Morocco* Pakistan was also a 
sufferer because its wheat requiren^nts were always coming through the 
Suez Canal. Addltioiial financial l i ab i l i t i es shouldered by European 
countries importing o i l as a result of higher freight costs between 
i^une and December 1967 were estimated at about £462 million. The total 
losses suffered by West European countries until 1968 were estimated 
at £583 million, (181) Consequently due to the closure of the Suez 
Canal, Western Europe increased its volume of trade exchange with the 
United States and came under ttie American influence, The Fi-ench paper 
Tribune des Nations wrote ( l i 2 ) : "For the f i r s t time in history, the 
181. For fu l l details see the UAxt delegation's report on the effects 
of the closure of the Suez Canal on the economy of a large 
number of countries to the International Conference of Parlia-
mentarians on the Middle i^ast Crisis held in Cairo, February 2-5, 
W O , The War of June 1967^ Cairo, 1970. pp. 58-73, 
182. Tribune des Katlons^ October 6, 1967. 
United States, together with Israel have imprisoned Western ifiurope 
in the Mediterranean Sea, barring its road to the Far East and cutting 
i ts communication with the West Indies and the Indian Ocean. Europe's 
future is threatened in Sue^, the meeting point of the Moditerraman 
Kurop© and the Afro-Asian world j irileed, a vital point since it consti-
tutes the heart of modern industry and civil ization." 
The closure of the Suez Canal has led to the re-routing of 
international tr^ d^e which becasQe a sou3?ce of great benefit to the 
United States of America since the closure has won her new markets for 
her o i l products and foodstuffs. Befoi-e the closure of the Canal, 20% 
of Europe's o i l passed through the Canal. After it£ closure the short-
age in Kurope was covered by o i l imports from the USA. 
South Africa was the happiest country and benefited .iiost out 
of the cr is is created the closure of the Suez Canal. The ships 
started calling at South African ports and an increase in revenues from 
transit fees, bunkering, ship repairs was registered. During 1966 and 
1967 the total number of ships which called on South African ports 
did not exceed 7,370 but by 1969 the number had shot up to 14,000. 
Israel also benefited froai the closure and it developed i ts i^llat port 
in order to laaintain i ts trade with East Africa and Bar East. The 
United States and Israel developed a vested interest in seeing the 
Canal closed, Julian Asnsry, member of the British Conservative Party 
once said: (183) "All considerations taton, the interests of the free 
world are better served by ^eping the Canal closed." Israel prevented 
^gypt from reopening the Suez Canal in 1968. 
183, The UAh delegation's report to the International Conference of 
Parliamentarians on the Middle East Crisis, The '^ ar of June 1967> 
sa« Sit . f p. 71. 
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fbe Egyptian tourist trade also suffered a serious setback, 
the loss of military equipment costing enormous money to the UAB, 
destruction of Important factories put Egyptian economy in dire straits 
but a total breakdown was prevented. 
An Arab Sumtait Conference was held at Khartoum from August 29 
to September 1« The Conference decided on measures to replenish the 
tottering economies of Jordan and the UAR. Kuwait, Saudi Arabi^, and 
Libya decided to make an annual c®tribution of £55 million, £60 
million, and £30 million, respectively to help the war torn economies 
of the tJAE, Jordan and Syria. The Conference also decided to "face any 
possible economic pressui'e from outside," (184) 
Repercussions > Pol it ical 
The most immediate and significant pol i t ical development after 
the June War was that public opinion in the Arab capitals had plunged 
from the height of elation, of absolute confidence in victory Into the 
depths of despair, the Internal pol i t ical cr is is in the UAH seemed 
far more d i f f i cu l t . The June wac of 1967 also gave rise to two mili-
tary and pol i t ical developments. 
The most significant is the rea^n-gence of a new military-cum-
pol it ical factor, namely, the Palestlnian Hesistance Movement which had 
always been In existence since the inception of Israel but now became 
more active and more popular-based. The Palestine Resistance Movement 
is a movement for the liberation of homeland* 
The Palestine refugees wanted Justice and when the United l<ations 
1S4. The Timesy September 2, 1967. 
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failed to give them justice they realized that what they had lost by 
force could be regained only by force. "After seventeen years of 
of patient waiting" (185) said a spokesman of the Palestine Arabs in 
the Unitea fvstions Special Pol it ical Committee, "they had lost a l l 
faith in tixa United Kations". !Jhe establishment of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in 1963 was a milestone in the Arab struggle 
to liberate Palestine and i t "had reawakened their hopes and afforded 
them an opportunity to renew the struggle for their home land" • The 
Palestine Liberation Organization i s not the only organization, there 
are other organizations like the »A1 Fateh' committed to the l ibera-
tion of Palestine and establishment of a secular democratic state in 
Palestine, The Intensification of revolutionary movement institu-
tionalijsed by the A1 Fateh posed a grave threat to Israel 's survival 
as a religlo-cuffl-racial state, Israel has started a campaign of 
v i l l i f i ca t i on against freedom fighters by calling them as "terrorists 
and saboteurs". The Palestine Besistance Movement is not an isolated 
phenomenon, i t is a part of world wide revolutionary movements for 
liberation as, for instance, in Viet Jfam, The Palestine freedom 
fighters realized that "Imperialism can only be fel led by a mature 
and armed population and that the only way to confront the imperialist 
war machinery is through popular war - through the transformation of 
the people into a revolutionary reserve armed with po l i t i ca l awareness 
and through the use of the strategy of long-term war to overcome im-
perialist technological superiority and. i ts blitzkrieg strategy", (186) 
The Palestine Liberation Movement i s not a sectarian movement 
185. U« Provisional Summary Htcord of Special Pol it ical Committee, 
»0. A/SPC/av. 437, October 26, 1965, pp. 3-4 . 
186. g'ateh f January 19, 1970, p. 3. 
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which was meant for a particuiar coiamunity professing a particular 
religious be l ie f . I t is a secular, broad based demOGratic movement 
and its objective of "the liberation of Palestine" ultimately means 
the liberation of the needy, tolling Jews oppressed by Zionism to co -
exist with other peoples of the world and within Palestine without 
any discrimination"* (187) 
Israelis entire existence seems to be in jeopardy at the hands 
of Palestine liberators and Israel has adopted a policy of repression 
against these fighters and i t also launches raids on the Arab States 
to wipe o f f the bases of the Arab commandos. 
ilordan and Lebanon have been victims of Israeli raids to int i -
midate these Arab States, On November 20, 1967 the refugee camp at 
Karameh was attaclsed causing huge loss of human l ives . Israel under-
took many raids to crush Palestinian resistance and punish the Arab 
States for supporting them. In 1968 Israel turned its wrath upon 
Lebanon when Beirut Airport was attacked and thirteen planes belonging 
to the Arab States were destroyed, 'ihe Israeli representative in 
the Security Council tried to Justify the attack as a reprisal against 
the attack mad© two days earlier by two Commandos on the Israeli Airline 
at Athens. Such an argument is totally untenable under the accepted 
principles of international law. The Arab States cannot be held res-
ponsible and accountable for the acts of Palestinian Freedom Fighters 
whom Israel has forcibly thrown out of their horneland. The President 
of Lebanon was forthright and outspoken when he said (188) "That Israel, 
187. Ibid. 
188. The Daily flews (Kuwait) May l o , 1970. 
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not Lebanon, ie responsible for the presence of Palestinians in I^ebanon, 
responsible for their plight and that Palestinians have got every 
right to fight for the recovery of the motherland," 
The Israeli raids eould not fee justif ied under any canon of law 
and morality. Its attack against Lebanon was motivated by i t s desire 
and ^heme of advaceing up to more defensibSa frontier of the Litani 
river in Lebancn. 
The Security Council condemned Israel on December 31, 1968 (189) 
" for i t s premeditated military action in violation of its obligations 
under the Charter and the ceasefire resolutions", The Council took 
very strong note of the Israeli attack on the Beirut air port and 
warned Isrtjel that " i f such acts were to be repeated, the Council would 
have to consider further steps to give ef fect to i t s decisions"* Th© 
resolution considers that "Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress 
for the destruction i t -suffered, responsibility for which has been 
acknowi&dgcd by Israel," Israel followed the policy of thots and eyes 
for one eye, retaliation against a l l the Arab States, Israelis emphasis 
on peace, negotiated settlement and its theory of retaliation remain 
irreconcilable. One Isreeli Minister has been quoted as saying (190)! 
"1 have never heard of peace by retaliation," 
Israel has tried, through its theory o f retaliation, to cloud 
the real issue. The acts of the Palestine Freedom Fighters are 
secondary matters which are nothing but human and natural responses 
to Israeli acts of "retaliation" undertaken for softening up, terroris-
ing, and expelling the Arabs out of their old homes. The Arab Commandos 
189. Uli Doc. S/iAes/262f December 31, 1968, 
190. Menuhin, Moshe, oja.. sjkJL. > P« S72. 
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are resorting to force because they have been forced to believe that 
injustice done to them could be undone only through force. The present 
escalation cannot be reversed so long as the Palestinians remain 
deprived of their national rights. Israel is worried by the fact that 
i ts international lines of conKnunications have become vulnerable, 
Israel cannot have peace unless and until the rights of Palestinians 
are restored to them. The establishment of a secular democratic 
Palestine i s the only rational solution. "Peace in the area", says 
Professor Machower, (191) "can oi;ly coa© through the de-Zionisation 
of Israel and the termination of the aSionist regime, and this means 
the renunciation by the Israelis of the absolute priority of preserving 
a Jewish State," 
Another major development resulting from the war has been the 
Great Powers' involvement with greater intensity in the Arab-Israeli 
conf l i c t . The USA believes Isi'ael to be a bastion of Western interests 
and has lent it f u l l support against the Arab world. The Soviet Union 
which had originally supported the creation of Israel and s t i l l stands 
by i t s commitment to the territorial integrity of Israel started cu l t i -
vating Arab friendship to counter the all-ou^ US support to Israel. 
In 1962 the USA embarked on its policy of *open door' towards Israel 
and started open supply of arms to keep the military balance in favour 
of Israel. In 1966 , 200 Patton Tanks were given to Israel and i t also 
received Skyhawk light bombers. The supply of Skyhawks gave Israel 
"a new striking force" , (192) The supply of Skyhawk light bombers got 
the USA directly involved in the arms race to the Middle East. The 
191. Le Monde, January 9, 1969. 
192. The Jerusalem Post^ May 22, 1966. 
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USA has also given Israel complete pol i t ical support. In 1967 war, 
the role the USA played was always to the advantage of Israel. There 
were incidents during June War which confirmed ttue fact of Israel i -
American collusion. The USA was asking Kasscr to exercise restraint 
and through tiie President's Personal Hepresentative Nasser was re -
quested not to fii'e the f i rs t shot. The USA fully knew that Israel 
with i t s strategy of surprise attack could emerge victorious helping 
the USA to get rid of Kasser - a potential threat to American interests 
in the area. **The combination of Israel .muscle and United States sweet 
talk had enunciated satisfactory results"* (193) President Johnson 
"knew he could afford to smile suggestively and leave the fighting to 
General Dayan." (194) 
The USA was neutral so long Israel had an upper hand in the 
military balance and strategy. One American journal has spelled out 
the^US policy in a very forthright manner ( l95)i "Neutral to a point, 
US Hinges i ts policy on Hopes that Israel wi l l win - and Quickly: 
Washington fears i t wi l l be Forced to intervene Alone if Arabs Get 
Upper Hand", The USA was ready to help Israsi militarily i f i t was in 
danger. One newspaper wrote (196): "The President.,.ordered alerts to 
the 82ncl Airborne Division and to the lOlst Airborne. ..Divisional o f f i -
cers were summoned to secret briefings at Ft. Bragg, K. C. and assigned 
their missions and targets in the Arab world which included protection 
for American o i l installations," 
193, Newsweek, June 19, 1967, 
194. New Statesman, June 9 , 1967. 
195, The Wall Street jQarnal, June 6, 1967. 
196. The Washington Observer^ July 15, 1967, 
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The Soviet aiiion*s interest in the Middle i^ast is not rccent. 
She was Instrumental in the creation of Israei but a ma^ jor breakthrough 
in her relations with the Arab States occurred in 1955 when Egypt 
struck an arm for cotton deal with Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union 
becatne a main supplier of economic and military aid to the OAR, The 
Soviet military aid to the Arab world notwithstanding hor role in 
1967 cr is is remains highly ambiguous. I t was Soviet Union's i n t e l l i -
gence network which gathered the information about probable Israeli 
attack on Syria and passed it on to Basser. On May 26, 1967 Moscow 
cautioned Wasser not to strike f i rst and refrain from taking the ini -
tiative which was complied with. The fiussian naval f leet equipped 
with modern radars was present in the Mediterranean and in a l l proba-
bi l i ty was capable of detecting even the raanutest air activity. That 
the Soviet Union choae to be silent and did not Inform the UAR of the 
impending danger remains a riddle shrouded in great mystery. After the 
wai' was over the Soviet Union tried to help the Arab tottering economy 
and badly shattered military power. 
The Arab Israeli confl ict is acquiring global dimension because 
of greater involven^nt of the USA and the USSR, Issac Deutscher sees 
the Palestine problem as an element of the Soviet American competition. 
He has said (197): "We have to relate this war to the great power strug-
gle and Ideological confl ict in the world which form its context." This 
academic verbosity of enlarging the scope of Arab Israeli confl ict by 
putting i t in global setting cannot bel i tt le the reality that the essence 
of the confl ict is the rights of the Arabs of Palestine, Unless they 
are restored their homes and other rights the conf l ict would remain as a 
cancer eating up the body polit ic of the Middle East, 
197. Deutscher, Issac, The Kon-Jewish Jew. London, 1968, pp. 126-27, 
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Chapter VI 
JERUSALEM 
Jerusalem is one of the few holiest c i t i e s in the world which 
has the highest form of spiritual devotion^ The faithlessness of the 
outside world had not touched i t j the materialism of urbanity had not 
contaminated it* Jerusalem is the heart, the soul, the confidant of 
the"three religions of the worlds Islam, Christianity and Judaism, 
The Christians look f w the very essence of their religion in 
Jerusalea, It encompasses the Roman Catholic, the Greek and the Russian 
Orthodox, the Armenian, the Coptic ^ d a soore of Protestant Churches, 
It is in Jerusalem that a true Christian finds himself in direct comcBuni. 
catiom with God and identifies himself with the incidents of historical 
importance» 
The holiness ar^ d significance of Jerusalem is clearly spelled 
out in the Holy Quran, Chapter XVII, ferse I of the Quran readsj 
"Glory be to Him Vfho carried Eis servant by night from the sacred Mosque 
to tlie Eemote Mosque (a l Mas^id al Aqsa), the precincts of which we 
have blessed, that we might show Rim some of our signs," 
In A,D, 638, the second Caliph Umar Ifon al-Khattab accepted in 
person the capitulation of Jerusalem. Since then Jerusalem has always 
been a part of Arab culture, history ana sovereignty. The Koman name 
was dropped and i t became al-Bait al-Muqaddas, The Muslim rulers of 
Palestine did not follow the policy of discrimination against other 
religions and i t s holy places. Islamic law propounded by Harun a l -
Hashid accorded special toisrance to "the People of the Book", the Jews 
and the Christians, 
The Christian and Muslim holy places are abundantly described 
by pilgrims and historians. There is no evidence in the standard works 
o ^  
by early Muslim historians or jurists of the existence of aiiy Jewish 
place of worship in the c i ty . One Persian traveller who visited Jeru-
salem some f i f t y years befoxe the Crusades, however, did mention of a 
Jewish holy place, l^aslr-i-Khusrau mentioned Jews who came to v i s i t 
the Synagogue, He describes Christian churches but does not say any-
thing more about the Synagogue than merely mentioning i t . Rabbi 
Benjamin of Tudela, a Spanish traveller wrote an account of his journey 
to Jerusalem which he made in 1167, He did not mention about any 
holy place of Jews but wrote that there were eijout two hundred Jews 
living in Jerusalem, <1) 
Some ten years later, another Jewish traveller, Rabbi Petachia 
of Regensburg, "found only one Jew in Jerusalem, a dyer," (2) 
The Jewish immigration started after 1187 when the crusades 
was on and European* Jews were taking shelter with Saladin in his Islamic 
kingdom. The well-kno\® Jewi^ historian Graetz observed that the 
Jews found in Saladin's Empire "a safe asylum from persecution," (3) 
This practice of granting asylum to persecuted Jews continued 
even during the Turkish rule. The Arab population of Jerusalem had 
always shown the Jews consideration and hospitability, and they were 
treated by the Arabs with courtesy and tolerance. The emergence of 
Zionism was mainly responsible for the change of attitude among the • 
Arabs which took place after 1914, The Jews under Zionist philosophy 
assumed extremist and hostile postures and claimed many places as 
1, Tibawi, A, L , , "Jerusalem - Its place in Islam and Arab 
History** The Arab i^orld (Nev York), vol , XIV, Koa 10-11, 
1968, p. 12. 
2 , Ibid, 
3, Ibid, 
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holy and sacred. One of the most important claims they put forward 
was about the Walling Wall which, according to the Jews, was a part 
of the Old Temple wall. Dr Chalm Weizmann wrote a letter to Balfour 
on May 30, 1918 in which he demanded (4) "the handing over of the 
Wailing Wall to the Jews"» The Zionists wanted to possess the Wailing 
Wall and under the British Mandate they were encouraged in their demand. 
In April 1920, the f i rst ma;3or clash between the Arabs and the Jews 
occurred' in Jerusalem. The Arabs ware alarmed at ttie Zionist incur-
sions on the wailing place, She Zionists gave an extremely dangerous 
and explosive twist to the question of the Wailing Wall by removing 
i t from the domain of religion to po l i t i cs . The most interesting and 
revealing aspect of the Zionist attempt at giving the issi;^ of Wailing 
Wall a po l i t i ca l colour was an entry on the Wall in "the universal 
Jewish Encyclopedia" published in 1939, while "The Jewish Encyclopedia" 
published in 1901 had not included any article on the Wailing Wall. 
The Zionist propaganda intensified and their pressure on Great Britain 
increased. The clash between the 2ioni3ts and the Arabs became a 
feature of Jerusalem's l i fe and feelings ran high on both sides. In 
September 1929, Great Britain appointed an Ad Hoc Commission with an 
appeal to the Council of the Leag.ue of Nations to determine the rights 
and claims of Muslims and Jews in connection with the Wailing Wall. 
The Commission's conclusions were (5) : 
"A. To the Muslims belong the sole ownership o f , and 
the sole proprietary right to the wesstern wall, seeing 
that i t forms an integral part of the Ear am esh-Sherif 
area, which i s a waqf property. 
4 . Letter has been quoted by A, L, Tibawi, ib id . , p. 18. 
5 , League of Nations Report on the Wailing Wall, The Arab World 
vol . XIV, hos, 3 -4 , Mc-rch-April 1968. p. 14, 
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To the Mosieias there also belongs the ownership of 
the pavement in front of the wall and of the adjacent 
so callficl Moghrabi (Moroccan) Quarter opposite the 
wall". 
B. "fhe jews shall have free access to the western wall 
for the purpose of devotions at a l l times". 
The Zionists were not ready to accept the verdict because it 
was not to their liking. They kept up their pol i t ical struggle for 
the ievish State which would include Jerusalem. The scheme o f parti-
tion granted the Zionists their long cherished Jewish State but 
Jerusalem and i t s environs were declared as international zone* 
Part III of the United Kations Partition Resolution said (6) j 
A. "The city of Jerusalem shall be establidied as a 
corpus separatum under a f e c i a l international 
regime and shall be administered by the United 
Iiiations. The Trusteeship Council shall be desig-
nated to discharge the responsibilities of the 
Administering Authority on behalf of the United 
Kations"# 
The city of Jerusalem shall include the present 
municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding 
villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall 
be AbuDis, the most southern, Bsthlehem, the most 
western, Ein Karlm (including also the limit up to 
area of Motsa), and the most northern Shu*fat, as 
indicated on the attached sketch map." (7) 
The Kesolution also requested the Trusteeship Council (8) "to complete 
the preparation of the statute of Jerusalem." 
It is d i f f i cu l t to understaisd how an international administra-
tive machinery could be imposed upon a c i ty with a clearly defined 
sovereign. The United Nations had bypassed the state terr itor ial 
6. UM Resolution No. 181(2) ^ November 29, 1947. 
7. For further details see Chapter I , pp. 57-61. 
8. UFDoc.VRes. No. aQSdV)^ i>ecember 9 , 1949, p. 25. 
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competence and Issued directives for internationaiization without. 
concluding a formal treaty with the concerned competent authorities. 
The international regime envisaged under the Partition Plan of 
November 29, 1947 did not come into existence. Fighting broK0 out 
between the Oews and the Palestine Arabs. The military balance was in 
favour of the Zionists and their terrorist groups which were fully 
armed. When the British mandatory rule can^ to an end on May 15,1948 
the Jewish attack started on three sides of the old city of Jerusalem. 
The Palestinian Arabs along with nominal forces from Trans-Jordari and 
Iraq defended Jerusalem t i l l a truce came into e f fect on November 30, 
1948 followed by an armistice agreement on April 3 , 1949'. The armistice 
agreement sanctioned ade facto partition of Jerusalem whereby Israel 
achieved more territorial gains than the United Nations had granted 
i t two years before. The areas gained by the Jewish forces before and 
after May 15, 1948 included Western Galilee, the New City of Jerusalem, 
the area west of Jerusalem to the Mediterranean, the Arab c i t ies of 
Jaffa, Acre, iiamleh, etc . 
The Security Council assigned priority to the question of 
hosti l it ies in Jerusalem and discussed i t . On May 28, 1948 the 
President of the Security Council, A.Parodl of France read out a tele^ 
gram from ttie Iruce Commission in which "the bombard®Bnt of the suburb 
of the city" (9) was mentioned. The chairman concluded from the 
telegram that the situation in the Holy City was alarming and said (10): 
" I wonder i f we should not now corxentrate a l l our 
ef forts on the situation in Jerusalem" because " i f we 
could bring about a cessation of hosti l i t ies in Jeru-
salem i t s e l f , we should have made tte authority of 
the United Iiatlons prevail iin One place in Palestine". 
UN Poc. 8 / 7 ^ 7 M a y 28, 1948. 
CoiiQ^xi Recpr^p (SCOR), May 28, 1948, p. 39. 
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Jessup of the USA also expressed his country*s deep concern for what 
was happening in Jerusalem. He said ( l l ) i "Ihe city of Jerusalem 
i s of special concern to mankind... The Security Council should order 
an unconditional ceasefire in Jerusalem... so that the destruction of 
Jerusalem v i l l come to an end." 
Count Bernadotte in his Report dated September 16, 1948 had 
suggested that the city of t'erusalem be accorded "special and sepa-
rate treatflienc because of its religious and international significance 
and the complexity of the interests Involved". (12) The UK was con-
cerned with the flare up in the Eoly City and ordered a ceasefire. 
Israel flagrantly and consistently violated the ceasefire 
directives of the United Nations and its attitude was so stubborn 
that iiegotiations at Lausanne could not make much headway regarding 
Jerusalem, the Ifew City of Jerusalem was under occupation of Isr-^el 
which was proceeding with i ts policy of annexation of the area under 
i ts control. 'Xti© Conciliation Commission in i t s Third Progress JReport 
said that Israel had established (13) ministerial services" within 
the area under its occupation which was in contravention of the reso-
lution of December 11, 1948. The General Assembly had adopted a reso-
lution on December 9, 1949 under which an international regiras was ^n-
(14) 
visaged. The Resolution had restated the General Assembly's intention 
SCOh. July 13, 1948 , 333rd and 334th Meetings, Ko. 96, 
pp. 39-40. 
12. ON Doc. A/64fiT p. 1?. 
13. Third Progress ueport of the Uf. Conciliation Commission 
for Palestine. UH Doc. A/Q27. 
14. m Doc./rtes. Ko. 303(17^J December 9, 1949, p. 25. 
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"that Jerusalem shoal4 be placed under a permanent International reglne , 
which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the 
Holy Places", i t confirmed "specif ically the following provisions of 
the General Assembly nesoJUition 181 (II)s 
1. the city of .lerusaletn shall be established as a 
corpus separatum under a special international 
regime and shall be administered by the United 
Nations; 
the Trusteeship Council shall b® designated to d i s -
charge the responsibilities of the Administering 
Authority,. .} and 
3 , the city of Jerusalem shall include the present 
municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding 
villages and towns." 
Israel after signing the Armistice Agreement with Jordan showed 
scant respect for i ts undertakings assumed under the agreement. The 
Demilitai'ized 2on© of Mount Scopus became the target of Israeli 
attacks. Jordan was deeply concerned about Israeli encroachments on , 
Mount Scopus. The zone was of immense significance for the security 
of Jordan's sector of Jerusalem because i t dominated the roads leading 
to tierusalesn. I f Isr^-el could capture the zone (16) it "would*/accord-
ing to l^eneral ii-.L.M. Burns, "dominate and could eventually compel the 
surrender of Jerusalem and probably cause the collapse of Jordanian 
control of the area west of the Jordan River," 
Th© Israeli attitude has been from the very beginning one of 
defiance, not to accept the schenje of the internationalization of 
Jerusalem. The United Nations directives were of no significance as 
far as Israel was concerned. In 1949 the Trusteeship Council called 
upon Israel to sidJmit to the authority. Its response to this was one 
15. Burns, h, L. M., Between Arab and London, 1962. 
p, 158. 
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of utmost defiance manifested in its transfer of i ts capital from 
Tel Aviv to tJerusalem. David Ben Gurlon, the Prime Minister of Israel 
had a sense of pride in defying the United ^^ations resolution which 
declared Jorusalem "Corpus Separatum" and which accordirg to him was 
"wicked counsel" and said that (16)s "our rebuttle of this wictoed 
counsel was unequivocal and resolute". The Government and Knesset 
at once moved their seat to Jerusalem and made Israel 's Crown and 
Capital irrevocably and for a l l ussn to see." 
Jordan's representative wrote a letter dated September 4 , 
1967 to the President of the Security Council in which Israel was - . 
chargea of committing violations (17) of "the General Armistice Agree-
ment in the area of Jabal El Mukabbir," in the »lerusalem Sector, The 
Security Council made many appeals to Israel to i,et as a law abiding 
nation but no amount of e f forts proved successful. Israeli leaders 
were always dx-eaming and planning to occupy the City of Jerusalem. The 
Zionist General Council declared (18): "Do not allow yourself any 
restj do not give the communities any cause - t i l l Zionism is re -
bui l t , the unity of the Jewish people assured, and t i l l Jerusalem has 
become, indeed, the symbol of the Jewish oneness and the glory of the 
earth." Israel was looking for en opportunity to occupy Jerusalem 
and make it a part of *l!*retz Israel». The opportuigity came in June 
1967 when Israel launched aggression against Jordan, the tlAR and Syria, 
16. Qurion, Ben, Rebirth gnd Destiny of Israel. Kew York, 1954. 
p. 362. 
SCOa, 787th Meeting, September 6, 1967, p. 9. 
18. Session of the Zionist Generftl Cnnpcil,^ 4th Session, 
Jerusalem, 1963. p. 96. 
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Jerusalem was the main target of Israeli armed forces. The Israelis 
were itching for the HoXy City. 
Ihe Israeli Armed Forces had the su|ffeme objective of l iberat-
ing Jerusalem and coriquering i t , ^heir aim was to make divided 
Jerusalem an al l - Israel i c i ty and drive Jordar out from the West 
Bank. I'he colonization of Jerusalem and its annexation was the most 
significant part of Israeli-policy of expansion, Levi Eshkol in an 
interview published in tiie German magazine Per Spejgel confessed that 
the people o f Israel would not tolerate a Government which did not 
think of colonizing Jerusalem. He said (19)t "Israel without Jerusalem 
is Israel without head... Jerusalem is the heart of the Jewish people 
in i ts present rebirth." 
Israel was not prepared to withdraw from Jerusalem come what 
may. Moshe Dayan was far from being ambiguous when he said (20)t "The 
Israeli Defence Forces liberated Jerusalem, We have reunited the torn 
c i t y , the capital of Israel. We have returned to this most sacred 
shrine, never to part from i t again". Aba Bban was reiterating the 
same stand when he told the Fifth Special Session of the General 
Assembly (21)j "In our nation's long history there have been few 
hours more intensely moving than the hour of our reunion with the Western 
Wall, k people had come back to the cradle of its birth. It has 
renewed its link with the mystery of its origin and i t s continuity". 
Israeli Government undertook immediately after the capture 
of Jerusalem, drastic measures to absorb the old c i ty within Israeli 
gPI Dispatchf Bonn, July 10, 1967. 
20. Ib id . , Tel Aviv, June 7 , 1967. 
21. A/PV/526y June 19, 1967, p. 61, 
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administrative fold, a {faster Plan was imdertaken and a P50 million 
fund was earmai'ked for th© reconstrvKJtlon of historical and religious 
sites (22). On June 21, 1967, the Knesset adopted a series of enabling 
laws extending Israeli sovereignty in the Holy City. On June 27, 1967, 
the Knesset passed an act which announced the annexation of Arab 
Jerusalem to Israel* The jiieasures undertaken by Israel to annex 
Jerusalem were In direct contravention o f the General Assembly reso-
lution of Ivovember 29, 1947. Aba Eban denied Israeli annexation of 
Jerusalem at a Press Conference in Kew York and suggested that the 
laws passed were purely administrative in character (23) • 
The General Assembly was seized of the situation in the Middle 
Last and.lt recorded Its disapproval for .Israel i measure aimed at 
annexing the Holy City. The General Assembly resolution asking Israel 
to rescind i t s measures in regard to the status of Jerusalem was 
sponsored by Pakistan, fh® ^^soluticai was adopted on July 4 , 1967 and 
i t said C24)j 
General Assea4>ly, 
Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem 
as a resull of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of 
the City, 
1. Considers that these measures are invalid5 
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind a l l measures already 
taken and to desist forthwith from taking any 
action which would alter the status of Jerusalem". 
The USA abstained from voting on the resolution but at the same time 
the OS Government made i t clear that Israeli policy in Jerusalem was 
22. ys , Dispatch, Jerusalem, June 9 , 1967. 
23. 2£i IDispatch United Jiatlons, June 89, 1967* 
24. Gemral Assembly ^ ^ , tV. » ^vily 4 , 196?. 
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a direct violation of international law. The USA regarded the 
Eastern portion of Jerusaieta (26) as "occupied territory and therefore 
suto^ect to the provisions of international law governing the rights 
and obligations of an occupying power." 
The General Assembly resolution of July 4 , 1967 was not 
complied with by Isreel and i t s reaction to the resolution was avail-
able the same day when l igal Allon, Israeli Minister of Labour, gave 
a statement to the Press. He salds (26) "The world must reconcile 
i t se l f to the fact that the city has at last returned to the nation 
that founded' It and that turned it into a holy c ity ." 
Israel»s policy of annexation continued and the General Assembly 
adopted another resolution July 14 recalling i t s earlier resolution of 
July 4, 1967» The resolution took (27): "note with the deepest regret 
and concern of the non-compliance by Israel" with its earlier reso-
lution. It deplored (28)» "the failure of Israel to implement General 
Assembly resolution" and reiterated " i t s c a l l to Israel to rescind a l l 
measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action 
which would alter the status of Jerusalem." 
On Kay 3, 1968 Rouhi El Khatlb, Mayor of Jerusalem, appeared 
before the Security Council said informed i t about Israeli atrocities 
against the Arabs therein. He said (29)i "The Israeli authorities 
started by spreading horror in a l l city corners, outside the walls and 
25. The Christian Science Monitor^ February 11, 1968. 
26. Dispatch New York, July 5, 1967. 
27. The General Assembly He solution 22S4(fes.-p^j July 14, 1967. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Khatlb, i:.l^iouhi, Jerusalem. Israeli Anne^^t;Lon. Aisman, 1968, 
p. 6. 
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inside, in the mosques as well in the churches, oocupying large 
buildings and hotels, raiding houses, shops and garages, looting what 
comes under their hands, treating cruelly anyone who shows the slightest 
sign of dissatisfaction, gathering the inhabitants from "their homes 
under heavy and disdaining measures, keeping them staining for hours,,," 
Speaking about the administrative measures aimed at annexing Jerusalem 
undertaken by Israel, he said (30): "Following the annexation of the 
A.rafo sector of ^Jerusalem by Israel , the Municipality and various 
Ministerial Israeli o f f i ces started to apply Israeli laws and regula-
tions and instruct the Arabs of ^Jerusalem to observe and abide by 
these laws and regulations, Israeli currency, custotas, excise and 
income taxes, t r a f f i c , telephone rates, municipal taxes aiKi.by laws 
were imposed" • Hebrew School curricula were applied for Arab schools 
and students." 
The Israelis seized Arab Land under the stress of military 
occupation. The area of the land seized (31) " i s 3345 dunoms or 848 
acres", Ihey seized the land in order to build up a Jewish housing 
area. Israel embarked upon a vigorous policy of liquidating tho Arabs 
living in Jerusalem in order to expropriate their properties, The 
houses belonging to the Arabs were tulldozed and many Arab villages 
were wiped out. The International Herlad Tribune reported (32)s "Israel 
announced last Thursday that 838 acres of the former Jordanian sector 
of Jerusalem were "expropriated" by the Israeli Governmefit". The Arabs 
30, Ib id . , p. 12, 
31, Ib id . , p, 15, 
32, Intermtlopal Herald Tyibune^ January 16, 1968, 
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living in Jerusalem were discriminated against and prevented from 
r 
participating even in local af fairs affecting their destiny. Michael 
Adams, who visited Jerusalem and saw things with his own eyes wrote 
that the Arabs living in Jerusalem were (33) "not represented in the 
Municipal Council which has assumed control of the c i t y ' s af fairs , nor 
in the parliament of the country which now seeks to claim his a l l e -
giance" . 
Israel was bent upon ignoring world public opinion and the 
United Jiations directives. It tried to hold a.military parade in 
Jerusalem which was a flagrant violation of the Partition itesolution. 
Jordan put up a complaint with the Security Ccuncil, which adopted a 
resolution on April 27, 1968. The resolution said (34): "The holding 
of a military parade in Jerusalem wil l aggravate tensions in the area 
and will have adverse e f fect on a peaceful settlement of the problems 
in the area." It called "upon Israel to refrain from holding the 
military parade in Jerusalem which was contemplated for 2 May 1968." 
Isrsfil did not pay any heed to the ca l l of the Security Council and 
shov/ed deplorable disrespect to the resolution of April 27, 1968 by 
holding the military parade on May 2 , 1968. The Security Council 
deplored (35) "the holding of Israel of the Military Parade in 
Jerusalem on May 2, 1968 in disregard of the unanimous decision adopt-
ed by the Council on 27 April" . 
33. The Guardian^ March 4 , 1968. 
34. SCOrt, uesolution 250, 1417 Mtg., April 27, 1968. 
35. Ib id . , resolution 251, 1420 Mtg., May 2, 1968. 
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On May 21, 1968 the Security Council adojjtea another resolution 
which reaffirmed a l l previous resolutions of the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, !rhe Resolution reaffirmed (36) that "acquisitions 
of territory by military conquest is inadmissible", and affirmed that i t 
"1 . Deplores the failure of Israel to comply with the General 
Assembly resolutions mentioned above. 
"2 . Considers that a l l legislative and administrative measures 
ai:.d actions taken by Israel, incltwiing expropi'iation of 
land and properties thereon, which tend to change the " 
legal status of Jerusalem are Invalid" . ' 
The resolution further stipulated that the Security Council 
"3 . Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind a l l such measures 
already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any 
further action which tends to change the status of 
Jerusalem", 
The Israeli response to the Security Council iiesolution.Ko 
• The Israeli representative said <37): "The reso-
lution ( ^ust adopted) i s neither practical nor reasonable. It J^nores 
reality and disregai'ds Israelis basic rights. It seeks to violate the 
natural unity of Jerusalem and to overlook the in'ierests of Jerusalem's 
inhabitants and their welfare." 
Israel continued disregarding the United Hations resolutions. 
Its spoken words about the i«^lfare of the people and reality of the 
situation were hardly coterminous. Arbitrary arrests, expropriation 
of Arab property, violation of religious places were Incidents which 
reminded people of Nazi regime of Hitler, 
The Eepresentative of Jordan in a letter dated June 26, 1969, 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, said that the 
36. Ib id . , Kesolution 262, 1426th Meeting, May 21, 1968, 
37. Ib id . , Resolution 252, 1426th Meeting, May 21, 1968, p, 43. 
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Government of Israel , In complete disregard of the UN directives (38) 
"had enacted Administrative Regalations Law 1968 which was to be put 
into force on 23 February and later was extended to 23 May 1969• On 
April 27, 3.969, further provisions and new regulations were enacted,., 
Israel had continued to violate basic human rights in the Holy City". 
The Secretary General's personal representative, Ernesto 
Thalmann, had confirmed this in his report when he said (39) that "the 
Israeli authorities bad stated unequivocally that the process of integ-
ration was irreversible and not negotiable." 
El-Farra o f Jordan quoted from Israeli newspapers and said 
that (40) "more than 100 buildings had been destroyed within the Old 
City acid 700 building were expropriated. Tjpe Arabs owned 595 of 
those buildings. The expropriated real estate included 437 places of 
business and 1,048 apartments housing over '5,000 people," 
On July 3, 1969 the Security Council adopted another resolution 
censuring (41) "in the strongest terms a l l measures taken to change 
the Status of the City of Jerusalem". The resolution repeated i t s cal l 
upon Israel " to rescind forthwith a l l measures taken by i t which may 
tend to change the Status of JeruBa34sm, and in the future to refrain 
from a l l actions likely to have such an e f f e c t , " 
The Arabs living in Jerusalem protested against the measures 
undertaken by Israeli authorities to undermine the Arab character of 
Jerusalem but a n these protests f e i l on a deaf ear. Israel went ahead 
38. UK Monthly Chronicle , vol. VI, No, 7 , July 1969, pp. 35-36, 
39. Ibid. , p. 37. 
40. Ib id . , p. 38. 
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with Its policy of destroyiijg Arab properties Including Muslim Holy 
P3fl.cGs. The most criminal act was committed when Al^Aqse Mosque was 
put on f i re on August 21, 1969. The news was received with utmost 
shock in the entire world specially in the Muslim world,-The fire caused 
much dsunage to Al-Aqsa, one of the holiest places of the Muslims* The 
criminal act evoked tremendous anguish and outrage among the Muslims. 
I s r ^ l was held responsible for the tragedy and was also charged with 
instigating the fire because iierusalem was under its military control. 
Akhbar al Kuwal,t wrote on August 23, 1969 (42)s "When the mosque was 
burnt, we naively expected the whole world to share with us our indig-
nation and sorrow. The magnitude of the sacrilege was a grave crime 
against c ivi l ization and against a holy place." The matter was brought 
before the Security Council which registered i t s anguish and was (43) 
"grieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al-Aqsa Mos. 
que in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the Military Occupation of 
Israel" . The resolution adopted on September 15, 1969 reaffirmed a l l 
previous resolutions and also the ''principle that acquisition of 
territory by military conquest i s inadmissible," The resolution "cal ls 
upon Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions and International law governing military occupation and to 
refrain from Causing anyiindrance to the discharge of the established 
functions of the Supreme Muslim Council of Jerusalem, Including any 
cooperation that Council may desire from countries with predominantly 
Muslim population and ftom Muslim communities in relation to its plans 
for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Plac«s in Jerusalem." 
42. AKhfrgr fll-ICvtWftil^, August 23, 1969. 
43. SCOa. Resolution 271, 1512th Meeting, September 15, 1969. 
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Israel was determined to defy the United Katloris and do what 
was befitting i t s expanslotilst policy. From an avowed position of 
non-annexation, i t has gradually proceeded to complete absorption of 
the Holy City by depriving i t of i t s Arab character, Israel is in 
occupation of entire Jerusalem and its leaders seem determinedtto agree 
to withdraw ftfom the City. Dayan and other iiionists are harping on 
religious emotions and sentiments and declaring that they had (44) **re-
turned to this most sacired,shrine, never to part from it again," Moshe 
Dayan on June 11, 1967 declared (45): " I think that Jerusalem s t i l l 
should and can be the capital of Israel and entirely under our control 
and within our country.,," 
The occupation of Jerusalem by Israel Imposes a set of duties 
and obligatioKS on i t which i t has failed to carry out. Its rule in 
Jerusalem is extremely partisan, discriminatory and in violation of 
Geneva Conventions on Euraan Rights, The occupation of Jerusalem by 
Israel was not an act of defence, i t was rather an act of fulflltraent 
with Israel which was shown and established by many Israeli administra-
tive f lats adopted immediately after the conquest, Israel is acting, 
and being allowed to act, as an aggressively defiant nation in our 
contemporary civi l ized world. Its unbridled behaviour disregarding a l l 
the directives of the United Nations and world public opinion is a 
ref lect ion on our society and constitutes the biggest threat to inter-
national order and world peace. 
44, Facts on File, June 8, 1967, 
45, Face the Katlon^ June 11, 1967, 
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Tba United Nations was envisaged as m international instru-
ment to ie&sen the area oS confl ict and enlarge the sphere of peace 
and under St andir^. The horrors of tvo world wars had shaken the 
entire humanity and forced on i t the Indispensahia need for a shock 
absorber. The United Nations was the result and it had the supreme 
task of saving the world from the third ma^or catastrophe. It was 
also supposed to be the guardian of international justice and funda-
mental human rights« Whenever the cloaas of war started gathering 
over the worM horiaoi, the only glimmer of optimism came from the 
hope that the United I-iations would somehow be able to step in and 
avert the disaster. The Hew Yprk s was commenting upon the United 
Nations* peace keeping role when i t wrote Ci}$ "The best hope, in 
fact , l ies in a continuing role by the United illations," But this hope 
was belied in regard to Palestine Question* 
The Palestine problem involved not only th© question of pre-
venting a local confl ict froai becoming a ma^or conflagration threaten-
ing the peace of the area. It aiUo involved the issue of fundamental 
human rights of the Palestinians which were being usurped by an alien 
community. The British Mandatory Government in Palestine was entrusted 
by the League of Nations to look after the interest of local people and 
administrative machinery of Palestine. Great Britain collaborated 
with iiionism in its crimes against Palestinians. When the Frankestine 
created by Great Britain struck at the roots of British imperialism 
in the Middle East, Britain had no option but to bring the issue to 
world forum. 
1* Kew York IMmes, May 22, 1967, 
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On April 2 , 1947 th« Onited Kingdom representative requested 
the Secretary General that the Palestine Question should be placed on 
the agenda of the General Assembly - a request which was complied with. 
At the meeting of the General Assembly held on May 15, 1947 the UK 
representative said (2 ) : "We have tried for years to solve the problem 
of Palestine. Slaving failed so far, we now bring i t to the United 
Nations in the hope that i t can succeed where we haire not 
Gjpeat Britain had calculated its move very carefully. She was 
aware that the then composition of the United Nations would be favour-
€0)16 for any suggestion agi^ eed among Big Powers, Great Britain was 
acting in collaboration with Zionist colonialism and had already opened 
the gates of Palestine to the floods of Jewish immigrants. When she 
found that the iiionists were powerful enough to wrest the country from 
its Arab inhabitants, the issue was brought into tiie arena of world 
diplomacy to lend finality and legality to the criminal design against * » 
the Arab world. The eggenda before the General Assembly was (3) "the 
termination of the Handate over Palestine and the declaration of its 
independence." The United Stations, however, adopted the Partition Reso-
lution of Kovember 29, 1967 which created a "Jewish State" in the heart 
of the Middle East, The manner in which Great Britain had referred 
the issue to the United Nations and the decision taken by i t l e f t 
much to be desired from the point of view of the Arab States and the 
Arabs of Palestine. 
The United Nations had acted in contravention of the principle 
2. Of f ic ia l htcorda of First Special Session of General Assembly, 
vol. I I I , pp. 183-84.. 
3 ' UK Document A/364f Annex 11^ pp. 1 -2 . 
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of self-determination enshrined in the Charter of world organization. 
The Arabs of Palestine were asked to share their exclusive terr i tor ia l 
sovereignty with aliens and intruders who had encroached upon their 
rights and territory. The United Nations had failed to protect the 
po l i t i ca l , economic and religious interests of the Arabs of Palestine, 
The Partition riesolution was a triumph for po l i t i ca l Zionism and i t 
had provided them a foothold for the f u l l realization of "Kretz 
Israel" as Ben Gurion and Menachea Beigin had envisioned i t a l l along, 
openly and unashamedly. 
The United JNations had and has no doubt, the competence to 
discuss the Palestine question or any other issue potentially threaten-
ing world peace. This does not, however, imply that the United Na-
tions canTaxbitrarily as i t did regarding the Palestine Question. The 
United Nations i s an organization which has to work under various 
limitations imposed and clearly laid dovm by the Charter, The gravest 
violation committed by the United Nations in adopting the Partition 
resolution was regarding the principle of self-determination en-
shrined in Article 1, Paragraph 2 of the Ghai'ter. The United Nations 
had assumed the role of a territorial sovereign and adopted the reso-
lution to partition Palestine. According to Professor Brownlie, the 
partition resolution was ultra vireg because i t was beyond the jur is -
diction and competence of the United Nations. He observess (4) 
" I t i s douDtful i f the United Nations, has a capacity 
to convey t i t l e , inter alia because the Organization 
cannot assume the role of territorial sovereign.. . Thus 
the resolution of 1947 containing a Partition Plan for 
Palestine was probably ultra vires and, i f i t was not, 
was not binding on member states in any case." 
4 . Brownlie, I . , PrJ.nciole^ of Public International Law. Oxford, 
1966. pp. 161-62, 
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Tte General Assembly under Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter 
is empowered to consider any question relating to peace and make re-
commendation. In case of ^'alestine, the General Assembly overstepped 
its jurisdiction and adopted a decision which implied coercion. The 
Partition resolution was not of a recommendatory character; i t was a 
decision supported by a clause that any attempt to alter i t by force 
would be considered as a threat to the peace and an act of aggression, 
within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, H. 
Keisen, a renowned authority on international law and the United Imtions 
observed (5 ) : "Article 14 authorizes the General Assembly only to 
males recoBuaendations. But the resolution (Partition ilesolution) goes 
beyond simple recommendations." 
The decision of the General Assembly was aimed at transforming 
the status quo and redistributing pol i t ical power in Palestine without 
consulting the people living in the area and almost bypassing their 
rights and wishes. The General Assembly again violated the United 
Nations Charter and i t s principles when it ' provided for the creation 
of a five member committee to administer Palestine during transitional 
period. The Assembly's decision that the United Nations shall adminis-
ter a territory for the purpose of vivisecting i t into two halves was 
not within the competcnce of the General Assembly. The Syrian Repre-
sentative attacked the committee and i t s composition. According fco him 
the constitution of the committee entrusted with the task of adminis-
tering Palestine was i l l ega l , i t s members having been appointed by 
the President of the Assembly and not by th© Assembly itself which "was 
/ 
Kelsen, Lm of the United Motions. London, 1951. 
p. 195, 
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a breach of Artlcis 84 of the Rules of Procedure." (6) 
The Assetably requested the Security Council to adopt 
enforcemoKt measures to ImpliBment the Partition resolution. 
The Charter of the UK has clearly laid down that the responsi-
b i l i ty of the Security Council was to maintain peace. The Security 
Council, whether requested by the Assembly or on its own, was not 
empowered to implSBient a decision or recommendation. As Hans Kelsen 
said i7)i "The Charter does not etapomr the Security Council to en-
force a polit ical settlement, whether it was in pursuance of a recom-
mendation made by the Assembly or of one made by the Council i t s e l f . . . 
The Council's action should not have as an aim the imposition of par-
tition but the maintenance of peace." 
The United Rations had flagrantly violated the rights of the 
majority by granting International status to the Jews who had come 
and forcibly settled down in Palestine. The Partition resolution of 
l^ ovember 29, 1947 had assigned the Jewish state definite areas but the 
chronology of events in Palestine during the six months preceding the 
end of the mandate enabled Jewish forces aiid terrorist groups to grab 
most of the Arab c i t i e s of Palestine before Hay 15, 1948. The Arabs 
of PalBstine were forcibly expelled trom their homes and the United 
Iv'ations could not do anything to resettle them in their homes. The 
Palestinian refugees constitute a heavy lump of flesh on the conscience 
of the United Nations. In his report of September 16, 1948 the UN 
Mediator sugbtsted (8; certain revisions in the boundaries as envisaged 
6. rsh P90, S/pV, p. 21. 
7. Kelsen, H., c i t . ^ p. 287. 
8. VN Doc, A/m, p. 17* 
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by the resolution of November 29, 1947. It also recommended (9) the 
repatriation of the Palestine refugees. The United Nations failed to 
act according to the recommendations made by the UH Mediator, Israel 
was allowed by the Oipited Nations to act as Its spoilt child. The 
United Nations has always spaced the rod and allowed Israel to enjoy 
the fruits of aggression. Israel 's expansion and advance Inside the 
Arab Land went unchecissd and every time it has confronted the United 
Mat ions with a fai,t' accQmpl^  gmid won recognition. Israel was a crea-
tion of the General Assembly UesolJition which had also imposed upon 
it duties and obillations towards its Arab inhabitants, The UK reco-
gnition of Israel was conditional to i ts capacity and willingness to 
f u l f i l these oblications. As Hedley Cooke pointed out (10); "Israel 's 
sovereignty, as contrasted with France's and %it2ierland's, is perma-
nently limited by i^r duties as embodied in the Charter of Existence 
towards the Arab residents of the area which she contro l s . . , , " 
Israel was boand by the UK resol^itlon to abide by i ts pt'ovialons and 
respect the territorial integrity of neighbouring states, Israel 
flouued a l l i ts obligations and the United Nations failed to make i t 
accept c ivi l ized norms but the world body was not "prepared", as 
suggested by Davis, former Commissioner General of UKKWA, (11) "to 
impose corrective measures on Israel against her wi l l , " 
The United Nations owes a tremendous responsibility towards the 
Palestine Arabs who were expelled from their home and deprived o f their 
9, Ibid. 
10. Hedley, Cook®, Israel » A Blessing and a Curse. London, 
1960, p, 180, 
11. Davis, John H., The J!.vasive Peace. London, 1968, p. 107. 
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pol i t ical power. As a goardian of international order and funda-
mental human rights, the United Kations should make efforts to 
recti fy the wrongs done to the Arabs of Palestine by the Big Powers 
in collaboration with Israel and the United Nations. 
The United States of America and the USSE are among the most 
significant original sinners against the Arabs of Palestine. Both 
powers voted in favour of the Partition resolution establishing the 
(Jewish State. 
The United States of America took a more than normal interest 
in advocating the Jewish case in the United Nations and outside. 
Many states which h ^ voted against the partition proposal in UKSCOp 
were pressurized to vote in favour of the plenary session of the 
General Assembly, Truman has admitted i t in his memoirs. He badly 
needed the iiionist support in his Presidential electionj he, there-
fore , (12) "instructed the State Department to support the Partition 
Plan", The US State Department employed more intimidation than per-
suasion and in that manner states like Liberia, Haiti, Luxemburg, 
Belgium, Paraguay, etc . were won over to the side of the Zionists. 
The United States was firmly committed to support Israel which 
Was regarded as a bastion of western democracy in the feudal society 
of the Middle ^ast. According to Professor Howard (13)j "Israel , i t 
i s said, i s the natural ally of the United States a kind of western 
outpost on tbs Eastern Mediterranean. The idea antedates the establish-
ment of the State of Israel, going back at least as far as the Balfour 
Declaration in i*;cvember 1917. When among other things, a Jewish 
12. Truman, Harry, Memoir^, vol . I I , Pai'is, 1956. p. 188, 
Jlsgufis Summer 1964. pp. 15-16. 
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»homeXand* was to serve British Imperial interests ir the neighbourhood 
of the Suez Canal. In later years it was to become a " l i t t l e bastion" 
of "embattled democracy" in the 'hostile* and 'feudal' Arab world, 
said to be anti-democratic, and western and antl-Araerican."_ 
The United Hates of America emerged, following the withdrawal 
of Britain from the Middle i^ast, as a ma o^r power in the area. Its 
chief aim was to contain communistn which brought her in direct con-
f l i c t with Arab nationalism, The Truman Doctrine of "containment of 
Communism" brought military alliances like Baghdad Pact into existence. 
The twin ob^jectives of the US policy in the Middle Uast were, to con-
tain communism and support and safeguard Israel. Enormous financial 
and military aid was pumped In a small State like Israel (14), "From 
1948 to 1962 apart from the high level direct investments, Government 
grants and loans totalling 880 million dollars and private g i f t s (tax 
free) and bond purchases totalling approximately 1,6 bi l l ion dollars 
have flowed into that small country. Given a population of some two 
million people, this represents something l ike, 1,200 dollars for every 
Israel man, woman and child. According to a U.S. Aid Financial report, 
covering the period 1949 to 1963, "the total value of a l l US dollar 
programme to Israel was ,002,600,000". (16) To this should be added 
the 1964 and 1965 grants of "^16,200,000", (16) making a total of 
JJl ,118,800 for 19-^ to 1965. (17) 
14. Wolte, n. H., "United States Policy and the Middle Kast" in 
The United States and the Middle East ed. by G. Stevens. Kew 
York, 1964, p. 165, 
15, Financial heoort by Aid ftepresentative in Israel (John Wilde) 
US Embassy, Tel-Aviv, July 26, 1963, 
16. Hear East Keport Supplement to May 1966 issue, p, 15, 
17, For a detailed account see "Bitter Harvest" by Sami Hadawi, 
New York, 1967. pp. 249-74. 
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The US Interest in the MiddJje East is strengthened by its 
capital investment in the o i l industry. In 1965 the tJS investment in 
o i l amounted to pil,590,000,000. Between 19S4 and 1966 relations bet-
ween the US and resurgent Arab nationalism were far from happy. Tt^ 
US had the primary objective of saving the Arab world from the 
•clutches* of expanding and penetrating coramunisra which had allied 
i tsel f with Arab nationalism and its main aspirations. The USA was, 
however, regarded by the Arabs as the chief ally of Zionlsta which con-
stituted the most potential threat to Arab territorial sovereignty. 
The United States of America was committed to Israel 's security 
and had always given i t maximum military support enabling i t to 
materialize i ts expansionist designs. The USA had shown intolerable 
indifference to tj^ rights and aspirations of the Arab people, Israel 
has always exploited the US support and in order to maximise it the 
myth of being a bastion of western democracy and modernization has been 
created* The USA commands enormous influence in Israel and its deter-
mined ef lbrts at persuading Isr^tel to act as a civilised country are 
bound to succeed. But the US leaders have allowed Israel to take 
American support for granted. 
The United States adopted a more or less disinterested attitude 
and was never disturbed about the major Israeli raids against the Arab 
States, In 1966 when Israel attacked Sammu», a Jordanian vi l lage, the 
US Ambassador to the UK Arthur J. Goldberg on Kovember 16, 1966 de« 
plored Israeli "r f jal iat ion raid" (18J against .Jordan but Washington 
never took strong measures to discourage Israel in i ts avowed policy 
of "reprisal" and "retaliation." The US was, in e f f e c t , adopting the 
18. Security Council Of f ic ia l Records (SCOd), I^ ovember 16, 1966, 
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Macbiavalllan tacts of duplicity. She was showing verbal sympathy 
towards ttie Arabs prevei.ting them from total surrend^er to the Soviet 
Union, On the other hand, she was giving ' moral, military and 
pol i t ical support to Israel in i ts tirade and aggressive designs 
against the Arab States, 
The US gam© of duplicity was exposed during the June War of 
1967 when massive collusion betv/een Isrc^el and the USA became known 
to the w r l d , fhe United States of America had f u l l knowledge of 
Israeli military strength and its aggressive intentions. 
She Johnson Administration did not make it clear as to what it 
was prepared to do in case of aggression by one side against the other, 
Israel escalated pol it ical confroi tation into a massive military con-
frontation and the Middle East stood on a volcano. The United States 
was the only power capable of sounding warning and restraining Israel 
from launching an aggression on the Arab States. But the policy-
makers in the US chose otherwise and no measure was adopted to deter 
aggressor unless he be Arab for whom there was the Sixth Bleet in the 
area, Israel was encouraged, allowed, and given fu l l military support 
to carry out its plan against the Arab States, There was an active 
military collusion between Israel and the US, Louis Heren, Washington 
correspondent of the London Times wrote (I9)i 
"Most diplomatists stationed in Washington are persuaded 
that the United States was in collusion v/ith I s rae l , , , 
This was obvious in the United Nations^ Security Council, 
or , rather, behind the scenes, when Washington began to 
press Jerusalem to accept the cease-fire resolutions only 
when the victory of Israeli arms was assured. Really heavy 
American pressure to stop the fighting was not applied 
before Friday, when Israel began to move into Syria. 
clearly some assurances were given to the Israelis before 
the hosti l it ies began. 
The Times (London), June 13, 1967. 
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"Tte more faint-hearted In »lerusalem could rest assured 
that an Israel defeat would never be allowed. General Moshe 
Dayan must have been fairly sure of about 96 hours in which 
to achieve his objectives before the Security Council could 
c a l l a halt." 
Ths Onited States and Britain were ready to provide air protection 
to Israel against any surprise iiigyptlan attack* Yugoslav observers 
in Libya noted unusual air activity at the Wheelus base and there 
was similar unusual air activity at British air bases in Cyprus. 
Tbe USA has helped Israel and done the greatest harm to the 
Arab world, The Johnson Administration, under the formidable Jewish 
triumvirate who helped to formulate and execute Americans Middle 
East policy - Arthur Goldberg, Walt Kostow and Eugene fiostow also 
known as American gentl^en of Jewish persuasion, did not ask Israel 
to withdraw from Arab territories , The OSA .hcs remained callously 
indifferent to the fate of frab refugees ft-om Palestine. It did not 
specifically ask for the return of the refugees to the territories 
occupijed by Israel, The USA holds the key to the solution of the 
Middle East conf l i c t , Moshe Dayan in an interview said (20)s "The 
United States held the key to the qiaestion of whether Israel could 
continue to insist that there would be no withdrawal from occupied 
Arab land as long as there was no peace ^ttleiaent," 
The United States of America has chosen to put a l l i t s eggs 
in the Israeli basket and seeks comfort in the Jewish State as the 
bastion of western detoocracy and vanguard of modernization. She has, 
however, not shown equal or similar interest and understanding for 
the forces engaged in the process of radlcalization of po l i t i ca l and 
20. Quoted in Jansen, G. H., Whose Suez? Aspects of Collusion 1967. 
Beirut, 1968. p. 36. 
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social set-up of the Arab world with the result that the USA i8 
totally alienated with the emerging pol i t ical pattern in the Arab 
States. She i s , therefore, rightly regarded by the Arabs as an ally 
of pol it ical ly reactionai-y forces like Zionism which stands for the 
revival of exclusive religious and racial identity of the Jews, 
Ttas interest of the Soviet Union in the Middle fiast is not 
of recent origin. It can be traced to pre-Bolshevik past when Russia 
was trying hard to gain access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean 
and the Persian Gulf. In the post war II era the interest of the 
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Soviet Union increased and she became a party responsible for the 
creation of Israel and was the f i r s t to grant de-^ure recognition to 
Israel in May 1948 when tbe United States had accorded to Israel only 
de facto recognition. "The Soviet Union", wrote W. Z. Laqueur (21), 
"was described as the only true friend of Jewish National Independence, 
the United States, on the other hand, merely pretend to support the 
State of Israel." 
The period of Soviet Israeli friendship came to an end when the 
Cold War Was extended to the Middle i^ast. The Soviet Union was d is -
illusioned because of Israel 's economic and pol i t i ca l commitments. 
The Soviet Union considered Israel ho more as a "democratic and inde-
pendent state 5 and those who came to power in Israel were bourgeois 
Jewish nationalists who enjoyed Anglo-American support and persecuted 
local communists." (22) 
21. Laqueur, W. Z . , The Soviet Union and the Middle Kast. London, 
1969. pp. 147-48. 
22. Morison, David, "Kussia, Israel and the Arabs" Mizan. vo l . 9, 
Ko. 3. May-June, 1967, p. 91. 
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The Soviet Union was fighting a battle of survival as an 
influential power in tbe Middle i»ast and its purpose was better 
served by coming into agreement with Arab nationalism. This support 
to Arab nationalian was motivated by the desire to counteract the 
Americans backed rsllltary alliance called the Baghdad Pact, The 
Soviet support to the Arab progressive forces came in a big way in 
the year 1955 when the Soviet Union announced to help Egypt in i ts 
development programme and also agreed to provide military aid. In 
the Arab Israeli conf l ict the Soviet Union showed (24) i t s "sympathies 
with the Eastern nations fighting for liberation from colonialism." 
During tbe Suez crisis the Soviet Union supported Egypt and threatened 
to take stern measures to repuJi^ e the tripartite attack. 
The Soviet Union had acquired higher stakes in the Middle East 
crisis and given iBllltary and financial aid to the Arab countries 
especially the UAK, Despite i t s pro-Arab postures the Soviet %ion 
has acted with extrenj© caution avoiding a direct confrontation with 
the USA, I t see EPS that the Soviet Union and the USA have developed 
some understanding and identity of interest during the 1967 June 
cr i s i s , area of confl ict is being slowly and gradually replaced 
by ever enlarging area of understanding between the UiSA and the USSR, 
The USSR like the USA sounded the UAR not to strike f i r s t and secured 
a firm assurance from Nasser on this point. 
The Soviet Union has, no doubt, condemned Israel as an aggres-
sor and always Insisted on ii.s withdrawal from occupied territories . 
It had administered a strong warning on Israel to the e f fect that i f 
24, Ivanov, K., "Imperialist intrigues and the policy of Israel" , 
International Affairs (Moscow), Jfe. 12, 19S7, p, 62, 
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hosti l i t ies did not cease, it would take drastic action, and i f 
necessary, resort to sanctions. Such sanctions was confined only to 
severiEg o f f diplomatic relations with Israel, The Soviet Union has 
also replenished the military losses of the UAH and Syria, and massive 
military assistance is being pumped into the the Arato States, 
But there exists a credibi l ity gap between the Soviet Union's 
utterances and actions. -The Soviet Union's pol i t ical support to the 
Arabs i s couched in general terms and o f fers only vague assurances. 
I'he Soviet Union*s suppcsrt to the Arabs does not emanate from 
philanthropic or altruistic considerations, i t forms an important 
part of the power pol it ics game being played between the UBa and the 
USSK. The Soviet inhibition of avoiding direct confrontation with 
the USA is the result of i t s lack of military strategic mobility. The 
Soviet Union can give military aid but i t s men cannot go and fight on 
foreign so i l and this factor is not conducive to active armed involve* 
K^nt. 
The Soviet Union and the USA are the two Super Powers who hold 
the key to the solution of the Middle E-ast problem. Both of them 
seem to have arrived at some tacit understanding which was exhibited 
during Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro. Both the Super Powers 
have developed a vested interest In restricting the scope of the Arab-
Israeli coni'lict. Tt® Soviet Union faces the most challenging task 
in the Middle East, It isi confronted with a new factor which may ex-
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ciiallenge that the four Great Powers - the USA, the USSxt, Britain and 
France - decided early in 1969 to consult together on how they could 
bring about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, The basis of 
the four Big Poi»rers talks was the Security Council resolution of 
tovember 27, 1967 which was rejected by the Palestinians. The-Pales-
tinians found it d i f f i cu l t to accept the resolution because i t did not 
promise liberation of thair own homeland - Palestine* The Middle East 
conf l ict is essentially a struggle between Zionism and the Arabs of 
Palestine viho had been forcibly thrown oat of their homes. The people 
depended on the United Uations and the Big Powers to get justice but 
they were proved wrong, The Palestine Arabs living as refugees in 
the Arab States gradually realized that no power on earth would help 
them get Justice if the^ ? themselves were not willing to fight their 
own battle. In the post-June irfar period the Hesistance Movement gathered 
enormous momentum. The Palestinians intensified their ara^d resistance 
movement and declared it a part of the heroic movement which the people 
of Vietnam were conducting to liquidate American colonialism. 
Israel, according to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
is an Imperialist base created to defend the monopolistic petroleum 
concessions and to weaken the Arab s!OveH»nt for national liberation. 
Al Fateh had always tried to set up the nucleus of a po l i t i ca l organi-
zation, and itom 1962 onwards the movement concentrated a l l i t s e f f o r t s 
on the setting up of a militai'y organization to fight against Zionist 
imperialism which is in collaboration with neo-coloniallsm. The nucleus 
of al-Fateh, 'Harakat al-Tahrir al-Falastini' gave rise to the nucleus 
of the military organization, al-Aslfa. 
Towards the end of 1966 two other groups appearedt Heroes of 
the Keturn, and the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement, 
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These groups, later on, set up the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP). After June 1967 the more extremist group, PFLP 
caught popular attention and the young, male and female, were attracted 
to Marxist-lie ninist doctrine which became a guide for a l l those en-
gaged In the struggle of liberation for their home land ^ from the 
clutches of Zionist colonialism* There exists ideological differences 
between al-Fateh and PFLP but ideological cleavages mean l i t t le because 
their objective is the same, namely, liberation of Palestine and the 
establishment of a democratic, secular' state in Palestine, 
The PaJfistinian He si stance Movement constitutes the most welcome 
development in the Middle East« I t is a national movement and asserts 
the Palestinian personality. The Movement is a ferment and wil l become 
a catalyst for the radioalization of pol it ics and help to escalate 
the struggle of Arab peoples for the introduction of basic economic, 
social and pol i t ical changes in Arab world. 
The confrontation in the Middle i-ast is between the forces of 
modfcrnity and feudalism. The emergence of the Palestinian Resistance 
Movement would strengthen and consolidate the forces of progress and 
modernity in the Arab States. It poses danger to colonial powers 
abroad as well as to feudal and traditional regimes at honi^ . The re-
cent flare up in Jordan shows nothing but deep rooted antagonism 
existing between modernitea represented by Arab Commandos and tradi-
tionalists represented by King Hussein. It is a verdict of history 
that ultimate victory belongs to those who stand for moving ahead and 
symbolist ^^a u a progressive and modern outlook. The Palestine Resist-
ance Movement has a popular support and believes in the people's army. 
They are determined to fight t i l l they get Justice denied to them a l l 
these years. They do not depend on any country, they now depend on 
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their own streiigth and deterinination» Any probable future solution 
of tliB Middle Kast problem cannot bypass the aspirations of the 
Palestinians who have become a force to reckon with. The f i rst and 
the foresMDst prerequisite for any solution is f u l l restoration of 
national rights and homes to Palestinians* Until i t is done they are 
determined to contirn® their armed struggle for the liberation of 
Palestine in order to establish a secular democratic state where Jews, 
Christians and Huslims could a l l live together in peace and complete 
harmony, and it would be a real service to the cause of international 
peace and prosperity, for which the UK was established, i f the world 
organization could help In making this transition both speedy and 
peaceful. 
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